

The Violent Legacy of Fascism¹

Neofascist Political Violence in Italy 1969-1988

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Abstract

Is political violence in democracies explained by past local authoritarian experiences? Several modern European democracies emerged from the ashes of fascism regimes in the early 20th century built around violent mobilization. However, we have limited knowledge about the long-term effects of this experience with fascism on the formation of European democracies and the periods of violence they experience in their trajectories towards socio-political stability. The last three decades represented an exceptionally period of peace across Europe. However, early experiences in the continent were characterized by cycles of violence, often violent, during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. Can these episodes of violence be explained by past experiences with violent mobilization during fascism? To answer these questions, we focus on the case of Italy and explore if and how fascist experience in Italy and the strength of its grassroots mobilization in the 1920s affected political violence during a turbulent period in the democratic republic, the so-called Years of Lead (1969-1988). To conduct this analysis, we created an original dataset that covers the political events at subnational level in Italy between 1969 and 1988. Using count model regressions, we find that the local membership of the fascist party in 1922 – hence before the institutionalization of the fascist regime – predicts neofascist political violence at the provincial level during the Years of Lead, more than forty years later. We find, moreover, that new windows of opportunities facilitate the resurfacing of local violent fascist legacies: notably, in the months when a new Minister of Interior is appointed, we see higher levels of neofascist violence in provinces where the early presence of the fascist party was stronger.

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I. Introduction

Democracies are founded on the idea of managing incompatible preferences and interests across all groups in society in ways that avoid the use of violence as a form of solving social conflicts. However, few democracies avoid violence altogether, especially in their early transition years. This was the case of Europe in the post-WWII period and until the late 1980s. Western Europe experienced 4,611 fatalities and 3,366 lethal attacks between 1965-2005, but the peak of violence was reached between 1970s and 1980s (Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2011). Italy had 254 victims of domestic terrorism between 1965-2005, compared to 34 in Germany and 55 in France in the same period, placing Italy as one of the most violent countries in Western Europe. All these were countries recovering from the trauma of two world wars, with deep histories of autocracy, dictatorship, and fascism².

Yet, they can undergo serious challenges because violent legacies can resurface from their previous non-democratic past. We ask in this paper whether past local authoritarian experiences with fascism and its forms of violent mobilization may explain periods of political violence in evolving democracies. Is there a risk of political violence for democracies due to legacies of authoritarian ideologies? To address this question, we focus in this paper on exploring the link between local experiences of early fascism in the 1920s in Italy and subsequent political violence during the 1970s and 1980s.

The establishment of the Italian republic in 1946 and its democratic constitution in 1948 were forged out of the ashes of a violent and oppressive Fascist regime that lasted twenty years. Democracy emerged after a short but virulent civil war in 1943-1945 (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015b) that caused more than 100,000 battle-deaths and around 10,000 killings of civilians (Costalli, Moro, and Ruggeri 2020). In the immediate aftermath of the war, about 10,000 individuals died as a result of extra-judicial executions (Grandi 2013). This armed resistance to the regime had a long-lasting effect on voting patterns in Italy (Costalli and Ruggeri 2019). However, much less is known about the legacies of the period of fascist rule that preceded the Italian civil war.

The life of the young democracy was marked by waves of large-scale political violence that involved the whole country for many years after 1946. Despite the new institutional setting and

² Besides the excellent data by Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, we tried to use other comparative data on terrorism and political violence in Europe. However, under thorough scrutiny, even well established and widely used data such as the GTD failed to report several main groups in Europe. Notice, for instance, that for the Italian case there were not neo-fascist terrorist organization and attacks in the period 1970-1990 according to GTD.

remarkable economic growth, demonstrations and violent clashes occurred in various areas of the country. This tension included the so-called “Events of Genova” in 1960 when the *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, a party built from the fascist ashes, tried to organize its political congress in Genova, but a large popular mobilization led to the cancellation of the event. Other violent demonstrations spread across Italy leading Fernando Tambroni, a Christian Democrat, to step down as prime minister. The following years, approximately ranging from 1969 to 1988, are conventionally defined the “Years of Lead” because the quantity, frequency and virulence of contentious politics increased dramatically and determined a watershed in Italian politics. During that period, Italy experienced over 15,000 acts of revolt, including domestic terrorist attacks and other forms of political violence, leading to over 360 deaths and more than 4000 wounded victims. The 1969 bombing of the Piazza Fontana in Milan and the kidnapping, and then the killing in 1978 in Rome, of Aldo Moro, the leader of the largest Italian party, *Democrazia Cristiana*, are some of the most tragic events of the Years of Lead and of Italian recent history.

In our article, we provide a theory of violent legacies of Fascism based on a tripod of violent knowledge - *know how, know whom and know what* - that needs all three elements to affect politics on the long-term. Moreover, we explain how contextual events - based on the unravelling of democratic procedures - can be catalysing opportunities and facilitate the resurfacing of the violent legacy. We show how illiberal ideologies, such as Fascism, that directly challenge the idea to avoid violence thorough institutional devices – such as elections and parliamentary debates - and make violence a central means of political struggle can survive locally after their national defeats. Local groups that experienced and practiced violence based on an ideological framework can transmit over time and over generations via socialization and local covert institutionalization ideological tenants, knowledge of violent practices and preserve and nourish a violent network. They keep alive a covert tripod of violence knowledge. However, these local legacies have a higher likelihood to resurface when the national liberal institution struggles or seems to be uncertain on how to use its legitimate monopoly of violence. Violent fascist legacies hit when the crux of political contention is under pressure: the relationship with violence and political order.

II. Authoritarian Legacies and Violence

In the last few years, the topic of historical legacies and their effects has been flourishing among political scientists, leading to some serious theoretical attempts at conceptualizing and theorizing

legacies (Wittenberg 2015) and several empirical studies (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, and Cederman 2016). In more recent years, works on the specific legacies of political violence have highlighted various possible enduring effects and relative mechanisms (see reviews by Davenport et al. 2019; Walden and Zhukov 2020 and the book by Sánchez-Cuenca 2019).

A growing body of research has also investigated the political legacies of authoritarian regimes. Most of these studies focus on political attitudes, public opinion, and electoral behaviour of individuals in post-authoritarian societies, although in different ways. Darden and Grzymala-Busse (2006) have investigated the channels through which authoritarian legacies influence electoral behaviour in post-communist countries, while Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) have shown the legacies of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes on different forms of civic society activism. More recently, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2020) have studied the reasons why left-authoritarian attitudes are more common among the citizens of post-communist countries and the channels through which these legacies are transmitted, while Dinas and Northmore-Ball (2020) distinguish and evaluate the role of indoctrination and repression as channels through which authoritarian regimes shape ideological preferences. Neundorf, Gerschewski and Olar (2020) compare exclusionary and inclusionary authoritarian regimes and find that the latter leave a stronger antidemocratic legacy.

Most of these studies focus largely on the legacies of authoritarian regimes for citizens' attitudes and behaviors. However, one important question is how past experiences with authoritarianism – specifically fascist regimes in this paper – may affect democracies emerging from those legacies. It is well-documented that the process of transition from authoritarianism to democracy is turbulent, with cycles of violence breaking at different junction points. Can these cycles of violence be explained by previous experiences with forms of violent mobilization that characterize fascist regimes?

Among the various social and political phenomena that can be affected by the legacies of authoritarian regimes, only a few studies have focused on political violence. Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman (2016) partly address this issue studying the legacies of different colonial regimes on the likelihood of conflict in postcolonial states, while Sanchez-Cuenca (2019) argues that the legacies of post-WWI regimes help explain the occurrence of revolutionary (mainly left-wing) terrorism in developed countries in the 1960s and 1970s.

In parallel, another body of research has studied the social and political effects of violence, with a large part of this literature focusing on the effects of violence as it originates from armed conflicts. While most of this literature has focused on modern civil wars in developing countries (Verwimp, Justino, and Brück 2019), some studies have traced the legacies of armed conflict in Europe. Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017) look at the long-term political consequences of indiscriminate Soviet violence in Ukraine, finding that it reduces support for pro-Russian parties in contemporary Ukraine, while Costalli and Ruggeri (2015, 2019) investigate the short and long-term electoral effects of civil war in Italy during WWII comparing exposure to violence and party organization as possible channels of conflict legacies.

However, political violence can also occur outside open armed conflict, for instance as a result of authoritarian and totalitarian repression. In this line of research, Charnysh and Finkel (2017) and Homola, Pereira and Tavits (2020) study the long-term economic and political effects of Nazi concentration camps on the surrounding communities, finding higher levels of political intolerance, xenophobia and anti-Semitism than the German average. On the Soviet side, Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) study the long-term political effects of massive deportation suffered by Crimean Tatars in the 1940s; Zhukov and Talibova (2018) find that Russian and Ukrainian communities that suffered more severe repression under Stalin are less likely to vote in contemporary elections; Rozenas and Zhukov (2019) find that the loyalty to Moscow of communities repressed through planned hunger during Stalin's era depends on the expectation of a possible response to their opposition.

Taken together, the existing literature shows that the consequences of authoritarian regimes, including fascist regimes, on post-authoritarian society and politics can either be traced to the legacies of authoritarian institutions or be interpreted as legacies of violence that occurred during those periods of authoritarian rule. One question remaining is whether the experiences with authoritarian rule also explain cycles of violence that many post-WWII democracies in Europe experienced in the early second half of the 20th century. To address this question, we study the case of Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, where cycles of extreme violence threatened the stability of democracy. The nature of these events and its origins in extreme rightwing views about society suggest that renewed fascist ideology may explain these events. We ask thus whether these violent events may have been the legacy of a grassroots ideological movement and fascist ideological networks formed in the 1920s. We contribute to the literature on authoritarian legacies in three ways. First, we study the legacy of Fascism, rather than authoritarianism more generally, which is still

an understudied phenomenon Second, we identify a new channel through which the authoritarian past can influence the life of democracies. Finally, we focus our analysis on the effect of Fascism on political violence, rather than more common outcomes in the literature on the legacies of authoritarianism, such as electoral behavior and political attitudes.

