Assignment procedure biases in randomized policy experiments

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Abstract

Randomized controlled trials (RCT) have become a dominant empirical tool in applied economics. The internal validity of RCTs crucially depends on the (implicit) assumption that the procedure assigning subjects to treatment and control groups has no effect on behavior. We show theoretically that this assumption is violated when people are motivated by belief-dependent preferences and care about the intentions of others. The choice of assignment procedure influences subjects’ behavior and, consequently, the RCTs’ findings. Strikingly, even a credible and explicit randomization procedure does not guarantee an unbiased prediction of the impact of a general introduction of the policy.

Keywords: Randomized controlled trials, Policy experiments, Internal validity, Procedural concerns, Psychological game theory.

JEL Classification: C70, C93, D63, I38, O12.

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1 Introduction

Randomized controlled trials (hereafter RCTs) have gained ground as the dominant tool for studying the effects of policy interventions on outcomes of interest in many fields of applied economics, most notably in labor economics, development economics, and public finance. Researchers have used RCTs to study such diverse questions as the effects of conditional cash transfers to poor families on education and health outcomes of children in Mexico (Schultz (2004), Gertler (2004)), of vouchers for private schooling on school completion rates in Colombia (Angrist et al. (2002), Angrist et al. (2006)), of publicly released audits on electoral outcomes in Brazil (Ferraz and Finan (2008)), of incremental cash investments on the profitability of small enterprises in Sri Lanka (De Mel et al. (2008)), of income subsidies on work incentives in Canada (Michalopoulos et al. (2005), Card and Robins (2005), Card and Hyslop (2005)), of saving incentives on the saving decisions of low- and middle-income families in the United States (Duflo et al. (2006)), and of the introduction of microfinance institutions on small business start-ups and consumption patterns in India (Banerjee et al. (2010)).

Advocates of RCTs argue that ‘conditional on the question of interest being one for which randomized experiments are feasible, randomized experiments are superior to all other designs in terms of credibility. In cases where the focus is establishing the existence of causal effects and where experiments are feasible, experiments are unambiguously the preferred approach’ (Imbens (2010): 401-402).1

Typically, RCTs are used for ex-ante program evaluation purposes. To evaluate ex-ante the effect of a general introduction of a government or development NGO intervention on some social or economic outcome, researchers assign individuals (or other units under study, e.g. schools or villages) into a treatment and a control group. The individuals in the treatment group receive the policy ‘treatment’ and subsequently their behavior is compared to that of the individuals in the control group. The observed difference between the outcomes in the treatment and the control group is used as a predictor for the effect of a general introduction of the program. Based on the experimental results, the program might be generally adopted or not.2

1The methodological debate about the usefulness of RCTs in economics is currently very active. See Heckman and Smith (1995) and Burtless (1995) for the earlier discussion, and Deaton (2010), Heckman (2010), and Imbens (2010) for the summary of the current debate.

2See Duflo (2004) for a description of the RCT and the subsequent general implementation of
The internal validity of the outcomes of RCTs (i.e. the unbiased estimation of the effect of a general introduction of the policy to the population under study) depends on two fundamental assumptions. First, the treatment and control group must not differ from the general population for which the program is designed. The key aspect here is the ex-ante comparability of the treatment and control group members; in other words, the absence of selection into the two groups on some unobservable characteristics that might influence the outcomes of the members of either group (regardless of the treatment). Second, the assignment into the treatment and the control group by itself should have no impact on the behavior of participants in the experiment. This is the so-called SUTVA (‘stable unit treatment value assumption’, i.e. the assumption that the value of the outcome variable for the unit under a certain treatment is independent of the treatment that other units receive), first discussed by Cox (1958) and analyzed formally by Rubin (1986).

At the heart of the claim of primacy of RCTs over other empirical methods lies the fact that the assignment into the treatment and the control groups is typically done using randomization. This guarantees the validity of the first assumption. Sometimes, researchers use an explicit randomization procedure, i.e. a public lottery (as, for instance, in Angrist et al. (2006), or in Ferraz and Finan (2008)). However, in most instances randomization is carried out privately, i.e. ‘behind closed doors’, without informing the subjects in either group about the details of the randomization process. Given that the potential bias arising from selection into treatment on unobservable characteristics plagued most studies before the diffusion of RCTs in economics, the clear improvement brought about by tackling this bias ‘head on’ by design, gave substantial credibility to randomized experiments as an empirical tool for studying causal effects of policies.

However, the validity of the second assumption in practice is often unwarranted as the assignment procedure itself can have an impact on the behavior of subjects participating in the experiment - the focus of our analysis here. As we theoretically show, when people are motivated by belief-dependent preferences à la Geanakoplos et al. (1989) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009), their behavior does not only depend on the consequences of their decisions - an assumption generally made in traditional PROGRESA conditional cash transfer program for school attendance in Mexico.
economic theory - but also on the decision-making procedures that led to the situations in which they find themselves. Applied to RCTs this means, when people are motivated by e.g. belief-dependent reciprocity (see e.g. Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)) and exhibit procedural concerns, how people are assigned into the treatment and control group matters for their behavior in RCTs and, hence, for the empirical findings. As we show, the credibility of random assignment procedures might influence people’s perceptions of encouragement and gratitude, if they are assigned into the treatment group, and their feelings of demoralization and resentment, when they are assigned into the control group. These feelings then might have an impact on people’s subsequent behavior.

These behavioral effects are not just hypothetical. An assignment-induced change in the behavior of the control group is well-known in psychology under the heading ‘resentful demoralization’. A good example where this demoralization effect played a key role is the Birmingham Homeless Project (Schumacher et al. (1994)), aimed at homeless drug-takers in Birmingham, Alabama. The randomly assigned subjects of the treatment group received more frequent and therapeutically superior treatment, as compared to those in the control group. Schumacher et al. (1994) note that ‘11 percent increase in cocaine relapse rates for usual care clients [i.e. the control group] was revealed’ (p. 42). They conclude, ‘demoralization represented a potential threat to the validity of this study [...] If the worsening of the usual care clients [control group] from baseline to the two-month follow-up point was related to demoralization, there exists a potential for an overestimation of treatment effects of the enhanced care program’ (p. 43-44).

