On time consistency for mean-variance portfolio selection

Elena Vigna

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Abstract

This paper addresses a comparison between different approaches to time inconsistency for the mean-variance portfolio selection problem. We define a suitable intertemporal preferences-driven reward and use it to compare the three possible approaches to time inconsistency for the mean-variance portfolio selection problem over $[t_0, T]$: precommitment approach (Zhou & Li (2000)), game theoretical approach (Basak & Chabakauri (2010), Björk & Murgoci (2010)), and dynamic approach (Pedersen & Peskir (2016)). We find that the precommitment strategy beats the other strategies if the investor only cares at the viewpoint at time $t_0$ and is not concerned to be time-inconsistent in $(t_0, T)$; the Nash-equilibrium strategy dominates the dynamic strategy until a time point $t^* \in (t_0, T)$ and is dominated by the dynamic strategy from $t^*$ onwards.

Keywords. Time inconsistency, dynamic programming, Bellman’s optimality principle, precommitment approach, Nash perfect equilibrium, mean-variance portfolio selection.

JEL classification: C61, D81, G11.

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†University of Torino and Collegio Carlo Alberto, Italy. Corso Unione Sovietica 218 bis, 10134, Torino, Italy. E–Mail: elena.vigna@unito.it. Tel. +39 011 670 5754.
1 Introduction

The notion of time inconsistency for optimization problems dates back to Strotz (1956). Broadly speaking, time inconsistency arises in an intertemporal optimization problem when the optimal strategy selected at some time \( t \) is no longer optimal at time \( s > t \). In other words, a strategy is time-inconsistent when the individual at future time \( s > t \) is tempted to deviate from the strategy decided at time \( t \). It is well known that an optimization problem gives raise to time-inconsistent strategies when the Bellman’s principle does not hold and dynamic programming cannot be applied. In finance, a notable example of problem which is time-inconsistent is the mean-variance problem, where the time inconsistency is due to the fact that there is a non-linear function of the expectation of final wealth in the optimization criterion (due to the presence of the variance of final wealth). Another important problem which produces a time-inconsistent behaviour is the investment-consumption problem with non-exponential discounting. This was the case studied by Strotz (1956), and time inconsistency arises because the initial point in time enters in an essential way the objective criterion. For a clarifying formalization of the possible sources of time inconsistency in intertemporal optimization problems, see Björk & Murgoci (2010).

In the last two decades there has been a renewed interest in time inconsistency for financial and economic problems. According to Strotz (1956) there are two possible ways to deal with time-inconsistent problems: (i) precommitment approach; (ii) consistent planning approach. In the precommitment approach, the controller fixes an initial point \((t_0, x_0)\) and finds the optimal control law \( \hat{u} \) that maximizes the objective functional at time \( t_0 \) with wealth \( x_0 \), \( J(t_0, x_0, u) \), disregarding the fact that at future time \( t > t_0 \) the control law \( \hat{u} \) will not be the maximizer of the objective functional at time \( t \) with wealth \( x_t \), \( J(t, x_t, u) \); therefore, he precommits to follow the initial strategy \( \hat{u} \), despite the fact that at future dates he will no longer be optimal according to his criterion. In the consistent planning approach, one tries to avoid time inconsistency by selecting the “best plan among those that he will actually follow”. This approach translates into the search of a Nash subgame perfect equilibrium point. Intuitively, sitting at time \( t \) the future time interval \([t, T]\) can be seen as a continuum of players, each player \( s \geq t \) being the “reincarnation” at time \( s \) of the player who sits at time \( t \). With this approach, a time-consistent equilibrium policy is the collection of all decisions
\( \hat{u}(s, \cdot) \) taken by any player \( s \in [t, T] \), such that if player \( t \) knows that all players coming after him (in \((t, T)\)) will use the control \( \hat{u} \), then it is optimal to him, too, to play control \( \hat{u} \).

The literature is full of examples of applications of the two approaches outlined. For conciseness reasons, we here report only a few of them. For instance, the mean-variance portfolio selection problem has been solved with the precommitment approach by Richardson (1989), Bajeux-Besnainou & Portait (1998), Zhou & Li (2000) and Li & Ng (2000), the first two with the martingale method, the last two with an embedding technique that transforms the mean-variance problem into a standard linear-quadratic control problem. The game theoretical solution to the mean-variance problem has been found originally by Basak & Chabakauri (2010), then extended to a more general class of time-inconsistent problems by Björk & Murgoci (2010). Other papers on the consistent planning approach for the mean-variance problem are Björk, Murgoci & Zhou (2014), Czichowsky (2013). The problem of non-exponential discounting, firstly introduced by Strotz (1956), has been treated with the game theoretical approach by Ekeland & Pirvu (2008), Ekeland, Mbodji & Pirvu (2012).

The precommitment strategy and the game theoretical approach are not the only ways to attack a problem that gives rise to time inconsistency. An alternative approach has been introduced by Pedersen & Peskir (2016) for the mean-variance portfolio selection problem, namely, the dynamically optimal strategy. The dynamic solution to the mean-variance problem in continuous-time introduced by Pedersen & Peskir (2016) is a novel approach to time inconsistency, although related work can be found in a recent paper by Karnam, Ma & Zhang (2016). The strategy proposed by Pedersen & Peskir (2016) is time-consistent in the sense that it does not depend on initial time and initial state variable, but differs from the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy. Moreover, their dynamic approach is intuitive and formalizes a quite natural approach to time inconsistency: it represents the behaviour of an optimizer who continuously revaluates his position and solves infinitely many problems in an instantaneously optimal way. The dynamically optimal individual is similar to the continuous version of the naive individual described by Pollak (1968). At each time \( t \) he turns out to be the “reincarnation” of the precommitted investor, for at time \( t \) he plays the strategy that the time-\( t \) precommitted investor would play, forgetting about his past and ignoring his future, and deviates from it immediately after, by wearing the clothes of the time \( t^+ \) precommitted investor. It is worth noting that the dynamically optimal approach has
strong similarities also with the receding horizon procedure or the model predictive control
(so-called rolling horizon procedures, see Powell (2011)), that are well established methods
of repeated optimization over a rolling horizon for engineering optimization problems with
an infinite time horizon.\footnote{In the problem considered in this paper the time interval over which the optimization is done shrinks when time passes, while it remains fixed in the problems where the receding horizon procedure is applied.}

This paper adds to the debate on what is the “appropriate” approach to time inco-
sistency by investigating the differences among the three approaches described above. We
define a suitable intertemporal preferences-driven reward and use it to compare the three
outlined approaches to time inconsistency for the mean-variance portfolio selection problem:
precommitment, consistent planning and dynamic optimality. A preview of the results is
the following. Expectedly, the precommitment strategy beats the other strategies if the in-
vestor only cares at the view point at time $t_0$ and is not concerned to be time-inconsistent
in $(t_0, T)$; for the comparison between the two time-consistent strategies, we find that the
Nash-equilibrium strategy dominates the dynamically optimal strategy until a time point
$t^* \in (t_0, T)$ and is dominated by the dynamically optimal strategy from $t^*$ onwards. We
prove existence and uniqueness of the break even point $t^*$ and provide a closed form for it.
Interestingly, the break even point $t^*$ does not depend on wealth, while it increases with the
market price of risk and the time horizon $T$. These results are in line with the results in
Pedersen & Peskir (2016), who also address the comparison among the two time-consistent
strategies. Differently from them, we make the comparison at any time $t \in [t_0, T]$ and not
only at initial time $t_0$ and final time $T$.

This is not the only paper on the comparison among the three approaches to time inco-
sistency. In a companion paper, Vigna (2017) disentangles the notion of time consistency
into the two notions of tail optimality of a control map and preferences consistency of an
optimizer, in the attempt to shed light on the differences between time-consistent and time-
inconsistent problems, and between the three approaches to time inconsistency.

The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the mean-variance
optimization problem, specify the financial market and list the strategies corresponding
to each of the three approaches to time inconsistency. In Section 3, we define a suitable
intertemporal preferences-driven reward and compare the three strategies according to it at
all times between initial time and final time. Section 4 concludes.

2 The mean-variance portfolio selection problem

2.1 Statement of the problem

An investor, endowed with a wealth \( x_0 > 0 \) at time \( t_0 \geq 0 \), is faced with a portfolio selection problem on the time horizon \([t_0, T] \). The financial market available for the portfolio allocation problem is the Black-Scholes model (see e.g. Björk (1998)). This consists of two assets, a riskless one, whose price \( B(t) \) follows the dynamics:

\[
\frac{dB(t)}{B(t)} = rB(t)dt,
\]

where \( r > 0 \), and a risky asset, whose price dynamics \( S(t) \) follows a geometric Brownian motion with drift \( \lambda \geq r \) and volatility \( \sigma > 0 \):

\[
\frac{dS(t)}{S(t)} = \lambda S(t)dt + \sigma S(t)dW(t),
\]

where \( W(t) \) is a standard Brownian motion defined on a filtered probability space \((\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \{\mathcal{F}_t\}, \mathbb{P})\), with \( \mathcal{F}_t = \sigma \{W(s) : s \leq t\} \) the natural filtration. The proportion of portfolio invested in the risky asset at time \( t \) is denoted by \( u(t) \). The fund at time \( t \) under control \( u \), \( X^u(t) \), grows according to the following SDE:

\[
\frac{dX^u(t)}{X^u(t)} = X^u(t)[u(t)(\lambda - r) + r] dt + X^u(t)u(t)\sigma dW(t),
\]

\[
X^u(t_0) = x_0 \geq 0.
\]

The investor is a mean-variance optimizer and his aim is to solve the problem

\[
\sup_{u \in \mathcal{U}} J(t_0, x_0, u) \equiv [E_{t_0,x_0}(X^u(T)) - \alpha V_{t_0,x_0}(X^u(T))],
\]

where \( \alpha > 0 \) is a measure of risk aversion, and \( \mathcal{U} \) is some set of admissible strategies.
2.2 Three possible approaches

Because Problem (2) is time-inconsistent, the investor can adopt three alternative investment strategies, that are optimal according to different perspectives.

If the investor cares only at being time-consistent at time $t_0$, and does not care of being time-inconsistent at future time $t > t_0$, then he could adopt the precommitment strategy $u^p$ (see Zhou & Li (2000)):

1. precommitment policy $u^p_{t_0,x_0}(t,x) = \frac{\delta}{\sigma x} \left[ x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} - x + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \right], \quad (3)$

where $\delta = (\lambda - r)/\sigma$ is the market price of risk, or Sharpe ratio. If the investor cares also at being time-consistent at future time $t > t_0$, then he can adopt either the time-consistent Nash equilibrium policy $u^e$ (see Basak & Chabakauri (2010) and Björk & Murgoci (2010)):

2. Nash equilibrium policy $u^e_{t_0,x_0}(t,x) = \frac{\delta}{\sigma x} \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{-r(T-t)}, \quad (4)$

or the time-consistent dynamically optimal policy $u^d$ (see Pedersen & Peskir (2016)):

3. dynamically optimal policy $u^d_{t_0,x_0}(t,x) = \frac{\delta}{\sigma x} \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{(\delta^2-r)(T-t)}. \quad (5)$

If the investor selects the precommitment policy, his optimal wealth follows the dynamics:

$$X^p_t = x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \left[ e^{\delta^2(t-t_0)} - e^{-\delta(W_t-W_{t_0})-\frac{\delta^2}{2}(t-t_0)} \right]; \quad (6)$$

if he selects the Nash-equilibrium policy, his optimal wealth follows the dynamics:

$$X^e_t = x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} + \frac{\delta}{2\alpha} e^{r(T-t)} [\delta(t-t_0) + W_t - W_{t_0}]; \quad (7)$$

if he selects the dynamically optimal policy, his optimal wealth follows the dynamics:

$$X^d_t = x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} \left[ e^{\delta^2(t-t_0)} - 1 + \delta \int_{t_0}^t e^{\delta^2(t-s)} dW_s \right]. \quad (8)$$
In all cases, the value function associated to the adoption of strategy \( u \) is

\[
V^u : [t_0, T] \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}
\]

\[
V^u(t, x) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x}(X^u(T)) - \alpha \nabla_{t,x}(X^u(T)).
\]  

\( (9) \)

3 Comparison among different strategies

In this section, we show how to make a comparison among the three approaches illustrated in Section 2.2. The comparison will be performed both at initial time \( t_0 \) and also at future time \( t > t_0 \), by defining proper stochastic reward functions at time \( t \) for each strategy.

In order to make a comparison of the three strategies, we will henceforth imagine that we have three investors: the precommitted static one (P-investor), the Nash-equilibrium one (E-investor) and the dynamically optimal one (D-investor), who will adopt the policies (3), (4) and (5), respectively.

3.1 Comparison among strategies at initial time \( t_0 \)

The comparison among the three strategies at initial time \( t_0 \) is straightforward. It suffices to compare the three value functions at \( t_0 \).

Adopting the precommitment strategy (3), the value function at time \( t_0 \) with wealth \( x_0 \) is

\[
V^{u_p}(t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0}(X^{u_p}(T)) - \alpha \nabla_{t_0,x_0}(X^{u_p}(T)) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 1}{4\alpha}.
\]  

\( (10) \)

Adopting the Nash equilibrium strategy (4), the value function at time \( t_0 \) with wealth \( x_0 \) is

\[
V^{u_e}(t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0}(X^{u_e}(T)) - \alpha \nabla_{t_0,x_0}(X^{u_e}(T)) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{\delta^2(T-t_0)}{4\alpha}.
\]  

\( (11) \)
Adopting the dynamically optimal strategy \((5)\), the value function at time \(t_0\) with wealth \(x_0\) is

\[
V^{u^d}(t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0}(X^{u^d}(T)) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t_0,x_0}(X^{u^d}(T)) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{4e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - e^{2\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 3}{8\alpha}.
\]

The following results hold:

**Proposition 3.1.** For all \(t_0 \leq T\) and \(x_0 \in \mathbb{R}\)

\[
V^{u^p}(t_0, x_0) \geq V^{u^e}(t_0, x_0) \geq V^{u^d}(t_0, x_0).
\]

The equalities hold if and only if \(t_0 = T\), or \(\delta = 0\).

**Proof.** For the first of the two inequalities:

\[
V^{u^p}(t_0, x_0) - V^{u^e}(t_0, x_0) = \frac{e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 1 - \delta^2(T-t_0)}{4\alpha} \geq 0,
\]

where the inequality holds as an equality if and only if \(\delta^2(T-t_0) = 0\), that holds if and only if \(t_0 = T\) or \(\delta = 0\).

For the second of the two inequalities:

\[
V^{u^e}(t_0, x_0) - V^{u^d}(t_0, x_0) = \frac{e^{2\delta^2(T-t_0)} + 2\delta^2(T-t_0) + 3 - 4e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)}}{8\alpha} \geq 0,
\]

where the inequality is due to the facts that (i) \(\delta^2(T-t_0) \geq 0\), (ii) the function \(f(x) = e^{2x} + 2x + 3 - 4e^x\) is strictly increasing, and (iii) \(f(0) = 0\). (ii) and (iii) imply that the inequality holds as an equality if and only if \(t_0 = T\) or \(\delta = 0\). \(\square\)

**Remark 1.** We see from Proposition 3.1 that, considering the reward only at time \(t_0\), the P-investor receives a higher value function than the E-investor and the D-investor. This is obvious, because the precommitment strategy by definition maximizes the objective criterion at initial time. The second inequality, already found in Pedersen & Peskir (2016), shows that at initial time \(t_0\) the Nash-equilibrium strategy provides a higher value function than the dynamically optimal strategy. This is also expected and consistent with the fact that,
by construction, the Nash-equilibrium strategy is the best among all the time-consistent strategies.

3.2 Comparison among strategies at time $t$: Reward functions and expected reward functions

The comparison cannot be done only at time $t_0$, otherwise the obvious answer to the question *what is the best strategy to be adopted* is “the precommitment strategy”, that beats all the others from the point of view at $t_0$. Indeed, if the investor only cares of being mean-variance at time $t_0$, he will select the precommitment strategy, and will not care of being time-inconsistent after $t_0$.

Suppose instead that the investor is concerned of being time-consistent at every $t \in [t_0, T]$. Then, assuming that he does not change his mean-variance preferences, his criterion at every time $t \in [t_0, T]$ will still be to maximize the mean of final wealth while minimizing its variance. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the **reward for the mean-variance investor** at time $t$ with wealth $x_t$ adopting strategy $u$ is:

$$ J^u(t, x_t) = \mathbb{E}_{t, X_t^u} (X_T^u) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t, X_t^u} (X_T^u). $$

Let us notice that the comparison among the three investors at time $t > t_0$ is delicate, because, while at time $t_0$ they have the same wealth $x_0$, at time $t > t_0$ they have different wealths, because they have been following three different investment strategies from $t_0$ to $t$. The P-investor will have wealth $X_t^p$, the E-investor will have wealth $X_t^e$, the D-investor will have wealth $X_t^d$, and in general these levels of wealth will be different from each other. Nevertheless, considering (14), their degree of happiness can be measured by their rewards:

$$ J^p(t, X_t^p) = \mathbb{E}_{t, X_t^p} (X_T^p) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t, X_t^p} (X_T^p) \quad \text{reward for the P-investor at time } t $$

$$ J^e(t, X_t^e) = \mathbb{E}_{t, X_t^e} (X_T^e) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t, X_t^e} (X_T^e) = V^e(t, X_t^e) \quad \text{reward for the E-investor at time } t $$

$$ J^d(t, X_t^d) = \mathbb{E}_{t, X_t^d} (X_T^d) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t, X_t^d} (X_T^d) = V^d(t, X_t^d) \quad \text{reward for the D-investor at time } t. $$
We notice that in the last two cases, the reward at time \( t \) coincides with the value function at time \( t \), because the Nash-equilibrium and the dynamically optimal strategies are time-consistent. In the first case, the reward at time \( t \) does not coincide with the value function, because the investor follows the time-inconsistent strategy decided at time \( t_0 \) and therefore does not optimize the mean-variance criterion at any time \( t > t_0 \).

Notice that, standing at time \( t_0 \), the rewards \( J_p(t, X^p_t) \), \( V^e(t, X^e_t) \) and \( V^d(t, X^d_t) \) that refer to time \( t > t_0 \) are random variables. However, it is possible to compare them standing at time \( t_0 \), by comparing their time-\( t_0 \) expectations. We thus define the following expected reward functions:

\[
R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} (J_p(t, X^p_t)) \quad (15)
\]

\[
R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} (V^e(t, X^e_t)) \quad (16)
\]

\[
R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} (V^d(t, X^d_t)) \quad (17)
\]

In general, the expected value in \( t_0 \) of the reward at time \( t \) of the investor who follows the strategy \( u \) is

\[
R(t, u; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{t, X^u_p (X^u_T)} - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t, X^u_p (X^u_T)} \right] . \quad (18)
\]

### 3.2.1 Comparison of expected reward functions at times \( t_0 \) and \( T \)

For the comparison among the expected rewards of the three strategies at times \( t_0 \) and \( T \), the following results hold:

**Proposition 3.2.** If \( t_0 < T \), \( \delta \neq 0 \), and \( x_0 \in \mathbb{R} \), then

\[
R(t_0, u^p; t_0, x_0) > R(t_0, u^e; t_0, x_0) > R(t_0, u^d; t_0, x_0)
\]

and

\[
R(T, u^p; t_0, x_0) = R(T, u^d; t_0, x_0) > R(T, u^e; t_0, x_0)
\]
Proof. For every strategy \( u \)
\[
R(t_0, u; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0}(X_T^u) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t_0, x_0}(X_T^u) \right] = V^u(t_0, x_0).
\]

Claim (19) follows by Proposition 3.1.

For every strategy \( u \),
\[
\mathbb{E}_{T, X_T^u} - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{T, X_T^u} = X_T^u \quad \Rightarrow \quad R(T, u; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0}(X_T^u).
\]

Using the dynamics (6), (7) and (8), we get:
\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0}(X_T^p) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0}(X_T^d) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} \left( e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 1 \right)
\]
and
\[
\mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0}(X_T^d) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{\delta^2(T-t_0)}{2\alpha}.
\]
If \(\delta^2(T-t_0) \neq 0\), then \( e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 1 > \delta^2(T-t_0) \). Therefore, claim (20) is obtained.

Remark 2. Result (20) was already found by Pedersen & Peskir (2016), in a first attempt of comparison between the two time-consistent strategies for the mean-variance problem. In their comparative analysis, they did not provide detailed argumentation for the reasonableness of the method used for the comparison.

Remark 3. Proposition 3.2 indicates that the static precommitment strategy is apparently never inferior to the other strategies. Similarly to Remark 1, this is due to the fact that the criterion \( R(t, u; t_0, x_0) \) illustrates the degree of happiness at time \( t \) of the mean-variance optimizer as measured at time \( t_0 \). No surprise that the precommitment strategy gives an outcome at least as good as the other strategies. This will be confirmed by Theorem 3.4 in Section 3.2.3. The comparison between the two time-consistent strategies is commented in the next section.
3.2.2 Comparison of expected reward functions at time $t$: comparison between time-consistent strategies

From Proposition 3.2, we see that the Nash-equilibrium strategy provides a higher reward than the dynamic strategy at initial time $t_0$, and a lower reward than the dynamic strategy at final time $T$, suggesting the occurrence of a swap between the two strategies at some time $t^* \in (t_0, T)$. The next theorem shows the existence and uniqueness of such a break even point.

**Theorem 3.3.** If $t_0 < T$, $\delta \neq 0$, and $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$, there exists one and only one point $t^* \in (t_0, T)$ such that

$$R(t^*, u^e; t_0, x_0) = R(t^*, u^d; t_0, x_0).$$

The break even point $t^*$ is the unique solution of the equation

$$e^{2\delta^2(T-t)} - (4e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} + 4\delta^2 t_0 - 3) + 2\delta^2(T-t) = 0.$$  

**Proof.** By defining the function

$$\Delta R^{ed}(t) = R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0) - R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0),$$

claim (22) is equivalent to prove the existence and the uniqueness of a root of the function $\Delta R^{ed}(t)$ in the interval $(t_0, T)$. Proposition 3.2 yields:

$$\Delta R^{ed}(t_0) > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta R^{ed}(T) < 0.$$  

Recalling that both the Nash-equilibrium strategy and the dynamic strategy are time-consistent, we can obtain $V^e(t, X^e_t)$ and $V^d(t, X^d_t)$ just by replacing $t_0$ with $t$, and $x_0$ with $X^e_t$ and $X^d_t$ in (11) and (12), respectively.

$$V^e(t, X^e_t) = X^e_t e^{\frac{\delta^2(T-t)}{4\alpha}}.$$  

$$V^d(t, X^d_t) = X^d_t e^{\frac{4e^{\delta^2(T-t)} - e^{2\delta^2(T-t)} - 3}{8\alpha}}.$$
Using (16), (17), (26) and (27), we have

\[ R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^e) e^{r(T-t)} + \frac{\delta^2(T-t)}{4\alpha}, \] (28)

and

\[ R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^d) e^{r(T-t)} + \frac{4e^{\delta^2(T-t)} - e^{2\delta^2(T-t)} - 3}{8\alpha}. \] (29)

Using the closed-form expressions (7) and (8), we get

\[ \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^e) = x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} + \frac{\delta^2}{2\alpha} (t - t_0) e^{-r(T-t)}, \] (30)

and

\[ \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^d) = x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{(\delta^2-r)(T-t)} \left[ e^{\delta^2(t-t_0)} - 1 \right]. \] (31)

By plugging (30) and (31) into (28) and (29), respectively, and using (24), after some simplifications we get

\[ \Delta R^{ed}(t) = \frac{e^{2\delta^2(T-t)} + (3 - 4e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 4\delta^2t_0) + 2\delta^2(T-t)}{8\alpha}. \] (32)