III. Fascist Legacy and Political Violence:

Theoretical Mechanisms and Empirical Expectations

How does local experience of fascist collective mobilization travel over time and affect local dynamics of political violence in democracies? And what contextual events may explain how the actions of the past affect later cycles of violence? Hereafter, we provide our theoretical arguments to explain how the legacy of this violent anti-democratic ideology can give rise to political violence in democracies decades after its defeat. Our central argument is that the legacies of fascism may re-emerge because local and contextualised networks of individuals can transfer the foundational norms and ideational preferences of fascist politics – *know what* –, practices of violence – *know how* –, and organizational and training networks – *know whom*. Hence, we argue that potential for violence can be sustained and passed on over time into young democracies by cover activists thanks to the intertwined transfer of ideas, organization, and practices. The violent fascist legacy is based on a tripod of violent knowledge - *know how, know whom and know what* - that needs all three elements to affect politics on the long-term. Moreover, we argue that the effects of local, past experiences – fascist legacies - can also be facilitated by new events in a democratic regime when its non-violent conflict resolution processes and mediating institutional procedures can (even inadvertently) display indecision and uncertainty on how to use the legitimate monopoly of violence. At these points in time, the fascist legacy – as a karst river – keeps the covert tripod of violence knowledge alive and challenges the democratic institutions and its politics.

To present our theoretical framework, we first introduce mechanisms of direct legacies based on ideological preferences, organizational features, and practices of political action. Then, we elaborate on how past local experiences and the fascist legacies can be catalysed by windows of political uncertainties during the unravel of democratic procedures.

Several works focusing on how past authoritarian experiences can be *internalized* highlight the individual as their main analytical unit, assuming that “individuals will adopt political attitudes and behaviours in line with the “official line” of the regime” (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020, 1842), usually via socialization (Checkel 2017). While we fully acknowledge the importance of individual experiences and their legacies, in this paper we elaborate on and highlight the importance of the meso level – *legacies of local and collective organizations, ideas, practices* - rather than the micro-individual level. The experience of local mobilization due to the action of a violent ideology like fascism can have lasting effects through the persistence of local opportunities and organizational structures. Local opportunities of socialization introduce the idea of the superiority of fascism against the indecision and weakness of liberal democracy in the market of ideas (Coase 1974), especially for the youngsters. Organizational structures – usually underground – provide financial and training support for those who, hooked by extreme right-wing ideas, decide to pursue their political action outside non-violent electoral procedures and democratic representation. Fascist activists who managed to survive the fall of the regime could become political entrepreneurs of further political violence (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015a). Their ideological message (“*know what*”), “*know how*” and “*know whom*”, can last longer than their personal action through the institutionalization of their organizational advantages – for instance establishing local informal networks, practices and transfer of ideas and political skills (Costalli and Ruggeri 2018) -, thus influencing the dynamics of political violence even after the apparent defeat of their ideology and regime.

This meso-level legacy is driven not only by local collective organizational capacity, but also by the local presence of narratives and political entrepreneurs that maintain a set of ideological preferences and action-tendencies (Elster 1998). More explicitly, organizations characterized by exclusionary and illiberal ideologies that motivate and foster a culture of political violence (Costalli and Ruggeri 2017), if they have local strongholds, can maintain and nourish locally these political beliefs and practices. We posit that a tripod of political knowledge – nourishing fascist ideas, maintaining organizational capacity, endorsing violent practices – constitute the legacies of fascism. Moreover, we highlight the importance of local political mobilization and contentious politics while other contributions have focused on the legacy of authoritarian institutions .

Proposition 1: *Localities that experienced higher level of fascist mobilization and activism witnessed subsequently higher levels of neofascist violence.*

It has been argued that the legacies of previous political regimes can also be retriggered or exacerbated by new events (Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020), which facilitate and catalyse the legacy. To go back to the metaphor of the karst river: the river was there, it was never gone, but thanks to new political opportunities it resurfaces. New political opportunities provide “options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group” (Koopmans 2004, 65) and these opportunities that can catalyse the fascist legacies should be understood according to the actors’ “beliefs about the opportunities” (Elster 1989, 20). The specific legacies we are investigating are characterized by an ideology based on anti-parliamentary and anti-liberal democratic values. The occupation of the state apparatus, the destruction of the parliamentary system and the conduct of politics with violent means are constitutive features of the Fascist ideology and its practices (Ebner 2011). Hence, the political groups that descend from these past local authoritarian and violent organizations do not aim at challenging the new democratic regime via parliamentary and electoral means, but threatening the legitimate monopoly of violence by the state (Weinberg 1979).

The local networks that transferred norms and practices and fostered a local legacy of fascism acted as covert groups in order to survive. Most likely, they were few and with little budget, hence their planning and resourcing of actions, especially for large violent ones, needed to be strategic, aiming for the higher marginal return of political investments. Hence, even if ready and present, these neofascist underground cells were waiting for events that could provide a catalysing opportunity to show the weakness of a liberal democracy and that the only feasible logic in politics is violence. These groups aimed to hop on events and radicalize them to confirm via actions their political narratives. If the local legacy of fascism can be seen as a persistent and static political opportunity, new events – dynamic political opportunities – can facilitate and incentivize political violence. Hence, our second mechanism put together two ideas of political opportunities: the idea of dynamic and changing political opportunities with more static political opportunity structures (Giugni 2009, 362).

In democracies there are several – also perceived and constructed - critical junctures when violent means can be used by organised and antagonist forces against liberal institutions, for instance before, during and after elections (Birch, Daxecker, and Höglund 2020). However, certain ideological groups, given the nature of their system of beliefs – in this specific case Fascism -

want to win against the state but not within its institutions. They want to show the fundamental weakness of liberal regimes in protecting and exercising the core role of the state: the physical protection of citizens from internal and external threats (Tilly 1978a). Because democracies face a fragile and critical balance between the use of oppressive means by the state and their popular legitimacy (Davenport 2007a, 2007b), one of the weakest moments is when a democratic cabinet signals indecision - or its decisions can be perceived as the result of preferences' heterogeneity - on enforcing repressive measures and managing internal order. The reorganization of national cabinet's ministers, especially those overseeing matters of national security, is one of those moments that can send unintended signals of government disagreement on how to deal with political violence and, therefore, provide dynamic windows of opportunity for violent actions (Rasler 1996).

Proposition 2: *Localities that experienced higher levels of fascist mobilization and activism witness subsequently higher levels of neofascist violence when the democratic government signals indecision on the use of the monopoly of violent means.*

IV. Years of Lead: The Italian Case 1969-1988

The political violence that occurred in Italy during the 'Years of Lead' was perpetrated by many armed groups – both right-wing and left-wing – with different mobilization capacities, diverse forms of support from international actors and branches of the state institutions, and using varied repertoires of violence.³ The time span of this period is not perfectly defined, but it is usually considered to extend between the end of the 1960s until the late 1980s. The beginning of this long violent period is usually identified with the massacre of Piazza Fontana in December 1969, when right-wing extremists placed a bomb in a bank in Milan killing 17 people and wounding 88.⁴ While the left-wing *Brigate Rosse* was probably the most tragically famous armed group of the whole period, and most of the scholarly research has focused on left-wing political violence, several right-wing, neo-fascist groups were also active at the same time. These groups - such as the *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari* (NAR), *Ordine Nuovo*, *Avanguardia Nazionale* and *Terza Posizione* - opposed both the

³ The label comes from the movie directed by Margarethe von Trotta [*Anni di piombo* (*Die bleierne Zeit*), 1981]. The movie is about the political violence in Germany by the *Rote Armee Faction* during the same period of activity by the *Brigate Rosse* in Italy. This term then stuck in Italy as label to define twenty years of political turmoil. The movie won the Leone d'Oro at the 38th International Exhibit of Cinema in Venice, Italy.

⁴ However, the first case of a violent clash took place in Rome on the 1st of March 1968, during the battle of Valle Giulia, which pitched rebelling students against the police. The first death of these years is that of police officer Antonio Annarumma, killed on the 19th of November 1969 in Milan.

extreme left-wing movements and the state authorities, organizing violent clashes in the streets, armed attacks against policemen and judges, and bombings in public places.

For about a year after the end of World War II, Italy underwent a period of institutional transition and violence spread, especially in the central and northern regions of the country, where the fascist regime had lasted longer and had ruled with the support of the Nazi forces during the last years of war. Extra-judicial executions against the local fascist leadership, mixed with violence against future political adversaries and criminal activities, caused about 10,000 deaths (Dondi 1999; Grandi 2013). However, since the entering into force of the new democratic constitution in 1948, Italy experienced a long period of modernization and economic development, with GDP growing on average by 6.9% per year between 1948 and 1963.⁵ The young democracy enjoyed strong legitimacy because all major political parties were rooted in the resistance movement against the fascist regime. Of key importance was the fact that the strong communist party participated in the writing of the democratic constitution and played its role within the democratic institutions. In addition, robust economic growth improved the living conditions of a large share of the population.

However, economic growth also caused tensions in the job market, and high inflation emerged in 1963, followed by reductions in GDP growth in 1964 and 1965. Economic development in the period was also uneven. Some areas of the country were not included in the process of change, large migration flows increased the size of the suburbs of industrial cities and tensions arose in many areas. Two new important social groups started to emerge in the more industrial cities: a newly educated middle class and a large group of migrant workers. This deep social change implied new requests to the government, including civil modernization, education reforms, urban planning, and more labour rights (Tarrow 1989). A wave of protests started, fuelled by a new generation of young Italians who had not experienced the war, were not satisfied with the material improvements provided by the post-war economic growth, and reclaimed a prominent role in politics and society. The protests, rooted in the international cycle that started in the USA and involved France and Germany, amounted to 350 events in the first half of 1968 and reached almost 600 in the following six months (Tarrow 1989).

The protesters defined themselves as left-wing, but the institutional left-wing parties and trade unions were taken by surprise and experienced serious difficulties in dealing with the movement. The young democratic institutions also faced serious challenges in managing the deep economic

⁵ <https://seriestoriche.istat.it>

and social change. As a result, neofascist movements started to exploit these social tensions to challenge the democratic order (Zavoli 1992).

