Loading Events

Peter Norman (UNC)

March 4 @ 12:00 - 13:15


  • Past event


March 4
12:00 - 13:15
Event Category:
Academic Events

“Sequential Persuasion”

This paper studies sequential move persuasion games with multiple senders. We use convex analysis to transform a problem with in nite action spaces to a nite action model. This way we prove the existence of equilibria by the Zermelo-Kuhn backward induction algorithm, show that equilibrium outcomes are generically unique, and obtain a simple algorithm for nding equilibrium outcomes. We also obtain a simple condition for when full revelation is the unique equilibrium outcome and some comparative statics results. Adding a sender who moves rst cannot reduce informativeness in equilibrium, and will result in a more informative equilibrium in the case with two states. Sequential persuasion cannot generate a more informative equilibrium than simultaneous persuasion and is always less informative when there are only two states.