Another example is the Baltimore Options Program (Friedlander et al. (1985)), which was designed to increase the human capital and, hence, the employment possibilities of unemployed young welfare recipients in the Baltimore Country. Half of the potential recipients were randomly assigned to the treatment group and half to the control group. The treatment group individuals received tutoring and job search training for one year. The control group members, aware of not having received the (desirable) treatment, became discouraged and thus performed worse in the outcome measure than

\[^{3}\text{This was first described in detail by Cook and Campbell in their seminal 1979 book, where they list resentful demoralization among potential threats to the internal validity of experiments in social sciences. See Onghena (2009) for a short survey.}\]
they would have performed if the treatment group did not exist. This clearly leads to
an overestimation of the effectiveness of the program. In fact, researchers found that
the earnings of the treatment group increased by 16 percent, but that the overall wel-
fare claims of program participants did not decrease. This implies that some of the
control-group individuals that would have normally moved out of welfare stayed longer
on welfare because of the experiment.

The opposite of resentful demoralization is encouragement. Take a young unem-
ployed chosen to participate in the Baltimore Options Program. The very fact of being
picked among all the other young unemployed (and this, without explaining to him that
choosing him was the outcome of a randomization procedure) might encourage him,
and this encouragement can induce him to intensify his job search. Empirically, this
effect is hard to distinguish from the effort increase caused by the better job market
perspectives induced by the enhanced skills from the training program. Nonetheless,
the existence of such an effect seems plausible in numerous experimental settings and
hence worth analyzing its possible impact on the estimates obtained.

As already hinted at above, the empirical finding that the assignment procedure
itself influences behavior is difficult to reconcile with traditional economic theory which
assumes that agents are consequentialists. Although this consequentialism allows that
an agent cares about the payoffs of other players, e.g. that she is altruistic or envious, it
inherently implies that people behave identically in outcomewise-identical situations,
regardless of the decision-making procedures that led to these situations. Thus, to
theoretically analyze the impact of resentful demoralization and encouragement on the
validity of results generated by RCTs, we construct a simple game-theoretic model of
RCTs in which agents are motivated by belief-dependent preferences. More speci-
fically, we adopt the framework suggested by Sebald (2010) in which agents are motivated
by belief-dependent reciprocity. That is, agents react positively to a particularly good
treatment and negatively to a particularly bad one.5

We find that a subject not assigned to the treatment group (while other similar

in which moves of chance are possible. Given that randomization in policy experiments crucially
involves moves of chance, this model fits particularly well our setting.

5There exists a lot of experimental evidence for this type of behavior. For an overview, see Sobel
(2005).
agents are) feels discouraged and provides less effort than without the existence of a treatment group. Hence, control group subjects are particularly demotivated. On the other hand, if a participant is assigned to the treatment group (while some other subjects are not), she feels particularly encouraged to provide more effort than without the existence of the control group. Consequently, the observed difference between the outcomes of the treatment and the control groups delivers a biased prediction of the effect of a general introduction of the treatment.

This bias depends crucially on the assignment procedure itself. If a subject is assigned to the control (treatment) group through a non-transparent (private) randomization procedure, the amount of resentful demoralization (encouragement) is particularly high. The estimate of the effect of a general introduction of the treatment under this type of randomization procedure is unambiguously biased upwards. On the other hand, if the experimenter uses an explicit and credible randomization mechanism, the impact of demoralization and encouragement is lower. Hence, the problem of the upward bias in the estimate is reduced. However, our analysis also reveals that generically the observed difference in outcomes of the two groups does not coincide with the effect of a general introduction of the treatment. In this case the experimental effect might even under-estimate the ‘true’ effect of a general introduction of the treatment. Thus, when a credible public random assignment is used, even the sign of the bias is unclear.

This paper contributes to the small but growing economic literature theoretically analyzing the behavior of subjects in RCTs. The closest papers to ours are by Philipson and Hedges (1998), Malani (2006) and Chassang et al. (2012).

Philipson and Hedges (1998) study a model of attrition built on the premise that treatment-group subjects in RCTs face stronger incentives to avoid type I and II errors than the researcher. Thus, they rationally decide on staying in or quitting the experiment and thus reveal, through attrition, their learning about (and the utility derived from) the effect of the treatment. One implication is that information about treatment preference can be inferred from the standard data on attrition rates coming from RCTs.

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6 Of course, there is a large methodological literature in empirical economics that discusses various biases that might arise in inferring the effects of a program from observed outcomes in experimental settings. Excellent reviews are provided by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a,b), Abbring and Heckman (2007), and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009).
Malani (2006) builds a simple model of the placebo effect in (medical) RCTs, i.e. the effect arising purely from the subjects’ response to treatment depending positively on her expectations about the value of the treatment. In his model, the individual outcome is influenced both by the treatment directly and by the belief of the individual about the effectiveness of the treatment. In this setting, more optimistic patients respond stronger to treatment than the less optimistic ones, and the obtained empirical estimates of the effectiveness of the treatment will be imprecise, because of the combination of the genuine treatment effect and the placebo effect. The paper then proposes a solution for this problem which consists of designing the experiment with two (or more) treatment groups plus a control group, and varying the probability of obtaining the treatment across the treatment groups. Higher observed outcomes for non-treated subjects in the treatment group(s) with higher ex-ante probability of obtaining the treatment corresponds to the detection of the placebo effect.