The mass left-wing mobilization of 1968 and the challenges experienced by the government to address the various demands provided a precious opportunity for neofascist underground networks to resurface the fascist legacy. On the one hand, conservative sectors of the society were scared by the political instability and the mounting left-wing movement; on the other hand, the youngsters leading the protests mainly belonged to the educated, urban middle class and therefore did not fully represent more marginalized sectors of the society and peripheral areas. Fascism, in the narratives of those who had kept and transferred its legacy underground, could respond to the growing instability, providing order and voice to the marginalized and overcoming the indecisions and weaknesses of the democratic institutions (Ferraresi 1996).

Despite the defeat of the Fascist regime and the prosecution of the Fascist leadership, extreme right-wing ideologies and preferences did not completely disappear in the new democratic Italy. Fascism first developed in Italy but, unlike Germany, which was massively bombed and subsequently occupied by the Allied forces, or Japan, which experienced two atomic bombs and had its post-war constitution drafted by the staff of General MacArthur, Italy enjoyed much more autonomy after the end of World War II. In September 1943, the Italian king signed an armistice with the Allied forces and co-operated with them to liberate northern and central Italy from the Nazi occupation and the remaining fascist militias (Costalli, Moro, and Ruggeri 2020). An important role in the liberation was also played by the strong resistance movement, which constituted the roots of the new political parties (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015a, 2018). As a consequence, Italy enjoyed a much larger degree of autonomy in the management of post-war institutional reconstruction and transitional justice. As a result, in the immediate aftermath of the liberation, Italy experienced the concurrent action of war tribunals, special tribunals established by the resistance movement, and ordinary courts, all dealing with crimes committed by fascists during the authoritarian regime and the civil war (Dondi 1999). In the autumn of 1945, the Minister of Justice Palmiro Togliatti, who was also the leader of the communist party (PCI), re-established ordinary courts as the only legitimate bodies to administer justice, but these found themselves overwhelmed by thousands of cases. In order to solve this technical stall, and to “quickly relaunch the country toward conditions of political and social peace”,⁶ after two years of civil war and post-

⁶https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazioneGazzetta=1946-06-23&atto.codiceRedazionale=046U0004&elenco30giorni=false

civil war violence, in June 1946 Minister Togliatti promoted an amnesty for crimes committed before August 1945.⁷

The amnesty included political crimes and therefore thousands of middle and low-rank officials of the fascist regime and militias were liberated either immediately or after short periods in jail. According to reliable estimates, more than 20,000 collaborationists and more than 5,000 fascists were set free due to the amnesty (Franzinelli 2016). If the Italian case could seem an outlier, due to its amnesty, it is in fact rather a forerunner of many other cases: between 1990 and 2016, 289 amnesties have been introduced as a result of ongoing conflict, as part of peace negotiations, or in post-conflict periods, 245 of which included political crimes.⁸

Although the new constitution banned the possibility of re-forming the Fascist Party, by December 1946 second-tier members of the vanquished regime had created a new party called *Movimento Sociale Italiano* (MSI). Despite being clearly right-wing and openly nostalgic of the fascist regime, MSI accepted nonetheless to be part of the new democratic order, participating in the elections and denying the intention of re-establishing the previous regime. This ambiguous strategy was severely and repeatedly criticized by some members of the party, who opted out and founded some of the neofascist movements mentioned above. The leaders of these movements completely rejected democracy and any possible compromise with its institutions and procedures, were inflexibly anti-communism and exalted the myth of violence (Zavoli 1992).

One important movement was *Ordine Nuovo*, created in Rome in 1969, with branches in other parts of Italy, especially in Veneto, Lombardia, Umbria, Campania and Sicilia (Battaglini, 1986: 32). The movement was ideologically and operationally revolutionary and it was strongly influenced by the thoughts and works of Julius Evola, a philosopher who participated in the fascist regime. Evola was described by the police as a “teacher and spiritual father of this clique of fanatics” (Murgia 1976, 129) and leaders of the neofascist groups such as “Erra, Rauti, and Graziani were his acknowledged disciples” (Ferraresi 1996, 211). Evola was very explicit on the use of violent means: “Your leaders are imbeciles’ is a typical remark Evola would toss to a group of young MSI militants reverently gathered to hear his word, ‘violence is the only possible and reasonable solution, but it presupposes intelligence, and intelligence is conspicuously absent’ ” (Salierno 1976, 142–43).

⁷ The amnesty excluded the most serious crimes, such as massacres and tortures, and the crimes committed by the highest ranks of the civil and military branches of the state administration. 259 fascists got condemned to death penalty and 91 were executed, while the other death penalties were transformed into life sentences because of the amnesty (Franzinelli 2016).

⁸ See <https://www.peaceagreements.org/amnesties/>.

Avanguardia Nazionale was first created as a youth movement by former members of MSI who shared part of their political path with the members of *Ordine Nuovo*. Openly neofascist and anti-democratic, the youth movement broke up in 1964, but was re-created again in 1970 by former members of MSI's youth section and finally disbanded in 1976. In these years, a younger generation of neofascists was growing increasingly dissatisfied with the ambiguous strategy of the MSI and even with the strategies of more extreme political movements, who were ideologically revolutionary and anti-democratic, but were perceived as being too slow in their actions. This is why between the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s the neofascist underground scene is dominated by the so-called spontaneous armed phenomenon (*spontaneismo armato*): small groups of young neofascist extremists will kill and wound dozens of people in their almost nihilistic struggle against the state, using the name *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari* (NAR) almost as a label available to all small groups who shared the idea of acting immediately to overturn the democratic state in a violent fascist revolution, with no formal, rigid, and hierarchic organization (Capaldo et al. 1986)

Based on our theoretical propositions and our case, hereafter we present empirical expectations of political violence in Italy, illustrating how the experience of the local-level fascist mobilization in Italy in the 1920s affected levels of neofascist political violence 30-40 years after the collapse of the regime. In the Italian case, therefore, we expect that local fascist strongholds before the institutionalization of the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF) into a regime – hence, when the fascists were aiming for the control of the state and not yet controlling it - created long-lasting organizational and ideational legacies at the local level for the neofascist violence happening during the Years of Lead. As Ferraresi put it: “within this galaxy the *Ordine Nuovo* and the *Avanguardia Nazionale* occupied a role of unquestioned hegemony, for the length of their formal presence on the scene (about twenty years for the former, fifteen for the latter), the energy of their leadership, and the activities they carried out. Moreover, by way of personal and ideological continuity, they provided a crucial trait d'union among periods and generations of militants, linking the veterans of the 1940s with the spontaneisti terrorists of the 1970s and 1980s.” (Ferraresi, 1997:52) The local transfer happened via direct witness and writings, as in the case of Evola but also, as for Delfo Zorzi (core member of *Ordine Nuovo*) thanks to the direct supervision of academics like Pio Filippo Ronconi, a professor who had been a member of the Italian SS during the fascist regime (Dondi 2015, 58).

Hypothesis 1. An above-average membership to the PNF in an area before the institutionalization of the regime predicts higher levels of “black” violence during the Years of Lead.

One of the most critical moments in Italy during the Years of Lead – as it happens in all democracies - was the discussion on the use of violence and repression by the state against anti-democratic and violent groups. In Italy the Minister of Interior has a direct role on managing national security policies (Dondi 2015: 207) and the minister has to monitor and report in parliament the actions of the police forces and their local leadership on systematic bases (Satta 2016: 283). Such role was so important and clear to neofascist organizations that for instance Mariano Rumor in 1973, at that time Minister of Interior, was targeted to alarm the public opinion on the incapacity of the democratic institutions to deal with the violent escalation (Milan Tribunal, Sentence 22/02/2005). The Minister also had the power to declare illegal political groups due to their violent activities, as it eventually happened to *Avanguardia Nazionale*. When *Ordine Nuovo* heard the rumour that the Minister was about to banish another organization, they declared: “The decision of the Minister of Interior Affairs and of the government would be of an extreme gravity: we know we could be the next one” (Satta 2015, 178). Hence, one of the most import catalysing events to make the local and violent fascist legacies resurface could have been observable in the reshuffle of this specific Minister:

Hypothesis 2. Areas with a strong fascist legacy, when facing a Minister of Interior’ reshuffle, experienced higher level of neofascist violence during the Years of Lead.

V. Data and Research Design

Even though political violence was widespread and frequent in Italy between the 1960s and 1980s of the XX century- several sources attest around 15,000 attacks involving domestic acts of terrorist and political violence of different political matrices – few datasets, but non comprehensive, exist. An original dataset on the cycles of political protest and violence in Italy between 1966 and 1973 was created by Della Porta and Tarrow (1986). They base their work on data on all forms of disruptive direct action uncovered in the country by a daily reading and coding of articles in the *Corriere della Sera*. Three shortcomings are present in their dataset: first, a single newspaper as main data source (the *Corriere* is based in Milano), hence higher probability of missing cases and geographical bias in reporting episodes; second, their time window covers only 7 years and excludes some major events and the peak of the Years of Lead; third, they look at aggregated national timeseries and not at subnational variation. A more recent data source, but not focused only on Italy, has been created by de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2011). Their dataset collects

fatalities of domestic terrorism in Western European countries for the period 1965–2005. Even though it covers a long historical period and the coding is supported by strong conceptualizations, the data include only fatalities due to terrorism, hence limiting the possible repertoire of violence under scrutiny (Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017; Kalyvas 2019).

We create an original dataset that aims at overcoming several shortcomings highlighted above. We coded the description of political events based on newspaper articles, in fact “most major research traditions in social movements have benefited from analysis of newspaper event data”(Earl et al. 2004, 66). However, we are aware that creating data from this type of sources could come with some biases (Earl et al. 2004; Franzosi 1987), and we refer to our data paper to provide a more elaborate discussion on measurement, validity and intercoder-reliability of the dataset (Costalli et al 2022). However, we want to stress that a core aspect that, for instance, Della Porta and Tarrow’s data lack of (and we address instead) is triangulation: “Triangulation of multiple sources is used to ensure a broader range of coverage, which is likely both to capture more events (addressing selection bias) and to provide multiple accounts of each event (addressing description bias)” (Earl et al. 2004, 74).

