The Mind and Society.

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BOOK REVIEWS

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The Mind and Society. By VILFREDO PARETO, translated and edited by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1935. 4 vols, 2033 pp. $20.00.

The American discussion of Pareto's treatise on general sociology[1] has already attained considerable dimensions, but to one fairly careful follower of it at least the impression the secondary literature gives is one of considerable confusion. Almost the only way in which the lines can be drawn is in terms of pro- and anti-. I can see little sign of a clarification of the substantive issues. In view of this situation it does not seem profitable to enter into a polemical discussion with any of the interpreters. I shall rather devote the present discussion to exposition of what seem to me to be some of the central elements of Pareto's thought and an indication of their derivation. I shall not attempt any general critical evaluation.

Some of Pareto's strong partisans have claimed for him an extraordinary degree of detachment from the currents of social thought of his time, implying perhaps that it was quite futile to try to understand him in terms of the theories and problems of his immediate predecessors. To a certain degree this is true. In a narrowly technical sense he had no immediate predecessors in sociology; he was member of no recognized "school." On the other hand, in a broader sense the principal components which go to make up his sociological theory are all elements which have played a major role in modern thought about man and society. His thought is part of, and deeply influenced by, the great broad stream of which sociology in a technical sense is a surface eddy.

We may single out three currents of this stream as of particular importance in the present context. One is the methodology of positive science, particularly the physical sciences. The second is the conception of rational action, particularly as developed in the main line of "orthodox" economic theory. The third, finally, is less definite but nevertheless highly important: it is the "humanistic" tradition of knowledge of the history and literature of the ancient world. The particular way in which Pareto combined these three elements will go a long way toward explaining the character of his work. The first two are most important for his formal analytical scheme,

[1] References here will be to the numbered sections which are uniform throughout the three editions.

the last for the more empirical aspects of his work, including his trends of choice in illustrative material.

The part which has been played by the methodological model of the physical sciences in all the social disciplines since about the eighteenth century is surely of paramount importance, not least in sociology. Directly or indirectly almost all the methodological discussions have turned on this group of questions, and a very large number of writers have set out to make sociology a science according to this model. In this respect Pareto's enterprise has a long list of antecedents. The interpretation of what the methodological model of physical science implied in direct relation to social data has, however, varied considerably. Here Pareto differs quite markedly from his most influential predecessors, such as Spencer.

By no means everything is completely clarified in Pareto's general methodological position. I cannot, in this brief discussion, enter into a careful analysis of the various problems involved. The following, however, seems to me the *main* line of his methodological doctrine, the one which fits in best with his substantive theoretical structure. *At a number of points the trend singled out is in conflict with others in his thought,* but for the sake of brevity I shall ignore this fact.

Science, Pareto says, is "logico-experimental."[2] This may be taken to mean that in a scientific theory are admissible two and only two orders of elements: logically correct reasoning and statements of observed or observable fact. The antithesis of the logical element is fallacious reasoning, which causes no methodological but only practical difficulties. Everyone is agreed that scientific theory is bound by the norms of logical correctness. It is in connection with the other, the element of experimental fact, that the methodological difficulties arise; there is by no means agreement as to what constitutes observable fact.

One thing seems to be clear, namely, the universal requirement that a fact shall not be "subjective," that it shall be as it were forced on the scientist whether he will or no, and thus be independent of his wishes or "personal equation." In this sense Pareto continually contrasts it with a "manifestation of a sentiment." It is also something which is observable and verifiable. A proposition is only a statement of fact, so far as its content is capable of submission to cognitive experience, experimentally or otherwise. At least potential agreement in their descriptive terms by different observers is certainly a requirement of the concept of fact.

