



LTI@UniTO
Long-Term Investors

Collegio Carlo Alberto
UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TORINO

Phantom of the Opera: ETF Shorting and Shareholder Voting

Richard B. Evans
Oğuzhan Karakaş
Rabih Moussawi
Michael J. Young

No. 4

September 2019

LTI WORKING PAPERS

www.carloalberto.org/lti/working-papers

© 2019 by Richard B. Evans, Oğuzhan Karakaş, Rabih Moussawi, Michael J. Young.
Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not those of LTI.

Phantom of the Opera: ETF Shorting and Shareholder Voting*

Richard B. Evans
University of Virginia

Oğuzhan Karakaş
University of Cambridge

Rabih Moussawi
Villanova University

Michael J. Young
University of Virginia

First Draft: November, 2018

This Draft: September, 2019

* We are thankful for helpful comments and feedback from Lucian Bebchuk, James Corah, Jeffrey Gordon, Edith Hotchkiss, Slava Fos, Scott Hirst, Henry Hu, Wei Jiang, Kevin Lyman, Nadya Malenko, Ron Masulis, Daniel Metzger, Edward Rock, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, as well as seminar participants at Boston College, Cambridge University, ESCP Europe, Lehigh University, Paris Dauphine University, University of Alabama, and University of Virginia. We also benefitted from comments by participants at the 4nations cup at HEC Paris, European Finance Association Annual Meeting in Carcavelos, European Financial Management Association Annual Meeting in São Miguel Island, CERF in the City Workshop in London, 27th Finance Forum in Madrid, Summer Finance Workshop at University of Dayton, and the Global Research Alliance for Sustainable Finance and Investment Annual Conference in Oxford. Karakaş gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance (CERF) and the J M Keynes Fellowship.

Richard B. Evans: University of Virginia, Darden School of Business, P.O. Box 6550, Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550, USA. Phone: +1-434-924-4030. E-mail: evansr@arden.virginia.edu. **Oğuzhan Karakaş:** Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1AG, UK. Phone: +44 (0)1223 766449. Email: o.karakas@jbs.cam.ac.uk. **Rabih Moussawi:** Villanova University, School of Business, Bartley Hall Rm 2051, Finance, 800 Lancaster Avenue, Villanova, PA 19085, USA. Phone: +1-610-519-8544. E-mail: rabih.moussawi@villanova.edu. **Michael J. Young:** University of Virginia, Darden School of Business, Charlottesville, VA 22906-6550, USA. Phone: +1-716-361-9759. E-mail: YoungM@arden.virginia.edu.

Phantom of the Opera: ETF Shorting and Shareholder Voting

Abstract

The short-selling of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) creates “phantom” ETF shares, trading at ETF market prices, with cash flows rights but no associated voting rights. Unlike regular ETF shares backed by the underlying securities of the ETF and voted as directed by the sponsor, phantom ETF shares are backed by collateral that is not voted. Introducing a novel measure of phantom shares both of the ETF and corresponding underlying securities, we find that increases in phantom shares are associated with decreases in number of proxy votes cast (for and against), and increases in broker non-votes, the vote premium, and value-reducing acquisitions.

Keywords: Exchange-Traded Funds, Proxy Voting, Vote Premium, Short Interest, Operational Shorting, Authorized Participants, Collateral, Broker

JEL Codes: G11, G12, G14, G23, G34

Introduction

With the dramatic increase in passively invested assets across the globe, index funds and ETFs play an increasingly important role in corporate governance.¹ In contrast to active managers, for whom exit is a governance strategy, passive investors must rely on voice – voting and engagement – to take an active role in governance.² To this end, there is a small but growing academic literature on the governance role of passive investors. On one hand, the inability of passive investors to ‘exit’ a given security may naturally increase their use of the ‘voice’ channel (e.g., Edmans, Levit and Reilly (2018)) and the institutional attention associated with passive ownership may enhance governance in the firm (e.g., Appel, Gormley and Keim (2016)). On the other hand, the implicit trust of the market’s price for a given security and the inherent cost minimization approach may result in a one-size-fits all, management supporting approach to governance (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen and Hirst (2017), Bubb and Catan (2018), Lund (2018), Strampelli (2018), and Davidson et al. (2019)).

While the debate regarding the efficacy of active versus passive voting decisions is in its early stages, our paper addresses a more foundational issue: whether or not exchange traded funds (ETFs) vote their shares at all. We find that one unintended consequence of ETF security design is the decoupling of cash flow and voting rights.³

¹ As of June 30th, 2018, passive assets have risen to over \$13 trillion - Trilbe, Wynne, Pensions & Investments, “Passive investing continues to captivate global audience”, 10/15/2018. See Bebchuk and Hirst (2019) for a recent discussion of governance implications of index/mutual funds.

² See Hirschman (1970) for a detailed discussion of the ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ responses, and Yermack (2010) for a survey of research on shareholder voting and corporate governance. Recently, Brav, Jiang and Li (2019) study the mutual fund voting in proxy contests, finding active funds being more pro-dissident than passive funds. Bolton, Ravina and Rosenthal (2019) analyze voting patterns of institutional investors from proxy voting records to infer institutions’ ideology.

³ See Hu and Black (2006) and more recently Kahan and Rock (2019) for a discussion of decoupling the economic ownership of shares from voting rights through derivatives.

To help clarify how this dissociation of cash flow and voting rights occurs, consider the example of a single ETF share (e.g., a share of the SPY ETF tracking the S&P 500). This ETF share is backed by the shares of the underlying basket of securities (e.g., the S&P 500 portfolio), which are held by a third-party custodian and voted by the ETF sponsor on behalf of the investor. In the case of this single share, the investor has access to both cash flow and voting rights. When that same ETF share is borrowed from the account of the original investor and then sold short to another investor, it creates two shares with cash flow rights corresponding to the underlying securities. The original share is still backed by the underlying securities held by a third-party custodian and voted by the ETF sponsor. The short-sold ETF share, however, is backed by collateral held by the securities lender. If this collateral does not correspond to the ETF's underlying securities (e.g., cash plus a S&P 500 futures overlay), there would be no corresponding voting rights. For ETFs, however, this collateral may actually consist of the underlying securities (e.g. the portfolio of S&P500 securities). However, these securities are held by the broker, and may not be voted except for 'routine' matters due to the limitations on broker voting. In this scenario, both the original share and the short-sold share have associated cash flow rights, but only the original share is associated with voting on the underlying, the short-sold share does not have associated voting rights.⁴ In this paper, we refer to the ETF shares with cash flow but no voting

⁴ While the example used here focuses on directional short-selling, an important component of overall short interest in ETFs is operational shorting by authorized participants (APs). While ETF shares are bought and sold by investors at bid-ask spreads posted by market makers, the supply of ETF shares adjusts due to the actions of APs. APs are authorized to arbitrage the difference in prices between the basket of underlying securities (e.g., the 500 stocks in the S&P 500) and the ETF (e.g., SPY, an ETF tracking the S&P 500). Through this mechanism, the supply of ETF shares is adjusted according to investor demand. To enhance ETF liquidity, however, Evans et al. (2019) document that APs sell ETF shares that have not yet been created (operational shorting) and therefore are not backed by shares of the underlying securities. Similar to the short-selling case, these shares can be bought and sold at ETF prices, granting investors economic ownership. However, because the AP has not purchased and delivered the basket of underlying securities to the sponsor, these ETF shares do not have corresponding voting rights exercised by the ETF sponsor. Similar to the shorting selling setting, the AP may hold cash, derivative hedges or the underlying securities in inventory to hedge the AP's exposure to the sold ETF share. If the underlying securities are held, they are less likely to be voted due to restrictions on broker voting.

rights as “phantom ETF shares,” and to the associated underlying securities as “phantom underlying shares” or, in short, “phantom shares.”

As investors increasingly invest in equities through ETFs, this disassociation of cash flow and voting rights has the potential to distort the voting process in public firms. To examine whether or not this is the case, we first develop two novel measures of phantom ETF and corresponding underlying shares using ETF short interest and institutional ownership. To get a sense of how prevalent phantom shares are, we measure the average ETF ownership of an underlying firm and find that over our sample period, the average (median) ETF ownership in a firm is just 2.61% (2.16%). In comparison, the average (median) ETF phantom share ownership of the same firm is 0.63% (0.43%). Because phantom share ownership is not associated with voting rights, this suggests that for the average dollar invested in an ETF, only \$0.81 has both cash flow and the associated voting rights and \$0.19 has cash flow rights only.⁵

With this measure of phantom ownership of the underlying securities in hand, we examine the impact on proxy voting outcomes on a sample of 5,928,246 voting records on 5,128 different US public companies from 1,451 ETFs over 2004-2016. Consistent with our notion that phantom ETF shares translate to phantom shares that are not voted, we find that increases in phantom shares around the voting record date are associated with a decrease in voting, both for and against, and an increase in broker non-votes for the underlying securities. Effectively, an increase in phantom shares is associated with an increase in sidelined votes of the underlying.

⁵ These estimates are derived from the means of “ETF Underlying Shares” and “Phantom Shares (SI)” in Table 2. Specifically, 81% is the percentage of total underlying share ownership in actual ETF shares, $2.61/(2.61+0.63)$, and 19% is the percentage of underlying share ownership in phantom shares, $(0.63)/(2.61+0.63)$.

To ensure this is not simply picking up a dual trend in ETF voting and voting patterns over time, we repeat the exercise with just director election votes. Before 2010, the Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) allowed brokers to vote shares even “without voting instructions from the beneficial owner”. This rule changed formally on January 1st, 2010, so that brokers would not be able to vote without instructions from the investors.⁶ We therefore repeat our analysis on director elections accounting for the change in policy and find a strong positive relationship between phantom shares and broker non-votes once brokers were no longer allowed discretion in voting such shares. However, before 2010 we find a strong negative relationship between phantom shares and broker non-votes, suggesting that brokers widely voted such shares in director elections.

If phantom shares increase the percentage of sidelined votes, they have the potential to affect the probability of a given proposal passing or failing. To assess the impact of phantom shares from this perspective, we model the probability of shareholder proposals and ISS-opposed items passing.⁷ As this setting relies on the possibility that the phantom shares would be voted by the ETF, we go away from our total phantom shares variable and assign a vote direction (for/against) to the phantom shares based on the vote of the ETF. In the case of shareholder proposals, an increase in phantom shares voted for decreases the probability of these proposals passing. Similarly, an increase in phantom shares voted against decreases the probability that ISS-opposed items pass.

