MASSIMO MARINACCI

Working Papers

We study uncertainty averse preferences, that is, complete and transitive preferences that are convex and monotone. We establish a representation result, which is at the same time general and rich in structure. Many objective functions commonly used in applications are special cases of this representation.

We consider a decision maker featuring two preferences, one that reflects decisions that are rational in an objective sense, and one that rational in a subjective sense.
We introduce a theoretical framework in which to study interdependent preferences.

We study unique and globally attracting solutions of a general nonlinear equation that has, as special cases, some recursive equations widely used in Economics.

  • "Cores and stable sets of finite dimensional games," with Luigi Montrucchio. February 2003.

    In this paper we study exact TU games having finite dimensional non-atomic cores, a class of games that includes relevant economic games. We first characterize them by showing that they are a particular type of market games. Using this characterization, we then show that in such a class the cores are their unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets.