Beyond the Familialist State? : Outsourcing Care in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Margarita Estévez-Abe
Yeong-Soon Kim
Beyond the *Familialist State*: Outsourcing Care in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Margarita Estévez-Abe  
Chair of Public Policy, Collegio Carlo Alberto  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
Maxwell School of Citizenship and International Affairs, Syracuse University.  
mesete02@maxwell.syr.edu

and

Yeong-Soon Kim  
Associate Professor of Political Science  
Department of Liberal Arts  
Seoul National University of Science and Technology  
isola@seoultech.ac.kr
I. Introduction: Demographic Challenges in Familialist Welfare States

What Esping-Andersen calls familialist welfare states include not only Japan and Southern European countries. All East Asian countries fall into this category. The East Asian welfare states possess the following three characteristics: (i) the under-development of social services such as childcare and elderly care; (ii) the meager levels of cash benefits to working-age citizens such as public assistance and unemployment benefits; and (iii) comparatively low levels of social spending. The last two features distinguish the familialist welfare states from the so-called “conservative” welfare states such as Germany and Austria whose social services tended to be less developed than their Nordic counterparts despite their high levels of overall social spending. The last feature distinguishes East Asian familialist welfare states from the Southern European ones. East Asian welfare states, like Southern European ones, have long relied on families to provide a basic safety net. As the welfare providing role of families wanes, citizens in familialist welfare states are finding themselves increasingly vulnerable to new social risks. Although longevity is causing demographic aging everywhere, the fertility rate decline has been much more drastic in familialist and conservative welfare states.\(^1\) The very fact that East Asian governments divert much smaller shares of their GDP than other advanced industrial countries means that their citizens are potentially exposed to the greatest levels of social risks. Yet, there has been little systematic effort to compare familialist welfare states.\(^2\) In order to fill in the gap, this paper compares how three East Asian cases—Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—are coping with the shrinking welfare capacity of the family.\(^3\)

[Figure 1: Demographic Aging in Selected OECD countries and Taiwan]

[Table 1: Fertility Rates]

Despite the “growth” of the welfare states in East Asia, the shrinking welfare capacity of the family has produced a “care crisis” in the public sector. The shortage of care leads to severe social as well as economic consequences. Two important solutions to the “care crisis” have been: (i) the expansion in publicly provided social services such as increasing the number of public nursing homes and childcare centers; (ii) the expansion of governmental subsidies to cover the cost of private care services financed directly from the general tax revenue or by new social insurance schemes (i.e. Long-Term Care Insurance); and (iii) the deregulation of immigration

\(^1\) Furthermore, familialist welfare states also have an added burden of the rise in non-marriage, which casts a long shadow over their demographic projections (Jones 2007).

\(^2\) For important contributions that try to fill this gap, see Chan, Soma and Yamashita (2011), Soma (2012), Soma, Yamashita and Chan (2011), Michel and Peng (2012). Although there are scholarly contributions that compare East Asian countries, they tend to categorize them as “productivist” or “developmentalist” rather than “familialists” and seek to evaluate if they have diverged from this original model or not (see for instance, Aspalter 2006; Peng and Wong 2008, ADD more citations).

\(^3\) There are very interesting comparisons between Southern European and East Asian countries, but it is outside the scope of this paper. One of the authors, Estevez-Abe, is currently working on such comparisons.
laws in order to facilitate “private” outsourcing of care to migrant workers. Specific policy options that a government adopts will have profound social and economic implications.

Importantly, the three East Asian countries have adopted different policy mixes. The cross-national variations among the three countries signal that choices and constraints that different familialist welfare states face as well as potentially different socio-economic outcomes. Before delving into the details in the main text of the paper, let us briefly summarize the nature of the cross-national variations that motivate our study. The public care sector in terms of the provision of benefits-in-kind—both for elderly care and childcare—is most developed in Japan. When we include government subsidies, however, South Korea’s childcare coverage is greater than Japan and Taiwan. Taiwan is the least developed of the three countries when it comes to public support of “care.” Instead, the government facilitated the use of migrant care givers. Japan and South Korea lag behind on this score.

The goal of this paper is two-fold. We want to understand: (i) why different countries choose different options when facing similar problems; and (ii) what their welfare implications are. The rest of the paper proceeds as following. Section II sets the stage for the later analysis by identifying the cross-national variations among the three East Asian countries in greater details. Whenever possible, we also provide a broader comparative context. Sections III, IV and V examine three potential explanations for the cross-national variations in the care options adopted in the three countries. Section III examines if the cultural differences explain the divergent policy paths, and concludes its limited application. Section IV examines to what extent economic conditions—particularly of women—explain the intra-regional variations in the care regimes. We argue that the better economic positions of Taiwanese women as opposed to Japanese and South Korean women might have led to the much greater degree of outsourcing of care in Taiwan than in Japan and Korea. Yet, women’s relative economic positions only explain the demand side story. In order to explain how the government reacted, we show that we need a political explanation. Section V thus turns to politics. Section VI concludes by evaluating the socio-economic implications of the policy choices and future possibilities for change.

II. Identifying Variations in Three East Asian Care Regimes—in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan

Although Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, can be described as familialist welfare states, there are important differences in the patterns of care provisions. Japan relies on the public sector most, and Taiwan relies on foreign migrant workers most. South Korea stands in between, but appears to have its own welfare mix.

As familialist welfare states, East Asia has been known for their high rates of multi-generational households, where household heads cohabit with their parents and children. Households head
support their old parents, and the parents help look after the grandchildren. Figure 2 shows the living arrangements of citizens above the age of 65 years-old. It highlights the prevalence of cohabitation of adult children with their elderly parents in East Asian familialist welfare states. Southern European familialist welfare states also demonstrate high levels of cohabitation that set them apart from Germany and Sweden. This attests to the importance of family care in East Asia. However, the importance of the extended family in East Asia might also be the mirror image of the underdevelopment of old-age public pension. We will come back to this issue in the concluding section.