Our data coding is based on the short description of events from a two-volumes publication prepared by a research team of Italian scholars from the University “La Sapienza” in Rome (Schaerf et al. 1992) . The authors decided not to use police archives due to the bureaucratic difficulties of accessing them, but most importantly, to avoid “political pushes” and biases that could have derived from using those data sources. Finally, since those archives are not public, they would have not allowed comparisons with other sources of information. Therefore, they used three broadly distributed national newspapers: *Il Corriere della Sera*, *Il Messaggero* and *La Repubblica*. These newspapers were based in the two largest Italian cities (Milan and Rome) but also had local journalists based in major Italian cities. Moreover, these newspapers represent different political positions: the establishment (*Il Corriere*), moderate-center (*Il Messaggero*) and more progressive readers (*La Repubblica*). They integrated and verified some additional information also using local newspapers. Overall, they suggest that the description of the events was substantially the same for the three newspapers; though, the use of the local press was necessary for minor events that were reported too succinctly in the main newspapers.

Based on the data provided by the Ministry of the Interior and reported by the press, in the period between 1 January 1969 and 31 December 1987, there were in Italy 14,591 acts of violence


politically motivated against people or things. A lot of acts included in this list are very different from each other, ranging from squad aggression to murder, from attacks with incendiary bottles to those with explosive. According to Schaerf and coauthors (1992), in the five years of greatest virulence of the terrorist phenomenon (from 1976 to 1980) there were a total of 9,673 acts of violence, with an average of over five episodes per day. In 1979, the year in which the subversive acts peaked at 2,513, the average was even seven acts of political violence every twenty-four hours. The deaths were a total of 419, the injured 1,181; the most tragic year was 1980, with 125 deaths and 236 wounded; but it should be noted that in that year the massacre of the Bologna station took place which, alone, caused 85 deaths and 177 wounded. Altogether in the eight massacres perpetrated in Italy between 1969 and 1984 there were 149 deaths and 688 injured. This includes the massacres of Milan (December 12, 1969), Gioia Tauro (July 22, 1970), Peteano (May 31, 1972), Milan Police Headquarters (May 17, 1973), Brescia (May 28, 1974), Italicus (4 August 1974), Bologna station (2 August 1980), train 904 (23 December 1984), while the two international massacres of Fiumicino are excluded.

Starting from the chronology provided by Schaerf and coauthors (1992), we undertook a systematic and deeper analysis of the episodes reported, while unpacking instances containing multiple events. The aim was to develop a more nuanced and granular dataset, elaborating on the diverse repertoires of political actions and the different groups active during the Years of Lead. We created a “catalogue of violent events” (Biggs 2018; Tilly 1978b), where we coded events based on an “Actor-Action-Target” structure, collecting information on actors characteristics, their modalities and repertoires, and their targets. In this paper however, we have used our new “catalogue of events” – containing 8131 instances- to create a panel with a month-province unit of analysis, and covering the period between January 1969 and December 1988.⁹

In Figure 1 we provide a description of the trends of political unrest where actors belonged to far-right groups (*Black Events*), which are the main focus of this study. We notice that *Violent Practice* is the dominant sub-category of action, with substantially higher levels in the first half of the Years of Lead, while exhibiting a decreasing trend during the whole time period considered. Given the greater organizational costs and effort that this type of political actions required, we expect a greater effect of the fascist legacy for far-right violent events, compared to non-violent ones.

⁹ While we have information on the day and city where the event occurred, in the current study we aggregate observations at the month-province level to conduct statistical analysis.

Figure 1: Time Trends - Black Events by Action Type



Since in our analyses we employ as dependent variables counts of (rare) events (e.g., violent actions perpetrated by neofascist groups), all specifications are estimated through zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB), which is appropriate for over-dispersed data (i.e., the conditional mean is not equal to the conditional variance) that are also sparse (Colin and Trivedi 2013). Our main explanatory variable to evaluate the first hypothesis is *DummyPNF*, which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the PNF members registered in the province on the 31st of December 1922 (Gentile 1989) is greater than the average. The rationale underlying this variable is trying to capture those areas where the fascists (and their organizational structures) were particularly rooted before the establishment of the regime.

However, in the Appendix we have also reproduced our baseline estimations using as alternative measurement the raw number of members in the local PNF section, with no substantive change in the insights provided by our results. Yet, we believe the interpretation of our main proxy is much clearer. For our second hypothesis, we have coded the month when a government had ministerial reshuffles relative to the Minister of Interior Affairs (MoI). Several of the socio-economic controls we use for both the 1920s and the Years of Lead come from the Italian Istituto Centrale di Statistica, whereas the votes to parties at provincial level are collected from Corbetta and Piretti (2009).

VI. Empirical Analysis

Analysis I: persistence of local legacies

To explicitly model the relationship between fascist legacy and political violence during the Years of Lead, and assess the hypotheses proposed in section IV, we move to a regression-based framework. In Table 2, we perform a series of ZINB regressions to test our first hypothesis. In our framework, the logit that models the excess of zeros is a function of covariates that might influence the likelihood of a political event occurring during the Years of Lead in a given Italian province: the value added of industry in 1971 and 1981 – as a proxy of the economic development of the province-, an average of the total population between 1971 and 1981, and GDP per capita in both 1971 and 1981. The count process contains our main independent variable of interest: *DummyPNF*. In the negative binomial model, we also include pre-treatment variables that might determine a non-random allocation of PNF members in the 1920s (i.e., GDP per capita in 1921, workforce in 1921, and male literacy in 1921). In the same equation, we add a dummy *South* that captures the geographical divide between Italian regions and a set of year fixed effects to control for shocks that are common to every province in a given year. In the different columns of Table 2, we explore the legacy of PNF across a range of categories of political events occurred during the Years of Lead. However, we only report estimates for the variables included into the count model. All observations are defined at the month-province level. In column 1, the dependent variable considers all the political events present in our dataset.

We observe a positive and statistically significant (at 5%) effect of *DummyPNF*. The coefficient implies an increase in the number of expected events by 72.7% in the provinces with a strong PNF legacy (*ceteris paribus*). In column 2 we look at violent events, but across the whole political spectrum. The coefficient on *DummyPNF* increases in magnitude and its statistical significance raises, meaning that the legacy effect is greater for those political events that are characterized by a violent component. However, when we move to violent events related to the extreme right (column 3), we observe that the legacy effect is larger and is now statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient implies an increase in the expected number of events by 120%. This does not appear to be the case when we focus instead on non-violent episodes committed by far-right groups (column 4), as *DummyPNF* is no longer statistically significant. Hence, the fascist legacy appears to have a stronger effect when we focus on violent acts perpetrated by “black” groups. In the other models presented we assess the robustness of our findings, as explained in section VII.¹⁰

¹⁰ In Table 1A of the Appendix, we reproduce our findings using just the number of PNF members in December 1922 as main independent variable. While the estimates are slightly less precise, the pattern of the results is qualitatively the same.

Analysis II: Local Legacies Resurfacing

We explore now our second hypothesis. Cabinet reshuffle is operationalized through a dummy variable *AppointmentMoI* that takes the value of 1 for the months when a Minister of Interior Affairs (MoI) is appointed.¹¹ The variable *IntAppDummy* captures the interaction between *AppointmentMoI* and *DummyPNF*. These terms are included in our preferred specification, the one presented in column 3 of Table 2. To gain a better understanding of the dynamics of black violence during the proposed windows of opportunity, we analyse different time intervals, considering also the months either before or after the MoI appointment. In the first column of Table 3 we focus only on the same month in which the appointment occurs. We notice a positive and statistically significant effect of *IntAppDummy* on the predicted number of violent events committed by far-right groups, supporting our hypothesis. The positive effect of the interaction counterbalances the negative one of *AppointmentMoI*, with a net increase in the number of expected events in those provinces with stronger fascist legacy. In column 2, we extend the scope of the time windows to the month before the appointment. Hence the variable *AppointmentMoIBefore 1M* takes the value of 1 in the month of the appointment and the one before. The coefficient on the interaction term (*IntAppDummyBefore 1M*) is now smaller in magnitude, but the effect is estimated more precisely. In column 3 we follow the same logic, but we consider the two months before the MoI appointment. The effect of the interaction term (*IntAppDummyBefore 2M*) is now statistically significant at the 1% level. In the next two columns we consider instead the months after the appointment. Interestingly, when we extend the time windows forward the interaction terms are never statistically significant, either that we look at the month after the appointment (column 4) or the following two (column 5).¹²

In Table 4 we narrow our definition of cabinet reshuffle to only those cases in which the Minister appointed was a new one. When we look at the same month of the reshuffle and the period before (columns 1, 2, and 3) we notice that, while the effect of the interaction terms is estimated less precisely, it is larger in magnitude compared to the corresponding estimates of Table 3.¹³ This is shown graphically in Figure 2 where we plot the predictive margins for the interaction terms in column 1 of both Table 3 and 4 (i.e., when we only consider the same month of the

¹¹ Note that this can happen because of the formation of a new government or within the same one due to actual reshuffle. Hence, the Minister appointed can be a new one or the same as before.

¹² In Table 2A of the Appendix we reproduce this set of results using the specification proposed in column 8 of Table 2. The effect of the interaction terms decreases in magnitude and statistical significance, but the results are qualitatively the same.

¹³ The loss of statistical significance can be partly explained by the fact that we are now looking at only nine cases: February 1972, July 1973, November 1974, February 1976, May 1978, June 1978, August 1983, August 1987, and April 1988.

appointment/change). We observe that, while in both cases the appointment of the MoI increases the gap in the expected number of events between provinces with weak and strong legacy, this increase is larger when we focus on those instances where the Minister appointed was a new one (Panel (b)). Moving back to Table 4, we find again no significant effect of the interaction terms when we extend the time windows to the months after the MoI's change (columns 4 and 5).

Table 2: ZINB Regressions - DummyPNF

VARIABLES	(1) GE	(2) VE	(3) VB (I)	(4) NVB	(5) VB (II)	(6) VB (III)	(7) VB (IV)	(8) VB (V)
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.5462** (0.267)	0.6187** (0.263)	0.7905*** (0.287)	0.2428 (0.388)	0.7663*** (0.206)	0.8136*** (0.199)	0.7976*** (0.197)	0.7477*** (0.187)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.5264 (0.500)	-0.7036 (0.503)	-0.9965** (0.487)	0.2066 (0.757)	-0.6416 (0.426)	-0.3683 (0.456)	-0.4165 (0.475)	-0.4605 (0.466)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0042*** (0.001)	0.0039*** (0.001)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0013 (0.001)	0.0030*** (0.000)	0.0028*** (0.001)	0.0029*** (0.001)	0.0029*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	-0.0016 (0.017)	0.0026 (0.018)	0.0074 (0.018)	0.0203 (0.021)	0.0030 (0.016)	-0.0043 (0.016)	-0.0042 (0.016)	-0.0021 (0.015)
<i>South</i>	-0.4040 (0.443)	-0.5717 (0.398)	-0.2427 (0.344)	0.1636 (0.513)	-0.0739 (0.315)	-0.1037 (0.296)	-0.1279 (0.295)	-0.1219 (0.287)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>					-1.8195*** (0.533)	-1.8937*** (0.490)	-1.8743*** (0.476)	-2.0161*** (0.486)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>						-5.3901** (2.270)	-5.2183** (2.226)	-5.6196** (2.227)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>								0.0087 (0.012)
<i>Constant</i>	0.2073 (1.219)	-0.0349 (1.243)	0.8558 (1.114)	-4.3170** (1.953)	0.4152 (0.826)	0.4088 (0.876)	0.5356 (0.899)	0.5139 (0.878)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

GE: General Events; VE: Violent Events; VB: Violent Black Events; NVB: Non-violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3 ZINB Regressions – Appointment Minister of Interior Affairs

VARIABLES	(1) Same Month	(2) 1 Mon Bef	(3) 2 Mon Bef	(4) 1 Mon Aft	(5) 2 Mon Aft
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.7338*** (0.126)	0.7289** (0.294)	0.6701** (0.283)	0.7838*** (0.303)	0.7942*** (0.299)
<i>IntAppDummy</i>	0.6072** (0.280)				
<i>AppointmentMoI</i>	-0.4838** (0.231)				
<i>IntAppDummyBefore 1M</i>		0.4014** (0.169)			
<i>AppointmentMoIBefore 1M</i>		-0.4743*** (0.143)			
<i>IntAppDummyBefore 2M</i>			0.4407*** (0.148)		
<i>AppointmentMoIBefore 2M</i>			-0.3461** (0.139)		
<i>IntAppDummyAfter 1M</i>				0.0500 (0.190)	
<i>AppointmentMoIAfter 1M</i>				-0.1889 (0.140)	
<i>IntAppDummyAfter 2M</i>					-0.0129 (0.135)
<i>AppointmentMoIAfter 2M</i>					-0.1676 (0.107)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.9967*** (0.215)	-1.0061** (0.484)	-1.0015** (0.482)	-0.9884** (0.485)	-0.9917** (0.485)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0077 (0.009)	0.0081 (0.018)	0.0075 (0.017)	0.0075 (0.018)	0.0076 (0.018)
<i>South</i>	-0.2654 (0.177)	-0.2567 (0.341)	-0.2671 (0.337)	-0.2508 (0.344)	-0.2475 (0.345)
<i>Constant</i>	0.8794* (0.483)	0.8843 (1.118)	0.9497 (1.109)	0.8508 (1.113)	0.8761 (1.103)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4 ZINB Regressions – Change Minister of Interior Affairs

VARIABLES	(1) Same Month	(2) 1 Mon Bef	(3) 2 Mon Bef	(4) 1 Mon Aft	(5) 2 Mon Aft
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.7469*** (0.124)	0.7579*** (0.293)	0.7563*** (0.292)	0.7742*** (0.296)	0.7768*** (0.298)
<i>IntChangeDummy</i>	0.7427* (0.427)				
<i>ChangeMol</i>	-0.1581 (0.354)				
<i>IntChangeDummyBefore 1M</i>		0.5665* (0.299)			
<i>ChangeMolBefore 1M</i>		-0.3367 (0.277)			
<i>IntChangeDummyBefore 2M</i>			0.5081** (0.249)		
<i>ChangeMolBefore 2M</i>			-0.5102** (0.217)		
<i>IntChangeDummyAfter 1M</i>				0.1713 (0.333)	
<i>ChangeMolAfter 1M</i>				-0.0199 (0.279)	
<i>IntChangeDummyAfter 2M</i>					0.1184 (0.264)
<i>ChangeMolAfter 2M</i>					-0.0235 (0.221)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.9715*** (0.214)	-0.9949** (0.484)	-1.0039** (0.483)	-0.9865** (0.487)	-0.9918** (0.488)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0068 (0.008)	0.0075 (0.018)	0.0077 (0.018)	0.0071 (0.018)	0.0072 (0.018)
<i>South</i>	-0.2317 (0.176)	-0.2387 (0.342)	-0.2492 (0.342)	-0.2399 (0.344)	-0.2425 (0.345)
<i>Constant</i>	0.8522* (0.478)	0.8659 (1.101)	0.8781 (1.107)	0.8532 (1.110)	0.8624 (1.112)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320


Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.


*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2: Predictive Margins Interaction

Panel (b): *Int.AppDummy*



Panel (a): *IntChangeDummy*



VII. Robustness: Sensitivity Analyses and Alternative Mechanisms

Here we summarise what we have done above to tackle possible non-randomness of stronger presence of the PNF, hence how we controlled for factors that might confound the relationship between local fascist legacy and the subsequent extreme-right violence in the Years of Lead. Moreover, we provide further sensitivity analyses and evaluate alternative mechanisms that could challenge our theoretical arguments and findings.

First, we have controlled (in all specifications) for a series of pre-treatment social economic factors - such as GPD per capita, workforce, male literacy- that could have had long-term effects on the local political dynamics. In addition, the year fixed effects control for homogenous shocks across all the provinces.

To validate our main findings and check that our theoretical framework applies just to specific political actors (i.e., neofascist groups), we reproduce the estimations in column 3 of Table 2 replacing the dependent variable with the number of violent events committed by left-wing terrorist groups (e.g., *Brigate Rosse*). Results are reported in column 1 of Table 3A in the Appendix. The coefficient of *DummyPNF* is not statistically different from 0, providing no evidence of local fascist legacies having an effect on the violence perpetrated by other political actors.¹⁴

In column 5 of Table 2 instead, we check that the legacy effect that we capture is not just a mechanical one driven by (historical) local preferences. We add in the count model of column 3 the share of votes for either the *Blocco Nazionale* or the *PNF* in the 1921 general elections. The *Blocco Nazionale* was a right-wing coalition of political parties proposed by the liberal Giovanni Giolitti, with the aim of exploiting the raising fascist movement against the socialist, communist and people's parties (Lussu 1931). The lists presented under the *Blocco* while gathering a broad range of political forces (e.g., nationalists, liberals, democrats) included also fascist candidates.¹⁵ The effect of *DummyPNF* decreases only slightly in magnitude and the results are still robust to the inclusion of the control.

In column 6, we add the share of votes for the *Partito Comunista* in the same elections, to account for the preferences towards the extreme left in the provinces. Again, the main insights from our findings do not change.

In Table 4A of the Appendix, we reproduce the results of Table 2, but including in the logit that models the likelihood of an event occurring the share of votes for the *Movimento Sociale*

¹⁴ In column 2 of Table 3A of the Appendix, we replace *DummyPNF* with the number of PNF members, as an alternative operationalization of the main explanatory variable. Again, there is no statistically significant effect on the level of extreme-left terrorism.

¹⁵ We do not consider just the share of votes for the *Fasci Italiani di Combattimento* (a fascist organization that can be considered the forerunner of the PNF), as they only presented an independent list in two constituencies (Naples and Verona).

Italiano (MSI) in the last elections (at the province level). The test is meant to check that the legacy effect does not disappear when we take into account the local political presence of this far-right party, which might be considered the heir of the PNF. As we can see, the coefficient on *DummyPNF* across the different specifications is basically unaffected by the addition of the variable.

In Table 5A of the Appendix instead, we include in the estimations a spatial lag that measures the surrounding units' fascist legacy (*Spatial Lag Dummy PNF*) and its interaction with *DummyPNF* (*IntSpatialLag*).¹⁶ The spatial lag captures potential diffusion effects, so that being surrounded by provinces with strong legacy might inflate the local level of neofascist violence. The interaction instead captures if these spillovers are mainly directed towards provinces that have strong legacy too (and so stronger local networks) or not. First, we observe that *DummyPNF* is still positive and statistically significant in the different models. Then we notice that from the inclusion of *Spatial Lag Dummy PNF* and the interaction term emerges an interesting but consistent pattern. While we capture positive spillovers from neighbouring provinces with fascist legacy (positive effect of *Spatial Lag Dummy PNF*), the negative coefficient on *IntSpatialLag* suggests that the effect is directed towards provinces where strong local networks, ideas, and practices are not present. Hence, suggesting also a relative mobility between provinces that had different fascist legacies experience.

Finally, in Table 6A we adopt a control function approach (Wooldridge 2015) to mitigate the potential endogeneity of PNF membership and our substantive results remain.¹⁷ We have collected data on the World War I casualties of Italian soldiers using the “*Albo d'oro*” of the Italian Ministry of Defence, the most reliable source of soldiers casualties (Fornasin 2017). The historical

¹⁶ The spatial lag is created counting the number of surrounding provinces with fascist legacy (i.e., those provinces for which *DummyPNF*=1), divided by the total number of neighbouring provinces.