The function \( \Delta R^{ed}(t) \) is continuous and, due to (25), it takes different signs at the extremes of \([t_0, T]\). Moreover,

\[ \frac{d}{dt} \left( \Delta R^{ed}(t) \right) = -2\delta^2 (e^{2\delta^2(T-t)} + 1) < 0, \]

that implies that \( \Delta R^{ed}(t) \) is also strictly decreasing. Therefore, there exists a unique root of \( \Delta R^{ed}(t) \) in \((t_0, T)\) and is given by the unique \( t^* \) that nullifies the numerator of (32). This concludes the proof. \( \square \)

Remark 4. Let us notice that Theorem 3.3 implies that

\[ R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0) > R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0) \quad \forall \ t \in [t_0, t^*) \]

and

\[ R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0) < R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0) \quad \forall \ t \in (t^*, T], \]
meaning that, among the time-consistent strategies for the mean-variance problem, the Nash-equilibrium strategy provides on average a higher reward until time $t^*$, while the dynamic strategy provides on average a higher reward from time $t^*$ onwards. This result is meaningful and suggests that the importance allocated by the decision-maker to different points in time should affect his attitude toward time inconsistency, and should play a part in the entire decision-making process. The first inequality is also consistent with the fact that the Nash equilibrium strategy is the best plan among those that are time-consistent: the criterion “best” here indicates the best at initial time $t_0$, and indeed $R(t_0, u^e; t_0, x_0) > R(t_0, u^d; t_0, x_0)$. Clearly, selecting the best time-consistent plan only from the view point at time $t_0$ can be considered insufficient for a decision-maker who is intrinsically an intertemporal optimizer.

While a detailed analysis of the break even point is beyond the scope of this paper, we notice that $t^*$ does not depend neither on wealth nor on risk aversion $\alpha$. It depends only on the market price of risk $\delta$, on the time horizon $T$ and on initial time $t_0$. Table 1 reports the value of $t^*$ with some typical values of $\delta$ and $T$, when the initial time is $t_0 = 0$: $\delta = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5$ and $T = 10, 20, 30, 40$ (see Vigna (2014)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sharpe ratio $\delta$</th>
<th>Time horizon $T$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Break even point $t^*$ with different Sharpe ratios $\delta$ and time horizons $T$ (in years).

The break even point increases with $\delta$ and with $T$. This is expected, because when $\delta = 0$ the three strategies collapse into the riskless strategy (where all the fund is invested continuously in the riskless asset) and there is no difference between portfolios, value functions and reward functions. The value and reward functions are trivially the same also in the degenerate case $T = 0$. We notice that $t^*$ varies between one week for 10 years and small $\delta$ ($\delta = 0.1$) and 17 years for 40 years and high $\delta$ ($\delta = 0.5$). In relative terms, $t^*$ ranges between 0.01% and 2% of $T$ for small $\delta$, and between 25% and 43% of $T$ for high $\delta$. 

14
The intuition behind the fact that $t^*$ increases with $\delta$ and $T$ can be the following. The dynamically optimal strategy is more aggressive than the Nash-equilibrium strategy by a factor $e^{\delta^2(T-t)}$ (see (4) and (5)). When $\delta$ or $T$ increase, the dynamically optimal strategy becomes even more aggressive than the Nash-equilibrium strategy. A more aggressive strategy increases to a larger extent the variance of final wealth, and to a lower extent the mean of final wealth, hence the global effect is a reduction of the intertemporal reward, and this happens with higher severity with the dynamically optimal strategy than with the Nash-equilibrium strategy. Therefore, an increase in $\delta$ or $T$ moves the break even point (that is the time point when the expected rewards of the two strategies switch) more far in the future, i.e., $t^*$ increases.

### 3.2.3 Comparison of expected reward functions at time $t$: comparison among time-inconsistent and time-consistent strategies

We now intend to compare the precommitment time-inconsistent strategy with the two time-consistent strategies considered above. In order to do this, we need to calculate the expected value in $t_0$ of the reward function for the precommitment strategy (see (15)):

$$R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} [J^p(t, X^p_t)] = \mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} [\mathbb{E}_{t, X^p_t}(X^p_T) - \alpha \mathbb{V}_{t, X^p_t}(X^p_T)].$$

As we noticed in Section 3.2, and differently from the other two cases, in the precommitment case the value of the reward $J^p(t, X^p_t)$ does not coincide with the value function $V^p(t, X^p_t)$ calculated at time $t$, because the precommitment strategy is not time-consistent. Indeed, if the precommitted investor finds himself at time $t$ with fund $X^p_t$, he will still apply the precommitted strategy (3). Therefore, the value of his reward $J^p(t, X^p_t)$ will not be the supremum of all possible values, the value function at $(t, X^p_t)$: the value function could be reached only by applying a new precommitment strategy with starting point $t$ and initial wealth $X^p_t$. In other words, for the static precommitted investor the “value function” has meaning only at time $t_0$ and has no meaning after $t_0$. However, inspired by (14), we can still assume that the reward for the precommitted investor at time $t$ with wealth $X^p_t$ is given by $J^p(t, X^p_t)$, and we can calculate its expectation at $t_0$, $\mathbb{E}_{t_0, x_0} [J^p(t, X^p_t)]$. 