[FIGURE 2 around here]

Figures 3 and 4 indicate that, when compared to South Korea and Taiwan, Japan developed more public social services in the "care sector" both in terms of child care as well as elderly care—with much stronger emphasis on the latter. South Korea has been expanding its public services rapidly in recent years. Like Japan, it has also introduced Long Term Care Insurance in 2008 (Japan introduced it back in 1997). However, South Korea’s overall “care mix” has a much larger private share than Japan. Taiwan lags behind both Japan and South Korea. In 2008, the Taiwanese government has embarked on its Ten-Year Long-term care plan but still does not provide much support for child care (Wang 2011; Long Term Insurance Preparatory Taskforce 2008).

[Figure 3. Enrolment Rates of Child Care and Early Childhood Education]

[Figure 4: Spending on LTC]

It is also worth noting an important contrast between policies adopted in Japan and those in South Korea (Figures 5 and 6). In contrast to Japan, which has expanded elderly care much more extensively than childcare, South Korea has emphasized childcare care expansion more whole heartedly earlier.5

[Figures 5 and 6 around here]

Furthermore, there is another difference between the Japanese and South Korean Long-term Care Insurance schemes. Austria and Germany both introduced long-term care insurance

---


5 A scholar of Japanese politics, Len Schoppa (2006), explained the cross-policy variation in terms of “voice” and “exit.” In other words, women can “exit” from motherhood thereby reducing the demand for childcare, but there is no “exit” option for elderly care. This makes people voice their needs and pursue collective action to expand public support for elderly care. His explanation fails to account for South Korea at all. As we will argue, the Japan-South Korea contrast signals the importance of different interest constellations in the two countries rather than “exit options” in childcare issues.
schemes, and opted for providing cash benefits to family care givers. South Korea emulated similar cash benefits to family care givers. The Japanese government, while well aware of Germany’s cash benefits, rejected the idea of such benefits, and decided to provide solely benefits-in-kind instead. As soon as the government introduced the Long-Term Care Insurance, frantic efforts to increase the number of care providing facilities began (Estévez-Abe 1993). As a result of this programmatic difference, while Japan introduced long-term care insurance later than Germany, the relative weight of public as opposed to private spending on long-term care is much bigger in Japan than in Germany or in Austria (see Figure 4).

While Taiwan lags behind in public support for childcare and elderly care, it stands out for its reliance on migrant care givers (mainly from Southeast Asia). At the end of 2012, there were 200,530 foreign nursing workers in Taiwan. Although South Korea had introduced a special visa status for co-ethnics from China, and some of these co-ethnics began working in personal and patient care, the numbers did not grow as much as in Taiwan. The Korean Economic and Social Development Commission (2012) estimates that half of the patient care givers (81,569) in the private sector to be foreign (i.e. Korean Chinese). This means that, although the figures may not be exactly comparable, roughly 40,000 foreign care givers are in South Korea as opposed to 200,530 in Taiwan. Given the fact that Taiwan’s population is about half the size of South Korean population, we can easily conclude that Taiwan relies on foreign care givers ten times more than South Korea. The Korean Immigration Service, however, estimates the number of foreign care givers to be significantly smaller at about 3,281 in 2010. In contrast to South Korea and Taiwan, Japan has had a highly restrictive quota for foreign care givers (500 care givers a year). Foreign care givers are basically non-existent in Japan.

When it comes to governmental attitudes vis-à-vis foreign care givers, the contrasts between South Korea and Taiwan, on the one hand, and between Japan and South Korea, on the other hand, are both intriguing and insightful. The South Korean government introduced a favorable work visa arrangement for “co-ethnic” caregivers from China (i.e. Korean Chinese), while Taiwan had no such restrictive arrangement. Taiwan provides visas to caregivers from different Southeast Asian countries. Japan did not even opt for “co-ethnic” options. This is particularly interesting given Japan’s history of granting preferential visa treatments to co-ethnic workers in the mid-1990s. Japanese Brazilians provided cheap labor for Japanese factories when they desperately needed to bring down labor costs. South Korean manufacturers too employed foreign workers. Since 2004, 30,00 Filipino found work in South Korean factories (“OFWs told not to overstay in South Korea,” Sun Star, February 27, 2003) Why would the


7 They estimate that about 3,281 people—around 2.5% of all female H-2 visa holders (131,249 persons in 2010)—were engaged in providing personal care including patient care. Korea Immigration Service. http://www.immigration.go.kr
Japanese government respond to the demand from manufacturing sector but not to the demand for “more and cheaper” caregivers—particularly in caring for frail elderly?

International marriages are another important way in which foreigners can contribute to fill in the gap left by the weakening family in East Asia. There is a meaningful gender dynamics in international marriages. Compared to East Asian women, men are much less likely to marry someone from other wealthy countries. Instead, East Asian men are more likely to marry women from poorer countries. As of 2010, 73,005 women are living in Korea as marriage immigrants, and about 68,000 are brides from poorer Asian countries. Some scholars point out that “Korean-Chinese daughters become “unpaid housewives” through international marriages, and their mothers often become “paid domestic workers” in Korea (Lee 2006: 504-505). According to Jones (2012), 14% and 11% of all marriages in South Korea in 2005 and 2010, respectively, were cross-border marriages. In the same years, respectively, 7% and 95% of international marriages in South Korea involved marriages between different ethnic groups. In Taiwan, 32% of all marriages were international marriages, of which 10% were marriages between different ethnic groups. In Taiwan, the ratio of international marriages and the ration of marriages across ethnic groups each declined to 20% and 13% as a result of the new restrictions placed by the government. The figures are much smaller for Japan: all international marriages are marriages between different ethnic groups compose around 5% of all marriages in 2005 and 2010. The sex ratio of international marriage pattern is highly skewed in all three countries: Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese men are much more likely to marry foreigners (often from less affluent countries) than women are. Taiwan demonstrates the most skewed sex ratio. Taiwanese men marrying foreign brides is 12.8 times more likely than Taiwanese women marrying foreign husbands. The similar ratios are 3.8 and 3.3 for Japan and South Korea, respectively.

When we place the cross-national variations among these three East Asian countries in a broader comparative perspective, it is evident that not all familialist welfare states are made equal. Cross-national variations are not simply about the issue of timing of welfare state developments or varying levels of demographic aging. Japan’s non-reliance on foreign workers stands out when compared to similar types of advanced welfare states such as Austria and Germany.