¹⁷ Under this approach, we first estimate through OLS the predicted number of PNF members using all the regressors included in the count model plus an exogenous instrument. For this purpose, we employ the total number of deaths in World War I (at the province level), as there are strong theoretical arguments for assuming a direct effect of the variable on (early) local PNF membership. We then include the residuals from the first stage in the count model, to control for the potential endogeneity of *PNF Membership*. We bootstrap standard errors to account for the two-stage procedure. The effect of interest is still positive and significant across the different models, with the main difference being that we now observe also a (marginally) significant legacy effect on the non-violent events perpetrated by far-right groups. We only focus on the direction of the effects as coefficients are not scaled. However, we would like to stress that such results should be taken with a pinch of salt given that the assumptions that method imposes (i.e., the statistical independence between the joint distribution of the error terms from the two equations and the full set of regressors) cannot be tested. We conduct the procedure using *PNF Membership* instead of *DummyPNF*, as dealing with a potential endogenous dichotomous variable in nonlinear models presents further issues under this framework.

literature suggest that variation of experience, trauma and memory of violence on war front affected the first memberships within Italy to the PNF (Alcalde 2017)¹⁸.

Analysis I: alternative explanations of violent legacy of Fascism

In column 7 of Table 2, we consider the possibility that far-right groups respond to the violence committed by the extreme left, so that the likelihood of a violent “black” event is driven by “red” terrorism. Hence, we include in the logit that models the excess of zeros the number of violent events committed by “red” terrorist groups in the same month. The effect of *DummyPNF* is still large and significant at 1%.

In the last column of Table 2 we add in the count model a variable capturing the total number of deaths in the political clashes occurred between 1920 and 1921 (*Total Deaths 1920-1921*), as they might be systematically correlated with the early presence of PNF members, to account for possible long-lasting effects of local contentiousness. This is an important evaluation of an alternative mechanism – legacy of local political valence-, as there was a high level of violent and contentious politics before the establishment of the fascist regime, and we do not want to measure a mere legacy of the “Biennio Nero” (when repeated violent clashes occurred between socialist and fascist groups), but, as elaborated in sections II and IV, the legacy of local fascism instead. While the coefficient on *DummyPNF* slightly decreases, our results are not substantially affected by this last check.

In Table 5, we focus on neofascist violence being a strategic response to the actions carried out by the government against “black” political groups, since an alternative mechanism could be a mere logic of retaliation. In column 1, we reproduce the specification of column 8 in Table 2 adding in the logit model the total number of events of state repression against extreme-right actors (at the month-province level).¹⁹ Again, the effect of *DummyPNF* is still strong and highly significant.

Next, we dig deeper and in the subsequent models (2-5), we explore the heterogeneity of the legacy effect when the sample is split according to the cumulated level of state repression over the whole time period (to capture those areas where the activity of the state is systematically higher).²⁰ Interestingly, we observe a non-monotonic trend in the effect of *DummyPNF*. The

¹⁸ Notice that a paper by Acemoglu and co-authors (2022) uses WW1 soldiers deaths as predictors for Socialist support in 1919, yet the historical literature has developed theoretical and empirical material on more direct effect of WW1 on mobilization of first movers fascists.

¹⁹ These events include both actual repression (e.g., a police charge) and stages of an investigation process (e.g., a sentence in a trial).

²⁰ To split the sample, we compute quartiles according to the total number of state repression’s events occurred in a given province across all years (1969-1988), weighted by the province’s population.

impact of the fascist legacy seems to increase for low levels of repression (first two quartiles) and then drops dramatically, where we could assume that repression reaches its optimum level, and it is effectively able to tackle the neofascist organizational structures coordinating violence. After this point, we observe a strong backlash: excessive repression is likely to exacerbate tensions and magnifies the effect of the legacy, leading to a substantial increase in the level of extreme-right violence.

In Table 6, we assess the possibility that an alternative, mediating mechanism is driving the relationship between fascist legacy and “black” violence during the Years of Lead. It might be that a strong early presence of the PNF in a given Italian province is systematically correlated with the killings of fascist militants that followed the Liberation Day (i.e., the 25th of April 1945); when the National Liberation Committee of Upper Italy seized the power, proclaiming generalized insurgency in those territories still under Nazi occupation and sentencing all fascist leaders to death. In turn, neofascist violence during the Years of Lead would just captures a long-lasting retaliation for these killings. To test this hypothesis, we add to the specifications of Table 2 the number of fascist militants’ deaths (in a given province) immediately after the Liberation Day (*PostDeaths*), together with its interaction with the variable *DummyPNF*. A significant coefficient on the interaction term *IntPostDeaths* would cast doubt on our theoretical mechanism. We observe that while *PostDeaths* might have an independent effect on the level of neofascist violence (e.g., columns 3 and 5), the interaction term is never statistically significant across the different models. On the contrary, the coefficient on *DummyPNF* stays positive and highly statistically significant in all specifications of interest (i.e., models 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8), with only minor changes in its magnitude compared to the baseline. Hence, we do not observe substantial evidence that the retaliation channel mediates the relationship between early fascist presence and extreme-right violence during the Years of Lead.

Analysis II: robustness of fascist legacy resurfacing

To assess the reliability of the findings reported in Table 3, we conduct a placebo test where we alter our “treatment” (i.e., the appointment of the MoI). The main idea is to randomly select months where we assume that a new appointment takes place when actually there was none, and test if, with this new set of “placebo nominations”, we still observe an exacerbation of the legacy effect.²¹ In this case, a statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term

²¹ To perform the test, we consider all possible months in our dataset excluding those in which an actual appointment of the MoI took place. Next, we randomly sample a set of “placebo nominations” (i.e., months) with the same size of the sample of actual appointments (to make the power of our placebo test consistent with the treatment’s one).

IntPlaceboDummy would cast doubt on our baseline findings. In Table 7 we report the results considering as time windows the same month of the appointment, one month before, and two months before (those periods for which we observe a significant effect in Table 3). We observe that in none of the specifications the coefficient of *IntPlaceboDummy* is statistically different from 0, providing further support to our conclusions.

In the last two columns of Table 7, we address the possible reverse causality that might affect our estimates in Table 3. That is, the relationship is running the other way around compared to our theoretical framework: it is the exacerbation in the level of extreme-right violence that leads to a weakening of the government, increased disagreement on how to deal with political violence, and a reorganization of the cabinet. Thus, we now estimate logit models where the dependent variable is *AppointmentMoI*, and the main explanatory variable is *Freq VB*, which captures the level of neofascist violence at the month- province level. Results are reported in column 4. The coefficient of *Freq VB* is not statistically different from 0. In column 5, we add the frequency of violent events committed by far-left terrorist groups (*Freq VRT*), but results are basically unchanged and none of the two variables is statistically significant. Hence, we find no evidence of a potential reverse causality issue in our baseline results of Table 3.²²

Analysis II: alternative explanations of fascist legacy resurfacing

Finally, in Table 8 we test an alternative political juncture that could be exploited by neofascist groups to raise the level of unrest, looking at the general elections as retriggering event.²³ We observe that in none of the time windows considered the relevant interaction term is statistically significant, providing no support for this alternative conceptualization.

²²Note that for the estimations of columns 4 and 5, we only consider provinces with weak fascist legacy (i.e., *DummyPNF=0*), that is because, if we were to expect an effect of increased extreme-right violence on the likelihood of an MoI appointment, this effect should hold across all provinces (irrespective of their fascist legacy). Hence, we exclude areas with strong legacy to partial out the effect of *DummyPNF* on the level of “black” violence (that we do find in our baseline results).

²³In the time period covered by our dataset, general elections were held in Italy in May 1972, June 1976, June 1979, June 1983, and June 1987.

Table 5: ZINB Regressions – State Repression

VARIABLES	(1) VB	(2) VB (Quartile I)	(3) VB (Quartile II)	(4) VB (Quartile III)	(5) VB (Quartile IV)
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.7241*** (0.189)	0.8441 (0.561)	1.2960** (0.534)	-0.0879 (0.220)	2.2888*** (0.746)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.5438 (0.450)	0.1371 (1.519)	1.9790*** (0.701)	-1.0829 (0.689)	2.0723** (0.960)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	-0.0058 (0.014)	0.0142 (0.033)	-0.0190 (0.022)	0.0346** (0.015)	-0.0864 (0.083)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0030*** (0.001)	-0.0077 (0.007)	0.0050 (0.004)	0.0039*** (0.001)	-0.0012 (0.001)
<i>South</i>	-0.2680 (0.259)	0.4722 (0.694)	2.1381*** (0.387)	0.0622 (0.236)	-1.4578 (2.026)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>	-1.8187*** (0.482)	-0.4089 (3.111)	-1.4915 (1.273)	-0.6662 (0.565)	-2.4967 (2.800)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>	-4.6640** (2.012)	2.0392 (3.353)	-19.3444*** (2.899)	-10.3122*** (3.840)	-16.0916 (14.610)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>	0.0033 (0.013)	-0.0402 (0.049)	0.0238 (0.026)	0.0163 (0.010)	-0.0674** (0.030)
<i>Constant</i>	1.0502 (0.745)	-1.1196 (3.344)	-6.0060*** (1.965)	-0.5409 (1.020)	1.3953 (4.733)
<i>Observations</i>	16,080	5,040	3,600	3,600	3,840

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

VB: Violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6: ZINB Regressions – Alternative Mechanism

VARIABLES	(1) GE	(2) VE	(3) VB (I)	(4) NVB	(5) VB (II)	(6) VB (III)	(7) VB (IV)	(8) VB (V)
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.6694* (0.381)	0.7343** (0.330)	0.7354*** (0.247)	0.1005 (0.497)	0.7214*** (0.203)	0.8653*** (0.207)	0.8367*** (0.193)	0.7508*** (0.190)
<i>IntPostDeaths</i>	-0.0007 (0.001)	-0.0008 (0.001)	-0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	-0.0003 (0.000)	-0.0007 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)	-0.0006 (0.001)
<i>PostDeaths</i>	-0.0005 (0.000)	-0.0006** (0.000)	-0.0015*** (0.000)	-0.0015 (0.001)	-0.0012*** (0.000)	-0.0007 (0.000)	-0.0008* (0.000)	-0.0008* (0.000)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.0870 (0.490)	-0.1661 (0.448)	-0.2480 (0.416)	0.4461 (0.887)	-0.1935 (0.405)	0.0545 (0.412)	-0.0117 (0.438)	-0.0717 (0.407)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0042*** (0.001)	0.0038*** (0.001)	0.0035*** (0.001)	0.0024 (0.002)	0.0033*** (0.001)	0.0030*** (0.001)	0.0032*** (0.001)	0.0031*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0045 (0.018)	0.0106 (0.019)	0.0157 (0.017)	0.0280 (0.026)	0.0112 (0.016)	0.0030 (0.016)	0.0033 (0.016)	0.0066 (0.015)
<i>South</i>	-0.0308 (0.419)	-0.1157 (0.349)	0.3377 (0.337)	0.4795 (0.559)	0.3228 (0.326)	0.2865 (0.316)	0.2620 (0.310)	0.2773 (0.295)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>					-1.2477** (0.558)	-1.3948*** (0.527)	-1.3661*** (0.525)	-1.5296*** (0.532)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>						-5.0096** (2.534)	-4.7251* (2.501)	-5.0566** (2.484)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>								0.0115 (0.014)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.5110 (1.254)	-2.1966** (1.056)	-1.9573** (0.982)	-6.1116* (3.322)	-1.6164* (0.897)	-1.5438 (0.972)	-1.3793 (0.972)	-1.4538 (0.942)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