15
If the static investor has wealth $x_t^p$ at time $t > t_0$, and he adopts the investment strategy (3), then his future wealth at time $\tau > t$ follows the dynamics given by the SDE:

$$
\begin{align*}
\begin{cases}
    dX^p_\tau &= X^p_\tau [r + u^p(\tau, X^p_\tau)(\lambda - r)] d\tau + X^p_\tau u^p(\tau, X^p_\tau) \sigma dW_\tau \\
    X^p_t &= x_t^p 
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
$$

(33)

where

$$
u^p(\tau, x) = \frac{\delta}{\sigma} \frac{1}{x} (Ke^{-r(T-\tau)} - x)
$$

with

$$K = x_0e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)}.
$$

(34)

Let us define the new stochastic process

$$Z_\tau = K^{-r(T-t_0)} - X^p_\tau e^{-r(\tau-t_0)},
$$

(35)

with $K$ given by (34). By applying Ito’s lemma to $Z_\tau$, we get its dynamics for $\tau > t$:

$$
\begin{align*}
\begin{cases}
    dZ_\tau &= -\delta^2 Z_\tau d\tau - \delta Z_\tau dW_\tau \\
    Z_t &= Ke^{-r(T-t_0)} - X^p_t e^{-r(t-t_0)}.
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
$$

(36)

Therefore

$$Z_\tau = Z_t e^{-\frac{3}{2}\delta^2(\tau-t) - \delta(W_\tau-W_t)}
$$

(37)

where $Z_t$ is given by (36). Plugging (37) into (35), after some simplifications, we get the solution to (33), i.e. the dynamics of $X^p_\tau$ for $\tau > t$:

$$X^p_\tau = \left[ x_0e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-\tau)} \right] +
\left[ x_t^p - x_0e^{r(t-t_0)} - \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \right] e^{(r-\frac{3}{2}\delta^2)(\tau-t)} \cdot e^{-\delta(W_\tau-W_t)}.
$$

(38)
Therefore

\[ X_T^p = \left[ x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} \right] + \]

\[ + \left[ x_t^p - x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} - \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \right] e^{(r-\frac{1}{2}\delta^2)(T-t)} \cdot e^{-\delta(W_T-W_t)}. \] (39)

Thus

\[ \mathbb{E}_{t,x_t^p} (X_T^p) = \left( 1 - e^{-\delta^2(T-t)} \right) \left( x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} \right) + x_t^p e^{(r-\delta^2)(T-t)} , \] (40)

and

\[ \nabla_{t,x_t^p} (X_T^p) = \left[ x_t^p - x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} - \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \right]^2 \left( e^{(2r-\delta^2)(T-t)} - e^{2(r-\delta^2)(T-t)} \right) . \] (41)

Therefore, the reward at time \( t \) for the precommitted investor is

\[ J_p(t, X_t^p) = \mathbb{E}_{t,x_t^p} (X_T^p) - \alpha \nabla_{t,x_t^p} (X_T^p) = \]

\[ \left( 1 - e^{-\delta^2(T-t)} \right) \left( x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} \right) + x_t^p e^{(r-\delta^2)(T-t)} + \]

\[ - \alpha \left[ x_t^p - x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} - \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \right]^2 \left( e^{(2r-\delta^2)(T-t)} - e^{2(r-\delta^2)(T-t)} \right) . \] (42)

Taking expectation at time \( t_0 \), we get:

\[ \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (J_p(t, X_t^p)) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} \left[ \mathbb{E}_{t,x_t^p} (X_T^p) - \alpha \nabla_{t,x_t^p} (X_T^p) \right] = \]

\[ \left( 1 - e^{-\delta^2(T-t)} \right) \left( x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} \right) + \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^p) e^{(r-\delta^2)(T-t)} + \]

\[ - \alpha \left[ \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^p) - x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} - \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)-r(T-t)} \right]^2 \left( e^{(2r-\delta^2)(T-t)} - e^{2(r-\delta^2)(T-t)} \right) . \] (43)

Using the dynamics (6), we get

\[ \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0} (X_t^p) = x_0 e^{r(t-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} e^{(\delta^2-r)(T-t)} \left[ e^{\delta^2(t-t_0)} - 1 \right] . \] (44)
Plugging (44) into (43), after some simplifications, we get the expected value in $t_0$ of the reward function at time $t$ for the precommitted investor:

$$R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) = \mathbb{E}_{t_0,x_0}(J^p(t, X^p_t)) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{4\alpha} \left[ 2e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - e^{2\delta^2(T-t)} - 1 \right]. \quad (45)$$

**Remark 5.** Notice that using (45) to calculate $R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0)$ in $t_0$ and $T$, we get

$$R(t_0, u^p; t_0, x_0) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{4\alpha} \left[ e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 1 \right],$$

which, as expected, coincides with (10), and

$$R(T, u^p; t_0, x_0) = x_0 e^{r(T-t_0)} + \frac{1}{2\alpha} \left[ e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - 1 \right],$$

which, as expected, coincides with (21).

We are now ready to compare the static precommitment strategy with the time-consistent strategies. The following results hold:

**Theorem 3.4.** If $t_0 < T$, $\delta \neq 0$, and $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}$,

$$R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) > R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0) \quad \text{for all } t \in [t_0, T], \quad (46)$$

$$R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) > R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0) \quad \text{for all } t \in [t_0, T), \quad (47)$$

and

$$R(T, u^p; t_0, x_0) = R(T, u^d; t_0, x_0). \quad (48)$$

**Proof.** By defining the function

$$\Delta R^{pe}(t) = R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) - R(t, u^e; t_0, x_0), \quad (49)$$

claim (46) is equivalent to the strict positivity of $\Delta R^{pe}(t)$ over $[t_0, T]$. By plugging (45) and
(28) into (49), we get:

$$\Delta R^{pe}(t) = \frac{1}{4\alpha} \left[ 2e^{\delta^2(T-t_0)} - e^{\delta^2(T-t)} - 1 - \delta^2(T + t - 2t_0) \right]. \tag{50}$$

The first derivatives of $\Delta R^{pe}(t)$ is

$$\frac{d(\Delta R^{pe}(t))}{dt} = \frac{\delta^2}{4\alpha} \left( e^{\delta^2(t-t)} - 1 \right) > 0 \quad \text{for } t \in (t_0, T),$$

implying that $\Delta R^{pe}(t)$ is increasing over $(t_0, T)$. Note that $\Delta R^{pe}(t_0) > 0$ by Proposition 3.2. Then, claim (46) follows.

By defining the function

$$\Delta R^{pd}(t) = R(t, u^p; t_0, x_0) - R(t, u^d; t_0, x_0), \tag{51}$$

claim (47) is equivalent to the strict positivity of $\Delta R^{pd}(t)$ over $[t_0, T)$, and claim (48) is equivalent to $\Delta R^{pd}(T) = 0$. By plugging (45) and (29) into (51), we get:

$$\Delta R^{pd}(t) = \frac{1}{8\alpha} \left[ e^{\delta^2(T-t)} - 1 \right]^2. \tag{52}$$

Then, claims (47) and (48) follow easily. $\square$

From Theorem 3.4 we see that the static precommitment strategy provides a higher expected reward for any time $t \in [t_0, T]$ than the two time-consistent strategies. As we observed in Remark 1 and Remark 3, this is due to the fact that the expectation of the future reward is done at time $t_0$. From Theorem 3.4 we also see that the difference $\Delta R^{pe}(t)$ between precommitment and Nash-equilibrium strategies is increasing over $[t_0, T]$, and reaches its maximum in $T$: this means that the positive difference between expected rewards becomes larger when time passes. On the contrary, the difference $\Delta R^{pd}(t)$ between precommitment and dynamic strategies is decreasing over $[t_0, T]$, and is null in $T$: this means that the positive difference between expected rewards becomes smaller when time passes, and disappears at terminal time $T$. 

19
4 Concluding remarks

In this paper we have addressed a comparison between the three common approaches to time inconsistency for the mean-variance portfolio selection problem, namely, precommitment approach, consistent planning approach and dynamical optimality approach. While the comparison at initial time $t_0$ is trivial, we have attempted to do a comparison also at time $t > t_0$, by defining an intertemporal stochastic time-$t$-reward, based on the assumption that the individual does not change his mean-variance preferences over time. A comparison between the expected values at time $t_0$ of the stochastic time-$t$-reward shows that, standing at time $t_0$, and expectedly, the precommitment approach beats the other two approaches, at the cost of being time-inconsistent. The comparison between the two time-consistent approaches, i.e., the consistent planning and the dynamical optimality approach, shows that the former dominates the latter from $t_0$ up to a unique break even point $t^* \in (t_0, T)$ and is dominated by the latter from $t^*$ to $T$.

The main message that one can probably get from this analysis is that when there is a problem that gives rise to time inconsistency there is no clear-cut answer to the issue “what is the right thing to do”. A normative approach that pretends to be universal fails to provide convincing arguments, for the appropriate behaviour is dictated not only by the non-linear optimizing criterion but also by other subjective factors, such as the attitude towards time consistency, and the importance given to different time intervals and singular points in time. Instead, we consider a philosophical approach more appropriate.

References