So, what explains the cross-national patterns among the three East Asian countries that we observed in this section? This is the question we turn to. As briefly summarized in the introduction, our view is that politics matters.

III. The Limitation of Cultural Explanations

Culturalists would attribute cross-national variations in the patterns of care provision to differences in social expectations and values. In societies where the majority of citizens believe
that the family should be the provider of childcare and elderly care, the government will be likely to provide public institutionalized elderly care (i.e. nursing homes) and public childcare centers. When the families come under duress, the governments may provide cash benefits or subsidies for home care services. It is possible that what citizens think about elderly care and childcare might be different. Such difference might explain why the government emphasizes childcare more than elderly care or vice versa.

Now, let us examine the validity of cultural explanations. Do the variations in cultural attitudes match with the patterns of policy solutions regarding childcare and elderly care? Figure 5 compares gender and family values in the three East Asian countries plus three European countries. The European countries include two Southern European familialist welfare states, which resemble the East Asian welfare states, and Sweden, which has highly developed public care sector. Figure 6 compares how respondents in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan perceive children's responsibility to look after elderly parents.

When we look at the perception on marriage, the vast majority in all six countries strongly disagree that marriage is an outdated institution. Japan and South Korea record the highest percentages of respondents who disagree with the statement, but the difference between South Korea and Sweden is minimal. In contrast, fewer people in Spain and Taiwan disagree. Therefore, there is no discernible divide either between East Asian and European countries or between familialist and gender egalitarian welfare states. The pattern changes, however, when we look at the percentages of people who consider being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay. Here, we observe a clear divide between East Asian and European countries. While the percentage of respondents who agree that being a housewife very fulfilling is slightly higher in Japan and South Korea than in Taiwan, the gap between Taiwan and the three European countries is significantly greater. The distribution of responses shows that East Asians are significantly more positive about housewife than others.8

Figure 7 also shows that all familialist countries demonstrate high percentages of respondents who agree that one of their main goals in life has been to make their parents proud. The gap between Sweden and familialist welfare states is staggering. The normative importance of parents in the familialist welfare states is highly compatible with the fact that lots of adult children in these countries cohabit with their elderly parents. Figure 8 further delves into who

8 The cross-national attitudinal distribution in Figure 7 is highly compatible with the cross-national pattern of mothers' employment. Educated women in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are much less likely to work than their counterparts in Italy, Spain and Sweden (Hirao 2001; Ito 2009; Kim Y-M 2012; Jung et al. 2012). It is important to note that in spite of their low rates of overall maternal employment in Italy and Spain, educated women in these two countries are much less likely to quit work upon motherhood than are their counterparts in the three East Asian countries. However, as we shall we in the following section, the apparent conformity of East Asian values of the housewife hides very important economic variations in East Asia.
the East Asian respondents think should care for the elderly parents. South Korea stands out for
a shared belief that only one of the children—and specially the eldest son—should be responsible
for looking after elderly parents.

[Figure 8 around here]

It is possible to say that some attitudinal variables appear to distinguish familialist
welfare states from those that are not, and some other variables distinguish East Asian variants
from Southern European variants. Clearly, all familialist welfare states demonstrate strong
normative values in terms of filial obligation. The East Asian variants attach strong normative
value to the housewife status.

However, the attitudinal variables in Figures 7 and 8 say little about intra-East Asian
variations in the care mix—i.e. policy differences.

While attitudinal variables about gender roles and family fail to explain intra-regional
variations in policy outcomes, the cross-national comparison of anti-immigrant feelings
highlights Japan’s peculiarity. Japanese respondents have an extremely negative view of
immigrants despite the fact that, as residents in one of the most homogenous societies, their
exposure to immigrants is minimal. 45.2% (70.3%) of respondents strongly agree with the
statement “immigrants increase crimes” (the figures in parentheses indicate the total percentages
of those who “strongly agreed” and “agreed”). The percentages for South Korea and Taiwan are,
respectively, 6.8% (32.4%) and 13.1% (59.5), while the percentages for selected OECD
countries are as the following: 34.9% (60.1%) in France, 11.3% (57.6%) in Spain, 19.4%
(57.2%) in Sweden, 7% (26.8%) in the United States.9

It is quite interesting to see that Japanese respondents possess much more negative views
of immigrants than in France, which is known for its successful right-wing anti-immigrant party.
Such a strong negative sentiment against immigrants may explain why Japan is the only outlier
among familialist welfare states in not bringing in any foreign care givers. That said, the
question remains as to why Japan did not opt for bringing in co-ethnics into the care sector as it
had done with manufacturing sector in mid-1990s. In the mid-1990s, the Japanese government
was already preparing for the introduction of the Long-term Care Insurance. Once the new
insurance scheme was voted on in the Diet, a frantic governmental effort to secure manpower in
the sector began. Attitudes per se do not provide us with a clear answer to the question.

IV: Economic Explanations: Explaining Outsourcing to Migrant Workers

9 The figures come from International Social Survey Program, National Identity II(2003), Q10a.
Cultural attitudes not explain the variations in the policies, because they may not determine citizens’ demand for care and their policy preferences. Another important factor to consider is the economic calculations of women and families make, because they are likely to affect the demand for outside care. In countries where the labor market is more gender-neutral, women—especially high human capital women—families’ incentives to outsource “care” should be greater. This is so because in such labor markets, women can earn as much as men can. When educated women can make as much money as educated men, their opportunity cost to stay home to look after the old and young becomes very high. Therefore we can expect to see more “outsourcing” of care in countries where educated women get relatively equal pay.

Furthermore, even where there is a relatively high level of inter-gender equality, the inherent difference between childcare and elderly care might produce different calculations on the part of the family. Unlike elderly care, childcare is more than simply providing care. It also involves social investment in one’s off-spring, and parents are likely to take into consideration the future returns on their investments. Since educational investments can only be outsourced to equally educated people (and hence expensive), educated mothers in countries with big gender wage gaps, would calculate that it is more economic and efficient for them to spend time with their young off-spring rather than outsource it. The same calculation is not likely to apply for the care of frail elderly who require non-medical assistant for daily chores, because the skill level of elderly assistants is not considered high and can be outsourced to low skill people.

Table 2 shows that gender wage gap is biggest in East Asia. Although all three East Asian countries show highly positive views of the housewife, this does not mean that women are held back equally in the labor market. Taiwan is much more gender-egalitarian than Japan and South Korea. This is compatible with the findings that the kind of human management practice that prevails in Japan and South Korea, but not in Taiwan exacerbates discrimination against women (Brinton ed. 2001; Estévez-Abe 2005, 2006; Peng 2010). It is important to note that not all familialist welfare states suffer from big gender wage gaps. In Southern Europe, the gender wage gap is much smaller than in East Asia.
gap is much smaller than the OECD average. Educated mothers tend to continue to work full-time and outsource all kinds of unpaid domestic tasks to low skill women—often migrant workers. Taiwan resembles Spain and Italy in this sense. When women are not discriminated against in the labor market, they are more likely to stay employed even after childbirth. This contrasts with the situation in Japan and South Korea, educated mothers quit work when they are married to husbands do not make sufficiently good living (Hirao 2001; Abe 2011; Kim, Y-M 2012; Jung et al 2012; Kim Y-S 2009).

V: Political Explanations: Explaining Different Policy Trajectories

The welfare state literature has produced different predictions such as partisan and institutional explanations. The most influential theory of welfare state attributes the development of the most generous welfare states to the political dominance of social democratic parties. A number of scholars also explain high levels of public provision of care services in terms of the social democratic dominance (Esping-Andersen 1999; Bonoli and Reber 2010). However, explanations based on social democratic dominance and partisan compositions of the government do not readily apply to East Asia where the unions were weaker and social democratic parties did not develop. Neither do partisan compositions of the government per se explain why some governments might be more involved in childcare rather than elderly care or vice versa (Estévez-Abe 2008; Kim 2010; Yang 2013).

New types of institutional explanations might be more useful. Traditional institutionalist theories of welfare states have, focus on social policy bureaucracy, policy feedback and veto points (Amenta and Skocpol 198X; Pierson 1993; Rothstein 1992; Immergut 1992, for instance). There are, however, new institutionalist analyses of welfare states that also pay close attention to the nature of electoral competition (Estévez-Abe 2008). In addition to policy feedback and veto points, the following institutional factors matter greatly in constraining welfare politics in a particular country. First, the types of national elections that take place (parliamentary and/or presidential) are important as elections are when politicians make promises. Second, the nature of electoral rules are critical as they shape politicians’ strategies about which voters to appeal to and what kinds of “distributive” and policy promises they are most likely to promise. Third, the organizational interest of the bureaucracy and their agenda setting power is also critical. These factors together shaped what we might call a political opportunity structure. Depending on the shape of the opportunity structure, certain interests were more likely than others to be represented in the policy process. For instance, in countries, where the ministries dedicated to gender equality (i.e. femocrats) exist, more women-friendly policy initiatives are likely to make it to the policy agenda. We consider the shape of the political opportunity to be a key factor in producing divergent paths for familialist welfare states.

The level of demographic aging in South Korea and Taiwan today is roughly comparable to the level of demographic aging in Japan in the 1980s. Japan also developed social security
programs in health care and old-age pension much earlier than South Korea and Taiwan. The difference in the historical trajectories meant that the problem of demographic aging was perceived differently by Japanese policy makers than, say, by South Korean and Taiwanese policy makers. In Japan, demographic aging, instead of emerging as a new social problem, became a fiscal issue right away. In contrast, in South Korea and Taiwan, demographic aging was very much a new social issue. Let me discuss the Japanese case first.

The Japanese Case:

In the absence of affordable nursing homes, demographic aging—particularly the increase of frail elderly—led to the dramatic rise in health care costs as middle class families used hospitals in lieu of nursing homes. Non-medical use of hospital beds was the most expensive form of frail elderly care. As Japan had introduced in the 1970s a free health care scheme for those above the age of 70, the health care costs grew exponentially as the population above the age of 70 grew rapidly (Campbell 1979, 1992). Hence there was a kind of policy feedback that shaped the way in which the problem of demographic aging manifested itself in Japan.

Not only the Ministry of Finance but employers’ associations grew alarmed as they had to share some of the rising health care cost. The Ministry of Health and Welfare at the time had a different perspective in addition to health care cost containment. Given the demographic trend in Japan, they saw elderly care services as a “growth sector” while they saw child care as a “declining sector” (interview at MHW 1996). There were reports prepared by businesses in the late 1980s and 1990s forecasting the market potential of what they called “silver (rather than gray) industry.” There were widely shared expectations that this would be the next big industry. Some thought that government subsidies could kick-start a new industry. The Ministry of Health and Welfare was very interested in this industrial forecast as they saw a chance to transform itself into more of an economic ministry overseeing numerous product market sectors.12

At no point, Japanese welfare bureaucrats contemplated bringing in foreign care givers despite the fact that Japan was bringing in thousands of Japanese Brazilians to work in factories exactly at the same time that it was formulating a new structure to provide non-medical care for the elderly. Instead, the government began a frantic drive to mobilize married women as cheap care givers in the strange category of “paid volunteers” to work in newly set up elderly day care facilities or as “home helpers” (Estévez-Abe 1993). Since the new insurance scheme provided benefits-in-kind rather than subsidies for individual families to contract caregivers, families in need relied on public services. Any services beyond what the municipal governments deemed necessary were to be paid out of pocket. But, in the late 1990s, private service providers had not yet developed.

12 For analyses that take a very different view, see Peng 2002, Schoppa 2006.
Japan’s peculiar personal management practices within the national civil service create systematic organizational interests within the bureaucracy, whereby all ministries constantly seek opportunities to enhance their regulatory power and financial resources to find and fund “post-retirement” positions (see Estévez-Abe 2008). The idea of helping kick-start “silver industry” as well as creating a new contributory social insurance scheme appealed to welfare bureaucrats. Having a whole new industry to regulate and a new insurance scheme would translate into more “post-retirement” positions. This would be a great win-win for the ministry. The welfare ministry bureaucrats took time to prepare the grounds. They held meetings with the stakeholders—key members of the ruling party, and representatives from the health insurance schemes, municipalities, unions, the peak employers’ association, and the associations of non-profit elderly care facilities. They also used academics to propagate the need for a new insurance scheme. After years to negotiations, the new bill was introduced in 1997, and the service provision began in 2000 (Campbell, other citations).