GE: General Events; VE: Violent Events; VB: Violent Black Events; NVB: Non-violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7: ZINB Regressions – Placebo Test & Reverse Causality

VARIABLES	(1) Same Month	(2) 1 Mon Bef	(3) 2 Mon Bef	(4) Logit (I)	(5) Logit (II)
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.8008*** (0.127)	0.7957*** (0.282)	0.8135*** (0.283)		
<i>Freq VB</i>				-0.2276 (0.157)	-0.2216 (0.155)
<i>Freq VRT</i>					-0.0563 (0.068)
<i>IntPlaceboDummy</i>	-0.0906 (0.252)				
<i>PlaceboAppointmentMoI</i>	0.1139 (0.194)				
<i>IntPlaceboDummyBefore 1M</i>		-0.0212 (0.128)			
<i>PlaceboAppointmentMoIBefore 1M</i>		0.0398 (0.105)			
<i>IntPlaceboDummyBefore 2M</i>			-0.0650 (0.120)		
<i>PlaceboAppointmentMoIBefore 2M</i>			0.0722 (0.076)		
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.9983*** (0.215)	-0.9979** (0.486)	-1.0011** (0.485)		
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)		
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0074 (0.008)	0.0075 (0.018)	0.0075 (0.018)		
<i>South</i>	-0.2447 (0.177)	-0.2423 (0.345)	-0.2425 (0.344)	-0.0044 (0.006)	-0.0071 (0.007)
<i>Avg Population 1971-1981</i>				0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)
<i>GDP Industry 1971 (Billion)</i>				0.0000 (0.000)	0.0001 (0.000)
<i>GDP Industry 1971 (Billion)</i>				-0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000** (0.000)
<i>GDP per Capita 1981 ('000)</i>				0.0000 (0.000)	0.0000 (0.000)
<i>GDP per Capita 1971 ('000)</i>				0.0000 (0.000)	-0.0000 (0.000)
<i>Constant</i>	0.8486* (0.483)	0.8481 (1.119)	0.8368 (1.117)	-2.4101*** (0.011)	-2.4123*** (0.012)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	8,640	8,640

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people, GDP of Industry is in billions of Lire.

VRT: Violent Red Terrorism; VB: Violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 8: ZINB Regressions – Elections

VARIABLES	(1) Same Month	(2) 1 Mon Bef	(3) 2 Mon Bef	(4) 1 Mon Aft	(5) 2 Mon Aft
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.7747*** (0.124)	0.7798*** (0.281)	0.7995*** (0.282)	0.7824*** (0.285)	0.7863*** (0.288)
<i>IntElectionsDummy</i>	0.6546 (0.645)				
<i>Elections</i>	-0.1773 (0.549)				
<i>IntElectionsDummyBefore 1M</i>		0.2575 (0.397)			
<i>ElectionsBefore 1M</i>		0.0261 (0.303)			
<i>IntElectionsDummyBefore 2M</i>			-0.1418 (0.289)		
<i>ElectionsBefore 2M</i>			0.4534** (0.225)		
<i>IntElectionsDummyAfter 1M</i>				0.5629 (0.554)	
<i>ElectionsAfter 1M</i>				-0.6365 (0.532)	
<i>IntElectionsDummyAfter 2M</i>					0.5560 (0.485)
<i>ElectionsAfter 2M</i>					-0.8712* (0.472)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.9834*** (0.214)	-0.9913** (0.486)	-1.0016** (0.489)	-0.9909** (0.486)	-0.9979** (0.486)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0033*** (0.000)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0070 (0.008)	0.0072 (0.018)	0.0075 (0.018)	0.0074 (0.018)	0.0079 (0.017)
<i>South</i>	-0.2396 (0.177)	-0.2445 (0.345)	-0.2488 (0.345)	-0.2352 (0.344)	-0.2308 (0.341)
<i>Constant</i>	0.8579* (0.482)	0.8647 (1.114)	0.8478 (1.116)	0.8473 (1.116)	0.8267 (1.111)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

VIII. Conclusion

Fascism first emerged in Italy in 1919 and the National Fascist Party (PNF) was founded in 1921. It spread in various forms to many other countries and over different continents; its German mutation caused WWII and was defeated after millions of deaths. However, to what extent it was really defeated? Contemporary political events show that anti-democratic ideologies hardly disappear forever, and ideological networks – even if composed only by a scant minority – can survive as karst rivers, that continue irrigating parts of the society and re-emerge on the surface at specific critical junctures. We show that Fascism, with its legacy of ideas and practices, including the use of violence, can survive under the skin of largely democratic societies for decades thanks to the existence of local networks that transmit its theoretical and practical message over time, and then re-emerge when the context provides favorable opportunities.

In post-WWII Italy this process was particularly evident. Measures of transitional justice were implemented to pacify the country after a bloody civil war and to guarantee the operation of crucial branches of the state administration. By doing so, many second-tier members of the fascist regime were reintegrated in the Italian society and fascist networks were not fully eradicated. We show that the experience of local grassroots fascist mobilization, with its legacy of ideas, organizational capacity, and violent practices can survive for decades and be reactivated when the democratic political life of the country seems to offer favorable opportunities for action.

For a fascist movement, a favorable opportunity is represented by the (perceived) weakness of democratic regimes and especially by their difficulties in managing public order and ensuring the security of citizens. In the case of Italy, the transformation of the Italian society caused by the post-war development and the mass protests of the New Left in the 1970s provided the occasion to re-trigger the violent legacy of fascism. The neofascist movements were fighting both against the danger of the “red revolution” and against the, so claimed, weak and incompetent democratic institutions. Geographically, our research shows how these violent but numerically small movements tended to hit violently in the same areas where the original fascist mobilization of the 1920s was relatively stronger. Temporally, we show that neofascists were more likely to organize violent acts in moments of (perceived) weakness of the democratic institutions, and specifically in moments of transition at the Ministry of the Interior.

Thus, while most of the growing and promising literature on the legacies of authoritarian regimes has focused on the legacies of authoritarian institutions or on the legacies of repression and regime violence, we investigate and reveal the legacies of an authoritarian ideological movement, with its load of ideas, organizational networks, and violent practices.

These legacies can survive as karst rivers even after the destruction of authoritarian institutions and can influence not only the political behavior of citizens in democratic countries, but also the level, location, and timing of political violence. Clearly, our research shares all the limitations of single case studies, but Italy represents an ideal setting to study the legacies of Fascism. To date, the legacy of fascism is an understudied phenomenon and therefore it seems appropriate to study first of all Italy, which is the place where fascism was born and then diffused. Moreover, Italy offers uncommon wealth of data that allows for detailed analyses, shedding light on possible future studies of other cases.

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Appendix: Table 1A: ZINB Regressions – PNF Members

VARIABLES	(1) GE	(2) VE	(3) VB (I)	(4) NVB	(5) VB (II)	(6) VB (III)	(7) VB (IV)	(8) VB (V)
<i>PNF Membership ('000)</i>	0.0626* (0.035)	0.0690** (0.035)	0.0924** (0.042)	0.0600 (0.043)	0.0797*** (0.031)	0.0911*** (0.027)	0.0886*** (0.026)	0.0851*** (0.025)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.5847 (0.475)	-0.7612 (0.474)	-1.0253** (0.445)	0.0824 (0.683)	-0.6538* (0.396)	-0.3746 (0.425)	-0.4210 (0.445)	-0.4462 (0.448)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0039*** (0.001)	0.0035*** (0.001)	0.0027*** (0.001)	0.0010 (0.001)	0.0026*** (0.000)	0.0023*** (0.001)	0.0024*** (0.001)	0.0024*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0021 (0.015)	0.0066 (0.016)	0.0089 (0.016)	0.0271 (0.022)	0.0039 (0.015)	-0.0028 (0.014)	-0.0028 (0.014)	-0.0018 (0.014)
<i>South</i>	-0.3879 (0.429)	-0.5716 (0.384)	-0.2857 (0.330)	0.0765 (0.517)	-0.1230 (0.327)	-0.1381 (0.301)	-0.1637 (0.302)	-0.1604 (0.295)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>					-1.7651*** (0.625)	-1.8286*** (0.519)	-1.8134*** (0.514)	-1.8945*** (0.513)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>						-6.1968*** (2.238)	-5.9837*** (2.212)	-6.1763*** (2.221)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>								0.0049 (0.013)
<i>Constant</i>	0.1263 (1.159)	-0.1364 (1.180)	0.8663 (1.065)	-4.7059*** (1.676)	0.4183 (0.879)	0.3481 (0.908)	0.4827 (0.939)	0.4786 (0.925)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force and PNF membership are in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

GE: General Events; VE: Violent Events; VB: Violent Black Events; NVB: Non-violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix: Table 2A: ZINB Regressions – Appointment MoI (Additional Controls)