Chassang et al. (2012) study a related problem of identifying the effect of the treatment in a setting where there is an underlying (unobservable) heterogeneity of subjects’ expectations about the effectiveness (or ‘returns’) of the treatment but the outcome depends on the (costly) effort and returns multiplicatively. The estimate of returns obtained from such an experiment would be imprecise because of the unobservable heterogeneity of expectations and thus of effort exerted by subjects. The solution that the authors propose relies on the mechanism-design approach and consists in letting subjects reveal their preferences over their treatment by probabilistically selecting themselves in (or out) of groups at a cost.

Our contribution differs from the above studies in that the focus of our study is the demoralization and encouragement effect of the assignment procedure - an issue not analyzed in the above literature.

In the next section we present a simple model of policy experiments that takes the demoralization and encouragement into account. Section 3 derives formally the biases connected to the different randomized assignment procedures. The final section discusses the implication of our results for the design of RCTs and concludes.
2 A simple model of policy experiments

Consider a policy experiment that entails giving some benefits to subjects in the treatment group. These benefits (e.g. a tool, or school supplies, or job market training) constitute an input into the production function of the outcome of interest for the experimenter (agricultural productivity, learning outcomes, or likelihood of finding a job). Denote the overall population of agents by $N$. $n$ of these agents are subject to the treatment, and $q = \frac{n}{N} \in [0, 1]$ denotes the fraction of agents in the treatment group. To concentrate on the impact of the randomized assignment procedures, we abstract from any idiosyncratic differences between the agents. Thus, all agents are identical except for their treatment status. We assume that the experimenter can choose between two procedures for assigning individuals into the treatment and the control group: (i) She can choose the $n$ treatment-group subjects directly. This also models a closed-doors random assignment procedure, when the agents do not believe in the randomness of the assignment. (ii) The experimenter can choose an explicit randomization procedure observable to the agents, such that each agent has the same probability $q$ of receiving the treatment. This also models a closed-door random assignment procedure, when the subjects do not doubt the randomness of the assignment. Since we are interested in the impact of the assignment procedure, we will not analyze the experimenter’s equilibrium choice as if she were a player. Rather, we will compare the reaction of the agents to the two assignment procedures.

Formally, any subset of the overall population with $n$ agents is a feasible action of the experimenter. The set of feasible procedures is given by all degenerate probability distributions that choose an action for sure (i.e. direct appointment of the $n$ treatment agents), and by the procedure where the experimenter chooses the $n$ treatment agents with the help of a public and fair lottery. Note that since all agents are equivalent, all these ‘degenerate’ procedures where the treatment agents are picked directly induce the same choices of the ‘treated’ as well as of the ‘untreated’ agents. Therefore, we restrict the analysis to a typical element of this class of procedures, denoted by $d$. Denoting the public randomization procedure by $r$, the experimenter’s set of assignment procedures is given by $P = \{d, r\}$ with $p$ denoting a typical element of this set. Upon assignment, the chosen agents receive the treatment, whereas the other individuals do not receive it.
Next, all agents choose simultaneously an effort level $e \in [0, 1]$.

In most RCTs, the outcome of interest for the experimenter depends not only on the treatment itself, but also on the effort level of the agents. Thus, as in Chassang et al. (2012), we model the outcome as depending on treatment and effort. Let the marginal success of effort be constant, and denoted by $t$. For analytical simplicity, we assume that $t = 1$ for agents that receive the treatment and $t = \frac{1}{2}$ for the other agents. Thus, the treatment makes it easier for participants to be successful. We use the variable $t \in \{\frac{1}{2}, 1\}$ to denote also whether an agent is in the control group ($t = \frac{1}{2}$) or in the treatment group ($t = 1$). We denote with $(t, p)$ the type of the agent who is put into group $t$ by the assignment procedure $p$. We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria where all agents of the same type $(t, p)$ choose the same effort level $e(t, p)$.

Together with the (lack of) the treatment, this effort determines the success of an agent with respect to, for example, finding a job or stopping drug consumption. Formally, the success of a $(t, p)$-agent is given by

$$s = te(t, p).$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

As already mentioned, we do not analyze the experimenter’s equilibrium choice as if she were a player. However, to determine the reaction of the agents to the assignment procedure, we have to specify the goal of the experimenter as perceived by the agents. In almost every policy experiment, the subjects do not know that the goal of the researcher is to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy intervention by comparing the outcomes of the treatment and control groups. If the agents would know that the effectiveness of the program is tested and that the experimental results determine the long-run feasibility and shape of the program, the agents’ long-term strategic interests would jeopardize the validity of the experimental results. To give the randomized experiments the best shot, we abstract from such effects by assuming that the agents, unaware of the experimental character of the program, consider the overall success, denoted by $\pi_x$, as the goal of the experimenter\footnote{The exact form of the experimenter’s goal as perceived by the agent is not important for our results. Any goal function would lead to allocation biases, as long as the agents believe that the experimenter cares about the agent’s success.}. It depends on the effort levels chosen by the agents (which, in turn, depends on the assignment procedure), and on the group
sizes:

\[ \pi_x = n e(1, p) + (N - n) \frac{1}{2} e(\frac{1}{2}, p). \]  (2)

We assume that the agents are motivated by their individual success: unemployed want to find a job, the drug users want to get clean, etc. Furthermore, each agent has to bear the cost of effort, which we assume to be quadratic. Disregarding the psychological payoff, a \((t, p)\)-agent’s direct (or ‘material’) payoff is

\[ \pi(t, e(t, p)) = te(t, p) - e(t, p)^2. \]  (3)

However, as we argue above, agents do not only care about their material payoffs, but also about the way they are assigned into their groups. If an agent feels treated badly (via the assignment procedure), she resents the experimenter, feels discouraged, and hence, is less willing to provide effort (as compared to the assignment procedure under which she would not feel treated badly). On the other hand, if the agent feels treated particularly well, she might feel encouraged, may want the program to be a success, and hence provides higher effort. In other words, agents are not only concerned about their material payoff but also act reciprocally.

Crucially, whether the agent feels treated kindly or unkindly depends on how much material payoff she thinks that the experimenter intends to give her relative to a ‘neutral’ material payoff.