In contrast, welfare bureaucrats had little interest in childcare. An expansion of existing childcare facilities simply appeared expensive and not sufficiently rewarding to their organizational interests. It is important to note that Japan had no “femocrats.” There was no department within the Ministry of Health and Welfare whose organizational objective was to create policies policies that helped working women or families,13 In the Japanese policy process, career bureaucrats possess a lot of agenda setting power. As a result of the long-rule by the LDP and the old electoral rules that demanded a lot of the politicians’ time and efforts in tending to the needs of their narrow constituent groups, the LDP had delegated all legislative tasks to the bureaucracy: bureaucrats come up with policy ideas for the LDP government, take care of the negotiations with the stakeholders, and draft the legislative proposals. As a consequence, they become agenda setters and gain power to put their preferred options into the agenda (such as a new insurance scheme) and exclude unwanted policy options off the agenda (Estévez-Abe 2008).

Furthermore, it was not only the bureaucrats that lacked enthusiasm for public childcare. The conservative politicians in the ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party) had little incentive to promote public childcare. Their constituencies were most rural, and required less public childcare services due to the prevalence of multi-generational households. Under the old pre-1994 electoral rules, there was absolutely no electoral gain in appealing to urban young families who were in need of childcare or appealing to “future families.” To make the matter worse, the fact that employees of public childcare facilities tended to be organized into public sector unions

---

13 This contrasts with the Ministry of Labor, which had created a new bureau of women’s affairs in the 1990s. The officials in the Women’s Affairs Bureau were keen on introducing new policies for women within their jurisdiction, and pushed hard for a paid parental leave that the ruling party politicians had little interest in. It took them a whole summer to visit and explain the need for a new paid parental leave to all the stakeholders—over 100 people or so. Finally, by linking it to paid elderly care leave, they succeeded in introduced a modest paid parental leave (interview, 1997). This contrast shows that when bureaucrats see something as a vital organizational interest, a legislative process may be initiated even in the absence of a strong social pressure or political pressure.
further reduced the conservative government’s willingness to expand public childcare. After 1989, the situation changed slightly as the religious Clean Party became part of the coalition government. (They continued to remain as part of the coalition government for most of the 1990s and 2000s.) As the Clean Party’s constituency is low-income families in urban areas, they pushed for childcare support. More dramatic change came when the electoral rules were changed to a two-tier mixed system of single member districts and proportional representation. To put it briefly, this new electoral system increased the importance of urban voters and also created a need on the part of political parties to make broader more universal policy promises. The contrast between before and after the 1994 electoral reform is insightful.

Before the electoral reform, the government has made only one plan to combat the underdevelopment of public support for childcare (the Angel Plan in 1994). After the first election under the new system, however, a number of policies and plans were introduced: the New Angel Plan (1999), the Zero Waiting List Plan (2001), the Measures for Fertility Decline Plus One (2002), the Promotion of Measures to Support the Next Generation Act (2003), The New Measures for Fertility Decline (2006), etc. Although important deregulations occurred concerning the eligibility of families who could use public childcare facilities, the government was very slow to expand childcare spots. Neither of these policies and plans dramatically improved the public childcare situation in Metropolitan areas, which suffered from severe shortages of childcare places. In 2006, under the LDP government, the use of kindergartens and childcare facilities was slightly deregulated in order to create a new type of facility that combined preschool and childcare facility called Licensed Children’s House (Nintei Kodomo-en). This was an important step, as the ministerial turfs over preschools (the Ministry of Education) and childcare facilities (the Ministry of Welfare) had long prevented the flexible use of existing facilities for pre-school children (interview at Ministry of Finance, 1996). Unfortunately the government subsidies were highly limited. There existed subsidies for the use of the new facility as preschools but not as childcare facilities.

When the opposition party, Democratic Party of Japan, came to power, they wanted to introduce a much bigger and generous Children’s Allowance than the existing allowance. Yet, they failed to secure the support of the very welfare bureaucrats who would draft the legislative proposal. The welfare bureaucrats had little organizational interest in diverting a significant portion of their budget to childcare.

In contrast, we observe that the political process in South Korea played out very differently. Three things are particularly important: (i) Presidentialism; (ii) the degree of bureaucratic control over the legislative agenda was smaller than in Japan; and (iii) the presence of strong social movements for the development of the welfare state and femocrats within the bureaucracy.

The Case of South Korea:
The diving force of the development of the welfare state (in general as well as women-friendly policies) has not been the strong social movements (Yang 2013; Kim 2010). Strong social movements could sway the President, and, once the President made up his or her mind under the pressure of public opinion, the bureaucracy would go along. This was a very distinctive political dynamics not seen in Japan. Korean social movements—including feminist movements—have contributed to the building welfare state in Korea by issue-raising, interest representation of the economic minorities, and even to the policy-making process itself.

After the democratization in 1987, the government mostly emphasized old-age pension and health care, and the modernization of public assistance system. There was thus little interest in providing social services (Haggard and Kaufman 2009; Kwon 2007; Wong 2004). Initially, public childcare remained a residual policy for those children in special circumstances who needed care. Although the government enacted the Childcare Act in 1991 acknowledging the responsibility of the government for childcare for the first time, there had not been much progress until 2000.

As the relatively progressive Kim Dae Jung government (1998-2003) established the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2001, and former feminist activists participated in the Ministry, childcare became a more salient welfare issue. However, it was Roh Moo-Hyun government (2003-2008) that systemized the child care policy and began to change the Korean care regime from familist to semi-public one. In the backdrop of increasing social concern about low-fertility rate and rapid population aging, the Roh government established Basic Plan for the Low-Fertility and Ageing Society (2006). The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family introduced the Saessak[sprout] Plan, which strengthened the role of the government in child care through ‘mid-to long-term childcare plans (2006–2010)’.