Beyond this it is noteworthy that Pareto does not lay down any rigid criteria as to what constitutes fact. He does not use the term "sense impression," or any related term, from which one could infer a "materialistic" position. His whole conception, with the two exceptions of the basic distinctions in principle between facts and manifestations of sentiments on the one hand, and metaphysical, that is, unverifiable propositions on the other, remains highly flexible and undogmatic. Even here it is only the distinction in principle on which he insists. The concrete point at which the line is to be drawn remains open to discussion.

[2] The principal methodological discussion is to be found in Chapter I.

Two other points, however, are noteworthy. Pareto's failure to limit facts to sense data is important because he evidently does not share a view which is often associated with that formula, in the extreme case by the behaviorists. That is, he does not exclude data concerning the subjective "states of mind" of persons other than the scientific observer from the category of fact. On the contrary, as we shall see, the "subjective aspect" of human action is central to his whole scheme. In particular, it seems to me from his treatment of "theories and propositions" as observable facts[3] it is quite legitimate to infer that not only the physical properties of symbols, linguistic and otherwise, are included in the status of fact, but also their meanings. It is true that Pareto does not subject this question to explicit methodological analysis. But two things may be said. His explicit methodology leaves the question open and his actual scientific work involves a very large amount of this kind of observation.

On the other question he is more explicit. A fact, while it must be observable, need not be a complete concrete phenomenon. It may be an element or an aspect of a concrete phenomenon. Above all it is not quantitative completeness of factual knowledge which is the aim of science and the measure of its achievement. Indeed, Pareto holds it is strictly impossible to know "all the facts" about any given phenomenon, and were it possible it would be undesirable.[4] Pareto's insistence on the role of fact in science is not a repudiation of theoretical abstraction. On the contrary, the element of abstraction is involved in his concept of fact itself. A fact is a theoretically significant observable aspect, element, or property of a concrete phenomenon.

Similarly, a scientific theory is not a mere aggregation of discrete statements of fact. It is a statement of logically *interrelated* facts. It involves "laws," which Pareto defines as "uniformities in the facts,"[5] or as we may say, uniform modes of relation between facts. It is in the concept of law that the significance of abstraction comes out most clearly. A concrete phenomenon is in general a meeting point of the "operation" of a number of laws.[6] It is quite illegitimate to require, as a test of validity, direct concrete correspondence between the expectations derived from a scientific law and the concrete course of events. This will exist only so far as the latter is free from the influence of elements not formulated in the law in question. The logical necessity inherent in scientific theory must not be translated into empirical necessity.

This brings us to the second of the main elements of Pareto's thought we are considering. Scientific theory would certainly be normally held to constitute a "rational" achievement of the human mind. A body of thought deeply preoccupied at the same time both with the status of scientific theory and with human action could not fail to attempt to bring the two together. That is, there is raised the question: In what sense and to what extent could human action be understood in terms of the scientific knowl-

[3] Sec. 7, 18, 81.
[4] See especially Sec. 33, 39.
[5] Sec. 99.
[6] *Ibid.*

edge of his situation possessed or capable of acquisition by the actor? This problem has played a very great part indeed in the development of modern social thought.

The point at which approximately this standard of rationality of action has undergone the most systematic theoretical elaboration in a social science is in orthodox economic theory. The fact that Pareto was at the same time trained in the physical sciences and deeply preoccupied with scientific methodology, *plus* the fact that he was an eminent economic theorist, gives the setting for his analytical scheme. It must not be forgotten that the methodology of science is important not merely as guiding his attempt to remain strictly logico-experimental in his sociological procedure, but also it provides the criteria for one of the main *substantive* distinctions of his own positive theory.

I took pains above to state Pareto's view that scientific facts are not necessarily fully concrete facts but contain an element of abstraction. This view is of direct substantive importance in the present connection. Specifically, Pareto's principal motive for embarking on his sociological studies was his conviction of the abstractness of economic theory. That is, he saw very clearly that the theoretical concepts of economics were inadequate to the full understanding of certain concrete phenomena in which an economic element was unquestionably involved, such as the effects of a protective tariff. From this inadequacy he did not, however, conclude with the "institutionalists" that the economic theory was wrong, but only that it was in need of supplementing by other theories which, synthesized with the economic, would give the required understanding.[7] He found, however, that other theories of this character which satisfied him were not to be met with elsewhere and so set out to build them up himself. Hence the treatise.