To model such concerns, we need to introduce first- and second-order beliefs into the utility functions. For any \(t, t’\) and \(p, p’\), denote by \(\bar{e}^{p}(t’, p’)\) the first-order belief of a \((t, p)\)-agent about the effort choice of a \((t’, p’)\)-agent. \(\bar{e}^{p}(t, p)\) is the belief of a \((t, p)\)-agent about the effort choice of the other agents of her own type. The first-order beliefs of a \((t, p)\)-agent are thus summarized by

\[ \bar{e}^{p} = (\bar{e}^{p}(1, d), \bar{e}^{p}(\frac{1}{2}, d), \bar{e}^{p}(1, r), \bar{e}^{p}(\frac{1}{2}, r)). \]

Furthermore, let \(\bar{e}^{p}(t’, p’)\) denote the second-order belief of a \((t, p)\)-agent about the experimenter’s belief concerning the effort choice of a \((t’, p’)\). The second-order beliefs
of a \((t, p)\)-agent are summarized by
\[
\mathcal{E}^p = (\mathcal{E}^p(1, d), \mathcal{E}^p(\frac{1}{2}, d), \mathcal{E}^p(1, r), \mathcal{E}^p(\frac{1}{2}, r)).
\]

Denote by \(\pi_x(e(t, p), \mathcal{E}^p)\) the level of overall outcome or ‘success’ of the program that a \((t, p)\)-agent intends for the program if she chooses \(e(t, p)\) and she believes that the others choose \(\mathcal{E}^p\). It is given by
\[
\pi_x(e(t, p), \mathcal{E}^p) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
e(1, p) + (n - 1)\mathcal{E}^1(1, p) + (N - n)\frac{1}{2}\mathcal{E}^1(\frac{1}{2}, p) & \text{if } t = 1 \\
\frac{1}{2}e(1, p) + n\mathcal{E}^1(1, p) + (N - n - 1)\frac{1}{2}\mathcal{E}^1(\frac{1}{2}, p) & \text{if } t = \frac{1}{2} 
\end{array} \right. (4)
\]

Note that \(\pi_x(e(t, p), \mathcal{E}^p)\) does not depend on the actual effort of the other agents, but on the agents’ belief about the other agents’ effort. Any change of \(e(t, p)\) does not change what the particular \((t, p)\)-agent thinks the other agents will contribute to the overall success. This is reflected by \(\frac{\partial \pi_x(e(t, p), \mathcal{E}^p)}{\partial e(t, p)} = t\).

\(\pi(\mathcal{E}^p)\) denotes the belief of a \((t, p)\)-agent about the expected material payoff the experimenter intends to give her. Crucially, we assume that the agents do not hold the experimenter responsible for the outcome of the public random assignment mechanism.\(^8\) Hence, \(\pi(\mathcal{E}^p)\) is given by
\[
\pi(\mathcal{E}^p) = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
q(\mathcal{E}^r(1, r) - \mathcal{E}^r(1, r)^2) + (1 - q)(\frac{1}{2}\mathcal{E}^r(\frac{1}{2}, r) - \mathcal{E}^r(\frac{1}{2}, r)^2) & \text{if } p = r \\
\frac{1}{2}\mathcal{E}^d(t, d) - \mathcal{E}^d(t, d)^2 & \text{if } p = d 
\end{array} \right. (5)
\]

Note that \(\pi(\mathcal{E}^1) = \pi(\mathcal{E}^2)\) whenever \(\mathcal{E}^1 = \mathcal{E}^2\). In other words, when the public randomization procedure is used and the agent’s second-order beliefs are independent of her group \(t\), the agent’s beliefs about the payoff that the experimenter intends to give her are not influenced by the agent’s treatment status. Furthermore, \(\pi(\mathcal{E}^p) \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}]\) since \(e \in [0, 1]\).

We also have to specify the ‘neutral’ payoff \(\widehat{\pi}\) that the experimenter has to intend for an agent for inducing the agent to regard the assignment procedure as being neutral,

\(^8\)This assumption gives the RCTs ‘the best chance’. If this assumption fails, the publicly randomized assignment procedure would induce a level of demoralization and encouragement similar to those under the direct assignment. As a consequence, the public randomization procedure would induce the same kind of bias as the private randomization.
i.e. neither favoring nor discriminating against the agent. As will be clear from the specification of the utility function below, whenever the agent thinks that the experimenter intends to give her \( \hat{\pi} \), she is neither discouraged nor encouraged, and hence she simply maximizes her material payoff. Note that the expected material payoff of an agent is maximized when she is directly assigned to the treatment group. It is minimized when the agent is directly assigned to the control group. Therefore, we assume that \( \hat{\pi} \) is a weighted average between the payoff that the agent thinks that the experimenter intends to give to someone directly assigned into the treatment group and the intended material payoff for an agent directly assigned into the control group. The weights are denoted by \( \lambda \) and \( 1 - \lambda \), respectively, with \( \lambda \in [0, 1] \):

\[
\hat{\pi}(e^{t,p}) = \lambda(e^{t,p}(1, d) - e^{t,p}(1, d)^2) + (1 - \lambda)(\frac{1}{2}e^{t,p}(1, d) - \frac{1}{2}e^{t,p}(1, d)^2),
\]

(6)

with \( \hat{\pi}(e^{t,p}) \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{4}] \) since \( e \in [0, 1] \).

The weight \( \lambda \) depends on the fraction of agents that are subject to the treatment, \( q \). Whenever an experiment is conducted, i.e. if \( q \in (0, 1) \), the agents take the existence of both groups into account, i.e. \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \). In the extreme cases when nobody (everybody) is subject to the treatment, i.e. when \( q = 0 \) (\( q = 1 \)), the agents are aware of it, i.e. \( \lambda = 0 \) (\( \lambda = 1 \)). Moreover, for \( q \in (0, 1) \) it seems natural to assume that \( \lambda = q \). However, it is well-known that people’s perception about what they deserve is often self-serving. For instance, most people regard themselves as being more talented than the average (the so-called ‘Lake Wobegon effect’; see Hoorens (1993)). Therefore, many individuals in the policy program might think that they deserve the treatment more than the others, implying that \( \lambda > q \). On the other hand, we also allow for the opposite effect, i.e. for \( \lambda < q \).