Although the Kim and Roh governments increased the expenditure for childcare greatly, they did not establish many public childcare facilities for the financial reasons. Instead, they chose to subsidize the childcare fees to the childcare facilities first, and then to the parents directly in the form of voucher in Lee Myung Bak Government (2008-2013). Consequently, although the childcare facilities increased dramatically in South Korea, the majority of them were private. As of March 2013, 75% of 0-5 year old children enrolled in day care centers are in

---

14 There are exceptions that prove the rule. In mayoral pr gubernatorial competitions, where candidates would compete for the sole top executive position just as presidential candidates do, we can observe similar dynamics to Korea even in Japan (see Estévez-Abe 2008).
15 The Ministry of Gender Equality changed its name to Ministry of Gender Equality & Family in 2005. At the same time the childcare related tasks were moved from Ministry of Health and Welfare to Ministry of Gender Equality & Family.
16 The Lee government introduced a voucher system in 2009, whereby the government subsidizes families that purchase child care services rather than subsidizing child care facilities or establishing public facilities. Parents of children under five received the childcare care subsidy in the form of voucher and choose a facility by themselves for their child. Parents received the same amount of money as subsidy according their household income, whether their child was enrolled in a public facility or private.
private childcare facilities, whereas only 11% of them is covered by national/public facilities. The rest of them belong to NPOs (legal corporations) or childcare cooperatives (Ministry of Health and Welfare).

While the Japanese government hesitated to extend public subsidies to private facilities, the Korean government chose a strategy that the government took the responsibility of funding and the private facilities provided the services. Instead of establishing public facilities, the government paid the subsidy to private childcare facilities. Such ‘defamilization through market’ strategy with public financial support greatly eased the childcare burdens on families in a relatively short time. However, it has its own downside: The quality of care is poor in some small-sized facilities. As a strong interest group, the association of private childcare facilities pressured the head of local government not to build more public childcare facilities by threatening of anti-campaign in the next election. They also have resisted the government’s attempt to strengthening regulatory oversight over private facilities.\textsuperscript{17} Locked in a kind of path dependency, now it is extremely difficult to build a public facility, which most parents prefer.

Another great change in childcare policies in Korea just started after the Presidential election in 2012. Free childcare was one of the hottest issues during the Presidential and National Assembly elections in 2012. The present President Park Keun Hye has pledged to provide free childcare for 0-2 year-olds by 2012 and for all 0-5 year-olds by 2013 in 2012 Presidential election. Now most of the pledged childcare policies started to be implemented. If the policies take full effects, the publicity of Korean care regime will be much strengthened.

The role of the organized, strong feminist movements and their femocrat colleagues in Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun government was critical. The femocrats within the government gave priority to childcare over elderly care for the work-family balance. They were also open pressures from strong feminist movements that worked closely with the femocrats. As the Korean family model was changing rapidly, and the nuclear family became the norm, the feminist activists and femocrats saw public support for childcare as an urgent issue. Elderly care, on the other hand, had no well-organized advocacy groups. The elderly themselves were not politically well organized and did not press politicians to do something for them until recently. Even in recent several years that seniors’ organizations became interested in welfare issue, their main concern has been basic pension. They hardly made a voice in the area of LTCI. As a result, in stark contrast to childcare, it was not until later in the 2000s that the government began to pay attention to elderly care issues. Alarmed by its unprecedentedly rapid population aging, the Korean government studies closely the introduction of LITC in Japan, and announced its plan to introduce a similar program. However, it was only in 2008 that the Long-term Care Insurance

\textsuperscript{17} In May 2013, the Association of Daycare Centers frustrated the legislation of <The Anti-Child Abuse Act> by threatening of anti-campaign in the next election against the three members of the National Assembly who co-proposed the Act.
was introduced in Korea. The main reason for this time difference between the two program areas is political pressure.

As the suicide rate of the elderly increased sharply from the mid-2000s, and family discord due to the elderly care problems became a social issue, the government introduced LTCI in a hurry. The Korean LITC is still in earlier stage of development. There is a significant gap between the number of seniors who benefit from the LTCI services and those who wish to access these services. Although, in theory, LTCI services are universal, the government tried to limit the number of beneficiaries by strict judgment of the need of the applicants for the financial reasons. In 2011, only 5.7% of the old-age population (5,640,000) received care services through the LTCI scheme. The average rate of receiving services of the OECD countries is about 10% (Jung H-S 2012, 343). As in childcare services, the Korean government chose a strategy that the government took the responsibility of funding and the private facilities provided the services. Most of elderly care facilities are private.

Compared with Japan, Korea has more favorable political conditions for the development of the welfare state. First, in terms of political institution, the presidential system provided some good opportunity to develop welfare programs in a short time. Korea has a very power-concentrated presidential system originated from the military dictatorship era. Such power concentration made the President overcome the resistance from bureaucrats easily and legislate what he wanted. In most cases, if the president decided, the bureaucrats just followed the decisions only with minor technical revision. In the area of welfare, the legislation of the National Basic Livelihood Security Act under the Kim Dae Jung government was a representative case.

Second in terms of political actor, Korea has strong social movements originated in the democratization movements under the military dictatorship. After the democratization, they have fought for the economic justice and social welfare (the issues of ‘old social movements’, not of new social movements), as trade unions and leftist party did not fulfill this function. In the

---

18 The Korean LTCI is funded by subsidies from the central government (25%), premium contribution by employees (62%) and user fees (13%). All contributors to the NHI scheme pay an additional sum equivalent to 4.05% of their National Health Insurance contribution to help fund LTCI (Jung 2012, 349-350).

19 The presence of presidential elections is double-edged. It is favorable for a candidate to raise national issue such as welfare in the campaign on the one hand. However, it might lead an election to candidate-centered instead of issue or policy-centered one; candidates’ integrity, morality, political or regional background, personal attractiveness. The latter usually happened in Korea. Policies have had very low profile in Korean presidential election even after democratization. In this regard, the 2013 election in which welfare and economic democracy were the hottest issues, was exceptional.
development of welfare state in Korea, social movements have played a great role in interest representation of the economic minority and in suggesting alternative policies. In the area of social care, women’s movement organizations played a role. They pushed Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun government to legislate women-friendly policies including the expansion of childcare facilities and, to a lesser extent, LTCI too. In addition, many women activists participated in the Kim and Roh governments. The feminist movements kept critical partnership with the femocrats in the governments, especially in the Ministry of Gender Equality (& Family since 2005).