VARIABLES	(1) Same Month	(2) 1 Mon Bef	(3) 2 Mon Bef	(4) 1 Mon Aft	(5) 2 Mon Aft
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.6983*** (0.137)	0.7000*** (0.191)	0.6453*** (0.188)	0.7352*** (0.196)	0.7356*** (0.194)
<i>IntAppDummy</i>	0.5087* (0.281)				
<i>AppointmentMoI</i>	-0.4034* (0.234)				
<i>IntAppDummyBefore 1M</i>		0.3213* (0.172)			
<i>AppointmentMoIBefore 1M</i>		-0.4112*** (0.142)			
<i>IntAppDummyBefore 2M</i>			0.3754** (0.146)		
<i>AppointmentMoIBefore 2M</i>			-0.3110** (0.136)		
<i>IntAppDummyAfter 1M</i>				0.0758 (0.184)	
<i>AppointmentMoIAfter 1M</i>				-0.1887 (0.136)	
<i>IntAppDummyAfter 2M</i>					0.0192 (0.130)
<i>AppointmentMoIAfter 2M</i>					-0.1839* (0.104)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.4656* (0.241)	-0.4680 (0.464)	-0.4715 (0.467)	-0.4494 (0.466)	-0.4514 (0.464)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0029*** (0.000)	0.0029*** (0.001)	0.0029*** (0.001)	0.0028*** (0.001)	0.0028*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	-0.0018 (0.009)	-0.0016 (0.015)	-0.0020 (0.015)	-0.0022 (0.015)	-0.0019 (0.015)
<i>South</i>	-0.1442 (0.184)	-0.1377 (0.285)	-0.1500 (0.286)	-0.1305 (0.287)	-0.1261 (0.286)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>	-1.9974*** (0.330)	-1.9997*** (0.492)	-1.9763*** (0.481)	-2.0140*** (0.483)	-2.0272*** (0.482)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>	-5.5935*** (1.212)	-5.5945** (2.213)	-5.5358** (2.212)	-5.6202** (2.226)	-5.6200** (2.235)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>	0.0087 (0.008)	0.0083 (0.012)	0.0082 (0.012)	0.0084 (0.012)	0.0088 (0.012)
<i>Constant</i>	0.5368 (0.512)	0.5383 (0.877)	0.6017 (0.881)	0.5180 (0.874)	0.5332 (0.864)
<i>Observations</i>	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix: Table 3A: ZINB Regressions – Violent Red Terrorism

VARIABLES	(1) VRT	(2) VRT
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.4088 (0.288)	
<i>PNF Membership ('000)</i>		0.0391 (0.031)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.7367 (0.526)	-0.7479 (0.542)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0037*** (0.001)	0.0035*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0132 (0.022)	0.0158 (0.024)
<i>South</i>	-1.4494*** (0.514)	-1.4579*** (0.527)
<i>Constant</i>	-18.5347*** (1.563)	-18.6013*** (1.750)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people,
the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

VRT: Violent Red Terrorism

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix: Table 4A: ZINB Regressions – MSI Share

VARIABLES	(1) GE	(2) VE	(3) VB (I)	(4) NVB	(5) VB (II)	(6) VB (III)	(7) VB (IV)	(8) VB (V)
<i>DummyPNF</i>	0.5488** (0.267)	0.6191** (0.263)	0.7964*** (0.284)	0.2375 (0.412)	0.7712*** (0.204)	0.8155*** (0.198)	0.7992*** (0.196)	0.7476*** (0.186)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.5367 (0.492)	-0.7045 (0.496)	-1.0057** (0.480)	0.2062 (0.760)	-0.6515 (0.419)	-0.3745 (0.448)	-0.4234 (0.468)	-0.4710 (0.457)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0042*** (0.001)	0.0039*** (0.001)	0.0033*** (0.000)	0.0013 (0.001)	0.0030*** (0.000)	0.0028*** (0.001)	0.0029*** (0.001)	0.0029*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	-0.0011 (0.016)	0.0026 (0.018)	0.0080 (0.017)	0.0198 (0.021)	0.0035 (0.016)	-0.0040 (0.016)	-0.0039 (0.016)	-0.0017 (0.015)
<i>South</i>	-0.4098 (0.441)	-0.5724 (0.394)	-0.2491 (0.343)	0.1681 (0.498)	-0.0799 (0.314)	-0.1060 (0.296)	-0.1304 (0.294)	-0.1249 (0.286)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>					-1.8153*** (0.534)	-1.8924*** (0.491)	-1.8723*** (0.476)	-2.0196*** (0.486)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>						-5.3579** (2.278)	-5.1802** (2.233)	-5.5876** (2.227)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>								0.0090 (0.012)
<i>Constant</i>	0.2189 (1.219)	-0.0345 (1.243)	0.8499 (1.124)	-4.2787** (2.129)	0.4155 (0.826)	0.4107 (0.876)	0.5377 (0.897)	0.5156 (0.875)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

GE: General Events; VE: Violent Events; VB: Violent Black Events; NVB: Non-violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix: Table 5A: ZINB Regressions – Spatial Lag

VARIABLES	(1) GE	(2) VE	(3) VB (I)	(4) NVB	(5) VB (II)	(6) VB (III)	(7) VB (IV)	(8) VB (V)
<i>DummyPNF</i>	1.6889** (0.728)	1.7452*** (0.590)	1.5339*** (0.505)	0.5373 (0.641)	1.0875*** (0.398)	1.2617*** (0.446)	1.2450*** (0.444)	1.2697*** (0.489)
<i>Spatial Lag Dummy PNF</i>	1.7006** (0.829)	1.9404** (0.798)	1.5645** (0.753)	3.0434** (1.424)	1.6438** (0.644)	2.0548*** (0.662)	1.9906*** (0.655)	2.0150*** (0.738)
<i>IntSpatialLag</i>	-2.5078** (1.222)	-2.6245** (1.029)	-2.0825** (0.839)	-1.7846 (1.323)	-1.3630* (0.708)	-1.7644** (0.753)	-1.7201** (0.754)	-1.7530** (0.855)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-0.8138 (0.572)	-1.0056* (0.552)	-1.1547** (0.512)	-0.5882 (0.988)	-0.9786** (0.496)	-0.7334 (0.547)	-0.7575 (0.563)	-0.7518 (0.551)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0045*** (0.001)	0.0044*** (0.001)	0.0037*** (0.001)	0.0030 (0.002)	0.0037*** (0.001)	0.0036*** (0.001)	0.0037*** (0.001)	0.0037*** (0.001)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	-0.0121 (0.017)	-0.0086 (0.018)	-0.0004 (0.018)	0.0162 (0.019)	-0.0039 (0.016)	-0.0146 (0.015)	-0.0141 (0.015)	-0.0147 (0.015)
<i>South</i>	-0.2862 (0.415)	-0.4075 (0.352)	-0.1076 (0.347)	0.1066 (0.606)	-0.0013 (0.356)	-0.0029 (0.333)	-0.0190 (0.332)	-0.0175 (0.333)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>					-1.7539*** (0.483)	-1.8234*** (0.398)	-1.8019*** (0.390)	-1.7623*** (0.512)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>						-6.4158*** (2.181)	-6.2525*** (2.137)	-6.1645*** (2.108)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>								-0.0021 (0.017)
<i>Constant</i>	1.2989 (1.450)	0.9995 (1.263)	1.3900 (1.151)	-3.3377** (1.693)	1.2816 (0.994)	1.4897 (1.052)	1.5461 (1.063)	1.5597 (1.092)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

GE: General Events; VE: Violent Events; VB: Violent Black Events; NVB: Non-violent Black Events

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix: Table 6A: ZINB Regressions – Control Function Approach

VARIABLES	(1) GE	(2) VE	(3) VB (I)	(4) NVB	(5) VB (II)	(6) VB (III)	(7) VB (IV)	(8) VB (V)
<i>PNF Membership ('000)</i>	0.3546*** (0.031)	0.3661*** (0.033)	0.3476*** (0.048)	0.2696* (0.155)	0.3256*** (0.066)	0.3266*** (0.054)	0.3294*** (0.060)	0.4067*** (0.072)
<i>Residuals PNF Membership ('000)</i>	-0.3542*** (0.034)	-0.3600*** (0.037)	-0.3124*** (0.053)	-0.2239 (0.154)	-0.2890*** (0.070)	-0.2787*** (0.058)	-0.2824*** (0.065)	-0.3592*** (0.078)
<i>GDP per Capita 1921 ('000)</i>	-1.6757*** (0.146)	-1.7349*** (0.172)	-1.6564*** (0.253)	-0.4937 (0.912)	-0.9488*** (0.226)	-0.6201*** (0.215)	-0.6446*** (0.168)	-0.5795** (0.242)
<i>Work Force 1921 ('000)</i>	0.0022*** (0.000)	0.0018*** (0.000)	0.0013*** (0.000)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.0009* (0.001)	0.0007 (0.000)	0.0007 (0.001)	0.0007 (0.000)
<i>Male Literacy 1921 (per 100)</i>	0.0034 (0.005)	0.0106** (0.005)	0.0079 (0.009)	0.0269 (0.018)	0.0009 (0.008)	-0.0049 (0.008)	-0.0048 (0.008)	-0.0123 (0.011)
<i>South</i>	-0.1395 (0.098)	-0.1801 (0.135)	0.2040 (0.141)	0.1381 (0.389)	0.4180** (0.178)	0.3745** (0.169)	0.3703* (0.191)	0.4038** (0.196)
<i>Votes Share B-F</i>					-3.1976*** (0.393)	-3.1291*** (0.401)	-3.1570*** (0.491)	-3.1976*** (0.470)
<i>Votes Share Com</i>						-8.2584*** (1.271)	-8.2633*** (1.292)	-8.6378*** (1.385)
<i>Total Deaths 1920-1921</i>								-0.0349*** (0.012)
<i>Constant</i>	2.5242*** (0.264)	1.6435*** (0.365)	1.9757*** (0.480)	-3.8433* (2.296)	1.0855** (0.514)	0.9214* (0.478)	0.9815*** (0.379)	1.2730** (0.506)
<i>Observations</i>	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,320	16,080	16,080	16,080	16,080

Notes: GDP per capita is in thousands of Lire, work force and PNF membership are in thousands of people, the male literacy rate is per 100 people.

GE: General Events; VE: Violent Events; VB: Violent Black Events; NVB: Non-violent Black Events

Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1