Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University)

Auctions With A Strong Bidder

Abstract: We consider auctions with N + 1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N + 1 is “sufficiently strong” relative to the others. The auction is a “tournament” in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N + 1. The bids
of the first N players are binding and the highest bidder proceeds to a second-price competition with N + 1. When N + 1’s values converge in distribution to an atom above the upper end of the distribution of the N bidders and the rest of the distribution is drained away from low values sufficiently slowly, the auction’s expected revenue is arbitrarily close to the one obtained in a Myerson (1981) optimal auction. The tournament design is “detail free” in the sense that no specific knowledge of the distributions is needed in addition to the fact that bidder N + 1 is stronger than the others as required. In particular, no additional information about the value of the atom is needed. This is important since mis-calibrating by a small amount an attempt to implement the optimal auction can lead to large losses in revenue. We provide an interpretation of these results as possibly providing guidelines to a seller on how to strategically “populate” auctions with a single bidder even when only weaker bidders are available.