We then look at the pricing implications of phantom shares. In particular, we analyze the relation between phantom shares and the value of shareholder voting rights (i.e., voting premium) around the shareholder meetings. We calculate the voting premiums of underlying shares using

⁶ See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Eliminate Broker Discretionary Voting for Election of Directors, SEC Release No. 34-60215 (July 1st, 2009), available at: <https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse/2009/34-60215.pdf>.

⁷ ISS (or Institutional Shareholder Services) is a leading proxy advisory firm.

the methodology introduced by Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014). This methodology essentially synthesizes a non-voting share using options, and obtains the voting premium by subtracting the synthetic (non-voting) share from the underlying (voting) share and normalizing the difference by the underlying share. We find that voting premiums increase with the phantom shares, around the record date for shareholder meetings, particularly for meetings that are contentious. Analyzing whether phantom shares do predict the contentious meetings, we find no effect. This suggests that the potential selection bias in firms with more phantom shares is unlikely to explain the increase in the voting premium in the presence of phantom shares. Together with the earlier results with the vote outcomes, our findings suggest that phantom shares make the voting process less efficient by reducing the shares voted (and increasing the broker non-votes), which in turn is reflected in an increase in the voting premium around the contentious shareholder meetings.

We also analyze the collateral mechanism of our findings, proxying for the collateral with the stock return correlations of the ETF and underlying stocks. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that the increase in broker non-votes with phantom shares is highest for the underlying stocks that are likely to be held/used as collateral/hedge. Distinguishing the directional vs. operational shorting channels in the ETF shorting, we find that both channels are at work in our findings. Regarding the governance implications of the phantom shares, we examine the stock reactions to acquiring firms in mergers. We find that high levels of phantom shares, interacting with poor firm governance, are associated with value-reducing acquisitions. This suggests that the distortion of phantom shares in voting process has negative effects on firm governance and value.

While this paper is the first to examine the impact of phantom ETF shares on voting, prior work has explored the issue of short-selling, phantom shares and empty voting for traditional equities (e.g., Christoffersen et al. (2007), Kahan and Rock (2008), and Welborn (2008)). This

literature makes the important point that securities lending may be associated with over-voting both directly, as market participants borrowed shares over the voting record date in order to vote them, and indirectly, as multiple claims of ownership may give rise to more than one vote per share. In contrast to this finding of over voting, our results suggest that ETF phantom shares are associated with reduced voting. The difference stems from two sources. First, this literature, in part, helped to motivate changes in regulation about voting including the Dodd-Frank rules about broker voting on non-routine matters that helped to curb over voting. Second, unlike borrowing or short-selling individual equities, the connection between ETF phantom shares and voting on the underlying is not direct. Rather, ETF shares in and of themselves have no associated voting rights; it is the underlying securities that have associated voting rights. The nature of these underlying securities (e.g., cash plus a futures overlay as collateral for an ETF loan) and the location of these securities (e.g., the actual stocks underlying the ETF are held by a broker as opposed to the sponsor/custodian) determine whether or not they are voted.

The accuracy and transparency of the US proxy voting process has also increasingly been under the spotlight of the SEC. Following up on the SEC’s “Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System”⁸ on July 2010 and the “Roundtable on the Proxy Process”⁹ on November 2018, which provide the blueprint for the proxy system in the US and discuss “proxy plumbing” problems such as over- and under-voting, Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) of SEC has recently called for a deeper investigation of the impact of securities lending on voting rights on July 2019.¹⁰ We believe our paper makes a timely contribution to this inquiry.

⁸ <https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2010/34-62495.pdf>

⁹ <https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf>

¹⁰ <https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/recommendation-investor-as-owner-subcommittee-proxy-plumbing.pdf>

Overall, our paper contributes to the literatures on corporate control and governance by introducing novel measures of the separation of cash flow and voting rights: phantom shares of the ETF and the corresponding underlying securities. We also show that, separate from index funds as alternative passive investment vehicles, this disassociation of economic exposure and voting rights arises from the unique short-selling and liquidity provision aspects of the ETF market. Given the dramatic increase in ETF assets world-wide, this is an important difference relative to other passive vehicles that should give investors, managers and regulators pause. This study also contributes to the ETF pricing literature by highlighting the importance of the value of voting rights in the underlying shares, which have not been examined by the literature previously, but are priced as our evidence suggests.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the data used and our approach to estimating ETF and underlying security phantom shares. Section 2 looks at how proxy voting outcome are affected by phantom shares. Section 3 examines the pricing implications of phantom shares. Section 4 discusses the collateral mechanism of our findings, the directional vs. operational shorting channels, and the governance implications of phantom shares. Section 5 concludes.

1. Data and Methodology

1.1. ETF and Proxy Voting Data

The database used in our analysis is constructed from a number of different sources. The ETF data, including holdings, is obtained from the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. Our initial ETF sample consists of all US Equity ETFs, excluding levered ETFs, from 2004 until 2016. Panel A of

Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the ETF-holdings report data observation level. The average ETF size is \$1.320 billion and the median ETF size is \$109.6 million. Consistent with a largely passive investment approach, the average expense and turnover ratio are 0.51% and 44.1%, respectively.

In order to better characterize the underlying holdings of the ETFs and to add firm specific variables, we then merge the holdings data with CRSP and Compustat. We also then add aggregate institutional holdings data from the Thomson-Reuters Global Ownership database as well as aggregate index and active mutual fund ownership from the CRSP holdings database used above. Panel B of Table 1 has the average statistics of these firms including firm age and institutional ownership.

(~Insert Table 1 about here~)

While the databases mentioned above are more commonly used in academic research, our final data source, the ETF-level and firm-level voting data, may not be as familiar to academic readers, so we describe this database in greater detail. Specifically, we use N-PX data compiled by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) as the source of our ETF voting record information. Beginning in 2004, the SEC required mutual funds and other registered management investment companies to disclose proxy vote records for the most recent twelve months ending June 30 of each year via the form N-PX with August 31 as the filing deadline.¹¹ The filing requires detailed disclosure on the policies and procedures used to guide proxy vote decisions, typically reported in the Statement of Additional Information (SAI), along with the proxy voting record for each

¹¹ Final Rule can be found in this link: <https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8188.htm>. Details on the contents of N-PX filings are in the N-PX pdf instructions document available in this page: <https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsmfproxyvotinghtm.html>.

security in each mutual fund portfolio.¹² It includes a brief identification of the matter voted on, information about whether the matter was proposed by the management or a shareholder, how the fund voted (e.g., for or against the proposal, or abstain; for or withhold regarding election of directors), and specifically whether the fund's vote aligned with management's recommendation or not.

In order to map the ISS N-PX data on WRDS with our ETF holdings data, we extract the ETF ticker information from the header of the N-PX filings using the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite. Specifically, we first extract the detailed series information, class/contract information, as well as the share class name, and ticker symbol for each N-PX filing, then map this data to the ISS N-PX records by matching the N-PX FileID to the SEC's accession number. This merged sample consists of 5,928,246 voting records on 5,128 different US public companies from 1,451 ETFs.

We then merge this fund-company level voting data with the company voting results dataset also compiled by ISS. This dataset provides information on the vote results reported in the 8-K or 10-Q filing subsequent to the firm's annual meeting. As ISS describes in their data manual, the vote results represent the summary of the voting by all investors, including ETFs. These results include the total votes for, against, abstaining, broker non-votes, and the vote outcome along with the ISS vote recommendation for each item. The dataset also includes the vote requirement threshold, an indication how the percentage voting threshold necessary for a proposal to pass is calculated, which is primarily relevant for proposals requiring supermajorities. The vote outcome

¹² For example, many State Street ETFs (SPDRs) report their voting records under the SPDR Series Trust (CIK: 0001064642) registrant. See, e.g., the individual vote records on each security held by 80+ SPDR ETFs in the 12-months period ending in June 2011 can be found in the following report filed on August 30, 2011: <https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1064642/0000950123-11-081354-index.htm>.

is derived from the comparison of support rate and required threshold disclosed by company. If the support rate is greater than or equal to the threshold, “Pass” is recorded, or “Fail” otherwise.¹³

This dataset also includes two important dates for each annual shareholder meeting. The meeting date on which the vote is held, and the record date on which the vote proxies are issued using the ownership of shareholders as of that date. We use the record date in the ISS vote results dataset to construct the actual ownership of ETFs and their holdings of individual securities in the ETF portfolio likely mapping their voting right claims.

1.2. Methodology to Construct the Phantom Shares

While the actual voting decisions of ETFs is an important control in our analysis, the primary variables of interest are the phantom ETF shares and their share of the associated underlying securities (phantom shares). In this section, we describe our two different approaches to estimating phantom shares from short interest data (phantom shares (SI)) and from the Thomson-Reuters 13F institutional ownership data (phantom shares (TH)).

Our estimate of phantom ETF shares is simply the difference between the total number of ETF shares held by investors, and the actual number of ETF shares created and outstanding. Whenever the number ETF shares held is larger than the number of ETF shares created, the extra shares held are, by definition, phantom ETF shares. While it might seem at first blush that these two numbers should be equal, recall that short selling and operational shorting of ETF shares increase ETF share ownership without increasing the underlying number of ETF shares outstanding. To estimate phantom ETF shares, we take the daily ETF shares outstanding data from

¹³ Vote outcomes can also be recorded as “Not Disclosed”, “Withdrawn” or “Pending” for votes that are respectively not disclosed, eventually withdrawn or are currently pending.

Bloomberg,¹⁴ but we create two different estimates of the total number of shares held by investors of a given ETF using two different sources: ETF short interest data and Thomson-Reuters 13F institutional ownership of these ETFs. The short interest phantom ETF share measure is the number of short interest shares reported in Compustat on a biweekly basis. To create the phantom ETF share measure using the institutional ownership data, we aggregate the number of ETF shares owned by institutions from the 13F filings. If the number of shares held by institutions exceeds the number of ETF shares outstanding, the difference is our phantom ETF share estimate; otherwise we set our phantom ETF share estimate to be zero. The summary statistics for these inputs are given in Panel C of Table 1.¹⁵

With these two different phantom ETF share measures in hand, we then estimate our measure of phantom share ownership of the underlying securities as the product of the phantom ETF share ratio (phantom ETF shares to ETF shares outstanding) and our estimate of the total shares of the underlying owned by the ETF. We begin with the most recent antecedent ETF holdings data observation, which gives the number of shares of the underlying held by the ETF.¹⁶ Because the holdings report date does not necessarily coincide with the voting record date, we then need to estimate the shares of the underlying held by the ETF on the record date of interest. Using the daily ETF TNA data and accounting for changes in the share price of the underlying security

¹⁴ We calculate the number of shares held by the ETF, implied by both, CRSP and Bloomberg and use the value from the data provider (CRSP or Bloomberg) that gives us the number of implied shares that is closest to the number of shares reported on the N-PX filing. We then use CRSP (Bloomberg) for the implied shares at the daily level, until the next N-PX filing, where we then repeat the process of comparing the implied shares to the actual reported.

¹⁵ Theoretically, both measures are equivalent as the difference between the shares held by all investors and shares outstanding, equals the number of borrowed shares, thus short interest. However, we can only observe the ownership by institutional investors, which we use as proxy for total ownership by all investors. Therefore, the short interest-based phantom share measures are expected to be more accurate than ownership-based phantom shares in capturing the true number of ETF shares that do not have voting rights.

¹⁶ While the reporting frequency of ETF holdings has increased over the sample period, some ETFs do not report holdings monthly. To account for the possibility that a fund holds the stocks but did not report holdings in the current month, we calculate implied shares for up to two months if holdings are not reported in month $t+1$ or month $t+2$ after a holdings disclosure in month t .

relative to the other securities in the portfolio, we estimate the number of actual shares of underlying held by the ETF on the record date. We then multiply the underlying shares held by the ETF on the record date by the ratio of phantom ETF shares to ETF shares outstanding to estimate the phantom share ownership of the underlying. Overall, this process gives us three measures that we will use in the voting regression: ETF underlying shares, Phantom Shares (SI), and Phantom Shares (TH).

We then add the fund voting records on day $t-3$ before the record date of the company vote. As the ISS fund vote file does not report the number of shares voted by the ETF, we assume that the ETF votes all of the underlying shares owned. From this, we assign all of the shares owned by the ETF in the underlying as being voted either for or against, using the ETF vote direction indicated in the ISS data. For each company-meeting-agenda item, we then aggregate all ETF shares voted for or against the item to create an aggregated measure of ETF votes for or against the agenda item. Lastly, as phantom shares should not have voting rights, we do not assign a vote direction to those shares. Instead, we only use the aggregate number of phantom shares implied by ETF ownership, in the underlying stock at $t-3$ before the voting record date. This gives us our final sample of company votes, where each agenda item from a meeting has a total number of ETF underlying shares voted for or against, and the total number of short-interest-based phantom shares (SI) and ownership-based phantom shares (TH).

Table 2 gives the summary statistics for overall voting data (i.e., for, against, broker non-vote) and the voting by ETFs, index mutual funds and implied underlying phantom shares. While the overall average ETF share ownership across our sample is low at 2.61%, the phantom share average using short interest, for example, is relatively high in comparison. Of the total ETF share ownership (phantom plus regular ETF underlying shares, 3.24%), phantom share ownership of the

underlying is 19.4%. Put another way, the average \$1.00 invested in ETFs corresponds to \$0.806 with both cash flow and voting rights and \$0.194 with no voting rights. The dollar or value-weighted measure of phantom shares indicates an almost three times larger percentage of the underlying shares outstanding.

(~Insert Table 2 about here~)

1.3. Estimating Phantom Shares: An Example

To illustrate our approach to measuring phantom shares, we explore a specific example of the SPDR S&P Retail ETF, XRT and the June 3rd, 2011 proxy vote associated with one of the holdings of this ETF, Netflix. Using Bloomberg data, we find that the number of XRT shares that have been created (i.e., the underlying basket of securities is being held by a third-party custodian on behalf of the ETF sponsor, State Street Global Advisors) as of May 31st, 2011 is 19,800,000. These ETF shares all have both economic ownership and associated voting rights. We then use the 13F data from the most recent quarter end and the bi-weekly short-interest data to estimate the total number of shares with economic ownership. The 13F data, which underestimate the total shares because only a subset of investors are required to file,¹⁷ show institutional ownership of 123,000,000 XRT shares. Similarly, the short-interest data which are reported at a greater frequency, indicate investor ownership of 165,842,820 shares. Through either operational shorting or repeated lending and short-selling of the same XRT shares, only 10% of the total estimated shares held by investors are backed by underlying securities held at the ETF sponsor. In other words, only 10% of the total estimated shares held by investors have associated voting rights.

¹⁷ Only institutional investment managers that exercise investment discretion over \$100 million or more of equity and equity-like securities, are required to file Form 13F with the SEC. See for more information: <https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/13ffaq.htm>

For a small subset of our data, the actual shares of underlying security voted by the ETF are disclosed in the SEC form N-PX filing. To lend credence to our claim above, we can compare the actual number of shares voted to the number of shares with economic ownership for a given underlying security. Translating the 13F and short interest estimates of investor ETF ownership into underlying Netflix shares (1.29% of the XRT ETF assets were held in Netflix as of May 31st, 2011), the number of Netflix shares would be 338,909 and 456,956 respectively. However, the actual number of Netflix shares XRT reports voting on is 38,216. In line with the estimates above, only approximately 10% of investors' XRT Netflix ownership has actually been voted. To estimate the number of phantom shares of a given underlying security, we simply take the difference between the number of underlying security shares implied by the 13F (or by short interest estimates) and the number of shares implied by the shares outstanding.

2. Phantom Shares and Proxy Voting

2.1. Preparation of the Sample for Analysis

For each company-meeting date, our merged database gives us the total underlying shares owned by ETFs and total phantom shares. These measures will be consistent across all agenda items for each company meeting. Our measures of ETF underlying shares voted for and ETF underlying shares voted against will vary across each agenda item of a company meeting, as ETFs may vote in different directions. Our three main dependent variables will be the total number of shares voted for the agenda item, and the total number of shares voted against the agenda item, and the total number of broker non-votes. Finally, we scale all of our main variables of interest and dependent variables by the total number of shares outstanding.

Once we have the total ETF underlying shares, voted for and against as well as phantom shares for each company-meeting-agenda item, we filter out agenda items that may have characteristics that could weaken the identification of the voting rights of phantom shares. First, we exclude any agenda item where the vote requirement to pass is equal to 1%. We do this as these votes are formalities and could, in most cases, be passed by the votes of insiders. Second, we exclude any director election. We do this, as SEC rule changes regarding broker voting may cause uncertain behavior of broker non-votes. Prior to 2010, brokers were allowed to vote their shares in director elections. However, after 2010 the SEC no longer allowed the brokers to vote their shares in director elections. In a later test, we will repeat our main tests on the sample of only director elections. Excluding director elections and those agenda items with a 1% vote requirement leaves us with a sample of 60,331 company-meeting-agenda item observations.

To determine the relationship between phantom shares and shareholder voting, we run three main specifications, using total shares voted for, total shares voted against and broker non-votes in the company vote as the dependent variables. As phantom shares do not have voting rights, we do not assign the shares as being voted for or against the agenda item; instead, we include the total number of phantom shares in each of our main specifications. As the ETF underlying shares do have voting rights, we include ETF underlying shares voted for in the votes for regression, and ETF underlying shares voted against, in the voted against regression. Finally, the aggregate measures of both phantom shares and ETF underlying shares are included in the broker non-vote regressions.

Each regression includes firm fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors by firm and meeting. We control for the size and age of the firm, as well as the book to market and return on assets. Additionally, we control for different types of ownership in the firm: index mutual funds

(IMF), active mutual funds, blockholders, and total institutional ownership. Lastly, to ensure that recent firm performance may be affecting our results, we included a six-month momentum measure for each firm-meeting. These filters leave us with a total of 5,128 firms and 28,397 meetings in our main test sample.

2.2. Relation of Phantom Shares to Votes Cast

Table 3 presents our main results examining the relationship between phantom shares and shareholder votes cast in company meetings. In Columns 1 to 3 of Table 3, we define phantom shares using the short interest outstanding in the ETF. In Columns 4 to 6 of Table 3, we repeat the tests from Columns 1 to 3, but use the institutional ownership from Thomson to create the phantom share variable. In Columns 1 and 2, we find that an increase in the number of phantom shares leads to less voting, both for and against, in company meetings. In Columns 4 and 5, we again find results consistent with phantom shares leading to less voting. For both short interest and institutional ownership phantom shares, we find results consistent with our hypothesis that phantom shares will lead to less voting. In each specification, we find that our measure of ETF underlying shares voted for and ETF underlying shares voted against is positively and significantly related to the number of votes for, and number of votes against, respectively.

(~Insert Table 3 about here~)

In Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3, we examine the relationship between phantom shares and broker non-votes. If phantom shares are being held by brokers, either as a result of shorting, or AP failures to deliver, then we should see these shares show up in the number broker non-votes cast. Here, we again find results that are consistent with our initial hypothesis that phantom ETF shares do not carry voting rights in the underlying stocks. In Columns 3 and 6, we find that phantom

shares are related to an increase in the number of broker non-votes cast in company votes. Importantly, we also find that our aggregate measure of ETF shares has now significant relationship with broker non-votes. As these ETF shares have both economic and ownership rights, we should not see a relationship between them and broker non-votes.

Overall, the results in Table 3 provide support for our initial hypothesis that for certain shareholders of ETFs, their shares do not carry ownership rights in the underlying stock which in turn lead to less votes cast in company meetings.

2.3. Rule Change: Broker Voting on Non-Routine Matters

In Table 4, we extend our study of phantom shares and votes cast using a discreet cut-off in the ability of brokers to vote their shares in director elections. Prior to 2010 the SEC allowed brokers to vote in director elections. A rule change was proposed and passed in 2009 that stated brokers were no longer allowed to vote their shares in director elections (Akyol, Raff and Verwijmeren (2017)). In Table 4, we split our phantom share variables into pre- and post-2010, and use this rule change as a clean setting to examine the voting rights of phantom shares. For this test, we replicate the regressions in Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3, but run them on a sample of only director elections.

(~Insert Table 4 about here~)

In Column 1 of Table 4, we use a piecewise regression to examine the relationship between short interest phantom shares and broker non-votes around the SEC rule change. Prior to 2010, we find a negative and significant coefficient on the phantom shares measure; a sign that brokers were actively voting their shares in director elections. After the rule change, we find a positive and significant coefficient on the phantom share measure. In Column 2, we replicate this test using the

institutional ownership measure of phantom shares, and find consistent results. Using this setting in Table 4, we are able to examine the voting rights of phantom shares around an exogenous change to the voting rights of brokers in director elections.