When he came to formulate the economic element in relation to the others he felt to be in need of analysis, it became evident that what was dealt with explicitly in economics shared with certain other elements of action this dominant property of rationality according to a scientific standard. This circumstance led him to make his basic distinction not between economic and non-economic action, but between the broader category of "economic plus"[8] which he called "logical" action and the non-logical.

This fact threw the emphasis on defining the category of logical action away from the criteria specific to the economic upon those common to it and the other "logical" elements. This was the element of rationality according to the "scientific" standard. Thus Pareto defines logical action as action consisting of "operations logically united to their end" from the point of view both of the actor himself and of an observer with a "more extended knowledge of the circumstances."[9] It involves, we may say, a purposive adaptation to the exigencies of the situation which is subjectively intended. At the same time the "correctness" of the actor's subjective

[7] Sec. 34.
[8] See Sec. 152 for an enumeration of the content of the "plus."
[9] Sec. 150.

"theory" is verified by the more extended knowledge of the observer, that is, by the best available scientific knowledge.

It is essential to note certain things about the distinction between logical and non-logical action. In the first place it is, as Pareto explicitly says, not a classification of *kinds of* action but of *elements in* action.[10] A concrete act is neither logical nor non-logical but always involves both elements. It is logical, as Pareto puts it, *so far as* it may be regarded as resulting from "a process of reasoning," that is, a scientifically verifiable "theory" of the facts and conditions of the situation in which the actor is placed. This does not imply that *any* concrete act is exclusively understandable in such terms. Even though, as I think is the case, Pareto does not consistently adhere to this position, it is the only basis on which his scheme as a whole makes sense.

Secondly, only the category of logical action is positively defined at all, leaving the non-logical as a *residual category*. It is action so far as it is *not* understandable in terms of the logical element, and that is all. It is absolutely essential to keep this fact in mind if one is to understand the subsequent development of Pareto's theory.

Finally, it may be noted that the line between logical and non-logical is drawn in subjective terms, in terms of the character of the "theory," the "process of reasoning," which the actor associates with his act. On the basis of observation of the external course of events alone the distinction cannot be drawn, for, so far as it is scientifically understandable, the result necessarily follows from the "operations" performed.

Having made this basic distinction, Pareto leaves logical action aside and proceeds to the explicit study of the non-logical. He does this by a peculiar procedure which it is important to understand correctly. He first makes a rough empirical distinction between three orders of elements involved in non-logical action. There are two kinds of empirically observable facts roughly distinguishable as overt acts and the linguistic expressions or "theories" associated with them. These he denominates as B and C respectively.[11] Both these stand in a functional relation of mutual interdependence with a third entity A, the "state of mind" of the actor. This state of mind is not positively defined at all, but is simply the "subjective" locus of the non-logical elements of action. So far as the external environment is rationally apprehended, its influence on concrete action will be embodied in the scientifically verifiable "theories," that is, in the logical element, and hence is of no interest in the present analysis. Hence it is in this state of mind that some at least of the main determinants of non-logical action are to be found. Pareto more generally refers to it by the blanket residual term "sentiment." It is not directly observed in the same sense as B and C, but through its "manifestations" in them.

Both B and C may legitimately be studied as means of throwing light on A. But Pareto deliberately chooses to neglect B and confine his analytical attention to C. An overt act is always to a large extent an adaptation to an

[10] Sec. 148.
[11] Sec. 162.

external situation. This, however, is not to the same extent true of a "theory" which is more directly an "expression" of the state of mind of its proponent. This is the principal reason for the choice. But whatever others may be involved the choice has an important consequence, that of bringing the standard of scientific validity back into the center of the stage again. For, if logical action is distinguished by the conformity of the theories associated with it to this standard, it follows that departure from the standard, for whatever reason, is, as far as *theories* are concerned, the criterion of the non-logical. Pareto's procedure then is an inductive study of theories *so far as* they depart from the scientific standard.[12]

The standard itself, as Pareto formulates it, admits of two types of departure: fallacies in reasoning on the one hand, and the inclusion in the place of statements of fact of elements which rest on erroneous observation, or which refer to non-empirical, non-verifiable entities, on the other. The inductive study leads to a discrimination between a central, relatively constant core of such theories, and a contingent, much more highly variable element. The former is always analogous to the statement of fact in a scientific theory. But the theories in question, being by definition non-scientific, always depart from this. Pareto employs the general formula that it is the "manifestation of certain sentiments." It is to be remembered that this element is an element of a theory, that is, is a proposition. The other, the variable element, may depart from the scientific standard both by including manifestations of sentiments in place of other statements of fact and by involving logical fallacies. The constant element is the residue, the variable the derivation.[13] This is the way in which Pareto arrived at the categories which have formed the central focus of the discussion of his work.

In interpreting what they mean, let us remember that non-logical action in the first place was a residual category and that this character is shared by the corresponding non-scientific theories. The residue is nothing but the inductively determined constant element in these theories. It is not and cannot be the basic explanatory category of a developed theory of non-logical action. It is, as Pareto remarked, analogous to a thermometer reading.[14] The "causes" lie not in the residue but in what it manifests. Though it is true Pareto does not in practice adhere strictly to this concept of the residue, it is the only definition for which sanction may be found in his work.

The residue is always a manifestation of sentiments. Hence the real problem of interpretation shifts to this category. In view of the original residual character of the category of non-logical action, it is not surprising that sentiment should turn out on further analysis not to be a homogeneous category. Pareto himself never carried the explicit analysis further. It is, however, possible by careful study of other parts of his own work[15] to discern the emergence of certain further distinctions. There is no space

[12] Occupying principally Chapters IV and V.

[13] (a) and (b) respectively which are elements of the non-scientific theories (c). See Sec. 803. This is not to be confused with the A, B, C, referred to above.

[14] Sec. 875.

[15] Especially the discussion of Social Utility in Chapter XII.

here to present the evidence for this view, but I should like to present dogmatically two fundamental distinctions which are, I think, indispensable to further progress with Pareto's mode of approach.

In the first place, it is necessary to discriminate those factors which may be summed up as "heredity and environment," which influence human action in modes other than the rational adaptation involved in logical action, from a quite distinct category which may be called "value" elements. Of the former category the most conspicuous elements are those involved in what may loosely be called "instinct," those hereditary tendencies of behavior which are relatively independent of conscious ratiocination. It is this group which has predominantly occupied our own anti-rationalist psychologists and sociologists, and significantly enough the great majority of interpreters have jumped to the conclusion that this is the real burden of Pareto's thought. It is *one* element but stands by no means alone. It is, incidentally, as should be quite evident, not the residue, but one of the things *manifested in* the residues. An instinct is not a proposition.

Pareto's original approach through the concept of rationality of action as used in economics inevitably brought the categories of means and ends and their relations into the center of attention. But it turns out that his concept of logical action concerns only the character of the means-end relationship;[16] action is logical so far as operations, i.e., means, are logically united to their end. But every system of means-end relationships will logically involve a system of ultimate ends which must, so far as they constitute causally relevant elements of action, according to Pareto's own position, be non-logical. But, as Pareto's own later work shows,[17] this element is not reducible to terms of heredity and environment or any psychological concept of instinct. Ultimate ends and the value-sentiments from which they are derived constitute an independent category within that of sentiment in general.

The second emergent distinction is on a different level. The concept of logical action involves the conception of the orientation of action to a certain type of norm, which may be called a "norm of efficiency." This is that of the most "appropriate" adaptation of means to an end[18] according to an intrinsic, scientifically demonstrable standard. It is possible for action to deviate from a norm of this character not merely in one respect but in two. On the one hand, the relevant norm may be of this "efficiency" type, but the actions in fact to a greater or less degree fail to attain it. That is, knowledge of the norm the actor professes to be striving to attain is in so far irrelevant to the understanding of his action. This is certainly the case with which the anti-intellectualist psychologists have predominantly been concerned. It is the one most frequently imputed to Pareto. It is one, but only one, of the things with which he was concerned.

[16] There is no space to present the justification for this and the following statements here. See my article "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory," *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1935.

[17] Especially his treatment of social utility, Chapter XIII.

[18] Sec. 150.

On the other hand, the deviation may concern the character of the normative elements themselves. Under this heading come two types of cases. In the first place, so far as an ultimate end is involved which is not to the actor part of a scientific theory but is the manifestation of a sentiment, a non-logical element is present. But this order of non-logical elements is not by itself a factor of deviation from the norm; it is rather a way of stating that the total concrete norm is not definable in terms of logical action alone. Secondly, the operations may not be "logically" united to their ends but non-logically, or arbitrarily. This is a case of great empirical prominence in Pareto's work, that of ritual actions. In discussing ritual, there is no question of a failure of the overt acts to correspond to the theory; that is taken for granted. It is the non-scientific character of the theory which is the non-logical element. *In both these cases there is no warrant whatever for the assumption that the sentiments manifested in these kinds of non-logicality are the instincts of psychology.* On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that value elements play a major part.

Enough has been said, I think, to show that Pareto's residue and derivation analysis does not constitute a developed analytical framework for sociological theory. It is rather an approach to the problem of building up such a theory. Indeed, Pareto himself, implicitly at least, went several steps beyond it in this direction. Sociology is not, however, a science so highly developed on its theoretical side as to permit such incompleteness, even though it be serious, to be made an excuse for rejecting Pareto's attempt out of hand as useless. On the contrary, I should like to draw particular attention to two features of Pareto's scheme which seem to me to make it extremely useful. (1) It approaches the problem of a general theory of human action in society through the problem of rationality in a relatively clearly definable sense. This sense is not one arbitrarily invented by himself, but has been thoroughly tested in a great part of modern social thought and is the foundation of what most would agree is, in systematic theoretical thinking, the most highly developed of the social sciences, namely, economics. But unlike most economists who have concentrated their attention upon this element for its own sake, Pareto in his sociology makes it the point of departure for a theory of the other elements in explicit relation to this. It is the explicit relation to the norm of economic rationality which has been lacking in most previous attempts, especially by psychologists, to deal with what Pareto calls the non-logical elements of action. Pareto was very far from completing the job, and in some directions more than he achieved is to be found in the work of other writers. But he defined this point of departure more clearly than any other writer of whom I know. Surely this is *one* of the most fruitful approaches to the major theoretical problems of sociology.

(2) The residue-derivation analysis seems to me to contain a technique of the greatest value which has not been so adequately developed elsewhere. The objectivist trend of our thought has tended to turn us away from the use of "speech reactions" as a field of data for study, except where their relation to overt action is of the simple and obvious kind involved in

Pareto's concept of logical action. Pareto has, I think, shown the possibility of dealing with "theories" in the non-logical context in such a way as to avoid the usual rationalistic fallacies and yet extract significant conclusions from the data. This same result has been achieved on a grand scale by psychoanalysis, but with a bias derived from preoccupation with neurotic symptoms. Pareto has gone a considerable distance in developing a technique for studying action through the medium of linguistic manifestations on the social level and with interest centered on the normal, while psychoanalysis has been primarily concerned with the particular individual and the abnormal.