To model demoralization and encouragement, we assume that the higher the payoff \( \pi(e^{t,p}) \) that the agent believes the experimenter intends to give her (as compared to the neutral payoff \( \hat{\pi}(e^{t,p}) \)), the more encouraged and the less resentful she is. Denoting by \( v(\pi_x(c(t, p), e^{t,p}), \pi(e^{t,p}), \hat{\pi}(e^{t,p})) \) the psychological payoff in the agent’s utility derived from demoralization and encouragement, a simple way to capture these motives is by

\( \hat{\pi} \) plays a role similar to the ‘equitable’ payoffs in Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
assuming that

\[
\frac{\partial v(\pi_x(e(t,p),\bar{e}^p),\pi(\bar{e}^p),\widehat{\pi}(\bar{e}^p))}{\partial \pi_x} = \pi(\bar{e}^p) - \widehat{\pi}(\bar{e}^p).
\]

(7)

For simplicity, we denote \( \frac{\partial v(\pi_x(e(t,p),\bar{e}^p),\pi(\bar{e}^p),\widehat{\pi}(\bar{e}^p))}{\partial \pi_x} \) by \( v_{x}^{t,p} \). Since \( \pi(\bar{e}^p) \) and \( \widehat{\pi}(\bar{e}^p) \in [-\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}] \), \( v_{x}^{t,p} \in [-\frac{3}{4}, \frac{3}{4}] \).\(^{10}\)

Summarizing, the belief-dependent utility of a \((t,p)\)-agent is the sum of the material and the psychological payoffs:

\[
u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^p,\widehat{e}^p) = te(t,p) - e(t,p)^2 + v(\pi_x(e(t,p),\bar{e}^p),\pi(\bar{e}^p),\widehat{\pi}(\bar{e}^p)).\]

(8)

### 3 Assignment procedure biases

In our context, an equilibrium in pure strategies is given by a profile of effort levels, such that the effort chosen by each type of agent maximizes her utility for first- and second-order beliefs that coincide with the equilibrium effort profile.\(^{11}\) Denote with \( e^*(t,p) \) the equilibrium effort level of a \((t,p)\)-agent. Our first result concerns the existence of such an equilibrium in pure strategies.

**Proposition 1** The game exhibits an equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium effort levels are in the interior, i.e. \( 0 < e^*(t,p) < 1 \) for all \( t,p \).

**Proof:** See Appendix.

Next we show that the effort levels of agents in both groups depend on whether the agents are assigned into the two groups through the private or the public randomization procedure.

**Proposition 2** For any \( q \in (0,1) \):

\[ e^*(1,d) > e^*(1,r) > e^*(\frac{1}{2},r) > e^*(\frac{1}{2},d). \]

\(^{10}\)Note that for \( \lambda = \frac{1}{2} \) this specification of the psychological payoff is equivalent to the psychological payoff of the reciprocity models of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).

\(^{11}\)This equilibrium notion coincides with the equilibrium concept of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004).
Proof: See Appendix.

Proposition 2 shows that in policy experiments the treatment-induced differences in effort between the two groups are larger when the assignment into the two groups is done directly (i.e. through private randomization) than when it is done using a public randomization procedure. The effort is highest among privately chosen members of the treatment group and lowest among members of the privately assigned control group. The effort levels of agents allocated through a random assignment procedure are less extreme, with the effort of treatment-group agents still being higher than that of control-group agents. This shows that the randomization procedure has an impact on the observed effectiveness of the treatment. On the one hand, agents feel encouraged if they think that they are deliberately chosen to get the treatment. On the other hand, agents are more discouraged when they feel deliberately assigned into the control group. This result holds for any fraction of people that are assigned into the treatment group $q \in (0, 1)$.

The previous proposition shows that randomization procedures have an impact on the behavior of agents in policy experiments. The key question then is: which procedure provides a correct (i.e. internally valid) prediction of the effect of a general introduction (scale-up) of the treatment, and under which circumstances does this occur?

In our setting, the effect of the program scale-up to the entire population is the difference between the effort level of agents in the situation when the treatment is applied to everyone and the effort in the situation when the treatment is applied to nobody, i.e. between $q = 1$ and $q = 0$. We need to compare this difference to the difference in effort levels between agents in the treatment and control groups, under the two randomization procedures.

**Proposition 3**  
i) If the treatment is applied to everybody, i.e. if $q = 1$, then $e^*(1, d) = e^*(1, r) = \frac{1}{2}$.  
ii) If the treatment is applied to nobody, i.e. if $q = 0$, then $e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d) = e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) = \frac{1}{4}$.

**Proof:** See Appendix

Proposition 3 shows that if nobody or everybody is chosen, the ‘assignment procedure’ does not affect the effort and the effort chosen by an agent is as if she were motivated only by her material payoff.
The assignment through a private randomization procedure always leads to an overestimation of the impact of the treatment, as the following proposition shows.

**Proposition 4** For any $q \in (0, 1)$,

$$e^*(1, d) > \frac{1}{2} \text{ and } e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d) < \frac{1}{4}.$$

**Proof:** See Appendix.

Under a private randomization assignment, the effort level of the control group is always smaller than the effort level realized when the entire population does not receive the treatment. The effort level of the treatment group is always larger than the one realized when the entire population receives the treatment. Therefore, any estimate of the effect of a general introduction of the treatment based on a policy experiment with private randomization is biased upwards. A policy-maker scaling up the program on the basis of such an RCT faces the risk of introducing a non-effective program to the entire population.

One might hope that with an explicit, credible randomization procedure the treatment-induced differential effort in the policy experiment is the same as the one induced by a general introduction of the treatment. However, as the following proposition shows, this holds only for knife-edge special cases.

**Proposition 5** i) For any $\lambda \in (0, 1)$, there exists at most one $q$ such that $e^*(1, r) - e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) = e^*_1 - e^*_0 = \frac{1}{4}$. ii) If $\lambda = q \in (0, 1)$, $e^*(1, r) - e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) \neq \frac{1}{4}$.

**Proof:** See Appendix.

Explicit randomization does not solve the problem of the assignment procedure bias. Generically, the experimental results still do not provide a correct prediction of the impact of a general introduction of the treatment. Remember that in terms of the material payoffs the agent is best off when she is directly assigned into the treatment group, and worst off when she is directly assigned into the control group. There is no reason why the resulting neutral payoff should equal the expected material payoff of an agent subject to explicit randomization. Hence, even under a public randomization the experimental results do not reflect the true benefits of a general introduction of the
treatment. This is in particular true for the natural case of \( \lambda = q \) when agents have a ‘rational’ perception of how much they deserve the treatment.

Moreover, while policy experiments with private randomization always lead to an over-estimate of the true benefits of a treatment, in policy experiments with public randomization, the estimate from the experiment can be either bigger or smaller than the true effect. Consider a numerical example. Let \( \lambda = \frac{1}{2} \) and \( q = \frac{1}{4} \). Using the first-order conditions (14), (15), (16), and (17), one obtains \( e^*(1, r) = 0.49261, \ e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) = 0.246305 \), implying that \( e^*(1, r) - e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) < \frac{1}{4}, \) an under-estimate of the true effect. However, letting \( \lambda = q = \frac{1}{2} \), one obtains \( e^*(1, r) = 0.5012, \ e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) = 0.2506 \), implying that \( e^*(1, r) - e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) > \frac{1}{4}, \) an over-estimate of the true effect.

4 Conclusion

In this paper we have analyzed the impact of assignment procedures on the applicability of policy experiments. If the agents are prone to demoralization and encouragement, the way in which experimenters assign them into the treatment and control groups influences their behavior. Thus, the size of the treatment effect depends on the assignment procedure. If agents are directly assigned into the treatment and control group, or if agents believe that they are directly assigned, the experimentally observed treatment effect is always larger than the effect of a general introduction of the treatment. This assignment procedure bias is smaller for a credible (explicit) randomization procedure. But in generic cases even credible random assignment leads to a bias, and its sign is unclear. In other words, our results show that the presence of procedural concerns might severely undermine the internal validity of RCTs.

This analysis concentrates on the effects of demoralization and encouragement. There are other belief-dependent motives like guilt (see e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg (2007), and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)), or disappointment (see e.g. Ruffle (1999)) that have been found to impact agents’ behavior. While not been analyzed in this paper, we suspect that such motives could also put into question the applicability of randomized policy experiments. Exploring these effects is left to future research.
5 Appendix

Proof of proposition 1

Recall that \( \pi(e^{t,p}) \) and \( \hat{\pi}(\bar{e}^{t,p}) \) depend only on the agent’s second-order beliefs about the effort (and not on the effort level itself) and that \( \frac{\partial \pi_x(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)} = t \). Hence,

\[
\frac{\partial u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)} = t(1 + v_t^{t,p}) - 2e(t,p),
\]  
\[
\frac{\partial^2 u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)^2} = \frac{\partial^2 v(\pi_x(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p}),\pi(\bar{e}^{t,p}),\hat{\pi}(\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p}))}{(\partial \pi_x)^2} t^2 - 2.
\]

Since \( \frac{\partial^2 v(\pi_x(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p}),\pi(\bar{e}^{t,p}),\hat{\pi}(\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p}))}{(\partial \pi_x)^2} = 0 \), it is easy to check that

\[
\frac{\partial^2 u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)^2} < 0 \quad \text{for all } t,p.
\]

Because \( |v_t^{t,p}| \leq \frac{3}{4} \), it is easy to check that

\[
\frac{\partial u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)} \bigg|_{e(t,p)=0} > 0 \quad \text{for all } t,p,
\]
\[
\frac{\partial u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)} \bigg|_{e(t,p)=1} < 0 \quad \text{for all } t,p.
\]

Because of (11) and (12), each of the equations

\[
\frac{\partial u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p})}{\partial e(t,p)} = 0
\]

has a unique interior solution for each \( t,p \) for any first- and second-order belief \( \bar{e}^{t,p}, \bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p} \). These solutions characterize the optimal effort choices of all types of agents for given first- and second-order beliefs. In equilibrium, the beliefs of first- and second-order have to be the same, i.e. \( \bar{e}^{t,p} = \bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p} \) for all \( t,p \). The solution of (13) can be rewritten as a function

\[
e^{t,p}_{opt} : [0, 1]^4 \rightarrow [0, 1]^4,
\]

with \( e^{t,p}_{opt}(\bar{e}^{t,p}) \) being the optimal effort choice of an \( (t,p) \)-agent who holds the same first- and second-order beliefs \( \bar{e}^{t,p} = \bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p} \). Since \( u^{t,p}(e(t,p),\bar{e}^{t,p},\bar{\bar{e}}^{t,p}) \) is twice continuously
differentiable, $e^{t,p}_{opt}$ is also continuous. Brower’s fixed-point theorem guarantees the existence of a fixed point:

$$\exists e^* \in [0,1]^4 : e^{t,p}_{opt}(e^*) = e^*(t,p) \text{ for all } t,p.$$ 

The effort levels characterized by this fixed point maximize the agents’ utilities for first- and second-order beliefs which coincide with the utility maximizing effort levels, i.e. for correct beliefs. Hence, $e^*$ fulfills the conditions for an equilibrium. \[\square\]

**Proof of proposition 2**

By proposition 1, the equilibrium effort levels are in the interior. Hence, they are fully characterized by the first-order conditions (FOCs):

\[
\begin{align*}
1 - 2e(1, d) + v^{1,d}_{\pi x} &= 0, \\ 
\frac{1}{2} - 2e(\frac{1}{2}, d) + v^{\frac{1}{2},d}_{\pi x} \frac{1}{2} &= 0, \\ 
1 - 2e(1, r) + v^{1,r}_{\pi x} &= 0, \\ 
\frac{1}{2} - 2e(\frac{1}{2}, r) + v^{\frac{1}{2},r}_{\pi x} \frac{1}{2} &= 0.
\end{align*}
\]

In equilibrium, the beliefs have to be correct. The FOCs hold with $\overline{v}^{t,p}(t', p') = \overline{v}^{t,p}(t, p)$. 

To prove the proposition, we first show that $e^*(1, r) > e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r)$. Since in equilibrium $\overline{v}^{1,r}_{\pi x}(t', p') = \overline{v}^{1,r}_{\pi x}(t, p') = e(t', p')$, $\overline{v}^{1,r}_{\pi x}(\overline{v}^{1,r}_{\pi x}) = \overline{v}^{1,r}_{\pi x}(\overline{v}^{1,r}_{\pi x})$. Because of this equality, $v^{1,r}_{\pi x} = v^{\frac{1}{2},r}_{\pi x}$. Using this and comparing the FOCs (16) and (17) reveal that $e^*(1, r) = 2e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) > e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r)$.

Second, we prove that

$$e^*(1, r) - e^*(1, r)^2 > \frac{1}{2} e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) - e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r)^2.$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

Inserting $e^*(1, r) = 2e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r)$ and rearranging terms, (18) becomes

$$\frac{3}{4}(e^*(1, r) - e^*(1, r)^2) > 0,$$
which holds for any $e^*(1, r) \in (0, 1)$.

Third, it has to be shown that $e^*(1, d) > e^*(1, r)$. Because of equations (5), (7) and (18) it is true that

$$v_{1d}^{1} - v_{1r}^{1} = e(1, d) - e(1, d)^2 - q(e(1, r) - e(1, r)^2) - (1 - q)(1/2 e(1/2, r) - e(1/2, r)^2)$$
$$> e(1, d) - e(1, d)^2 - e(1, r) + e(1, r)^2.$$

Comparing (14) to (16), one sees that

$$v_{1d}^{1} - v_{1r}^{1} = 2(e(1, d) - e(1, r)).$$

implying that

$$e(1, d) - e(1, r) > -e(1, d)^2 + e(1, r)^2. \quad (20)$$

However, this condition can only hold for $e^*(1, d) > e^*(1, r)$.

Finally, it remains to show that $e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) > e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d)$. Because of equations (5), (7) and (18), it holds that

$$v_{1d}^{\frac{1}{2}} - v_{1r}^{\frac{1}{2}} = q(e(1, r) - e(1, r)^2) + (1 - q)(1/2 e(1/2, r) - e(1/2, r)^2) - 1/2 e(1/2, d) + e(1/2, d)^2)$$
$$> 1/2 (e(1/2, r) - e(1/2, r))^2 - 1/2 e(1/2, r)^2 + e(1/2, d)^2).$$

Comparing (15) to (17), one gets

$$v_{1d}^{\frac{1}{2}} - v_{1r}^{\frac{1}{2}} = 4(e(1/2, r) - e(1/2, d)),$$

implying that

$$\frac{7}{2} (e(1/2, r) - e(1/2, d)) > -e(1/2, r)^2 + e(1/2, d)^2.$$ 

However, this condition can only hold for $e^*(\frac{1}{2}, r) > e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d)$.

\textbf{Proof of proposition 3}

i) $q = 1$ implies that $\lambda = 1$. Therefore, $\pi(\bar{e}^{1,d}) = \pi(\bar{e}^{1,d})$ and $v_{1d}^{1} = 0$. From (14) follows that $e^*(1, d) = \frac{1}{2}$. Since the beliefs have to be correct in equilibrium, we get
that $\pi(e^{1,r}) = \frac{1}{4}$. By substituting into (16) we get
\[ 1 - 2e(1,r) + (e(1,r) - e(1,r)^2 - \frac{1}{4}) = 0, \] (21)
given that the beliefs have to be correct. The unique solution to (21) is $e^*(1,r) = \frac{1}{2}$.

ii) $q = 0$ implies that $\lambda = 0$. Therefore, $\pi(e^{1/2,d}) = \pi(e^{1/2,d})$ and $v_{1/2}^d = 0$. From (15) follows that $e^*(1,d) = \frac{1}{2}$. Since the beliefs have to be correct in equilibrium, we get that $\pi(e^{1/2,r}) = \frac{1}{16}$. By substituting into (17) we get
\[ \frac{1}{2} - 2e(\frac{1}{2},r) + \frac{1}{2}(e(\frac{1}{2},r) - e(\frac{1}{2},r)^2 - \frac{1}{16}) = 0, \] (22)
given that the beliefs have to be correct. The unique solution to (22) is $e^*(\frac{1}{2},r) = \frac{1}{4}$.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Proof of proposition 4}
\end{center}

We first show that in equilibrium $v_{1/4}^d > 0 > v_{1/4}^d$. Inserting (5) and (6) into (7) gives
\begin{align*}
v_{1/4}^d &= (1 - \lambda)(e(1,d) - e(1,d)^2 - \frac{1}{2}e(\frac{1}{2},d) + e(\frac{1}{2},d)^2), \\
v_{1/4}^d &= -\lambda(e(1,d) - e(1,d)^2 - \frac{1}{2}e(\frac{1}{2},d) + e(\frac{1}{2},d)^2)
\end{align*}
(23)
Both equations together can only hold for either $v_{1/4}^d = v_{1/4}^d = 0$ or for $v_{1/4}^d$ and $v_{1/4}^d$ having opposite signs.