These findings corroborate the role of brokers holding phantom shares, either as a result of (directional) shorting, or AP failures to deliver (operational shorting), in diminished voting of underlying shares. Considering that phantom shares are backed by collateral held (and/or hedged) by brokers, security lenders, APs, or market makers, in Section 4.1, we provide further evidence and discussion on the collateral mechanism of phantom shares not being voted. In Section 4.2, we split the ETF shorting into directional shorting and operational shorting, and analyze the role of these two shorting channels.

2.4. Voting Outcomes: Proposal Pass Rate

While ETF phantom shares may increase broker non-votes, the question remains if there is any material impact on voting outcomes. In Table 5, we estimate the probability of passing for shareholder proposals (Columns 1 and 3) and those items opposed by ISS (Columns 2 and 4). All variables are standardized, and coefficients are given as odds ratios.¹⁸ Hence, coefficients greater than 1 indicate an increase in the probability of an item passing, while coefficients less than 1 indicate a decrease in probability.

(~Insert Table 5 about here~)

While in Tables 4 and 5, we focused on total phantom shares, in this table we separate phantom shares into those that conceivably would have been cast for and against the proposal, based on the ETF's decision to vote the actual shares held by the ETF for or against. While the

¹⁸ In this case, the odds ratio reported represents a one standard deviation increase in the independent variable.

actual votes cast by ETFs and Index funds for and against these important proposals positively and negatively, respectively, affect the probability of passing as expected. Phantom shares, on the other hand, have the opposite effect. In the case of shareholder proposals, an increase in phantom shares of the underlying associated with an ETF that otherwise cast its vote in favor of the proposal, decreases the probability of the shareholder proposal passing. Similarly, in the case of ISS-opposed items, an increase in phantom shares of the underlying associated with an ETF that otherwise cast its vote against the item, increases the probability of the ISS-opposed item passing. When shares of the underlying are not voted because they are held by the broker as collateral as described above, the phantom shares that would have been voted in favor of (against) a proposal, are negatively (positively) affect the probability of the proposal passing.

3. Phantom Shares and Voting Premium

In the previous section, we analyze the effect of phantom shares on the quantity of the votes cast. In this section, we analyze the impact of phantom shares on the price/value of shareholder voting rights (i.e., the voting premium). Given the inefficiencies created at the voting process and outcomes with the phantom shares discussed in the previous section, we expect such inefficiencies to reflect on the prices of the votes, the voting premium.

3.1. Constructing the Voting Premium

We calculate the daily voting premium following the method in Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014). This method relies on two observations: (i) a stock is a package of two components: cash flow rights and the control/voting rights (Manne (1964)), and (ii) option prices derive their value from the cash flows of the underlying stocks, but not from the voting rights. Hence, subtracting

the price of a non-voting stock synthesized using options, \hat{S} , from that of the underlying stock, S , we obtain the value of voting rights in the stock. In order to compare the voting premium over time and across companies, we normalize the price differential between the underlying (voting) stock and the synthetic (non-voting) stock by the price of the underlying stock.

Formally, we calculate \hat{S} using put-call parity for an option pair with the same maturity T and strike price X , and adjust for the early exercise premiums (EEPs) of American options and for dividends (DIVs) paid before the options mature:

$$\hat{S} = C - P + PV(X) + \text{adjustments for EEPs and DIVs}, \quad (1)$$

$$\text{Voting Premium} = (S - \hat{S}) / S, \quad (2)$$

where C and P are the American call and put option prices, respectively, and $PV(X)$ is the present value of investing in a risk-free bond with face value X that matures at time T .

Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014) show that liquidity of stock or option, or other non-control-related frictions do not drive the changes in the voting premium around shareholder meetings. In addition, they show that the voting premium is positive on average and increases with the expected maturity of the synthetic stock.¹⁹

The voting premium is time-varying and depends on the probability of control contest and the economic significance of the contest (Zingales (1995)). Consistently, Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014) also document that voting premium increases around events in which control would be expected to matter and be valuable. These events include special shareholder meetings and/or

¹⁹ Voting premium for options with maturity T can be annualized with the following formula (Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014): $1 - (1 - \text{voting premium})^{365/T}$. Given that the average voting premiums across firms is 13.6 basis points (Table 2) and the median (average) maturity of options employed in our analysis is 32 (64) days, the corresponding annualized voting premium is 1.55% (0.78%) of the stock price.

contentious meetings with close votes, episodes of hedge fund activism, and merger and acquisition events.

The method we employ has an important advantage, compared to other common ways to calculate the value of control in the literature using dual-class shares (see, e.g., Nenova (2003) and Zingales (1994)) or controlling block sales (see, e.g., Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Dyck and Zingales (2004)): we can estimate the market value of voting rights for a large number of widely held public firms at any point in time.

Voting premium reflects private benefits consumptions and associated managerial inefficiencies, priced by the market. Karakaş and Mohseni (2019) and Gurun and Karakaş (2019) use the same voting premium we employ. The former finds that firms with staggered boards on average have higher voting premium, which is in line with the entrenchment view on staggered boards. The latter documents that the voting premium increases with the unexpectedly negative earnings, particularly around the shareholder meetings, consistent with an increased probability of capital gains from improving the inefficient management of the firm.

3.2. Options Data

We use the OptionMetrics database at the WRDS for the calculation of daily voting premium. OptionMetrics is the standard data set used for studies on options and provides data on US equity options starting from 1996. This database provides end-of-day bid and ask quotes, trading volume, open interest, and option-specific data, such as implied volatility, maturity, strike price, for the American call and put options on stocks traded on US exchanges. The database also provides the stock price and dividends of the underlying stocks and zero-coupon interest rates.

Voting premium calculation requires availability of both call and put option prices. To construct the synthetic stock, following Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014), we form option pairs which consist of matched call and put options on the same underlying stock and with identical strike price and time to maturity. We drop option pairs for which the quotes for either the call or the put options are locked or crossed. The option prices are taken as the midpoints of the bid and ask quotes, which are the best closing prices across all exchanges on which the option trades. Since the options are of American style, we compute the early exercise premium for both the call and put options using the binomial option-pricing model.

In our calculations, we use the most liquid option pair for each firm-day, which is defined as the one with the highest option volume (minimum volume of call and put), closest-to-the-money and shortest maturity. We use only the options with positive volume. Using the closest-to-the-money options also minimizes the potential downward biases in the voting premium due to the early exercise possibilities of the American options (see Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014) for a more detailed discussion).

3.3. Relation of Phantom Shares to Voting Premium

Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014) find that voting premium increases around shareholder meetings, particularly when the control contest is contentious (e.g., special meetings, meetings with close votes). Following Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014), we measure the median voting premium for each firm $[-3,0]$ trading days before the cum-date, which is three trading days prior to the record date (to allow for settlement of the stock trades) for the upcoming shareholder meeting. We include in the regression an indicator variable of whether or not the voting item of interest is “*Critical*” as identified by five scenarios: (i) an annual meeting and the vote difference was less than 10%, (ii) an annual meeting/special item, (iii) a special meeting, (iv) a proxy contest,

or (v) ISS recommended voting against the item. If the voting item meets one of those five criteria, the “Critical Item” indicator variable takes a value of one, and zero otherwise.

(~Insert Table 6 about here~)

In Table 6, we find that voting premiums increase with the phantom shares, around the record date for shareholder meetings for those meetings which are likely to be contentious based on the inclusion of a “Critical Item”. Consistent with our expectations discussed earlier, our results are stronger with the short interest-based phantom shares which are calculated with data on a bi-weekly frequency, compared to 13F-based phantom shares measure which are calculated with data on a quarterly frequency.

(~Insert Table 7 about here~)

Analyzing whether phantom shares do predict the contentious meetings, we find no positive effect of critical items (Table 7) on vote premiums. This suggests that the potential selection bias in firms with more phantom shares is unlikely to explain the increase in the voting premium in the presence of phantom shares. Together with the earlier results with the vote outcomes, our findings suggest that phantom shares make the voting process less efficient by reducing the shares voted (and increasing the broker non-votes), which in turn is reflected in more increase in the voting premium particularly around the contentious shareholder meetings.

4. Further Analysis

We document so far that ETF shorting leads to creation of phantom shares that are not voted with increased broker non-votes and voting premium. In this section, we further deepen our

analysis and discuss issues related to the collateral mechanism of our findings, the directional vs. operational shorting channels, and the governance implications of phantom shares.

4.1. Collateral Mechanism

If the underlying companies of phantom ETF shares are backed by collateral held (and/or hedged) by brokers, security lenders, APs, or market makers, how do they vote?

European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) conducting a “Call for Evidence on Empty Voting” on September 14th, 2011 (ESMA/2011/288), was fact-finding for possible rule-making and coincidentally asked institutional market participants the following question relevant to our paper:

“Internal policies relating to voting practices

Q5. What kind of internal policies, if any, do you have governing the exercise of voting rights in respect of securities held as collateral or as a hedge against positions with another counterparty?”

Consistent with the responses of other market participants reported in Appendix B, International Securities Lending Association (ISLA) answered the above question as follows [emphasis added]:

*“An ad hoc survey of lenders confirmed that **lenders have not, nor ever would exercise any voting rights in respect of securities held as collateral.** The majority of written governance policies are worded specifically to exclude the voting of collateral.”*

The answers to ESMA’s questionnaire confirm our conjecture that phantom shares that are backed by collateral held (and/or hedged) by brokers, security lenders, APs, or market makers, are not voted. To further illustrate this collateral mechanism, in Table 8, we examine the effect that

underlying shares likely to be held in collateral (and/or as a hedge) on the relationship between phantom shares and broker non-votes. We proxy collateral/hedge with the correlation between ETF returns and underlying stock returns, as stocks in the ETF basket that have higher return correlations with the ETF are more likely to be used as a collateral and at the same time a hedge for the phantom ETF shares.

(~Insert Table 8 about here~)

In Columns 1 and 3 of Table 8 we use the weighted average correlation between the stock and the ETFs. In Columns 2 and 4 we rank stocks into deciles based on the return correlation. Using both collateral proxy measures and both measures of phantom underlying shares, we find that the increase in broker non-votes is stronger for stocks more likely to be held as collateral. This result is consistent with our initial hypothesis and is in line with the above quotes from ESMA.

4.2. Directional vs. Operational ETF Shorting

Our analysis so far has focused on the total ETF shorting. However, as discussed before, the shorting could be directional or operational. Unlike directional shorting, which consists of borrowing ETF shares with the goal to sell them for speculative or hedging purposes, operational shorting is associated with ETF shares that have not yet been created but are already sold by market makers and authorized participants (APs), which is allowed under market making exemptions. Evans et al. (2019) argue that operational shorting is an important component of overall short interest in ETFs and is essential component in the ETF liquidity provision and in the process to arbitrage the difference in prices between the basket of underlying securities. Through this mechanism, the supply of ETF shares is adjusted according to investor demand. Similar to the

short-selling case, these shares can be bought and sold at ETF prices, granting investors economic ownership. However, because the AP has not purchased and delivered the basket of underlying securities to the sponsor, these ETF shares do not have corresponding voting rights exercised by the ETF sponsor. Similar to the shorting selling setting, the AP may hold cash, derivative hedges or the underlying securities in inventory to hedge the AP's exposure to the sold ETF share. If the underlying securities are held as collateral, they are less likely to be voted due to restrictions on broker voting.

In Table 9, we split the ETF shorting into directional shorting and operational shorting, and analyze how much each of the two shorting channels contribute to our findings. We use share lending data from Markit Securities Finance database, which is available on a daily frequency to create a 'directional' phantom underlying shares variable using the Total Demand Quantity (TDQ), computed as the quantity in shares on loan by borrowers tracked by Markit.²⁰ We then merge the TDQ data with the biweekly short interest data from Compustat to create a biweekly series of total short interest as well as directional shorting, and we compute operational shorting as the difference between the two.²¹ We scale all three variables by ETF shares outstanding. Our descriptive statistics show that operational shorting (directional shorting) represents, on average, two-third (one-third) of ETF short interest.

Using the difference between our original phantom underlying share variable, total share interest, and the 'directional' phantom share variable to create the 'operational' phantom underlying share variable, we rerun our baseline regressions and report the results in Table 9. Our

²⁰ TDQ is the most expansive measure of total borrowing provided by Markit. It differs from BOLQ as follows: in addition to shares borrowed by Markit borrowers from Markit lenders, TDQ also includes shares borrowed by Markit borrowers from non-Markit lenders, as well as shares loaned by Markit lenders to non-Markit borrowers.

²¹ We clean TDQ time series by dropping instances when TDQ goes 10X above or drop more than 1/10 below a moving average of TDQ.

results show that both directional and operational shorting contribute to the increase in broker non-votes. However, we do find that the magnitude of the ‘operational’ phantom underlying share measure is roughly twice as large as ‘directional’ phantom underlying shares, which is consistent with the proportional economic magnitude of operational shorting relative to directional shorting.

(~Insert Table 9 about here~)

4.3. Corporate Governance: Acquirer Returns

As a final exploration in to the implications of phantom shares and voting, we look at relationship between phantom shares and corporate governance, specifically acquirer stock returns in Table 10.

(~Insert Table 10 about here~)

A large literature analyzes stock market reactions to merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements, interpreting them as evidence on whether M&As create value for shareholders. A general finding is that M&As often do not add much shareholder value, particularly for the acquiring firms (see, e.g., Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and Chen, Harford and Li (2007)). Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001, p.111) also find that “the negative announcement period stock market reaction for acquiring firms is limited to those that finance the merger with stock.” A reason for these findings is the poor governance of the acquiring firms in which under monitored/disciplined managers may take value-destroying acquisition decisions that may benefit themselves on the expense of the shareholders (see, e.g., Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1991), and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007)).

Because phantom shares give the holder cash flow rights but no voting rights, we might expect those firms with large phantom share ownership to underperform in acquisitions as firm governance is hindered by the lack of voting rights. Put otherwise, the unintended distortion effect of phantom shares in shareholder voting we documented above, may further weaken the monitoring and discipline over the firms, which in turn may lead to value loss for shareholders. From one perspective, increased phantom shares of the underlying in tantamount to the creation of a dual share class with the same cash flow rights but no voting rights.

The dependent variable in Table 10 is a 4-factor alpha (Fama-French 3 factor plus momentum) obtained from a daily regression from days $t-10$ to $t+1$ or $t-1$ to $t+1$, where t is the M&A announcement date.

Looking at the results in Table 10, we see that high levels of phantom shares interacting with poor firm governance (proxied by E-index of Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009)) are associated with worse M&A performance, particularly in M&As financed with stock. These results suggest that phantom shares are associated with reduced value for shareholders.

5. Conclusion

This paper analyzes the impact of ETFs on the shareholder voting on the underlying shares of the ETFs. We introduce novel measures of the wedge between the economic ownership and the voting rights of underlying shares through ETFs, the phantom (ETF) shares, and analyze the implications of phantom shares for the voting process, voting outcomes, voting premium, and firm performance.

We find that phantom shares are costly for the investors, since they do not convey voting rights to the ETF owners, but are sold at the full price of share, which reflects both cash flow rights and voting rights. Phantom shares also seem to create inefficiencies within the voting process by increasing the broker non-votes, and decreasing both the shares voted for and the shares voted against in the shareholder meetings. This becomes particularly important in cases with close votes. Relatedly, we find phantom shares to be positively related to the voting premium, particularly during the meetings with contentious votes.

Our findings highlight an important phenomenon with the recent surge of the ETFs and have policy implications. In particular, due to the existence of phantom shares through ETFs, there could happen inefficiencies regarding the exercise of control rights, and in turn regarding the corporate governance and market for corporate control, for the firms with phantom shares particularly during times the markets are bearish and/or when the votes are critical and very valuable. This is particularly important when considered against the simple alternative of investing in index funds which are fully collateralized by the underlying securities held by a custodian and voted by the sponsor. In other words, index funds do not suffer from a similar lack of voting rights.

Appendix A: ETF/Index Fund and Phantom Share Variable Construction

$$ETF \text{ Underlying Shares}_j = \sum_i^n \frac{ETF \text{ TNA}_i \times \text{Underlying Share Percent TNA}_{i,j}}{\text{Underlying Share Price}_j}, \quad (3)$$

$$Phantom \text{ Shares (SI)}_j = \sum_i^n ETF \text{ Underlying Shares}_{i,j} \times \frac{ETF \text{ Short Interest}_i}{ETF \text{ Shares Outstanding}_i}, \quad (4)$$

$$Phantom \text{ Shares (TH)}_j = \sum_i^n ETF \text{ Underlying Shares}_{i,j} \times \frac{13F \text{ ETF Ownership}_i}{ETF \text{ Shares Outstanding}_i}, \quad (5)$$

$$Index \text{ Fund Underlying Shares}_j = \sum_i^n \frac{Index \text{ Fund TNA}_i \times \text{Underlying Share Percent TNA}_{i,j}}{\text{Underlying Share Price}_j}, \quad (6)$$

where i is the ETF/Index Fund and n is the number of ETF/Index Funds in our sample, and j is each underlying stock that each ETF/Index Fund in our sample owns. Underlying Phantom Shares (TH) takes the value of 0, at the ETF level, if the ratio of 13F ETF Ownership to ETF Shares Outstanding is less than 1. TNA is the total net asset value.

Appendix B: Variable Definitions and Sources

Variable Name	Definition
Fundamental Data (Source: CRSP and Compustat)	
Six-Month Momentum	Return of the stock over the six months prior to the shareholder meeting.
Book to Market	Market value of equity / Book value of equity.
Assets	Total firm assets.
Return on Assets	Net income / Total assets.
Firm Age	Number of years since the IPO of the firm.
Blockholder Ownership	Percentage of shares outstanding owned by blockholders with 5% of more ownership in the stock, using 13F institutional ownership data.
Institutional Ownership	Percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutions, excluding ETFs, index funds, and blockholders.
Short-Sale Supply	Short Interest Ratio / Institutional Ownership.
ETF-Stock Return Correlation	The value weighted return correlation between the firm and all of the ETFs that own shares.
Voting Related Data (Source: ISS, OptionMetrics)	
Votes For	Total number of votes “for” the agenda item, as a percentage of shares outstanding.
Votes Against	Total number of votes “against” the agenda item, as a percentage of shares outstanding.
Broker Non-Votes	Total “broker non-votes” for the agenda item, as a percentage of shares outstanding.
Shareholder Sponsored	Takes the value of 1 for agenda items proposed by shareholders, 0 otherwise.
ISS Against	Takes the value of 1 for agenda items opposed by ISS, 0 otherwise.
Vote Premium	The value of the shareholder voting rights, defined using the measure from Kalay, Karakas and Pant (2014), from days (-3,0) around the record date for each firm annual meeting.
Merger and Governance Data (Source: SDC Platinum, ISS RiskMetrics Governance Data)	
E-Index	E-index developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)
Same Industry	Takes the value of 1 if the acquirer and target are in the same industry
Deal Value	Total deal value

Appendix C: Feedback to ESMA’s Questionnaire on Empty Voting

European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) conducted a “Call for Evidence on Empty Voting” on September 14th, 2011 (ESMA/2011/288). ESMA was fact-finding for possible rule-making and coincidentally asked institutional market participants the following question relevant to our paper:

- *“Internal policies relating to voting practices
Q5. What kind of internal policies, if any, do you have governing the exercise of voting rights in respect of securities held as collateral or as a hedge against positions with another counterparty?”*

ESMA’s “Feedback Statement” on “Call for Evidence on Empty Voting” on June 29th, 2012 (ESMA/2012/415) summarizes the responses to question #5 above as follows:

- *“Only 11 interested parties fully replied to this question, while a few respondents just declared they have no internal policy on the exercise of voting rights within their normal business activity. Five respondents asserted that the voting right attached to these securities is not exercised. Three contributors affirmed that they (or their members) recall (or encourage to act accordingly) any lent shares before the record date, especially when voting in contentious situations or for significant issues. Other replies more specifically stated that e.g. the voting rights cannot be exercised in order to benefit from trading book exemption; or they discouraged the borrowing of securities for the purposes of voting; or simply the rights remain assigned to the beneficial owner.”*

Some excerpts from the individual responses of the institutions to ESMA’s question #5 above are below (sourced from ESMA’s website, available upon request):

- **International Securities Lending Association (ISLA)**
“An ad hoc survey of lenders confirmed that lenders have not, nor ever would exercise any voting rights in respect of securities held as collateral. The majority of written governance policies are worded specifically to exclude the voting of collateral.”
- **J.P. Morgan**
“J.P. Morgan adheres to industry standards and practices as referenced herein in relation to not facilitating the borrowing of securities for the purposes of voting. Through its Prime Brokerage business, it is able to prevent voting in respect of any borrowed securities that it lends to hedge fund clients, to the extent that they are retained on its Prime Brokerage books and records. J.P. Morgan also has strict vetting procedures around counterparties to which it is willing to lend securities within its Equity Finance business.

continued on the next page

- **J.P. Morgan (continued)**

In addition, the Worldwide Securities Services division of J.P. Morgan does not permit lending clients to vote on securities held as collateral in its securities lending programme. Furthermore, through our derivatives activity, clients are aware that no voting rights are passed through the contract and J.P. Morgan has a separate internal policy to abstain from voting in most instances of hedge trading positions, as they are temporary in nature.”