If the above view of the incompleteness of Pareto's analytical scheme is correct, then we should expect that it failed to give a full explanation of his empirical sociological theories, his classification of the residues, his account of cycles of social change and of other social processes such as that of "crystallization." I think it does account for certain broad lines of his empirical views, but by no means all of them. This would imply that there is an empirical element in Pareto's work for which we have not yet accounted, which cannot be reduced to terms of any well-defined analytical categories.

It is unlikely that this would be found to have any one source. But one certainly stands out with particular prominence. Pareto was throughout his life an avid student of the history and literature of classical antiquity. His sociological treatise is, as every reader of it knows, heavily weighted with illustrative material drawn from this source. Along with it he absorbed a set of attitudes and opinions which may be called "aristocratic humanism." In such terms he built up the outline of a philosophy of history, the most striking expression of which is to be found in his cyclical theory of social change.[19] Within the broad lines of which I have spoken, this theory seems to me to be derived from empirical sources and his reading of ancient authors and certain semi-moderns, among whom Machiavelli stands out. Its connection with the analytical scheme to which most of our attention has been devoted is relatively loose. Certainly one who tries to work with the analytical scheme is not bound by the details of the cyclical theory.

The principal connecting link between these two aspects of his work seems to me to be the classification of the residues. So far as I know no one has ever subjected this classification to a thorough critical analysis with the analytical scheme and its further development in mind. My general impression is, however, that the classification is less a product of Pareto's analytical thinking than it is of the empirical historical aspect of his work. It is more akin to a classification of minerals according to their easily describable properties such as color, weight, etc., than according to chemical composition.

This empirical element entering into the classification of the residues, as distinct from the technical concept residue, seems to be one of the things

[19] Developed in Chapter XII.

which accounts for Pareto's confusing lack of consistency in the use of the term. For in his practical use of the first two classes of residues, the "instinct of combinations" and the "persistence of aggregates," he seems to be speaking not of classes of propositions involved in non-scientific theories, but of general tendencies of action involving both overt behavior of certain types and *total* theories of certain types, e.g. scepticism and faith. This situation is definitely confusing, and has lent color to the interpretation of the residue as "a fancy name for instinct." After all, the term instinct has fluctuated in meaning between a name for a hereditary *element in* action and for a concrete kind or tendency of action. Pareto's inconsistency seems to me more an index of the incompleteness of his analytical theory than of anything else.

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Primitive Law. By A. S. DIAMOND, M.A., L.L.M., Barrister-at-Law of Gray's Inn and the North-Eastern Circuit. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1935. Pp. x+451. $10.00.

This book is intended to demonstrate the falsity of Sir Henry Maine's theories which are expounded in his *Ancient Law* (first American edition 1864) and in his *Dissertations on Early Law and Custom* (1883). Since both books embrace many subjects of sociology and early social history, their criticism will be of interest to readers of this *Review.*

It is not the first time that Maine's hypotheses have been attacked. Anthropologists who have at their disposal the material obtained since Maine's epoch have long since alienated themselves from his opinions. Nevertheless, his ideas still hold sway in the minds of these jurists and sociologists who are not conversant with the results of research in other fields. Diamond's venture is, therefore, beneficial.

The author divides his book into three parts. He first considers a number of sources, chiefly records of old written laws such as the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, the Assyrian laws and the Hittite Code. The second part is intended to criticize Maine's view that early law was determined by religion and morals. The Anglo-Saxon Laws, the Pentateuch, the Hebrew Code, the Code of Manu, and the Fragments of the Twelve Tables are included to substantiate the author's contention. In the third part, the author discusses the development of courts and legislation and such institutions as marriage, inheritance and property. Here are treated crime and civil injury, procedure, ordeal and oath, and last of all, contract.

Diamond argues that law refers to the rules of conduct between man and man, while religion refers to those between man and nature. In my opinion, the pattern of thinking determines law as well as religion. The author denies (p. 197) that law originated from the practice of voluntary arbitration, that arbitration can therefore be regarded as the precursor of courts, and that the customary law, derived from the decisions rendered in the