Take first the case of $v_{1/4}^d = v_{1/4}^d = 0$. In this case, the equilibrium effort levels would be $\frac{1}{2}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$, respectively (see FOCs (14) and (15)). Inserting these values and (5) and (6) into (7), one obtains that $v_{1/4}^d > 0 > v_{1/4}^d$ - a contradiction.

Hence, $v_{1/4}^d$ and $v_{1/4}^d$ must have opposite signs. Assume that $v_{1/4}^d < 0 < v_{1/4}^d$. This inequality together with the FOCs (14) and (15) implies that $e(1,d) < \frac{1}{2}$ and $e(\frac{1}{2},d) > \frac{1}{4}$. Since $e(1,d) > e(\frac{1}{2},d)$, this implies that $e(t,d) \in (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{2})$ for $t = 1, \frac{1}{2}$.

Because of (23) and $v_{1/4}^d < 0 < v_{1/4}^d$,
\begin{equation}
-e(1,d) + e(1,d)^2 + \frac{1}{2}e(\frac{1}{2},d) - e(\frac{1}{2},d)^2 = -v_{1/4}^d + v_{1/4}^d > 0
\end{equation}
(24)
For \( e(t, d) \in (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{2}) \) the left-hand side of (24) is decreasing in \( e(1, d) \) and \( e(\frac{1}{2}, d) \). However, even for the limit case of \( e(1, d) = e(\frac{1}{2}, d) = \frac{1}{4} \) the left hand side of (24) is \(-\frac{1}{8}\). Hence (24) cannot hold and \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} < v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} \) is not possible in equilibrium. Therefore, \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} > 0 > v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} \). This and (23) also implies that \( e^*(1, d) - e^*(1, d)^2 > \frac{1}{2} e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d) - e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d)^2 \) - the material payoff from getting a treatment is larger than from not getting a treatment, if the selection is done directly.

Recall that \( v_{t,p}^{1,p} \pi x \in [-\frac{3}{4}, \frac{3}{4}] \). Hence, \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} \pi x \in (0, \frac{3}{4}] \) and \( v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} \pi x \in [-\frac{3}{4}, 0) \). Using this and the FOCs (14) and (15) one immediately gets that \( e^*(1, d) \in (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{7}{8}] \) and that \( e^*(\frac{1}{2}, d) \in [\frac{1}{16}, \frac{1}{4}) \).

**Proof of proposition 5**

i) Subtracting (17) from (16) reveals that \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} - \frac{1}{2} v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} = 0 \), whenever in equilibrium \( e(1, r) - e(\frac{1}{2}, r) = \frac{1}{4} \). Since \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} = v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} \), this can only hold for \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} = v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} = 0 \). Hence, \( e(1, r) = \frac{1}{2}, e(\frac{1}{2}, r) = \frac{1}{4} \) in equilibrium if the difference in equilibrium effort is \( \frac{1}{4} \).

In equilibrium, the beliefs have to be correct. From this, \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} = v_{t,d}^{1/2,1} = 0 \), and \( e(1, r) = \frac{1}{2}, e(\frac{1}{2}, r) = \frac{1}{4} \), we get that in equilibrium the neutral payoff must be given by

\[
\pi = \frac{3q + 1}{16}. \tag{25}
\]

Using the definition of \( \pi \), (25), and again the fact that the equilibrium beliefs are correct, we get

\[
\frac{3q + 1}{16} = \lambda \pi(1, d) + (1 - \lambda) \pi(\frac{1}{2}, d). \tag{26}
\]

If in equilibrium \( e(1, r) - e(\frac{1}{2}, r) = \frac{1}{4} \), then the equation (26) has to hold. Recall that \( \pi(1, d) \) and \( \pi(\frac{1}{2}, d) \) are determined by the joint solution of the FOCs (14) and (15). Since \( v_{t,d}^{1,1} \pi x \) is independent of \( q \), \( \pi(1, d) \) and \( \pi(\frac{1}{2}, d) \) do not depend on \( q \). Hence the right-hand side of (26) is independent of \( q \), whereas the left-hand side is strictly increasing in \( q \). Hence, for any given \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) there exists at most one \( q \) such that \( e_1^* - e_0^* = \frac{1}{4} \).

ii) Inserting (25) into (7) and (14) leads to

\[
1 - 2e(1, d) + (e(1, d) - e(1, d)^2 - \frac{3q + 1}{16}) = 0.
\]
By solving this equation one gets

\[ e(1, d) = \frac{-2 + \sqrt{19 - 3q}}{4}. \]  

(27)

Inserting 25) into 7) and 15) leads to

\[ \frac{1}{2} - 2e(\frac{1}{2}, d) + \left(\frac{1}{2}e(\frac{1}{2}, d) - e(\frac{1}{2}, d)\right)^2 - \frac{3q + 1}{16} = 0. \]

By solving this equation one gets

\[ e(\frac{1}{2}, d) = \frac{-7 + \sqrt{64 - 3q}}{4}. \]  

(28)

Given that \( \lambda = q \) and because of (28) and (27), (26) becomes

\[ \frac{3q + 1}{16} = q \left(\frac{-2 + \sqrt{19 - 3q}}{4} - \left(\frac{-2 + \sqrt{19 - 3q}}{4}\right)^2\right) + (1 - q) \left(\frac{1}{2} - 7 + \sqrt{64 - 3q} - \left(\frac{-7 + \sqrt{64 - 3q}}{4}\right)^2\right), \]

(29)

leading to

\[ 0 = 96q + 8q\sqrt{19 - 3q} - 16q\sqrt{64 - 3q} + 16\sqrt{64 - 3q} - 128. \]  

(30)

For any \( q \in (0, 1) \), the right-hand side of (30) is strictly larger than zero. This equation holds only for the limit cases \( q = 1 \) and \( q = 0 \).

6 References


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