- **BNP Paribas**

“With regard to the shares held for our own account in a trading book, the voting rights attached to the shares held as hedging of such positions cannot be exercised if it is intended to benefit trading book exemption. If the voting rights are exercised and consequently the exemption of trading book not applied, the Transparency declarations have to be provided in accordance with French law (threshold disclosures and, if applicable, disclosures on securities lending before general meeting).

With regard to the shares owned in collateral for client’s transactions, the voting rights should not be used by the credit institution or investment firm.”

- **Hermes Equity Ownership Services**

“Given our approach to see such activity as market abuse, it should not come as a surprise that we do not vote stock held as collateral or a hedge.”

- **Aviva Investors**

“We do not vote these shares”

References

- Agarwal, V., P. Hanouna, R. Moussawi, and C. Stahel, 2018, Do ETFs Increase the Commonality in Liquidity of Underlying Stocks? *Working paper*, Georgia State University and Villanova University and Investment Company Institute.
- Akyol, A.C., K. Raff, and P. Verwijmeren, 2017, The Elimination of Broker Voting in Director Elections, *Finance Research Letters* 21, 34–39.
- Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, and E. Stafford, 2001, New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 15(2), 103–120.
- Antoniewicz, R., and J. Heinrichs, 2014, Understanding Exchange-Traded Funds: How ETFs Work, *ICI Research Perspective* 20(5), 1–39.
- Antoniewicz, R., and J. Heinrichs, 2015, The Role and Activities of Authorized Participants of Exchange-Traded Funds, *ICI Research Report* March, 1–13.
- Appel, I.R., T.A. Gormley, and D.B. Keim, 2016, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, *Journal of Financial Economics* 121(1), 111–141.
- Barclay, M.J., and C.G. Holderness, 1989, Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations, *Journal of Financial Economics* 25(2), 371–395.
- Bebchuk, L.A., A. Cohen, and A. Ferrell, 2009, What Matters in Corporate Governance?, *Review of Financial Studies* 22(2), 783–827.
- Bebchuk, L.A., A. Cohen, and S. Hirst, 2017, The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31, 89–102.
- Bebchuk, L.A., and S. Hirst, 2019, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, *Working paper*, Harvard University and Boston University.
- Ben-David, I., F. Franzoni, and R. Moussawi, 2017, Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs), *The Annual Review of Financial Economics* 9(6), November 2017.
- Ben-David, I., F. Franzoni, and R. Moussawi, 2018, Do ETFs Increase Volatility?, *Journal of Finance* 73(6), 2471–2535.
- Bhattacharya, A., and M. O’Hara, 2018, Can ETFs Increase Market Fragility? Effect of Information Linkages in ETF Markets, *Working paper*, Baruch College and Cornell University.
- Bolton, P., T. Li, E. Ravina, and H. Rosenthal, 2019, Investor Ideology, *Journal of Financial Economics*, forthcoming.

- Brav, A., W. Jiang, and T. Li, 2019, Picking Friends Before Picking (Proxy) Fights: How Mutual Fund Voting Shapes Proxy Contests, *Working paper*, Duke University, Columbia University and University of Florida.
- Brown, D., S. Davies, and M. Ringgenberg, 2019, ETF Flows, Non-Fundamental Demand, and Return Predictability, *Working paper*, University of Arizona, University of Colorado at Boulder and University of Utah.
- Bubb, R., and E. Catan, 2018, The Party Structure of Mutual Funds, *Working paper*, New York University.
- Chen, X., J. Harford, K. Li, 2007, Monitoring: Which Institutions Matter?, *Journal of Financial Economics* 86(2), 279–305.
- Christoffersen S., C. Geczy, D. Musto, and A. Reed, 2007, Vote Trading and Information Aggregation, *Journal of Finance* 62(6), 2897–2929.
- Da, Z., and S. Shive, 2018, Exchange Traded Funds and Asset Return Correlations, *European Financial Management* 24(1), 136–168.
- Dannhauser, C., 2017, The Impact of Innovation: Evidence from Corporate Bond ETFs, *Journal of Financial Economics* 125(3), 537–560.
- Davidson, H., D. Macciocchi, R. Michaely, and M. Ringgenberg, 2019, Passive Investors are Passive Monitors, *Working paper*, University of Utah and University of Geneva.
- Dyck, A., and L. Zingales, 2004, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, *Journal of Finance* 59(2), 537–600.
- Evans, R. B., R. Moussawi, M.S. Pagano, and J. Sedunov, 2019, ETF Short Interest and Failures-to-Deliver: Naked Short-Selling or Operational Shorting?, *Working paper*, University of Virginia and Villanova University.
- Glosten, L.R., S. Nallareddy, and Y. Zou, 2019, ETF Activity and Informational Efficiency of Underlying Securities, *Working paper*, Columbia University and Duke University.
- Gurun, U.G., and O. Karakaş, 2019, Earnings and the Value of Voting Rights, *Working paper*, University of Texas at Dallas and Cambridge Judge Business School.
- Hamm, S., 2014, The Effect of ETFs on Stock Liquidity, *Working paper*, The Ohio State University.
- Hirschman, A.O., 1970, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, Harvard University Press.
- Hu, H.T.C., and B. Black, 2006, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable)

Ownership, *Southern California Law Review* 79, 811–908.

Israeli, D., C. Lee, and S. Sridharan, 2017, Is There a Dark Side to Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs)? An Information Perspective, *Review of Accounting Studies* 22(3), 1048–1083.

Jain, A., and C. Jain, 2015, Fails-to-Deliver Before and After the Implementation of Rule 203 and Rule 204, *Financial Review* 50, 611–636.

Jensen, M., 1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, *American Economic Review* 76(3), 323–329.

Kahan, M., and E. Rock, 2008, The Hanging Chads of Corporate Voting, *Georgetown Law Journal* 96(4), 1227–1281.

Kahan, M., and E. Rock, 2019, Anti-Activist Poison Pills, *Boston University Law Review* 99(3), 915–970.

Kalay, A., O. Karakaş, and S. Pant, 2014, The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices, *Journal of Finance* 69(3), 1235–1271.

Karakaş, O., and M. Mohseni, 2019, Staggered Boards and the Value of Voting Rights, *Working paper*, Cambridge Judge Business School and Texas A&M University.

Lang, L.H.P., R.M. Stulz, and R.A. Walkling, 1991, A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns, *Journal of Financial Economics* 29(2), 315–336.

Lund, D., 2018, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, *Journal of Corporation Law*, 43(3), 493–536.

Madhavan, A., 2012, Exchange-Traded Funds, Market Structure, and the Flash Crash, *Financial Analysts Journal* 68(4), 20–35.

Madhavan, A., 2014, Exchange-Traded Funds: An Overview of Institutions, Trading, and Impacts, *Annual Review of Financial Economics* 6, 311–341.

Malamud, S., 2016, A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of ETFs, *Working paper*, SFI–Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne.

Manne, H.G., 1964, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, *Columbia Law Review* 64, 1426–1445.

Masulis, R.W., C. Wang, and F. Xie, 2007, Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, *Journal of Finance* 62(4), 1851–1889.

Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, 1990, Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, *Journal of Finance* 45(1), 31–48.

Nenova, T., 2003, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, *Journal of Financial Economics* 68(3), 325–351.

Pan, K., and Y. Zeng, 2019, ETF Arbitrage under Liquidity Mismatch, *Working paper*, Harvard University and University of Washington.

Strampelli, G., 2018, Are Passive Index Funds Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, *San Diego Law Review* 55(4), 803–852.

Welborn, J., 2008, The ‘Phantom Shares’ Menace, *Regulation* Spring, 52–61.

Yermack, D., 2010, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, *Annual Review of Financial Economics* 2, 103–125.

Zhang, T., and T. Judge, 2016, Investment Analysis of Leveraged ETFs, *Working paper*, University of Chicago.

Zingales, L., 1994, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience, *Review of Financial Studies* 7(1), 125–148.

Zingales, L., 1995, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(4), 1047–1073.

Table 1: ETF and Underlying Share Summary Statistics

In this table, we present the summary statistics for the ETFs, the underlying firm characteristics, and the ETF ownership in our sample, which is based on US public firms over 2004-2016. Panel A presents summary statistics for the ETFs. Observations are taken at the date ETFs report holdings. *Total Net Assets* is the total net assets of the fund taken from CRSP, in million US dollars. *Return* is the return of the ETF in the reporting month. *Expense Ratio* and *Turnover Ratio* are the expense and turnover ratios of the fund reported by CRSP, respectively. *Fund Age* is the number of years since the fund was introduced. *Net Flows* is the net flows into the ETF in the month that holdings were reported. Panel B reports summary statistics on the firms in our sample of company votes. Each observation here is an agenda item of a meeting. *Six-Month Momentum* is the return of the stock over the six months prior to the meeting. *Book to Market*, *Assets*, and *Return on Assets* are the book to market, assets in million and return on assets reported by Compustat, respectively. *Institutional Ownership*, *Index Mutual Fund Ownership*, and *Active Mutual Fund Ownership* are the percentage of shares outstanding owned by institutional investors, index mutual funds and active mutual funds, respectively. Panel C presents summary statistics for the institutional ownership, shares outstanding, and short interest of ETFs. *ETF Shares Outstanding (CRSP)* is the number of outstanding ETF shares reported by CRSP. *ETF Shares Outstanding (Bloomberg)* is the number of ETF shares outstanding reported by Bloomberg. *ETF Shares Ownership by Institutions* is the number of ETF shares held by institutions taken from Thomson 13F ownership data. *13F Ratio* is the ratio of shares owned by institutions to the number of shares outstanding of the ETF. The number of shares outstanding is taken from either CRSP or Bloomberg, depending on the accuracy of using each to calculate the implied number of shares the ETF holds in an underlying stock. *Short Interest Ratio* is the short interest ratio of the ETF taken from CRSP and reported on the same day as the holdings of the ETF.