The Taiwanese Case:

Taiwan offers yet another interesting variation in the care regime that relies heavily on foreign care givers. As for its political structure, until 2005, it had electoral rules that combined single non-transferable vote and multi-member districts (SNTV/MMD) like Japan used to until 1994. At the same time, like South Korea, Taiwan also has the first-past-the post-Presidental elections as well. Moreover, like South Korea, there were some femocrats within the bureaucracy, which worked with feminist activist organizations. The way the demographic aging problem had emerged was more as a new social problem as in South Korea, and it was different from the case of Japan.

As a relatively young democracy and welfare state, the early days of democracy saw the introduction of new social policies. After the democratic transition in 1987, Taiwan, too, focused on health care and old age pension policies as did South Korea. However, the differences in the electoral systems of South Korea and Taiwan led to different trajectories. While the nature of electoral competition under single member districts quickly led to the introduction and expansion of universalistic programs in South Korea, Taiwan had a very different kind of electoral politics.

Until 2005, Taiwan had electoral rules that combined single non-transferable vote and multi-member districts very similar to the old Japanese electoral system. Under the old system, just like it used to be in Japan, politicians only cared about delivering benefits and favors to well-organized small sub-sections of their electoral districts. Therefore, there was no incentive on the part of politicians to advocate universalistic welfare benefits such as children’s allowance or long-term care insurance that covered the whole population. Instead, politicians preferred to provide welfare benefits in a targeted manner—giving something special to different occupational groups, for instance. The arrival of democracy in Taiwan thus meant the development of highly targeted welfare programs just as in postwar Japan. In ways that resemble Japan very much, Taiwanese politicians prefer to deal with old age issues in terms of public pensions that gave different benefits to different groups and subsidies. The important issue under the SNTV/MMD system was that benefits could be targeted either by occupation or
geography. Programs such as long-term care for frail elderly or childcare benefits were not good electoral tools as the eligibility was not based on geography or occupation.

Instead of developing universalistic elderly care provisions, Taiwan opted for heavy reliance on foreign care givers since 1992 (Wang 2011, 168) Interestingly, the government’s decision to liberalize visa arrangements for foreign care workers came about because of lobbying from women’s groups such as Modern Women’s Foundation and Kangfu Community Mothers’ Classroom Organization (Shinkawa et al. 2013:46). As we have argued in the section on economic explanations, Taiwanese women’s relative economic independence gave them the economic means to outsource their unpaid tasks in the absence of public provisions of care. In fact, even in terms of political institutions, Taiwan was more feminist than Japan and South Korea. In addition to the Department of Gender Quality in the national government Executive Yuan), by the late 1990s, Taiwan introduced committees designated to promote women’s rights at various levels of the government. Importantly, nonetheless, this political power was not sufficient to override politicians’ electoral incentives to provide targeted social program rather than universalistic programs such as family cash benefits and childcare services to middle classes. In this sense, Taiwan resembled Japan.

Unlike Japan, however, the Presidential elections created an electoral arena where the visible targeted benefits for specific minority groups could be turn into an anti-government issue in an attempt to rally opposition. The Democratic Progressive Party attacked the Kuomintang’s highly targeted pension politics. In 2000 presidential elections, the DDP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, became the first opposition candidate to win the presidency. In 2001, DDP became the plurality winner in the parliament as well. Feminist groups had been pushing for women-friendly policies, and the Department of Gender Equality worked with them. After years of negotiation, finally, the Gender Equality in Employment Act was introduced under the DPP government in 2002. The GEE Act stipulated maternity, paternity, parental and family leaves. However, care policies that involved governmental spending did come onto the policy agenda until after the electoral reform in 2005. The introduction of a new electoral system in 2005 changed the politicians’ electoral calculations. Interestingly, Taiwan’s new electoral system is very similar to the Japanese new electoral system: a two-tier mixed system of single member districts and proportional representation. Together with the existing rules for the Presidential elections, the electoral incentives have decisively turned in favor of universalistic programs. Under the new electoral system, more universalistic welfare programs are effective tools to appeal to voters. In fact, the Ten-Year Long-Term Care Plan that was initiated in 2008, the Early Childhood Education and Care Act in 2007 attest to this new electoral dynamics

IV. Problems in the Current Care Regimes in East Asia
This paper has situated the three East Asian care regimes in a comparative context and analyzed the underlying causes that have shaped the familialist welfare states. In particular, it looked into the political processes that had produced cross-national variations in the policy response.

As the oldest East Asian welfare state and also the most rapidly aging society, Japan was relatively early to introduce its Long-term Care Insurance. That said, as we have shown, Japan was slow to expand childcare coverage despite the rapid decline in fertility rates that had already started in the 1980s. When compared to Japan, the rapid policy adaptation in South Korea is striking. Given the fact that the current levels of demographic aging in South Korea and Taiwan are only at the levels of what Japan used to be in the 1980s, we can say that the demographic issues hit the policy agenda much more quickly in Korea and Taiwan than in Japan. It is also worth noting that these “younger” democracies proved to be much more receptive to social pressures possibly because of presidential systems. As for Taiwan, its old electoral system like the old Japanese electoral system, was not conducive to addressing big policy issues. However, just as the electoral incentives changed in Japan after the electoral reform, a similar change seems to be under way in Taiwan.

Japan has the most developed public services in elderly care among East Asian countries, and South Korea and Taiwan have turned to the Japanese case as a model in formulating their own policies. Does Japan provide a model to be emulated? Japan clearly has rapidly expanded its “care ability.” In Japan, the number of care users covered by the Long-term Care Insurance today is three times bigger than when the system was first implemented in 2000. According to OECD Health Data on long-term care resources and utilization, however, the density of nurses and personal care givers as a percentage of the population aged 65 years old and over remains still low in Japan. The density rates are: Japan 5.4%, South Korea 4.3%, Germany 3.8%, Spain 4.4%, Sweden 13% and the United States 11.9%. OCED has no figures for Taiwan, but given the percentage of those aged 65 years old and over and the number of foreign care migrants, a similar density rate in Taiwan can be estimated to be close 10%. These figures indicate that the introduction of a long-term care insurance scheme per se does not solve the care crisis.

Furthermore, given the speed of aging and worsening fiscal conditions, ever since the implementation of the Long-term Care Insurance was implemented in 2000, Japan has also carried out periodic revisions. The government raised the user fees and tightened the eligibility rules for various services. This means that the situation for low- and middle-income families, particularly in municipalities without sufficient fiscal means, is worsening. A new concept of “community-based care” has been introduced as part of the most recent reform of the Long-Term

---

20 The former chairman of the Bank of Japan almost comes close to accusing the welfare ministry for having underplayed the severity of Japan’s fertility decline for its own organizational purposes (citation).
21 Because the electoral reform in Taiwan was relatively recent as the first post-reform election only took place in 2006, we still need to monitor future developments.
Care Insurance in 2012 as a way of economizing the cost of care while delivering the necessary levels of care. It is still too early to say what changes this new reform might bring in the actual life of the elderly in need and their families.

Although many have attributed the high rates of inter-generational cohabitation to the Confucian family values, as noted earlier, the persistence of the extended family in East Asia might also be the mirror image of the underdevelopment of old-age public pension. In fact, the pension replacement rates are generally lower in East Asia even when there are public pension schemes. The gross pension replacement rates for average earners in Japan and South Korea are well below the OECD average, while the same rates for Spain and Italy are above the OECD average. Spain, in particular, has the most generous public old-age pension of the familialist welfare states (OECD 2011, *Pensions At A Glance*, 119). In Taiwan, for which there is not OECD data, we can safely estimate that the gross pension replacement rate was even lower since the coverage of public pension itself had been very limited until 2009. In 2009, only about 16.40% of the elderly in Taiwan had income from retirement benefit/insurance. 17.12% of the elderly relied on government assistance, and 42% relied on economic support from their children (Ministry of Interior, Taiwan, *Survey for the Living Conditions of Elderly People* 2009).

Given the context of low social security benefits, the weakening of welfare providing functions of the family is particularly worrying in East Asia. Existing studies show that weather the elderly live alone or with their children affects their odds of falling into poverty by significantly bigger margins in East Asian countries and the US (Murozumi and Shikata 2004). In fact, according to the OECD data, both Japan and South Korea have higher poverty rates of the elderly than the OECD average (see Figure 9). In an international comparison, Korea stands out for its high poverty rate among the elderly. Korea’s extremely high suicide rate for the elderly—several times higher than most other OECD countries—has to be placed in this economic context. Even in Japan, which looks better relatively Korea, average amount of monthly pension for elderly who had been self-employed was roughly 55,000 yen in 2009 (roughly about 600 dollar). This is hardly enough for subsistence unless the elderly live with their children. As a result, many elderly citizens who have no support from their children fall below the poverty line. More than half of those on public assistance in Japan are elderly people. We can expect the Japanese situation to get much worse. Those who entered the labor market after the burst of the bubble are much less likely than the previous cohorts to have regular full-time employment. This means that the coverage of earnings-related public pensions is shrinking. This means two things for the near future: (i) the post-bubble cohorts will not be able to financially help their parents, and (ii) a much larger percentage of these cohorts will fall into poverty requiring public assistance. The poverty rates among the Japanese elderly are expected to rise.
Figure 7 also shows an interesting contrast between Korea and Japan. The poverty rates among families with children are much higher in Japan. Although Japan and South Korea both have means-tested cash benefits for families with children, the coverage is more generous in Korea. As we have discussed, the coverage of childcare is higher in Korea as well. The relative underdevelopment of support for families with children in Japan implies greater poverty rates for this category of families, and yet another hurdle for Japan to reverse its fertility decline.

Japan bears an important lesson for South Korea and Taiwan. It is crucial: (i) not to link employment status to old age via the public pension system; (ii) to have a relatively generous minimum pension to prevent people from falling into poverty; and (iii) to reduce the childcare cost and provide more financial and childcare support for families.
Tables and Figures

Figure 1 Demographic Aging

Table 1: Total Fertility Rate in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fertility Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.Korea</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD Family data base, online, Chart SF2.1.A: Total fertility rate for OECD countries (19701, 1995, 2009); the figure for Taiwan is for 2008 (Ito 2009, Table 1).

Table 2: Gender Wage Gap (male wage-female wage) for fulltime workers in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Gender Gap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD 26-average</td>
<td><strong>16.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Living Arrangements of Elderly (65 and older)

Source: Data for South Korea (year 2000) from Nittame (2006), Table 1; data for Japan (2009) from Demographic Aging White Papers 2011 平成23年版高齢社会白書, Figure 1-2-1-4; Taiwan (2005) from Table 4 in http://www.gde.go.jp/Japanese/Publish/Download/Report/pdf/2008_114_04.pdf

Data for European countries come from Household Structure in the EU, Eurostat (2010), Table 7.1: The living arrangements of people aged 65 years and over in 2007. This table breaks down household types for each sex. We have only used the % for elderly females. Thus they are not directly comparable with the percentages for the East Asian countries, which include both men and women.

Figure 3. Enrolment Rates of Child Care and Early Childhood Education

OECD Family database, year of the figures 2008;

The data for Taiwan is for 2007, from Tsai (2008), table 7.
Figure 4: Public and Private Spending on Long-Term Care (% of GDP) in 2008


Figure 5. Public expenditure for daycare /home-help service for children, % of GDP)

Source: OECD SOCX Database.
Figure 6. Public Expenditure for Residential care/home help service for the elderly, % of GDP

Source: OECD SOCX Database

Figure 7: Gender and Family Attitudes in Selected Countries (% of responses)

Figure 8: Attitudes Concerning Filial Responsibility toward Elderly Parents (% of responses)


Figure 9. Poverty among Children and the Elderly

Bibliography