Panel A: ETF Summary Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p25	p50	p75	p95	p99
Total Net Assets (\$M)	72,023	1,320	6,474	1.778	22.74	109.6	510.7	5,307	22,950
Return (%)	72,657	0.563	6.609	-19.28	-2.24	0.805	3.815	9.464	16.69
Expense Ratio (%)	62,241	0.509	0.262	0.07	0.32	0.50	0.650	0.950	1.24
Turnover Ratio (%)	61,085	44.11	91.76	2.00	11.00	24.00	50.00	137.00	304.00
Fund Age (years)	70,078	5.17	3.99	0.0833	1.917	4.333	7.583	13.08	16.5
Net Flows (%)	71,996	0.878	22.633	-20.857	-2.640	0.729	4.005	10.389	21.721

Table 1: ETF and Underlying Share Summary Statistics (continued)**Panel B: Underlying Firm Summary Statistics**

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p25	p50	p75	p99
Six-Month Momentum (%)	29,660	7.397	40.120	-72.730	-11.140	5.939	22.380	62.830
Book to Market	28,989	0.661	0.610	0.038	0.309	0.542	0.862	1.521
Assets	29,998	10,603	75,418	17.08	320.2	1,167	4,111	31,008
Return on Assets (%)	29,182	-0.369	8.293	-28.990	-0.153	0.630	1.889	4.863
Firm Age (years)	30,032	22.620	16.280	3.000	10.000	18.000	30.000	58.000
Blockholder Ownership (%)	29,635	21.600	16.290	0.000	8.666	19.990	31.580	50.200
Institutional Ownership (%)	29,038	69.930	28.840	4.495	50.820	76.000	91.270	105.600
Active Mutual Fund Ownership (%)	29,979	16.650	11.110	0.000	7.380	16.110	24.460	35.990

Panel C: ETF Ownership Summary Statistics

Variables	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p50	p75	p95	p99
ETF Shares Outstanding (CRSP)	68,563	21,870,000	76,300,000	50,000	2,900,000	11,400,000	94,100,000	343,200,000
ETF Shares Outstanding (Bloomberg)	64,432	21,000,000	73,890,000	50,000	2,831,000	11,200,000	90,900,000	308,100,000
ETF Shares Owned by Institutions	70,968	12,270,000	52,980,000	500	811,194	4,278,000	207,600,000	207,600,000
13F Ratio	61,404	0.565	7.898	0.007	0.375	0.565	0.998	2.402
Short Interest Ratio	56,332	0.084	0.417	0.000	0.009	0.033	0.323	1.407

Table 2: Phantom Shares and Voting Summary Statistics

In this table, we present the summary statistics for the Phantom Shares and voting measures that we use in our main regressions. *Votes For (Against) [Broker Non-Vote]* are the number of shares voted for, against or that were broker non-votes, as a percentage of shares outstanding for each agenda item in a company meeting, respectively. *ETF Underlying Shares* is the number of shares in the underlying firm that are held by all ETFs in our sample. *ETF Underlying Shares Voted For (Against)* is the number of underlying shares owned by ETFs that voted for (against) the agenda item, as a percentage of shares outstanding. *Phantom Shares (SI)* is the total number of phantom underlying shares implied by ETF short interest, as a percentage of shares outstanding. *Phantom Shares (TH)* is the total number of phantom underlying shares, implied by Thomson ownership data, as a percentage of shares outstanding. *Voting Premium* is the voting premium as defined by the measure introduced by Kalay, Karakaş and Pant (2014). The premium is taken as the median value from days 0 to $t-3$ around the cum-date, which is three trading days prior to the record date for shareholder meeting (to allow for settlement of stock trades). All statistics below are reported as percent of shares outstanding, and in percentage figures.

Variables		Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	p1	p25	p50	p75	p99
Votes For ;	<i>Stock-date-item observation unit</i>	232,110	74.6	169.4	14.1	66.6	78.6	86.1	97.5
Votes Against		232,114	5.10	10.2	0.01	0.62	1.61	4.51	52.9
Broker Non-Vote		231,973	7.88	10.6	0	0	5	11.6	45.3
ETF Underlying Shares		232,280	2.61	2.38	0	0.75	2.16	3.67	10
ETF Underlying Shares – Voted For		232,280	2.47	2.38	0	0.5	2	3.53	9.94
ETF Underlying Shares – Voted Against		232,280	0.07	0.43	0	0	0	0	2.08
IMF Underlying Shares		230,351	2.93	9.74	0	0	2.03	4.65	11.6
IMF Underlying Shares – Voted For		230,351	2.75	9.46	0	0	1.61	4.46	11.3
IMF Underlying Shares – Voted Against		230,351	0.09	0.77	0	0	0	0	3.55
Phantom Shares (SI) ;	<i>Stock-date observation unit</i>	29,899	0.63	0.75	0	0.02	0.43	1.06	1.55
Phantom Shares (TH)		29,899	0.41	0.94	0	0	0.07	0.57	1.01
Phantom Shares (SI)		29,899	1.77	0.63	0.70	1.40	1.65	2.02	2.32
Phantom Shares (TH)		29,899	0.82	0.33	0.33	0.61	0.76	0.89	1.42
Voting Premium (Median in % – [3,0] days of cum-date)		11,573	0.17	1.21	-1.61	-0.06	0.04	0.18	4.07
Voting Premium (Average in % – [3,0] days of cum-date)		11,573	0.17	1.21	-1.63	-0.06	0.04	0.18	4.13

Table 3: Phantom Shares and Votes Cast

In this table, we examine the effect of Phantom Shares on voting in company meetings. The dependent variable is the number of shares voted for the agenda item in Columns 1 and 4, the number of shares voted against in Columns 2 and 5, and the number of broker non-votes in Columns 3 and 6, all as a percentage of shares outstanding. *Phantom Shares* are defined as the total number of phantom shares of the underlying securities of ETFs, using short interest or Thomson ownership, both are a percentage of shares outstanding. *Shares Voted For (Against) by ETFs [Index Mutual Fund]* is the percentage of shares outstanding that were held by ETFs [Index Mutual Funds] and voted for (against) the item. *ETF [Index Mutual Funds] Underlying Shares* is the total number of shares held by ETFs [Index Mutual Funds]. All control variables are defined in Appendix Table B. We exclude director elections and any agenda item that has a pass requirement of 1%. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm and meeting are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	For	Against	Broker Non-Vote	For	Against	Broker Non-Vote
	<i>Short Interest (SI)</i>			<i>Institutional Ownership (TH)</i>		
Phantom Shares	-1.294*** (0.149)	-0.157** (0.074)	0.358*** (0.078)	-0.451*** (0.107)	-0.044 (0.042)	0.084* (0.044)
ETF Underlying Sh. – Voted For	1.356*** (0.073)			1.202*** (0.067)		
IMF Underlying Sh. – Voted For	0.037*** (0.012)			0.039*** (0.013)		
ETF Underlying Sh. – Voted Against		3.270*** (0.205)			3.263*** (0.205)	
IMF Underlying Sh. – Voted Against		0.757*** (0.169)			0.757*** (0.169)	
ETF Underlying Shares			-0.100** (0.040)			-0.039 (0.036)
IMF Underlying Shares			-0.000 (0.003)			-0.000 (0.003)
Shareholder Sponsored	-0.252*** (0.007)	0.198*** (0.007)	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.253*** (0.007)	0.198*** (0.007)	0.009*** (0.002)
ISS Against	-0.244*** (0.003)	0.162*** (0.003)	0.048*** (0.002)	-0.245*** (0.003)	0.162*** (0.003)	0.048*** (0.002)
Log (Assets)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.004** (0.002)
Firm Age	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.005*** (0.000)	-0.007*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	0.004*** (0.000)
Institutional Ownership	0.083*** (0.010)	0.018*** (0.005)	-0.041*** (0.005)	0.082*** (0.010)	0.017*** (0.005)	-0.040*** (0.005)
Six-Month Momentum	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)
Book to Market	-0.009*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)	-0.010*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.005*** (0.001)
Return on Assets	0.021 (0.013)	0.002 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)	0.017 (0.014)	0.001 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
Short-Sale Supply	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)
Constant	0.911*** (0.019)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.012 (0.011)	0.892*** (0.018)	0.013 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.011)
Observations	58,706	58,786	58,697	58,706	58,786	58,697
R-squared	0.706	0.794	0.323	0.706	0.794	0.323
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 4: Broker Non-Votes in Director Elections

In this table, we examine the effect of Phantom Shares on the number of broker non-votes around an SEC ruling that made brokers ineligible to vote in director elections starting in 2010. For this test, we include only the agenda items that are director elections. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the number of broker non-votes case in the election as a percentage of shares outstanding. We split the Phantom Shares measure using the Post 2010 dummy. Phantom Shares Pre 2010 (Post 2010) replicate the Phantom Shares variable in Table 2, but take the value of zero for years after 2010 (before 2010). Firm controls include ETF ownership, index mutual fund ownership, active mutual fund ownership, log of assets, firm age, institutional ownership, blockholder ownership, book to market and return on assets, and are defined at the Appendix Table B. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm and meeting are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	For	Against	Broker Non-Vote	For	Against	Broker Non-Vote
	<i>Short Interest (SI)</i>			<i>Institutional Ownership (TH)</i>		
Phantom Shares – Pre 2010	-0.977*** (0.233)	0.076 (0.092)	0.032 (0.162)	-0.075 (0.161)	-0.156*** (0.058)	-0.056 (0.086)
Phantom Shares – Post 2010	-2.460*** (0.189)	0.232*** (0.061)	1.405*** (0.145)	-0.719*** (0.119)	0.186*** (0.053)	0.360*** (0.082)
ETF Underlying Sh. – Voted For	1.253*** (0.072)			0.977*** (0.066)		
IMF Underlying Sh. – Voted For	0.023*** (0.008)			0.026*** (0.008)		
ETF Underlying Sh. – Voted Against		2.962*** (0.223)			2.963*** (0.223)	
IMF Underlying Sh. – Voted Against		0.696*** (0.258)			0.695*** (0.257)	
ETF Underlying Shares			-0.370*** (0.068)			-0.177*** (0.059)
IMF Underlying Shares			-0.006 (0.005)			-0.008 (0.005)
Post 2010	-0.067*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.001)	0.059*** (0.002)	-0.078*** (0.003)	-0.008*** (0.001)	0.068*** (0.002)
Constant	0.894*** (0.022)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.064*** (0.019)	0.857*** (0.022)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.042** (0.018)
Observations	146,303	146,512	146,393	146,303	146,512	146,393
R-squared	0.763	0.551	0.758	0.760	0.551	0.756
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 5: Phantom Shares and Proposal Pass Rate

In this table, we examine the effect of phantom shares on the pass rate of important votes in a panel logit specification. The dependent variable in each column is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the vote passed and the coefficients are given as odds ratios. *Underlying Phantom Shares Voted For (Against)* is calculated by first multiplying the number of underlying phantom shares by an indicator variable of whether or not the Shares Voted For (Against) by ETFs the proposal in their actual underlying shares. This is then aggregated across all ETFs that voted for (against) the proposal and divided by the number of shares outstanding of the firm. We standardize all independent variables so that each coefficient reported in the table represents the odds ratio for a one standard deviation increase. Columns 1 and 3 are shareholder proposals. Columns 2 and 4 are items that ISS is against. All other controls are the same as in Table 3. Standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pass	Pass	Pass	Pass
	<i>Short Interest (SI)</i>		<i>Institutional Ownership (TH)</i>	
Phantom Shares – Voted For	0.350*** (0.110)	0.839 (0.105)	0.888 (0.182)	1.022 (0.086)
Phantom Shares – Voted Against	1.026 (0.043)	1.092*** (0.026)	1.034 (0.033)	1.052*** (0.018)
ETF Underlying Sh. – Voted For	78.073*** (31.562)	4.113*** (0.712)	40.144*** (13.524)	3.455*** (0.518)
ETF Underlying Sh. – Voted Against	0.732*** (0.037)	0.686*** (0.024)	0.741*** (0.035)	0.719*** (0.021)
IMF Underlying Sh. – Voted For	53.443*** (35.496)	4.160*** (0.593)	71.442*** (48.351)	4.510*** (0.634)
IMF Underlying Sh. – Voted Against	0.898*** (0.034)	0.994 (0.021)	0.905** (0.034)	0.991 (0.020)
Observations	3,019	4,468	3,019	4,468
Number of Firms	316	616	316	616
Firm Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 6: Phantom Shares and Voting Premium

In this table, we examine the effect that phantom shares have on the voting premium around critical votes. Phantom Shares measure is created using short interest in Columns 1 and 2, and is created using ownership data from Thomson in Columns 3 and 4. The dependent variable in each column is the vote premium using the measure created by Kalay, Karakaş and Pant. (2014). We use the median value of the vote premium around a window of [0,-3] days around the cum-date, which is three trading days prior to the record date for shareholder meeting (to allow for settlement of stock trades). *Critical Item* is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one item on the meeting agenda meets the following criteria, and zero otherwise: (i) an annual meeting and the vote difference was less than 10%, (ii) an annual meeting/special item, (iii) a special meeting, (iv) a proxy contest, or (v) ISS recommended voting against the item. Firm controls include index mutual fund ownership, active mutual fund ownership, log of assets, firm age, institutional ownership, blockholder ownership, book to market and return on assets, and are defined at the Appendix Table B. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm and meeting are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Voting Premium	Voting Premium	Voting Premium	Voting Premium
	<i>Short Interest (SI)</i>		<i>Institutional Ownership (TH)</i>	
Phantom Shares	0.012 (0.029)	0.014 (0.029)	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.015)
Critical Meeting × Phantom Shares	0.072** (0.035)		0.030 (0.021)	
Critical Meeting	-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	
Log (1 + Critical Items) × Phantom Shares		0.062** (0.031)		0.031* (0.018)
Log (1 + Critical Items)		-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)
Constant	0.005 (0.003)	0.005 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)
Observations	10,203	10,203	10,203	10,203
R-squared	0.382	0.382	0.387	0.387
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 7: Predicting Critical Votes

In this table, we test the possibility that our measures of Phantom Shares could cause critical votes. Phantom Shares measure is created using short interest in Columns 1 and 2, and is created using ownership data from Thomson in Columns 3 and 4. *Critical Item* is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if at least one item on the meeting agenda meets the following criteria, and zero otherwise: (i) an annual meeting and the vote difference was less than 10%, (ii) an annual meeting/special item, (iii) a special meeting, (iv) a proxy contest, or (v) ISS recommended voting against the item. Firm controls include index mutual fund ownership, active mutual fund ownership, log of assets, firm age, institutional ownership, blockholder ownership, book to market and return on assets, and are defined at the Appendix Table B. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm and meeting are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Critical Item	Log (1 + Critical Items)	Critical Item	Log (1 + Critical Items)
	<i>Short Interest (SI)</i>		<i>Institutional Ownership (TH)</i>	
Phantom Shares	1.224 (3.117)	0.059 (0.625)	-1.010 (1.983)	-0.492 (0.356)
Constant		0.350*** (0.092)		0.361*** (0.091)
Observations	21,002	26,443	21,002	26,443
R-squared		0.459		0.459
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 8: Phantom Shares and Collateral

In this table, we examine the effect that underlying shares likely to be held in collateral on the relationship between phantom shares and broker non-votes. In all columns the dependent variable is the number of broker non-votes. *Phantom Shares* are defined as the total number of phantom shares of the underlying securities of ETFs, using short interest or Thomson ownership. Both are a percentage of shares outstanding. *ETF Underlying Shares* is the total number of underlying shares held by ETFs. *ETF-Stock Return Correlation* is the value weighted return correlation between the stock and all of the ETFs that hold it. *ETF-Stock Ret. Correlation Deciles* sorts the *ETF-Stock Return Correlation* variable into deciles each month. All control variables are defined in Appendix Table B. In this table, we exclude director elections and any agenda item that has a pass requirement of 1%. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm and meeting are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Broker Non-Vote	Broker Non-Vote	Broker Non-Vote	Broker Non-Vote
	<i>Short Interest (SI)</i>		<i>Institutional Ownership (TH)</i>	
Phantom Shares	0.167 (0.137)	-0.053 (0.154)	-0.201* (0.111)	-0.151* (0.085)
ETF Underlying Shares	-0.109** (0.054)	-0.126** (0.060)	-0.132* (0.068)	-0.102* (0.054)
ETF-Stock Return Correlation	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.011*** (0.004)	
ETF-Stock Return Correlation × Phantom Shares	0.004* (0.002)		0.560*** (0.193)	
ETF-Stock Return Correlation × ETF Underlying Shares	0.000 (0.001)		0.189* (0.103)	
ETF-Stock Ret. Correlation Deciles		-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)
ETF-Stock Ret. Correlation Deciles × Phantom Shares		0.068*** (0.021)		0.043*** (0.013)
ETF-Stock Ret. Correlation Deciles × ETF Underlying Shares		0.007 (0.007)		0.012* (0.006)
Constant	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)
Observations	55,622	55,622	55,622	55,622
R-squared	0.325	0.325	0.324	0.324
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 9: Directional vs. Operational ETF Shorting

In this table we examine the relationship between directional shorting and operational shorting of ETFs, underlying phantom shares, and broker non-votes. In all columns the dependent variable is broker non-votes. *Phantom Shares – Directional* is the number of phantom shares calculated using share lending data from Markit. *Phantom Shares – Operational* is the difference between the *Phantom Shares – Directional* variable and our main *Phantom Shares* variable. All control variables are defined the same as in Appendix Table B. In this table, we exclude director elections and any agenda item that has a pass requirement of 1%. All models include firm fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by firm and meeting are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.

Dependent Variable	(1) Broker Non-Vote	(2) Broker Non-Vote	(3) Broker Non-Vote
Phantom Shares (SI) – Directional	0.946*** (0.315)		0.621* (0.321)
Phantom Shares (SI) – Operational		0.417*** (0.139)	0.324** (0.145)
ETF Underlying Shares	-0.132*** (0.049)	-0.150*** (0.051)	-0.161*** (0.052)
IMF Underlying Shares	0.037 (0.031)	0.053* (0.031)	0.045 (0.032)
Shareholder Sponsored	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
ISS Against	0.049*** (0.002)	0.049*** (0.002)	0.049*** (0.002)
Log (Assets)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Firm Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Institutional Ownership	-0.066*** (0.008)	-0.066*** (0.008)	-0.067*** (0.008)
Six-Month Momentum	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Book to Market	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)
Return on Assets	-0.002 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)	-0.003 (0.015)
Short-Sale Supply	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
Observations	42,433	42,433	42,433
R-squared	0.333	0.333	0.333
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 10: Phantom Shares and Acquirer Returns

In this table, we examine possible effects of phantom shares on the announcement returns for acquiring firms. In each column, the dependent variable is a 4-factor alpha (Fama-French 3 factor plus momentum) obtained from a daily regression from days $t-10$ to $t+1$ or $t-1$ to $t+1$. All columns include acquiring firm SIC3 industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered by firm are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. While a constant is included in the regression, the coefficient is omitted for brevity.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent Variable: 4-Factor Alpha	[-10,+1]	[-1,+1]	[-10,+1]	[-1,+1]	[-10,+1]	[-1,+1]
Phantom Shares	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.010 (0.008)	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	0.000 (0.005)
Stock Only	0.011* (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)			0.009 (0.008)	0.003 (0.006)
Stock Only × Phantom Shares	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)			0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)
E-Index			-0.001 (0.008)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.003)
E-Index × Phantom Shares			-0.013** (0.006)	-0.014*** (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)
Stock Only × E-Index					0.014* (0.008)	0.008* (0.005)
Stock Only × E-Index × Phantom Shares					-0.022*** (0.007)	-0.016*** (0.006)
ETF Underlying Shares	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.003 (0.004)
IMF Underlying Shares	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.017 (0.011)	-0.019** (0.009)
Log (Deal Value)	-0.006* (0.003)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.008)	-0.007* (0.004)	-0.008*** (0.003)
Same Industry Dummy	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)
Return on Assets	-0.005 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	-0.083 (0.074)	-0.071 (0.067)	0.003 (0.014)	-0.007 (0.009)
Book to Market	0.004 (0.006)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.015)	-0.006 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.008** (0.004)
Firm Age	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.006 (0.011)	-0.000 (0.010)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)
Institutional Ownership	0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.036** (0.014)	-0.005 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)
Short-Interest Supply	-150.201* (83.771)	-45.564 (93.425)	-359.757 (287.231)	-53.946 (233.712)	-205.985 (222.871)	-257.303* (140.437)
Observations	1,409	1,409	126	126	923	923
R-squared	0.147	0.160	0.526	0.502	0.236	0.323
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes