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The legacies of historical events on political engagement: Comparative Quantitative Evidence from Western Europe, 1973–2002

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**The legacies of historical events on political engagement:
Comparative Quantitative Evidence from Western Europe, 1973–2002**

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While the literature has extensively documented the attitudinal political legacies of “historical events”—abrupt, disruptive, and collectively experienced political contingencies—we know much less on whether they can also have durable consequences on civic life by impacting how strongly people are politically engaged in everyday life. This investigation involves theory building and the conduction of a comparative quantitative analysis, the first to my knowledge in the literature, to examine whether, which and how events have such impacts. Departing from standard historical imprinting theories that regard these influences as positive, stable through time, and stronger for more disruptive events, I propose an alternative “dynamic updating” understanding of event effects on political engagement that see these impacts as changing recursively in connection with changing political contexts and life-cycle patterns of political involvement. Based on this view, this investigation proposes that event effects on political engagement decay over time, are stronger not for disruptive but for durably consequential events, and are negative in direction for events associated with rallying effects. Using 340 surveys conducted in 5 Western European countries between 1973 and 2002, this investigation finds supportive evidence for these “dynamic updating” hypotheses by analyzing the cohort impacts that 43 twentieth-century historical events from Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands had on everyday political discussion, a robust indicator of daily political engagement. This analysis is premised in an innovative research design that addresses prevalent inferential issues in the literature related to ambiguous case selection, measurement error in the modeling of historical sensitivity across cohorts, and cohort-level omitted variable bias.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent times, the emergence of powerful political disruptions in many countries across the globe has coincided with a growing interest within political science in understanding how the past impinges on individual-level political attributes (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020; Dinas and Northmore-Ball 2020; Neundorff 2010). Jointly, these trends call for extending our knowledge of the political legacies that abrupt, strong, and fast-evolving political contingency sequences—what the literature calls “historical events”—exert on those who experience them. Previous studies have studied these influences mainly on political attitudes and orientations (Osborne, Sears and Valentino 2011; Bartels and Jackman 2014; Ghitza and Gelman 2014). This work focuses instead on historical events’ impacts on how strongly people are politically activated. Despite the normative importance of this question, we know very little on whether events, beyond their well-documented attitudinal consequences, can also affect sustained political engagement.

This investigation uses data from 340 surveys conducted between 1970 and 2002 in France, Belgium, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands to shed light on this capability. By engaging in theory building and conducting quantitative comparative analyses, I examine whether, which, and how twentieth century events in these countries generate cohort-level impacts in political discussion, a foundational political behavior associated with sustained political engagement.

A generational “historical imprinting” outlook toward event effects is currently the standard theoretical model used in the literature to understand these influences. This outlook

maintains that an event's impact on political engagement varies across cohorts along a gradient centered in "impressionable cohorts" who experienced it during young adulthood. It also regards events' impacts on political engagement as positive, larger the more disruptive an event was, and time resistant. Noting how historical imprinting outlooks fail to explain how these effects become stable over time, this research offers an alternative "dynamic updating" model of event effects on political engagement. It agrees that these impacts follow an impressionable-cohort gradient but regards these influences as changing over time and by event type. This model hypothesizes (1) that event effects on political engagement fade over time due to their gradual dissociation from ongoing political issues; (2) that the strength of an event's impact on political engagement is positively related to how consequential it was, since its ability to bringing about lasting political alterations makes it more likely to remain associated to future political issues; and (3) that events that produce rallying effects have negative impacts on political engagement due to the added costs they put to identifying political homophily in young adults' interaction networks.

The hypotheses above are tested by analyzing, first, the capacity that twentieth century history events from the countries under analysis have to impact everyday political discussion, and subsequently, the association between these impacts and cohort-level attributes. Besides addressing generalizability issues from case study findings, the research design followed by this comparative evaluation also contributes to tackle inferential shortcomings related to case selection imprecision, cohort-level omitted variable bias, and measurement error in the modeling of historical sensitivity across cohorts.

This study begins by conducting exhaustive historiographical research to identify 43 historical occurrences for which factual evidence exists of fitting contemporary analytical definitions of events (Sewell 1996; Wagner Pacifici 2010; Basta 2017) between the First

World War and 2002 in the countries under analysis. This in-depth historiographical work is also used to generate indicators of recency, disruptiveness, consequentiality, and rallying capacity for each of these events. To enable the introduction of cohort-level controls in regression analyses, statistical archival work was also conducted to construct original data series on cohort size and affluence.

The lasting impact of each period identified as eventful is quantitatively examined through cohort-level variables of historical sensitivity. Available modelings of these variables carry wide measurement error because they are binary and tend to be idiosyncratic regarding the location and width of the cohort segment they model as historically sensitive. To tackle this problem, this investigation uses original exponential variables of historical sensitivity. They take bell shapes with peak values specifically modeled after concrete theoretical propositions regarding their location and span. The impact of these variables on political discussion is evaluated across 360 different statistical models using cross-regression parameters of statistical performance. As a final step, to test the hypotheses of interest, the investigation evaluates the association between these cross-regression parameters and event-level indicators of recency, disruptiveness, consequentiality, and rallying capacity.

The results find 24 events to be significant regressors on political discussion. The results also find that an event's robustness of influence is strongly and positively correlated with its recency and, to a lesser but still statistically significant degree, its capacity to produce lasting political changes. Results find no evidence supporting the expectation that more disruptive events had stronger impacts on political discussion. The analysis also shows that a large share of events are associated with negative effects on political discussion. Political crises associated with neoliberal economic turns in the early eighties tend to be significantly

and negatively associated with political discussion. Events triggered by terrorist attacks, which tend to produce rallying effects, are also strongly associated with negative impacts.

Based on its theoretical and methodological contributions, the findings above provide seminal evidence that events are able to generate lasting legacies on how strongly people engage with politics. Its results find no supportive evidence of generational imprinting hypotheses on how events lastingly affect political engagement. They find support instead for the dynamic updating hypotheses introduced in this work.

The paper is divided into six sections. The first conducts a substantive and methodological revision of the literature on event effects. The second identifies generational imprinting expectations on how events produce political engagement legacies, and introduces an alternative dynamic updating outlook. The third part discusses the data, research design of the investigation, and the fourth describes the statistical modeling analyses that were used for hypothesis-testing. The fifth presents the analysis' results, and the concluding section recapitulates the paper's findings and main contributions, and points to directions for future research.

THE POLITICAL LEGACIES OF HISTORICAL EVENTS: STATE OF THE LITERATURE

Most of what we know about the individual-level political legacies of historical events comes from a long tradition of investigations that fall under the rubric of “generational research.” Following Karl Mannheim’s *The Problem of Generations* (Mannheim (1952 [1927])), these works take a “generational imprinting” outlook to understand how events produce lasting political legacies on those who experience them. This outlook is based on two key tenets. The first is that the occurrence of an event produces modifications

in political features associated with its specific characteristics that are organized along an “impressionable cohort” gradient. Impressionable cohorts refer to those that experienced an event during young adulthood, which are understood to be open to change by combining nascent political interest with political inexperience (Dinas 2013). The second tenet of generational imprinting outlooks to event effects is that over time, political age differences generated by events in the short run morph into stable cohort variations that set people from impressionable cohorts apart from others.

Empirical support for these processes dates back to at least 1966, when Maurice Zeitlin found that the attitudes of Cuban working-class men towards communism and the Cuban Revolution varied according to the political contexts they experienced when they were young (Zeitlin 1966). Many other investigations began producing similar findings in the seventies and eighties. Most came from investigations that studied the political legacies of the 1960s in the United States. These pieces found that people who came of age in this decade held political traits that distinguished them from older citizens. They attributed the political distinctiveness of the “sixties generation” to the historically turbulent context in which they came of age (Nie, Verba and Petrocik 1976). Two works stand out for their comprehensiveness within this line of inquiry. One is Jennings and Niemi’s longitudinal analysis of the political characteristics of 1965 high school seniors and their parents (Jennings and Niemi 1981). It explores how the political orientations of these groups evolved and differed from one another. The other is Delli Carpini’s examination, using twenty-eight years of National Election Surveys (NES) data, of how the political characteristics of the sixties generation differed from the rest of Americans (Delli Carpini 1986). Both works found that people who came of age during the sixties exhibited distinctive attitudes in key political issues during that time—for example, school desegregation.

In the 1970s, generational imprinting processes also began to be identified for partisanship. Using repeated cross-sectional data (typically, the NES surveys), cohort-based analyses showed that party identification was patterned at least as strongly by birth year as by age, which was then the temporal factor most frequently used to understand people's partisan preferences (Glenn 1972; Abramson 1979). This body of research did not explicitly relate cohort patterns of partisanship to differences in historical experiences in the beginning. It preferred instead to associate them with differences in broader “formative socializations” (Abramson 1976). But after the 1990s, investigations on partisanship began to relate more vocally cohort variations in this political orientation to differences in the historical contexts they experienced during young adulthood (Miller 1992; Osborne, Sears and Valentino 2011; Bartels and Jackman 2014; Ghitza and Gelman 2016).

Collective memory research has also generated results supporting generational imprinting processes. At the end of the eighties, Harold Schuman and Jacqueline Scott analyzed responses to open-ended survey questions that asked people to name those historical events they considered most important. They found that historical developments experienced during young adulthood were better remembered and more likely to be considered relevant (Schuman and Scott 1989). They and their colleagues have found similar findings in other national contexts since then (see Schuman and Corning 2012 for an overview; see also Griffin 2005).

The findings above have been key in cementing historical event's status as important political socialization devices. However, in recent times the literature seems to be at an impasse. While the literature on historical legacies has grown in dynamism, specific discoveries on event effects have slowed down and several inferential and theoretical limitations remain unaddressed.

An attitudinal ceiling remains in our understanding of how events modify political trajectories. Recent work on event effects has revisited event effects findings on attitudinal, public opinion, or collective memory outcomes, but the discovery of event impacts on other political attributes has stagnated. We still don't know if events can also affect foundational political dispositions and behaviors. While there are explorations of events' impacts on protest participation (Caren, Ghoshal, and Ribas 2011), an extra-ordinary kind of political behavior, little research has been done on whether events can affect the strength of people's engagement with politics as they traverse their daily lives. Investigations on event impacts on sustained forms of political engagement are scarce, focused on non-behavioral outcomes, and have produced contradictory findings. Delli Carpini (1986) found that people who came of age during the sixties exhibit lower levels of political interest. Jennings and Niemi's results (1989), on the other hand, found that relative to their parents, people from this cohort segment have a higher sense of political efficacy and give more weight to politics

There are also opportunities for development with respect to the research contexts that have been used to test event effects. The literature's reliance on case studies poses challenges to the generalizability of its results. Moreover, many of the contexts selected for investigation are analytically imprecise. As meaningful categories for empirical analysis, events have come to be understood as emergent, impactful, and collectively experienced moments of political uncertainty (Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifici 2017; Basta 2017). However, the inferences we make about their political effects often come from studies researching socializing effects of long-ranging periods of regime change or diffuse political stability—for example, the “dramatic historical occurrences” of the sixties (Jennings and Niemi 1981, 8; Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011, or the “Italian fascism” or the “Weimar republic” periods (Barnes 1972; Weil 1987). Recent data-driven investigations into generational imprinting

processes have done a better job in linking their results to more concrete political discontinuities. However, the inductive way in which these instances are identified poses threats to the analytical consistency of the term “historical event”. Here, an “event” can be considered everything from the murder of JFK (Schuman and Corning 2012) to a midterm election in the 1950s (Bartels and Jackman 2014). In a more general fashion, the event effects literature’s reliance on case studies

Large measurement error also persists in how generational imprinting processes are operationalized. An event’s generational imprinting capacity is modeled via dummy variables that assign a value of one to members of impressionable-cohort members who came of age when it occurred, and zero values to everyone else. This modeling strategy sees historical impressionability—or “sensitivity”—as a quality that abruptly passes from being fully absent to becoming fully operative, and then back to being fully absent in an equally abrupt fashion. This operationalization adequately recognizes young adulthood as a life period of heightened historical sensitivity but it is insensitive to the gradual, not discontinuous, way in which the characteristics driving “openness to change” shift across contiguous ages (*Ibid*; Prior 2010). Measurement inconsistency in the range of cohorts assumed to be historically sensitive is also pervasive. Mannheim locates historical impressionability in the 8-year cohort range span mediating between those aged between 17 and 25 when an event occurred (Mannheim 1972 [1927], 300). However, empirical pieces tend to locate historical impressionability in wider cohort ranges. An extreme example is Delli Carpini’s investigation into the sixties generation, which considers members of this cohort range everyone born in the 35 years spanning between 1928 and 1963.¹

¹ Other alternative amplitudes for the segment of historically open cohorts have been 5, 11, 14, 15, 16, 22, and 32 years (Barnes 1972; Osborne, Sears and Valentino 2011; Weil 1987; Griffin 2005; Miller 1992).

Last but not least, results from current research are also exposed to cohort-level omitted variable bias. Cohort-level attributes other than the historical sensitivity dummy variable are absent from their analysis. Thus, they cannot accurately separate the legacies that historical events have as *historical contingencies* from those associated with the broader *historical contexts* in which they are embedded in. According to Inglehart’s well-known post-materialism theory (Inglehart 1981; see also Davis 1975), for instance, a plausible explanation of the distinctiveness of the “sixties’ generation” can be built as much around the historical ruptures it experienced during young adulthood as in connection with the social conditions that prevailed when they came of age—for example, increased wealth or higher rates of educational attainment level.

Against this backdrop, generating specific and robust knowledge of how event effects impact political engagement requires, first, identifying concrete hypotheses on how events affect this trait, and second, developing a robust comparative research design capable of robustly examining them empirically. I undertake the first task in the next section and the second in the subsequent one.

THEORIES OF EVENT EFFECTS ON POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT

Generational imprinting hypotheses

As noted earlier, generational imprinting outlooks on event effects maintain that these historical phenomena modify political attributes resonant with their particular characteristics. They also contend that these effects are organized along an impressionable cohort gradient (Mannheim 1952 [1927]; Weil 1987; Griffin 2005). Since historical events are moments of heightened political involvement (Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifci 2017; Beissinger

2013), a generational imprinting outlook on event effects suggests, first, that people who experienced an event closer to coming of age will exhibit higher political engagement levels later on (*H1a, positive effects hypothesis*); second, that these increases will be stronger the more disruptive an event was—that is, the stronger it was able to generate strong political discontinuities (*H1b, disruptiveness hypotheses*); and third, that the cohort differentiations related to these increases will remain unchanged and survive the passage of time (*H1c, temporal stability hypothesis*).

Dynamic updating hypotheses

Generational imprinting theories contend that the age-based modifications they trigger during their occurrence are preserved and evolve into stable cohort-level differentiations. By doing so, they see event impacts as phenomena mainly related to the times when events are active. This synchronic understanding of event effects is not discussed in detail. It is also hard to justify against the backdrop of issue replacement in contemporary political attention. Even if an event intensely disrupted business as usual politics, it is probable that its ability to persistently shore up political engagement will gradually wane as it becomes detached from those political issues that will organize political attention in later times. The erosion of cognitive resources for political engagement across adulthood also poses challenges to the ability of “impressionable” cohorts to keep being politically engaged. Although political interest tends to remain stable after youth (Prior 2010), other important dispositions leading to steady political involvement gradually diminish after people come of age. Individuals tend to undergo life events, like marriage and parenting, that reduce their investment in public-oriented matters (Kalmijn 2003; Stoker and Jennings 1995). After young adulthood, people’s core discussion networks—a key locus of political interaction and

involvement—also start to shrink (Wrzus et al. 2013; Marsden 2018). Steady decreases in political cognition and environmental sensitivity are added to these changes during senior years (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). These life-cycle trajectories suggest that event impacts on cohort levels of politicization diminish over time, as impressionable cohorts grow old.

The arguments above suggest that rather than being static, these impacts keep changing in interaction with political conditions and life cycle political dynamics. Besides identifying events as fading over time, adopting this diachronic or “dynamic updating” perspective to event effects also allows constructing two additional expectations on how the strength and direction of these influences are distributed across events.

One contends that the strength of influence of an event is not related to its disruptiveness, as posited by generational imprinting theories, but to its capacity to exert lasting changes in key political institutions or government policies—a feature I will refer to as consequentiality. More consequential events are more likely to have more robust impacts on political engagement because they are more likely to be associated with political issues organizing political attention later on, which would help to slow down their waning capacity to shore up political engagement in the long run. An event that produced lasting turnarounds in basic state structures or redistributive policies might be able to continue fostering political engagement if later political issues remain associated with these generative modifications. In the long run, these “effective” events are more likely to have a more substantial impact on political engagement than, for instance, an event that was initially powerful but stopped resonating with key political issues soon after.

A dynamic updating perspective on how events affect political engagement also departs from expectations that regard these impacts as only positive. It posits instead that these influences should be expected to be negative for events that produce rallying effects

(Hetherington and Nelson 2003) or cohesive, non polarizing reactions. This expectation is grounded in the fact that relative to business as usual historical contexts, these types of “unifying” events add costs to the identification of political homophily in members of historically sensitive cohorts, which shrinks in turn the expected size of their political discussion networks—a key platform for sustained political engagement .

When a cohesive event occurs, political interactions increase around an issue that generates more homogeneous political responses relative to business as usual historical contexts. Because of this, cohesive events will make the detection of ideological positions more costly and obstruct the identification of political homophily, a key feature of political interaction networks (Noelle-Neumann 1993; Mutz 2002; Baldassarri and Bearman 2007). This obstruction will have particularly detrimental effects in the expected political engagement of young people, who are also members of impressionable cohorts. Unlike adults, who already count with stable interaction networks, young adults are developing theirs by replacing teenage relationships with workplace or college ones (Bidart and Lavenu 2005). A lower capacity to identify political homophily will bring down the number of stable politically loaded ties that young people are able to down. Over time, relative to a business as usual historical environment, this will drive down the expected volume of their interactional resources for political engagement.

In sum, an alternative dynamic updating perspective on how events affect political engagement hypothesize that the more recent an event is, the more likely it will impact cohort levels of political engagement (*H2a, recency hypothesis*); that consequential events are more likely to have more robust effects in political engagement (*H2b, consequentiality hypothesis*); and that unifying events are associated negative impacts in political discussion (*H2c, bidirectionality hypothesis*).

RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA, EVENT SELECTION, AND MEASUREMENT OF EVENT ATTRIBUTES

Data

I test the hypotheses above using data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File (METF). This database is a repository of all survey items from Eurobarometers that were included at least five times between July 1970 and April 2002. They provide nationally representative information for people aged 15 and up when they were conducted.

For Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, The METF includes responses from 340 Eurobarometers—68 per country—carried out at least once a year between 1973 and 2002 on a question I will refer to henceforth to as *political discussion* (or *poldisc*): “when you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently (2), occasionally (1), or never (0)?”² The total range of responses range from 68,609 (Be) to 70,577 (Fr). The density, time span and temporal distribution of this data is at least comparable to other robust cross-sectional data used by recent work on historical legacies in political behavior (Caren, Ghoshal and Ribas 2011; Ghitza and Gelman 2014; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2020).

The survey data provided by the METD offers an unusual opportunity to use high quality data to conduct a cross-national quantitative analysis on events’ impact on interpersonal political discussion, a robust indicator of everyday political engagement for at least four reasons. First, it measures factual behavior rather than an attitudinal outcome. Second, unlike other alternative indicators of political engagement such as vote intention, it measures recurrent participation in a sustained political practice rather than self-

² Values for this variable were recoded from original metrics for ease of interpretation. Appendix A shows the distribution of *political discussion* across cohorts.

assessed projected involvement in a discontinuous one. Third, contrary to widely-held beliefs, political discussion is an infrequent political behavior that is time, cognitive, and socially costly (Eliasoph 1998; Bennet, Flickinger and Rhine 2000; Wyatz, Katz and Kim 2000; Bearman and Parigi 2004). Fourth, political talk is strongly associated with more institutionalized forms of political involvement like electoral participation, interpersonal political persuasion, and enrollment in civic organizations (Eliasoph 1998; McClurg 2006; Baker, Ames and Rennó 2020; Knoke 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Klofstad 2010).³

Table 1 shows pooled and cohort-level descriptive statistics for *political discussion*. It identifies West Germany and Belgium as the most and least talkative countries, respectively. In between lie the Netherlands, Italy, and France. Consistent with previous findings, it also shows that political talk is sparse in these countries. Average values sit below the “sometimes talking about politics” threshold (*poldisc* = 1).

TABLE 1
POLITICAL DISCUSSION: COHORT DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS PER COUNTRY¹

	Pooled Values		Cross-Cohort Values ²	
	(1)	(2)	(5)	(6)
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
1.—Belgium	.659	(.644)	.120	.794
2.—France	.815	(.678)	.351	.951
3.—West Germany	.973	(.586)	.444	1.063
4.—Italy	.833	(.691)	.454	.994
5.—Netherlands	.919	(.627)	.147	1.040

¹ Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset, 1973-2002.

² Values calculated for cohorts with 20 or more observations.

³ As an indicator of sustained political engagement, intention to vote is also likely to carry large measurement error in high electoral turnout contexts like twentieth-century Western Europe. In the MTF, only 4.1% of respondents reported not planning to vote in the next general elections.


Table 1 also shows substantial variations in average cohort values of *political discussion* values in all countries under analysis—between 0.540 (Italy) and 0.893 (Netherlands). These fluctuations are indicative that *political discussion* varies across cohorts. But, is the shape that these variations take indicative of event effects?

The heat maps shown in Figure 1 show visualizations that allow exploring this question. They plot *political discussion* values across 2-year age/period cells. Cells from different periods are distributed across different rows and cells from different ages along different columns; in consequence, cells from different cohorts are diagonally distributed.

The heat maps in column 1 color mean *political discussion* values relative to the scores of cells for all the time range under study. Cells with higher *political discussion* means are colored with stronger shades of red, and those with lower values with darker tones of green. Cells with a small sample of respondents ($n < 20$) are shown in gray. Consistent with previous findings, the heat maps from Column 1 shows evidence that levels of political talk are altered by the eruption of major political contingency. In Italy, for instance, average *political discussion* scores quickly passed from moderate to maximum levels during the early 1990s. During this period, the country was shaken by massive corruption scandals, high-profile political executions, and terrorist acts, and the collapse of its postwar political system—which was then often referred to as the “First Republic” (see Appendix D for a narrative account).

The heat maps in column 2 color average values of *political discussion* relative to scores from cells of the same biennium. These charts show that the relative talkativeness ranking that a cohort exhibits when it came of age keeps being noticeably stable as they traverse adulthood. Of special interest for this analysis, the heat map shows instances when cohorts that become talkative or silent during the critical period of young adulthood coincides with the occurrence of an event. In Italy, for instance, people who came of age

FIGURE 1
MEAN POLITICAL DISCUSSION VALUES ACROSS TIME



¹ Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset, 1973-2002.

² Values calculated from cohorts with 20 or more observations in the dataset

during the First Republic dissolution period became frequent political talkers in that period and kept being so later on. By contrast, those who were young during the early 1980s, a period marked by terrorist violence scandals and labor unrest (see Appendix E), exhibited moderately high levels of political discussion then, but afterwards they decreased their political talk levels relative to other cohorts.

The trends above are suggestive that historical events impinge on cohort patterns of political discussion. In preparation for the formal analysis of their influence, the rest of this section discusses the sources and procedures that were conducted to identify and code attributes of the full array of twentieth century events whose impact on political discussion is researched for each of the countries under analysis.

Identification of Event Universe

No systematic mapping of historical events in Western Europe across the twentieth century currently exists. Using in-depth historiographical analysis, this task was conducted in a way explicitly aimed at increasing accuracy in the empirical identification of these historical phenomena. This work is in and of itself a contribution to the literature.

Current theories of historical events define them as unforeseen and fast-paced sequences of political disruptions that triggered collectively experienced moments of political uncertainty (Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifiçi 2017; Basta 2017). Identifying the compliance of a concrete historical occurrence to this definition in a precise and verifiable fashion required high-resolution narratives capable of validating their unexpectedness, speed, and disruptive capacity. Such narratives are scarce in the literature. While the volume of studies on twentieth-century Western European political history is vast, the theoretical perspectives that

inform them have often precluded discussing political discontinuities as open-ended, analytically distinct, and causally loaded phenomena (Braudel 1980, 3; Gould 1995, 10; Jenkins 2006). This context hindered conducting event identification work through a simple, streamlined content analysis of a compact array of historical work. This work was based instead in the assemblage and analysis of comprehensive historiographical material to gather and thread factual evidence regarding the eventfulness of a historical occurrence. This work was conducted in two phases.

The first phase centered on the revision of twentieth-century Western European history surveys, national history monographs, and works on historical cycles of collective action. These sources are listed in Appendix B. They were used to gain knowledge on how political environments evolved in the countries under analysis and to identify historical occurrences described as discontinuities in this evolution. The second phase of the event included the revision of 443 historical research pieces and more than 16 years of news data series⁴ centered on these historical occurrences or the historical periods they were located in (selected bibliography for each historical event is shown in Appendix B.) These materials were used to identify factual indicators of abruptness, speed and disruptiveness in how a historical occurrence evolved that would enable confirming it (or not) as an accurate empirical operationalizations of a historical event.


The work described above led to the identification of historical events in 43 contiguous “eventful” years between 1918 and April 2002.⁵ Figure 2 shows their temporal

⁴ Historical investigations of years posterior to 1970 are relatively scarce. For events that occurred after this year, event verification work relied primarily on newspaper and newsweekly data series. These are identified in Appendix B.

⁵ The most recent Eurobarometer in the METF was conducted in April 2002. Years previous to 1918 were not considered in the temporal range of the event identification work due to scarcer historiographical material and the low number of respondents who came of age then (between 0.2 and 0.3% of country samples).

FIGURE 2
IDENTIFICATION OF EVENTS UNDER ANALYSIS¹

Temporal Location



Period Event Instances

Belgium

- 1.— '36. Rexist Party breakthrough; Summer Strikes.
- 2.— '50. Léopold III restoration crisis; Murder of Julien Lahaut.
- 3.— '55. Collard Law protests.
- 4.— '60. Intervention in Congo; Unitary Law strikes.
- 5.— '68. Catholic University of Leuven split.
- 6.— '78. Egmont Pact Breakdown crises..
- 7.— '80-'81. Events from the *Redressement* period: Federalization crises ('80); Economic Readjustment Crises ('81); First Peace March ('81).
- 8.— '83. Second Peace March.
- 9.— '92. Black Sunday and Wifried Martens downfall.
- 10.— '95-'96. Agusta-Dassault Corruption Affair ('95); Marc Dutroux Affair, White March & Di Rupo judicial inquiry ('96).

France

- 1.— '34-'36. Events from the *Front Populaire* period : Anti-Parliamentary Riot ('34) Unitary Rally ('35); Popular Front Victory & Matignon Agreement strikes ('36).
- 2.— '47. Tripartite Government downfall; November Strikes; Establishment of Gaullist Front.
- 3.— '54. Indochina Withdrawal Crises²; European Defense Community controversy.
- 4.— '58. First Algiers Putsch and Establishment of Fifth Republic.
- 5.— '61-'62. Algerian Withdrawal crises³.
- 6.— '68. Spring '68 Events: Student protests; labor strikes; government crisis.
- 7.— '81. Socialist Pary Electoral Victories.
- 8.— '83. *Tournant de la Rigueur* economic policy turnaround.

¹ See Appendix B for bibliography summary and attributes' information for each events

² Dien Bien Phu defeat; Genève Agreements'Government crisis.

³ Referendum on Algerian Independence, OAS Terrorism (First Wave); Second Algiers Putsch; Repression of Algerian- and Left-Wing Protests ('61); Évian Agreements, OAS Terrorism (Second Wave), De Gaulle Murder Attempt; Bab-el-Oued and Oran Massacres.

FIGURE 2 (CONT.)
IDENTIFICATION OF EVENTS UNDER ANALYSIS (CONT.)

West Germany

- 1.— '18-'20. Events from the German Revolution period: Capitulation, January Strikes, and Second Reich Downfall Events ('18)⁴; January Uprising, Freikorps Campaigns, Dissolution of Councils & Weimar Constitutive Assembly ('19); Kapp Putsch and Ruhr Uprising ('20).
- 2.— '23. War Reparation Crises.⁵
- 3.— '30. Federal Election Results.
- 4.— '32-'33. Events from the Weimar Republic downfall period: National Concentration Cabinet crises ('32); Reichstag Fire and Enabling Acts ('33).
- 5.— '48-'49. Events from the Federal Republic Establishment period: End of Blockade & Economic Reintegration ('48); Establishment of Federal Republic ('49).
- 6.— '61-'62. Partition of Berlin ('61); *Der Spiegel* Affair ('62).
- 7.— '67-'68. Extra-parliamentary Opposition (APO) protests⁶.
- 8.— '72. *Ostpolitik* Political Crisis; RAF Terrorist Campaign.
- 9.— '77. RAF Terrorism – Red Autumn period.
- 10.—'81. Anti-Nuclear Missile Movement protests; Flick and Neue Heimat scandals.
- 11.—'83. Events from the *Wende* Period: Helmut Schmidt downfall and 1983 General Election; Flick Commission; Nuclear Action Week.
- 12.—'90. Reunification.
- 13.—'00. CDU Illegal Funding Scandal.

Italy

- 1.— '18-'20. Events from the *Biennio Rosso* period: Strikes, Fiume Occupation Crises, General Election Results, ('18-'19); Political Violence escalation ('20)⁷.
- 2.— '22. Legalitarian Strike and March on Rome.
- 3.— '48. First Postwar General Election; Togliatti Murder Attempt and Fall Strikes.
- 4.— '68-'70. Events from the *Maggio Strisciante* period: *Sessantotto* Protests and Labor Strikes ('68); *Autunno Caldo* ('69); Piazza Fontana Attack & Aftermath ('70).
- 5.— '76-'78. Events from the *Anni di Piombo* period: Lockheed Scandal, General Election ('76); Lockheed Commission; '77 Movement & Terrorist Acts ('77); Aldo Moro Murder ('78).
- 6.— '80. Events from the *Riflusso* period: Political Terrorism and Donat Cattin Scandal; Ustica Incident and *Strage di Bologna*; FIAT Strike and marcia dei quarantamila; Cossiga downfall.
- 7.— '92-'94. Events from the First Republic Dissolution period⁸.

Netherlands

- 1.— '33-'34. *Die Zeven Provinciën* Mutiny ('33); Jordaan Riot ('34).
- 2.— '46-'48. Indonesian Crises: Linggajatti Agreements & Conscription Protests ('46); First Indonesian Police Action ('47); Second Indonesian Police Action ('48).
- 3.— '76-'77. Lockheed Affair ('76); Drenthe Hostage Crises, Gov't Formation Crisis ('77)-
- 4.— '81. Anti-Nuclear Missile Movement protests.
- 5.— '83. *Keerpunt* economic policy turnaround; Antinuclear Missile Movement campaign—1983.

⁴ Capitulation; Kiehl Mutiny; Reich Downfall (Wilhelm II abdication, Workers' Councils, December Coups).

⁵ Ruhr Occupation, Passive Resistance, and Cuno Strikes; Bavaria State Commission; Dissolution of Communist Governments in Saxony and Thuringia, and Hamburg Uprising, Küstrin Coup, Beer Hall Coup.

⁶ Summer '67 student protests; Summer '68 student protests and murder attempt against Rudi Dutschke.

⁷ Ancona Mutiny; Factory Occupations; Fascist Squads and Palazzo Accursio Massacre; Siege of Fiume.

⁸ 1992 General Election, anticipated presidential election, and gov't formation crisis ('92); *Mani Pulite-Tangentopoli*-Enimont-Guardia di Finanza judicial inquiries ('92-'94); Falcone & Borsellino Murders and mafia terrorist attacks ('92-'94); Economic emergency measures and anti-austerity protests ('92-'94); Postwar Party System Collapse, *Discesa in Campo*, and 1994 general elections ('92-'94); Berlusconi downfall events (Biondi decree, Fininvest Inquiry standoff; Pension reform protests ('94).

location and a label indicating the events that occurred in them.⁶ Ten eventful periods were identified for Belgium, 8 for France, 13 for West Germany, 7 for Italy, and 5 for the Netherlands. 9 events occurred during the interwar period (1918-1939), 21 are located during the postwar years (1946-1979), and 13 happened after the economic oil shocks of the 1970s (1980-20020). For ease of exposition, I will refer to these eventful periods as “events”. To refer to a specific period, I will use the name of its underlying political contingency(es).

Coding of Event Attributes

The historiographical analysis used to identify historical events was also leveraged to generate indicators of recency, disruptiveness, consequentiality, and polarizing capacity for each event. Table 1 presents a summary of these indicators; appendix B shows scores across these indicators for the events under analysis.

The last year of occurrence of an event was used to measure its *recency*.⁷ As indicators of an event’s disruptiveness, measurements of duration, governmental discontinuity, narrative density, and experiential strength were also constructed.

The *duration* of an event was measured by gauging for how much time they generated political discontinuities that “forced their way into subjects’ field of attention” (Wagner Pacifici 2017: 1358). This measure was the number of months spanning between the first factual political discontinuity it produced and the political development that ended its ability

⁶ The year of occurrence for events that spanned two years but lasted less than six months was set to the year with the largest share of months of occurrence. The temporal location of the “Black Sunday” in Belgium, for instance, was assigned to 1992 since the election that triggered it took place in November 1991 but most of its political effects occurred in the next year (see narrative provided in Appendix C).

⁷ The recency value of multi-year events was assigned to their last year of duration.

to keep producing political incertitude. The student protests, labor strikes, and political crises of the Spring '68 in France, for instance, lasted two months: May and June '68.⁸

TABLE 2
INDICATORS OF EVENT-LEVEL ATTRIBUTES

Indicators of event-level variables	(1)	(2)
	Nbr.	Value Range
<i>Recency Indicators</i>		
1.— Last active year.	1	1920-2000
<i>Disruptiveness indicators</i>		
1.— Months of duration.	1	2-33.
2.— Government discontinuity.	3	0-6. Categories: 0; 1; 2 or more.
3.— Narrative Density.	4	1-7. Categories: 1; 2; 3-5; 6 or more.
4.— Experiential Strength.	3	moderate; strong; very strong.
<i>Consequentiality indicators</i>		
1.— Lasting changes in political institutions. redistributive policies, or pol. cleavages	1	0;1.
<i>Indicators of rallying capacity</i>		
1.— acts of terrorism.	1	0;1.
2.— Scandals.	1	0;1.

Governmental discontinuity was measured by counting the number of unscheduled government and presidential resignations that took place along the duration span of an event. The French '68 features one: Georges Pompidou's resignation as Prime Minister following the strains that the May and June protests provoked in his relationship with president De Gaulle.⁹

⁸ On May 2, left-wing demonstrations organized by left-wing University of Paris students transferred their protests from the Nanterre campus to downtown Paris' Latin Quarter, where they were violently evicted from the University premises. This eviction degenerates into violent street confrontations between police and students, which soon led to an unprecedented social mobilization wave that kept shaking French politics until Charles de Gaulle's electoral victory in the snap elections at the end of June. This electoral outcome largely neutralizes the protests and strikes that had taken place in the previous two months (Pavard 2018; Vigna and Vigreux 2008).

⁹ Unscheduled presidential substitutions in France and Italy were also counted due to the politically active role that presidents take there.

An additional measurement of disruptiveness considered the number of narratively independent political disruption sequences that was observed along the span of duration of an event. I called this number an event's *narrative density*. The French '68 features three such sequences: the student protests of May and June; the wildcat (and later on, union-backed) strikes that led to government-labor negotiations and the signature of the Grenelle agreements on May 27; and the political crisis that emerged out of president Charles De Gaulle's loss of control of the political agenda and the generation of strong demands for his resignation through May and June, which abruptly came to an end after his landslide electoral victory at the end of that month.

A final indicator of an event's disruptiveness was a nominal indicator of *experiential intensity* that distinguished between "moderate," "strong," and "very strong" events. Events with disruptions that yielded few tangible shifts in citizens' everyday lives and remained contained within formal politics were coded as experientially moderate. Events associated with economic crises or terrorism waves, which impacted quality of living and public security perception, were coded as strong. Events related to sustained and geographically widespread violence were coded as very strong.

To measure an event's *consequentiality*, a nominal indicator was constructed that evaluated whether an event had led to swift and durable changes in foundational political institutions, economic redistributive policies, or major topics of political contention.¹⁰

Past studies have also shown that *terrorist attacks* and widespread *corruption* scandals tend to bring homogeneous effects in terms of political support (Hetherington 2003; Dinisen and Jaeger 2013; Feinstein 2016;) or political disaffection (Kumlin and Esaiasson

¹⁰ Examples of events associated to each of these changes are the German Revolution events of 1918-1920 (Ryder 2008); the neoliberal turnaround of the *Keerpunt* period in the Netherlands ('83); and the split of the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium in 1968 along linguistic lines, which converted the relationships between the Belgian state and its linguistic communities into a front line political issue (CRISP 1968).

2011). Based on these findings, the research uses a dummy variable signaling an event's association with this type of contingencies as an indicator of its *rallying capacity*. While this is only a raw metric of an event's divisive/rallying capacity, in the absence of previous measurements, it offers an initial instrument to evaluate the role that this property has in modulating event impacts on political engagement.

STATISTICAL MODELING AND ANALYSES

I test event effects on sustained political engagement by evaluating the performance of cohort-level variables of historical exposure to each event under analysis as regressors of *political discussion*. Given the lack of research about the contribution of cohort-level factors orthogonal to events to political research, this performance is evaluated across 72 different model specifications that include different combinations of cohort-level control specifications. Since events are political disruptions bound to country-specific contexts, I conducted separate statistical analyses by country. This choice also allowed controlling for country-specific factors impinging *political discussion*. I use the results from these regressions to estimate Bayesian cross-regression parameters of statistical performance that take into consideration differences in the likelihood of occurrence of each of these models.

Dependent Variable and Model Specification

The dependent variable is *political discussion*, a variable with three different values: never (0), occasionally (1), and frequently (2).¹¹ Consistent with standard modeling choices

¹¹ Total responses by country range between 68,818 and 71,222. In the countries under analysis, missing values made up only between 0.58 and 2.19 % of observations.

for ordinal categorical variables, the analysis regresses *political discussion* using ordered logistic models with robust standard errors.¹²

Key Independent Variables

The key regressors are sets of 43 variables that capture differences across respondents from different cohorts in historical sensitivity towards a specific historical event. I will refer to these covariates as “event variables.” Variables of exposure to World Wars I and II were also included. Although not properly events due to their long duration, their importance to twentieth-century European history provided a compelling rationale to include them.¹³

To capture the gradual growth and decline of historical sensitivity before and after young adulthood more precisely than standard dummy variables, the shape of event variables takes the form of a bell skewed towards cohorts who came of age when an event occurred. Figure 3 illustrates the shape of these variables across cohorts using the French '68 as an example. These variables take the following functional form:


$$sensitivity_{i(k), j(k)} = \begin{cases} 100 & \text{if } (peak_{j(k)} - 20 - cohort_{i(k)}) = 0, \\ 100 * \exp[-a * (peak_{j(k)} - 20 - cohort_{i(k)})^2] & \text{if } (peak_{j(k)} - 20 - cohort_{i(k)}) < 0, \\ 100 * \exp[-6a * (peak_{j(k)} - 20 - cohort_{i(k)})^2] & \text{if } (peak_{j(k)} - 20 - cohort_{i(k)}) > 0. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

¹² In recent years, several methodological pieces have recommended the use of OLS models to analyze ordered categorical variables due to comparability issues in OLS models stemming from unobserved heterogeneity (Mood 2010; Breen, Karlson and Holm 2018). I conducted OLS analyses as robustness checks informed by these recommendations. Results are similar to the ones reported in the results section.


¹³ The WWI exposure variable was omitted for the Netherlands due to non-participation. In Germany and Italy, due to the development of nationally circumscribed contingencies in 1918, this year was included as part of the German Revolution period and the *Biennio Rosso* events, respectively.

FIGURE 3
SHAPE OF EVENT SENSITIVITY VARIABLES
EXAMPLE: SPRING 1968, FRANCE

1.— Functional Forms for Sensitivity Variables



2.— Values across Time/Age Space
amplitude: $a = 0.004$



where $sensitivity(k)_j(k)$ indicates individual i 's historical sensitivity to the j -th event of country k , and $cohort\ i(k)$ is i 's birth year. This function assigns its maximum value (100) to those who experienced event j when they were 20 years old.¹⁴ This value gradually decreases until reaching near-zero levels for members of the oldest and youngest-living cohorts when event j erupted. People who were not yet born when event j occurred were assigned zero values.

The *a-factor* modulates the width of the bell in the functional form of event variables. This width can be interpreted as the span of “impressionable” cohorts with highest historical sensitivity scores. As noted before, the literature has yet to agree on a single cohort impressionability span. Mannheim’s original (and seldom applied) contention locates it in cohorts aged between 18 and 25 years when an event occurs, but empirical works have tended to use wider cohort impressionability spans. In response to this disagreement, the analysis makes use of four distinct *a-values* that define different impressionable cohort spans. The first *a-value* (0.004) approximates Mannheim’s original proposition about the location of historical sensitivity peaks. This *a-value* assigns tenth-decile historical sensitivity scores to cohorts that were aged between 19 and 26 during an event’s occurrence. Three other alternative *a-factors* were used (0.006, 0.008, 0.010). They assign tenth-decile historical sensitivity to people exposed to an event when they were between 18 and 26, 18 and 27, and 18 and 30 years, respectively. These impressionability widths are 14, 28 and 71% wider than Mannheim’s original proposition.

¹⁴ Event variables were centered at 20 years old since this age gave time for the development of a young adult political experience to mature while remaining close to the transition from adolescence to young adulthood.

Age, period, and cohort variables are perfectly collinear. This relationship, often known as the age-cohort-period (APC) identification issue, has been commonly discussed as an inferential challenge for quantitative historical analyses (Mason, Mason and Poole 1973). The problem with this warning is that, in the words of Bartels and Jackman (2014, 8), the APC identity issue stems from an “accounting equation rather than an explanatory one.” This identity problem would only have explanatory traction if the age, period, and cohort impacts are assumed to be linear, monotonic (consistently growing or decreasing in value) and independent (*Ibid*, 243; Yang, Fu, Schulhofer-Wohl and Land 2008, 1697). These assumptions, however, lack theoretical bases and go against key findings about how political behavior distributes across the life cycle.¹⁵ Against this backdrop, the analysis takes a different path to incorporate concerns about the impact of period, cohort, and age on political engagement. It includes specific, theoretically grounded factors associated with these temporal dimensions as regressors.

Following findings from previous research about an inverted u-shape in trajectories of political engagement across the life cycle (Nie, Verba and Kim 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Quintelier 2007), a respondent's age is included as a regressor through a quadratic specification.

Electoral years have been associated with increased political talk (Sears and Valentino 1997). Informed by this finding, the analysis includes a dummy variable indicating

¹⁵ Assuming linearity of age effects contradicts systematic evidence of a quadratic relationship between age and political engagement (Nie, Verba and Kim 1974; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Quintelier 2007). In addition, the non-linear temporal location of events over time makes “cohort effects” unlikely to be linearly organized. Finally, assuming linear effects of period on *political discussion* assumes an odd, non-historical assumption of perpetually progressing (or regressing) trends in political deliberation across societies. Moreover, the behavior of *political discussion* across biennials shown in Figure 1 gives no evidence of period having a linear relationship with political deliberation.

general *election* years. Yearly rates of GDP *growth per capita* are also included to test the strength of association between *political discussion* and economic performance.

The size and educational attainment level of someone's cohort are also included in the analysis since they have been discussed as factors that impinge on people's political attributes (Inglehart 1981; Ryder 1965: 845-846). No previous measurements of these factors exist. Data series of indicators related to these factors for each cohort under analyses were built leveraging available historical statistical sources. The *educational attainment* of *i*'s cohort was measured as the proportion of higher education graduates among people aged between 15 and 25 when she was 18 years old. *i*'s *cohort size* was set as the number of people aged between 20 and 25 when she was 22. Appendix C discusses in more detail how these scores were calculated. Given the absence of previous research on the performance of these cohort properties as political regressors, I include them in the analysis in both a linear and a quadratic form. Finally, to control for unaccounted cohort-related factors affecting *political talk*, I included dummy variables indicating a respondent's ascription to 5-year *cohort categories*. The reference category was the first cohort bracket under analysis.

Individual-level controls

Individual-level controls included measures of *income*, *education*, *female* identification, and *marital status*. These variables have been previously found to be associated with political discussion levels (Marsden 1987; Moore 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Bearman and Parigi 2004). The analysis includes education levels through categorical dummies indicating maximum educational attainment, incomplete high school, complete high school, incomplete

college, incomplete college, and ongoing studies.¹⁶ Income is included through five categorical dummies associated with monotonically increasing earning brackets, measured in 2002 real value local currencies. The reference categories for these variables were people with incomplete higher education and the lowest income bracket.

Indicators of *urban* vs. rural, regional, and metropolitan residence were also included.¹⁷ The reference category for the latter was the most industrialized region for each country.

Sets of model specifications and cross-regression parameters of interest

Recent methodological pieces have warned about widespread inferential challenges related to model selection uncertainty—the ignorance about the “true shape” of a causal model (Young 2009; Young and Holsteen 2017). This warning is particularly relevant for this investigation, given the absence of previous quantitative comparative analyses on event effects, disagreements about the span of impressionable cohorts, and the absence of empirical studies on the impacts of non-historical cohort-level factors on political engagement. This investigation assesses threats related to model selection uncertainty by analyzing the results of 72 regressions per country.

All regressions include a fixed vector of individual- and period-level variables. It contains all variables for which robust evidence exists of their influence on political dispositions and behavior. Each regression, on the other hand, contains a different

¹⁶ Eurobarometers do not include information on respondents’ educational attainment. As an alternative, the age at which a respondent left school was used to construct an indicator of 4 educational attainment categories. Incomplete high school (1), complete high school (2), incomplete college (3), complete college (4) and ongoing education (5). I included *income* through five categorical dummies associated with monotonically increasing income brackets, measured in 2002 real value local currencies.

¹⁷ The metropolitan residence variable indicates whether a respondent lived in an urban core area with over a million inhabitants: Paris, West Berlin, Rome, and Amsterdam.

combination of specifications for *cohort education* (linear, quadratic or absence), *cohort size* (linear, quadratic or absence), *cohort dummies* (inclusion or absence), and event variables (*afactor*=0.004, 0.006, 0.008, and 0.0010).

I analyze the statistical performance of each independent variable across these 72 regressions per country. I use results from these regressions to do cross-regression parameters of statistical performance. Setting these parameters as simple average statistics fails to take into account likelihood differentials across regressions. To account for these differences, I constructed cross-regression parameters of impacts as weighted means. The weights I use are Bayesian posterior probability scores for each model under analysis. They are calculated using the following formula (Rafterty 2005):

$$w_i = p(M_i) = \frac{\exp[-\frac{1}{2}\Delta BIC_i]}{\sum_{i=1}^{72} \exp[-\frac{1}{2}\Delta BIC_i]} \quad (2)$$

,where the *i* subindex refers to the *i*-th regression, BIC is *i*'s Bayesian Information Criterion, and ΔBIC is the difference between *i*'s BIC score and the minimum BIC value observed across the regressions. Each of these weights can be interpreted as the likelihood of a model relative to all others under investigation (Western 1996).

RESULTS

I discuss regression results by focusing on two parameters of statistical performance. One is cross-regression scores of estimated effects, which report differences between

maximum and minimum estimated probabilities of political discussion across a variable's value range. The other is cross-regression statistical significance values.


I begin discussing the analysis results with the help of Figure 4. Column 1 shows cross-regression estimated effects on the probability of talking at least sometimes about politics, and column 2 reports the cross-regression score and statistical significance of p-values from estimated coefficients.¹⁸ The graph at the beginning of the figure provides a visual summary of results for statistically significant events. The size of circles' area plots the magnitude of an event's effects on the probability of talking at least sometimes about politics. Its color signals its direction. Red circles refer to negative effects, and green to positive impacts.

Historical exposure variables related to World War I tend to be negatively related to *political discussion*. For Belgium, this effect is strong and achieves statistical significance. World War II variables, by contrast, are small in magnitude and heterogeneous in direction. The only country where it achieves statistical significance is West Germany, where it has a small and positive effect.

With respect to historical events, results show that these phenomena are more often than not associated with significant effects on *political discussion*. Among the 43 events under analysis, 26 are statistically significant regressors of political discussion. Appendix D provides day-to-day narrative descriptions for each.

¹⁸ Estimated coefficients are not shown as they lack substantive interpretability; they are included in Appendix E. The statistical significance of a cross-regression p-value is defined as the probability of achieving standard levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.1$) at the 90% confidence level.

FIGURE 4
CROSS REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR EVENT EXPOSURE VARIABLES¹



			effects on $\hat{p}(poldisc \geq 0)$	p-value ²
Event			(1)	(2)
End of First World War				
1.— '18.	Belgium		-.235	.0000****
2.— '18.	France		-.083	.0175*
Interwar Events				
1.— '18-'20.	W. Germany	German Revolution events	.062	.3444
2.— '18-'20	Italy	<i>Biennio Rosso</i> events	.106	.3960
3.— '22.	Italy	Legalitarian Srike-March on Rome	-.027	.8279
4.— '23	W. Germany	War Reparation crises	-.036	.5994
5.— '30	W. Germany	1930 Federal Election results	.013	.7910
6.— '32	W. Germany	Weimar Downfall events	.031	.4547
7.— '33	Netherlands	DZP Mutiny/Jordaan Riot	-.016	.1868
8.— '34-'36	France	Popular Front formation events	-.067	.0081**
9.— '36.	Belgium	Rexist breakthrough; summer strikes	-.120	.0015**
Second World War				
1.— '39-'45.	Belgium		.040	.1934
2.— '39-'45.	France		-.005	.8816
3.— '39-'45.	W. Germany		.051	.0095**
4.— '39-'45.	Italy		.070	.1231
5.— '39-'45.	Netherlands		.047	.0237*

FIGURE 4 (CONT.)
CROSS REGRESSION STATISTICS FOR EVENT EXPOSURE VARIABLES

			effects on $\hat{p}(poldisc \geq 0)$	p-value ²	
			(1)	(2)	
Events					
Postwar period					
1.—	'46-'48	Netherlands	Indonesian Crises.	-.018	.4027
2.—	'47	France	Tripartite govt' fall; november strikes033	.5264
3.—	'48	W.Germany	Establishment of Federal Republic030	.1352
4.—	'48	Italy	General Election, Togliatti strikes.	-.088	.0513*
5.—	'50	Belgium	Leopold III abdication, Lahaut murder. .	-.087	.0195**
6.—	'54	France	Indochina Withdrawal.	-.124	.0001**
7.—	'55	Be	Collard Law protests.032	.4343
8.—	'58	France	Algiers Putsch, 5th Republic est075	.0717
9.—	'60	Be	Intervention in Congo; UL strikes	-.045	.0847
10.—	'61-'62	France	Algerian Withdrawal.	-.054	.0471*
11.—	'61-'62	W.Germany	Berlin Crisis / Der Spiegel Affair097	.0000****
12.—	'67-'68	W.Germany	APO protests.	-.074	.0012**
13.—	'68-'70	Italy	<i>Sessantotto</i> and <i>Autunno Caldo</i>025	.3914
14.—	'68	Belgium	Leuven University Split.038	.2885
15.—	'68	France	Spring '68 events.024	.1050
16.—	'72	W.Germany	RAF Terrorism / Ostpolitik crisis073	.0006***
17.—	'76-'77	Netherlands	Lockheed Affair / Drenthe crises.049	.0000****
18.—	'76-'78	Italy	<i>Anni di Piombo</i> period events.	-.016	.1765
19.—	'77	W.Germany	RAF Terrorism-Red Autumn.	-.035	.0033**
20.—	'78	Belgium	Egmont Pact breakdown	-.074	.0000****
Post-oil crises period					
1.—	'80	Italy	<i>Riflusso</i> period events.	-.110	.0000****
2.—	'80-'81	Belgium	<i>Redressement</i> period events129	.0000****
3.—	'81	France	Socialist Party electoral victories.050	.0001***
4.—	'81	W.Germany	Peace Protests, corruption scandals. .	.145	.0000****
5.—	'81	Netherlands	Anti-nuclear missile march.049	.0001***
6.—	'83	Belgium	Second Peace March	-.046	.0103**
7.—	'83	France	<i>Tournant de la Rigueur</i>	-.098	.0000****
8.—	'83	W.Germany	<i>Die Wende</i> period events	-.052	.0001***
9.—	'83	Netherlands	<i>Keerpunt</i> and Second Peace March	-.071	.0000****
10.—	'90	W.Germany	Reunification043	.0000****
11.—	'92	Belgium	Black Sunday.065	.0000****
12.—	'92-'94	Italy	1 st Republic dissolution events.131	.0000****
13.—	'95-'96	Belgium	Agusta-Dassault/Dutroux affairs	-.028	.0600*
14.—	'00	W.Germany	CDU Financing Scandal.	-.032	.0201**

¹Cross regression parameters are average values weighted by regressions' posterior probability distribution.

²Probability of significance at 90% confidence levels: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$; **** $p < 0.0001$.

Significant events are unevenly distributed across periods between the First and the Second World Wars, highly disruptive events like the German Revolution or the *Biennio Rosso* do not achieve statistical significance. The only two interwar significant events are events associated with political discontinuities and social mobilizations in the mid-1930s: on the one hand, the breakthrough of the Rexist party and the summer strike wave that took place in Belgium during 1936; and on the other, the French political turbulences that began with the Anti-Parliamentary riots of February 1934 and ended with the victory of the Popular Front electoral coalition and the signature of the Matignon labor agreements, also in the summer of 1936. Both events are negative predictors of political talk.

Ten out of the 20 events that occurred between WWII and the 1970s oil crises are statistically significant. Most are associated with moments that saw government crises occur parallel to political scandals or terrorist attacks. The German 1972, which saw the first government fall in postwar Germany and a major wave of terrorist attacks organized by the Rote Armée Fraktion (RAF), is a case in point. Events related to the 1968 social unrest, on the other hand, fail to achieve statistical significance except for West Germany.

All the fourteen events that occurred after the oil shocks are significant predictors of *political discussion*.

Those from the early eighties tend to exhibit the largest substantive impact on this variable. One of them, the politico-financial scandals and anti-nuclear missile mobilizations that shook West Germany in 1981, is the strongest event predictor of political discussion. It impacts political talk positively and with a magnitude similar to the ongoing studies indicator variable. (see Appendix D). Three of the ten events between 1978 and 1983 are positive predictors of *political discussion*. Five are negative predictors, including all but one event associated with political turbulences brought about by economic crisis and neoliberal

adjustment policies (Fr '83, Ge '83, Ne' 83). Events related to systemic or institutional political transformations in the early 90s in Belgium, West Germany, and Italy are positively associated with political discussion. Finally, events related to major scandals in Belgium and West Germany at the end of the 90s are negatively associated predictors with *political discussion*.

The results above show that events negatively related to *political discussion* are frequent rather than an exception. Seventeen are associated with *political discussion* decreases, and three with drops of more than 10% in the probability of talking at least sometimes about politics. The strongest is France's Dien Bien Phu defeat in Indochina and the government crises that followed suit in 1954. Exposure to this event is associated with a 12.4% decrease in the likelihood of talking about politics. This magnitude of influence is comparable to that of income or gender.

The results show that the strength of association of an event variable with *political discussion* is unevenly distributed across periods and that negative event effects are widespread. These trends do not contradict dynamic updating hypotheses on event effects on political engagement, but go in the opposite direction of generational imprinting effects.

Table 3 shows the results of a more formal statistical test of generational imprinting and dynamic updating hypotheses. Columns 1 and 2 show Spearman correlation scores and p-values measuring the association between event attributes. Columns 3 and 4 report similar scores with respect to cross-regression p-values of estimated coefficients¹⁹ Results shown in the table are likely conservative since correlation calculations using small samples increase the score threshold needed for statistical significance.

¹⁹ Spearman correlation coefficients were chosen as Shapiro-Wilk tests provided evidence of non-normal distribution of scores and significance of effects on *political discussion*. The size of the universe of events used for this analysis is small but largely enough for the central limit theorem to hold.

TABLE 3
CORRELATION BETWEEN STATISTICAL PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS AND EVENT ATTRIBUTES¹

Attributes	Effects on p(poldisc>0) ²		Significance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Corr.	P-value ³	Corr.	P-value ³
<i>Disruptiveness indicators</i>				
1.—Duration (months)1736	.2280	.0348	.8101
2.—Experiential strength				
Moderate	-.1245	.3891	-.2296	.1087*
Higher (terrorism, recessions)0202	.8892	-.1172	.4177
Highest (generalized violence)1201	.4062	.3951	.0045**
3.—Government Discontinuity				
No government fall.0874	.5461	.0834	.5649
One government fall.0934	.5188	.0914	.5280
Two ore more gov't falls0402	.7817	.0772	.5942
4.—Narrative Density ⁴				
One contingency sequence.1068	.4604	.0909	.5302
Two sequences	-.1722	.2318	-.0491	.7350
Between 3 and 5 sequences.	-.0190	.8957	-.1437	.3196
Six or more sequences.1430	.3219	.1959	.1727
<i>Recency indicators</i>				
1.—Last active year.0965	.5050	-.5527	.0000***
<i>Consequentiality indicators</i>				
1.—Turnaround capacity.0895	.5364	-.2072	.1487+
<i>Rallying capacity indicators</i>				
1.—Corruption scandals	-.0849	.5579	.0354	.8070
2.—Terrorist acts.	-.2051	.1530	-.1878	.1915

* $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.001$; **** $p < 0.0001$.

¹ War variables not included.

² Average changes in predicted probabilities of talking at least sometimes about politics.

³ Significance levels from tests evaluating null correlation hypothesis.

The results shown in Table 3 remain unsupportive of generational imprinting expectations. No indicator of disruptiveness is significantly associated with effects on *political discussion*, and estimated p-values are only significantly associated with indicators of experiential strength. But this strong association indicates that, if anything, events ranking higher in disruptive capacity are less rather than more robustly associated with *political discussion*. While the indicator of moderate experiential intensity is strongly associated with smaller p-values, and hence, with more statistical significance, its higher experiential intensity counterpart is associated with larger p-values and less statistical significance.

The indicator of *recency*, on the other hand, performs according to the expectations of dynamic updating hypotheses. An event's newness is weakly associated with substantive impacts on predicted probabilities of *political discussion*, but it is significantly and negatively related with the p-value of their underlying estimated coefficients. This relationship describes newer events as more robust predictors of *political discussion*. The indicator of *consequentiality* also performs according to dynamic updating expectations: its association with cross-average p-values is negative and significant at the 0.15 level.

Associations between indicators of *rallying* capacity and parameters of statistical performance also behave according to the expectations of dynamic updating hypotheses. Events related mainly to terrorist acts are correlated with negative effects on *political discussion* at a very close significance to the 0.15 level ($p < 0.152$). Scandals are also negatively associated with political talk, although its association is not statistically significant.

Regarding controls, I briefly discuss results for age, period and cohort-level variables. Results for individual-level controls are overall consistent with previous findings and can be consulted in Appendix D.

Age is a significant predictor of *political discussion* in all countries but West Germany. Consistent with previous findings, results depict *political discussion* as peaking during adulthood and decreasing for younger and older ages.²⁰ Regarding period controls, *general election* years are associated with significant, positive, and small effects in *political discussion* for all countries. West Germany is also an exception here, as this covariate does not achieve statistical significance. Yearly *economic performance* is a significant predictor of *political discussion* in all countries, but its direction of influence shifts across countries. It is positive for France and Belgium and negative for Italy, West Germany, and the Netherlands.

Cohort education is a significant predictor of *political discussion* in both linear and quadratic specifications for all countries but Italy, where its linear specification fails to achieve standard confidence levels. Linear specifications describe negative estimated impacts of this cohort attribute on *political discussion*. Quadratic specifications also indicate mainly negative effects across most of the value range of *cohort education*.²¹

Cohort size, on the other hand, fails to be a significant predictor of *political discussion* except for Belgium and the Netherlands, where its quadratic specification attains statistical significance. The effect of *cohort size* on *political discussion* in these cases takes a u-shape with inflection points outside maximum cohort size values, describing in practice a negative relationship of strong magnitude.

Finally, all countries except the Netherlands have at least one cohort bracket attaining significance as a regressor of *political discussion*. The direction, magnitude and

²⁰ For Belgium, this inflection point is located in late seniority (81 years) .

²¹ Predicted values describe an inverted-u shape association between cohort education attainment and *political discussion* with inflection points located at very low educational attainment levels—as low as 0.04% and no bigger than 0.22.

location of these significant brackets tend to be strong but vary across countries; full results are contained in Appendix D.²²

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

While historical events have been found to reshape the content of people's politics, we know little if they can also have a role in lastingly modulating civic political life by impacting the strength of people's political activation as they go about their daily lives. This investigation contributes to shed light on this capacity. Combining in-depth historiographical and statistical archival research with innovative quantitative analysis of long-spanning and underused political survey data series, it explored the statistical performance of variables of cohort exposure to twentieth-century Western European events as regressors of interpersonal political discussion, a robust behavioral measurement of everyday political engagement. It subsequently used these single-event results to examine the association of different event-level attributes with the values and the statistical significance of events' predicted effects on political discussion.

The conduction of this analysis produced three concrete theoretical, methodological and substantive contributions.

Theoretically, the present study offers an original "dynamic updating" model on how events impact political engagement. This alternative model seeks to correct currently dominant theories' overemphasis on the short-run disruptions that events provoke as the main sources of their lasting legacies. This paper introduces an alternative dynamic updating outlook to these legacies. It posits that the disruptions that events provoke when they occur

²² Significant birth year brackets are 1911-1920 and 1981-1985 for Belgium; 1906-1925 and 1956-1960 for France; 1941-1987 for West Germany; and 1916 and 1965 for Italy.

interact with changing political circumstances and life-cycle political processes later on to generate heterogeneities in the strength and direction of their impact on political engagement. Based on this perspective, this outlook contends that an event's recency and consequentiality, rather than its short-term disruptive capacity, are the main drivers of an event's strength of influence on political engagement. It also hypothesizes that rather than being always positive, events should be expected to have negative impacts on political engagement if they are associated with rallying effects.

The way in which these hypotheses are empirically tested offers several methodological contributions, the broadest of which is the conduction of a quantitative comparative analysis, the first to my knowledge within the literature on event effects. Besides tackling generalizability issues from case-study designs, this comparative analysis also benefits from several other innovations that allow to address inferential challenges stemming from case selection imprecision, measurement error in the modeling of event effects, cohort-level omitted variable bias, and model selection uncertainty. The analysis formally identifies periods with eventful characteristics between the First World War and the end of the twentieth century for Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy and the Netherlands using exhaustive historiographical analysis. The lasting impact of each of these events on political engagement was then evaluated through cohort-level variables of historical exposure following bell shapes with peak values in cohorts who experienced an event when they were young adults. The investigation subsequently explored the performance of these variables as regressors of political discussion across 72 different model specifications with different combinations of cohort size and cohort education controls.

The results from this analysis provide seminal answers to three interrelated questions of varying analytical dissolution.

The broadest of these interrogations is related to capability: are historical events capable of reshaping political activation in the societies where they occur? The findings from this investigation strongly suggest this is the case, and that this capacity is common. Rather than being exceptional cases, events associated with significant effects in interpersonal political discussion constitute more than half of the 43 eventful periods identified for Western Europe across the twentieth century.

The second question is more historical in nature: which were the events that were significant regressors of political discussion in Western Europe through the last quarter of the twentieth century, and what was the specific impact they had on everyday political discussion?

This investigation found that three-quarters of the events with significant impacts on political discussion cluster in three periods. The first is the mid 1930s. Events related to electoral political instabilities, social unrest, and massive strikes in France and Belgium in this time are associated with negative effects on political discussion. The second is the early 1980s, when political disruptions associated with economic crisis and neoliberal reforms achieved statistical significance as predictors of political discussion. These events tend to have a negative impact on political discussion. The third and final period is the 1990s. Political readjustments at the beginning of the decade are associated with positive and negative impacts on political discussion, while political scandals in its second half are related with negative effects. Nineteen-sixty-eight events and the violent and complex political regime changes after the First World War, on the other hand, fail to be significant.

The results above offer high-resolution historical knowledge on the temporal location and direction of influence of events with estimated significant impacts on everyday political engagement in Western Europe during a thirty-year span. A further exploration of

these legacy powers constitutes an important avenue of further research, particularly as historical socialization studies centered in Western Europe have recently tended to lag behind relative to other geographic areas. Within this line of inquiry, the study of potentially depoliticizing effects of events associated with neoliberal turns in the early eighties appears to be a particularly rewarding direction in the absence of previous findings on this capability and the sharp increase in the scholarly interest of the early eighties as a political and economically transformative period.

The third and final question that the results of this investigation allow addressing concerns hypothesis testing: can observed differences across events in their association with political discussion be better accounted for by historical imprinting or dynamic updating hypotheses?

Table 5 summarizes the type of support that each of these hypotheses receive and the key empirical evidence associated with it.

Findings strongly disconfirm all generational imprinting hypotheses on how events affect political engagement. Departing from expectations from the positive effects hypothesis (H1a), more than half of the events under analysis and 19 out of the 26 that achieve statistical significance are associated with negative effects on political discussion. Findings also go in an opposite way to the disruptiveness hypothesis (H1b). The few indicators of disruptiveness that are correlated with statistical significance associate highly disruptive events with higher, rather than smaller, p-values. If anything, this suggests that highly disruptive events hold a much more fragile footprint of influence than less intense counterparts. Results were not supportive of the temporal stability hypothesis (H1c) either, as they show that significant events tend to concentrate in more recent years.

TABLE 5
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF HYPOTHESES

Hypotheses	(1)	(2)
	Empirical Support	Key Evidence
H1.— Imprinting Hypotheses		
a.— Positive Effects	None	Less than 50% of events and only a quarter of significant events are positive predictors of <i>political discussion</i>
b.— Intensity effects	Little	No association between indicators of political disruptiveness, experiential strength, or narrative diversity and robustness or magnitude of influence on <i>political talk</i> .
c.— Temporal Stability	None	Likelihood of significant influence decreases the older an event is.
H2.— Dynamic Updating Hypotheses		
a.— Bidirectionality	Suggestive	Scandals and Terrorist attacks are correlated with negative effects on <i>political discussion</i> ; association for terrorist attacks is significant
b.— Consequentiality effects	Strong	Positive and significant correlation between an event's capacity to modify state action and its significance rate.
c.— Temporal decreasing returns	Strong	High, positive, and significant correlation between recency and robustness of influence.

The findings of this research, on the other hand, align in various degrees of significance with dynamic updating hypotheses. The recency hypothesis (H2a) is strongly supported by the strongly significant positive correlation between the newness of an event and its statistical significance as a predictor of political discussion.

Results are also supportive of the consequentiality hypothesis (H2b). Events associated with lasting changes in foundational political institutions or economic policies are positively, strongly, and significantly associated with larger statistical significance. Results also trend along the bidirectionality hypothesis (H2c). Despite their low number, the two

events associated mainly related to terrorist attacks, which typically produce rallying effects, manage to be negative predictors of political talk at levels very close to $p < 0.15$.

The associations described above are notable given the significance penalization that the relatively small universe of events under consideration give to correlational scores. Overall, they suggest that event effects are not statically maintained once created, but recursively negotiated in connection with people's political changes across the life cycle and with ongoing political developments.

While the findings above provide seminal insights into the capacity of historical events to shape sustained political activation, they carry inferential limitations related, first, to the number of events identified for the geographical area and the period under analysis; second, to the scarcity of events identified as pertaining to types of categorical interest (for instance, terrorism and scandals), and third, to issues of generalizability of its findings to events from other places and periods. Tackling these issues also constitutes a fruitful research direction. This study aspires to stimulate such investigations by providing an expanded and enhanced set of theoretical outlooks, research designs, measurement instruments, and baseline empirical results for subsequent comparative work on the political legacies that historical events leave on those exposed to them

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
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APPENDIX A
DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL DISCUSSION RESPONSES BY COHORT



¹ Source: Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend Dataset

APPENDIX B

SELECTED REFERENCES AND CODED ATTRIBUTES FOR EVENTS

REFERENCES CONSULTED DURING THE PRELIMINARY EVENT IDENTIFICATION PHASE

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CODED ATTRIBUTES AND SELECTED REFERENCES USED DURING VERIFICATION PHASE

Belgium

Belgian events include the results of the 1936 General Election and the Summer Strikes that followed suit; the abdication of king Léopold III (1950); the large protests against the secular Collard Education Bill in 1955; Belgium's intervention in Congo shortly after its independence in 1960 and the strikes against economic austerity measures that occurred during the winter that year; the political crisis created by the split of the University of Leuven

Appendix B

along linguistic lines in 1968; the sudden breakup of the Egmont Pact, which reorganized the Belgian state along communitarian lines, in 1978; the government crises generated by political standoffs regarding the federalization of the country and by a steep economic downturn in 1980; the First and Second Peace Marches of 1981 and 1983; the unexpected defeat of prime minister Wilfried Martens and the electoral success of the extreme right in the 1992 Snap Election; the Augusta-Dassault corruption scandal of 1995, and the Marc Dutroux Judicial Scandal and the White March organized in reaction to it on 1996.

1936.

Rexist electoral breakthrough; Summer strikes
(Period with multiple events)

Duration:	12 months.
Beginning	May 1936: General Election Results.
End:	April 1937: Degrelle – Van Zeeland parliamentary election run-off.
Narrative Sequences:	Electoral breakthrough of Rexist Party; Summer strikes.
Government Falls:	Van Zeeland I.

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1950.

Léopold III restoration crisis; Murder of Julien Lahaut.
(Political crises)

Duration:	6 months.
Peak Beginning:	March 1950: Results of Referendum on the return of king Léopold III to Belgium.
Peak End:	August 1950: Abdication of Léopold III and murder of communist party chairman Julien Lahaut.

Narrative Sequences: Léopold III restoration crisis; murder of Julien Lahaut.
Government Falls: Eyskens (Gaston) I; Duvieusart.

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1955.

Collard Law protests
(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	6 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	February 1955: Introduction of the "Collard Laws", a series of secularizing education reform proposals introduced by socialist education minister Léo Collard.
<i>Peak End:</i>	July 1955: demonstration of catholic organizations against the Collard Laws in Brussels and passage of the Laws in Parliament.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Collard Law protests.
<i>Government Falls</i>	None.

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1960.

Intervention in Congo; Unitary Law strikes
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	5 months ¹
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	July 1960: Beginning of Belgium's intervention in independent Congo
<i>Peak End:</i>	January 1961: Strikes against the "Unitary" Austerity Law introduced by Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Belgian intervention in Congo; Unitary Law Strikes.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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1968.

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) split.
(Political Crisis)

<i>Duration:</i>	5 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	January 1968: The KUL's French section unilaterally announces an expansion program towards the Flemish-speaking outskirts of Brussels.
<i>Peak End:</i>	June 1968: The recently established government of Gaston Eyskens announces the transfer of the French section of KUL away from Leuven.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Split of the Catholic University of Leuven; Split of Belgian Christian Parties along linguistic lines.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Vanden Boeynants I.

¹ The duration of this contingency period adds the span of two non-contiguous events: the Belgian intervention in Congo after its independence (July 1960-September 1960); and the organization of a large wave of strikes in opposition to economic austerity measures announced by Prime Minister Eyskens (December 1960-January 1961).

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1978.

Egmont Pact Breakdown crises
(Political Crisis)

<i>Duration:</i>	7 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	September 1978: Resignation of Prime Minister Leo Tindemans after the unexpected defeat of a state reform reorganizing the Belgian state along community lines.
<i>Peak End:</i>	April 1979: Installation of Wilfried Martens as Prime Minister.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Egmont Pact Breakdown Crisis.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Tindemans III.

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1980-1981.

Events from the *Redressement* period
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	23 months. ²
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	December 1979: The Flemish Christian's party rejects establishing of a regional government for Brussels of equal juridical status to Flanders and Wallonia.
<i>Peak End:</i>	February 1982: Parliament grants decree government powers to newly reappointed Prime Minister Wilfried Martens.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Federalization Crises, Economic Readjustment Crises, First Peace March.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Martens II, Martens III, Martens IV, Eyskens (Mark).

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² The duration of this contingency period adds the span of two non-contiguous instances of contingency: the government crisis connected with disagreements over the federalization of Belgium (December 1979-October 1980); and the period where the First Peace March occurred and government crises related to economic policy disputes developed (March 1981- February 1982).

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1983.

Second Peace March
(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	3 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	October 1983: 300,000 demonstrators attend a protest against the installment of NATO nuclear missiles in Belgium.
<i>Peak End:</i>	December 1983: After numerous delays, Prime Minister Martens finally agrees to the deployment of 48 NATO nuclear missiles in Belgium by 1985.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Second Peace March.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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1992.

Black Sunday and Wilfried Martens downfall.
(Elections)

<i>Duration:</i>	5 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	November 1991: Prime Minister Wilfried Martens unexpectedly loses anticipated elections. The elections also see soaring support for the Vlaams Blok, a recently constituted extreme right-wing Flemish party.
<i>Peak End:</i>	March 1992: A grand coalition appoints Jean-Luc Dehaene as Prime Minister, ending a decade of Wilfried Martens governments and lack of participation of socialist parties in the government.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	November 1991 General Election Results
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Martens IX.

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1995-1996.

Agusta-Dassault Scandal; Dutroux Affair, White March and Di Rupo judicial inquiry
(Scandal)

<i>Duration:</i>	10 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	February 1995: the treasurer of the Socialist Flemish Party accuses high-profile socialist politicians of having participating in a kickback scheme related to contracts assigned to the Italian company Agusta by the Belgian Air Force.

<i>Peak End:</i>	December 1996: Belgium's Supreme Court dismisses pedophilia accusations against vice-prime minister Elio Di Rupo after evidence of declaration tampering by the main witness of the case.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Agusta-Dassault Scandal (1995); Dutroux Affair, White March, and Di Rupo inquiry (1996).
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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France

French events include the Anti Parliamentary Riots of 1934, the Left-wing Unitary Rally of 1935, and in 1936, the electoral victory of the Popular Front and the strike wave it triggered soon after; the end of the tripartite National Unity government in 1947 and the strike wave that followed suit in the fall; France's defeat against the Viet Minh in Dien Bien Phu and the political crises it unleashed in 1954; the first Algiers Putsch and the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958; the Algerian War military, political, and terrorist crises between 1961 and 1962; the Spring '68 protests, strikes, and political crises; the unexpectedly strong electoral victories of the Socialist Party and François Mitterrand in 1981; and the sudden adoption of neoliberal policies by his government in 1983—commonly known as the *Tournant de la Rigueur*.

1934-1936.

Events from the *Front Populaire* period
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	12 months. ³
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	January 1934: Extreme right-wing riots lead to the resignation of Prime Minister Camille Chautemps.
<i>Peak End:</i>	June 1936: A massive strike wave organized after the electoral victory of the Popular Front leads to the signature of the Matignon labor agreements.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Anti-Parliamentary Riots (1934); Unitary Rally (1935), Popular Front Victory; Summer Strikes (1936).
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Chautemps II; Daladier I; Doumergue II, Flandin I; Bouissson I; Laval II.

³ The duration of this contingency period adds three non-contiguous moments of contingency: the Chiappe Anti Parliamentary Riots (January-February 1934), the staging of the Unitary left-wing rally (June-September 1935), and the electoral victory of the Popular Front, as well as the wave of strikes that developed soon after it (January-June 1936).

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1947.

Tripartite Government downfall; Autumn Strikes; Gaullist Front establishment
(Political Crisis)

<i>Duration:</i>	9 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	May 1947: The French Communist Party is expelled from the governing coalition led by socialist Paul Ramadier.
<i>Peak End:</i>	November 1947: Ramadier resigns as prime minister following a large-scale strike wave that month.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Dissolution of Unitary Government; Establishment and Electoral Victories of Gaullist Front; November strikes
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Ramadier II.

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1954.

Indochina Withdrawal Crises; European Defense Community controversy.
(Political Crisis)

<i>Duration:</i>	10 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	November 1953: French forces in Vietnam launch a military offensive against the Viet Minh in the Dien Bien Phu valley.
<i>Peak End:</i>	August 1954: after years in parliamentary limbo, the National Assembly rejects France's participation in the European Defense Community a month after the signature of Geneva agreements, which granted independence to Vietnam.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Dien Bien Phu defeat; European Defense Community Question; Genève Agreements' Government Crisis.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Laniel I.

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1958.

First Algiers Putsch and Establishment of Fifth Republic
(Insurrection)

<i>Duration:</i>	5 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	April 1958: Prime Minister Félix Gaillard resigns after losing a confidence vote on Algerian independence.
<i>Peak End:</i>	September 1958: The Fifth Republic is established after a new Constitution designed by Charles de Gaulle, who had stepped in as Prime Minister after a military coup on May, is overwhelmingly approved by a referendum.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	First Algiers Putsch and Establishment of Fifth Republic; Spring Left-wing Demonstrations.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Gaillard I; Pflimlin I.

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1961-1962.

Algerian Withdrawal Crises
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	22 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	November 1960: President Charles de Gaulle makes a turnaround in his policy towards Algerian independence and announces a referendum on Algerian self-determination.
<i>Peak End:</i>	July 1962: At least 95 European Algerians are killed in Oran one month after France's recognition of Algerian independence, accelerating the evacuation of French citizens from the former colony.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Algerian Independence Referendum; OAS Terrorism (first wave); Second Algiers Putsch; Repression of Algerian and Left-Wing Protests; OAS Terrorism, (first wave); Murder Attempt against Charles De Gaulle; Bab-el-Oued and Oran Massacres.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Debré I.

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1968.

Events of the Spring '68 period
(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	2 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	May 1968: A student sit-in in the premises of the Sorbonne University in downtown Paris is violently repressed.
<i>Peak End:</i>	June 1968: An anticipated General Election gives De Gaulle a strong electoral victory and an unprecedented absolute majority in the French National Assembly.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Student Protests; Strike wave; Spring '68 political crisis.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Pompidou I.

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1981.

Socialist Party Electoral Victories.
(Elections)

<i>Duration:</i>	3 Months
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	April 1981: Victory of François Mitterrand in the 1981 Presidential Elections.
<i>Peak End:</i>	June 1981. The anticipated legislative elections called for by Mitterrand give the left an absolute majority of the left in Parliament for the first time in the Fifth Republic.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Socialist Party Electoral Victories.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Barre I.

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1983.

Tournant de la Rigueur economic policy turnaround
(Political Crisis)

<i>Duration:</i>	1 month
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	March 1983: The incumbent socialist party minimizes expected losses in the run-offs of the 1983 municipal elections, giving François Mitterrand margin of action to continue or reverse demand-oriented economic policies to address a long-running economic crisis.
<i>Peak End:</i>	March 1983: Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy announces the adoption of supply-side economic policies to contain the economic crises and the reversal of the economic policies decisions established by the Mitterrand presidency.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	<i>Tournant de la Rigueur</i> turnaround.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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West Germany

Eighteen years featured major political contingencies in West Germany. The first of these periods is the sequence of political shocks that lead to the downfall of the Prussian Empire and the establishment of the Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1920. They also include the multiple political turbulences unleashed by the 1923 war reparation crisis; the unexpectedly strong showing of the Nazi Party in the General Elections of 1930; the government crises of 1932 and 1933, which paved the way to the Adolf Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor; the establishment of the Federal Republic in the Western part of Germany between 1948 and 1949; the partition of Berlin in 1961 and the Spiegel civil rights affair of 1962; the extra-parliamentary opposition (APO) protests of 1967; in 1972, the attacks perpetrated by the RAF terrorist group and the government crisis associated to Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* policy; the second wave of terrorist acts produced by the RAF in the "German Autumn" of 1977; in 1981, the demonstrations against the deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany and Neue Heimat corruption scandals of 1981; the Nuclear Action Week and the arrival to power of democristian Helmut Kohl—which was then commonly know as *Die Wende*; the fall of the Berlin Wall and the German Reunification process of 1990, and the CDU illegal financing scandal of 2000.

1918-1920.

Events from the German Revolution period.

(Period with multiple events)

Duration: 19 months.⁴

Peak Beginning: January 1918: Major strikes against the continuation of war efforts erupt in Berlin.

⁴ The duration of this contingency period adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the January Strikes, the End of the First World War, and the German Revolution events (January 1918-May 1919); and the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhr Insurrection (March-April 1920).

<i>Peak End:</i>	April 1920: The German army breaks into the Ruhr and crushes an uprising of workers in the region.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	January 1918 Strikes; First World War Defeat; Downfall of Second Reich and German Revolution Events; Kapp Putsch and Ruhr Uprising.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Von Baden I; Council of People's Deputies; Scheidemann I ; Bauer I; Müller I.

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1923.

War Reparation Crises

(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	10 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	January 1923: Allied forces invade the Ruhr region as a way to extract reparations from World War I.
<i>Peak End:</i>	November 1923. Members of the National Socialist Party stage a failed coup against the Federal government in Munich.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Ruhr Occupation, Passive Resistance and Cuno Strikes; Von Kahr's Bavarian State Commission; Hamburg Uprising and Federal Interventions in Saxony and Thuringia; Küstrin Coup; Munich Coup.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Cuno I; Stressemann I.

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1930.

Federal Election Results
(Elections)

<i>Duration:</i>	3 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	July 1930: President Paul Von Hindenburg dissolves the Parliament and calls for general elections after Parliament overrules an economic decree issued by Chancellor Heinrich Brüning.
<i>Peak End:</i>	September 1930: Featuring a record turnout, general election results elections dramatically increase the vote share of the National Socialist and the Communist Parties.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Brüning Government Crises.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Müller I.

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1932-1933.

Events from the Weimar Republic Downfall period
(Political Crises)

<i>Duration:</i>	10 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	June 1932: President Von Hindenburg retires his support to Chancellor Brüning due to his stances on agricultural policies and paramilitary Nazi organizations.
<i>Peak End:</i>	February 1933: After being appointment as Chancellor and following the eruption of a fire in the Reichstag, Adolf Hitler suspends civil and political liberties and calls for new general elections, which take place under an increasingly overt coercive environment.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	National Concentration Cabinet Crises and Hitler's Arrival to Power; Reichstag Fire; Nazi Enabling Acts.

Government Falls: Brüning I, Von Pappen I, Schleicher I.

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1948-1949.

Events from the Federal Republic Establishment period
(Political Crises)

Duration:

Peak Beginning: June 1948: the Deutsche Mark is launched in the German areas occupied by Western Allies.

Peak End: August 1949: First Postwar German General Election. Konrad Adenauer is elected Chancellor of the German Federal Republic by a one-vote difference.

Narrative Sequences: Reconstitution of German Statehood; 1948 Berlin Crisis.

Government Falls: Allied Occupation.

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1961-1962.

Partition of Berlin; Der Spiegel Affair.

(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	5 months. ⁵
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	June 61: Walter Ulbricht, the chairman of the German Democratic Republic, announces the closure of the border between East and West Berlin.
<i>Peak End:</i>	November 62: The German Liberal party abandons the governing coalition in protest against the government's intervention in the <i>Der Spiegel</i> magazine after the publication of a critical report against the state of the German Army. The liberal-demochristian coalition is reconstituted once Adenauer commits to resign as Chancellor by the end of 1963.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Partition of Berlin; <i>Der Spiegel</i> Civil Rights Affair.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Adenauer IV.

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⁵ The duration of this contingency period adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the erection of the Berlin Wall (August-October 1961), and the *Spiegel* Affair (October-November 1962).

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1967-1968.

Extra-parliamentary Opposition (APO) Protests
(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	9 months. ⁶
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	June 1967: Clashes between police and left-wing students protesting against the visit of the Iranian Shah to Germany lead to the death of a demonstrator.
<i>Peak End:</i>	The German Parliament passes the Emergency Law, which introduces the State of Emergency figure expanding surveillance capabilities of the German state during crisis. The Law had become increasingly contested by student demonstrations throughout the year.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Summer 1967 student protest wave; Spring 1968 student protest wave and murder attempt against Rudi Dutschke.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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⁶ The duration figure adds the 1967 (June-September) and 1968 (February-June) waves of student protests.

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1972.

Ostpolitik Government Crisis; RAF Terrorist Campaign
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	8 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	April 1972: Rainer Barzel, the chairman of the German demochristian party (CDU/CSU), fails to win a motion of no confidence against Chancellor Willy Brandt.
<i>Peak End:</i>	November 1972: Chancellor Willy Brand wins an anticipated general election and obtains a supportive majority in Parliament.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	"Barzel's Coup", minority Government, and November Anticipated Elections; RAF Spring Terrorist Acts; Munich Terrorist Acts.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Brandt I.

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1977.

RAF Terrorist Attacks – Red Autumn period
(Terrorist Act)

<i>Duration:</i>	7 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	April 1977: The RAF murders Attorney General Sigfried Buback in retaliation for the conviction of the founding members of the terrorist organization.
<i>Peak End:</i>	October 1977: After the suicide of imprisoned RAF leaders followed a failed attempt to secure their release through an airplane kidnapping, RAF members kill Hanns Martin Schleyer, the president of the German Business Federation.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Stammheim trial against RAF members and "Red Autumn" Terrorist Acts
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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1981.

Anti-Nuclear Missile Movement protests; Flick and Neue Heimat scandals
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	5 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	June 1981: During the last day of the German Protestant Church Congress in Hamburg, 100,000 people attend a demonstration against NATO's nuclear arms deployment in Western Europe.
<i>Peak End:</i>	February 1982: <i>Der Spiegel</i> publishes an exposé on widespread mismanagement and profiteering inside <i>Neue Heimat</i> , a union-owned corporation that was then Europe's largest construction company. Albert Vietor, the company's director, is fired shortly after. The revelations add another frontline of news on systemic corruption in Germany after the start of the illegal party finance Flick affair two months before.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	1981 Peace Movement Protests; Flick Party Donation Affair; Neue Heimat Scandal.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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1983.

Events from the *Wende* Period
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	14 months. ⁷
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	September 1982: Helmut Schmidt's government falls after the Liberal Party leaves the governing coalition and supports a no confidence vote that installs Demochristian Helmut Kohl as Chancellor.
<i>Peak End:</i>	November 1983: Parliament agrees to the installation of Nuclear Missiles in Germany, going against the demands of the massive anti-nuclear demonstrations that had taken place one month before.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Helmut Schmidt Downfall and 1983 General Election; Flick Parliamentary Inquiry Commission; Nuclear Action Week.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Schmidt III.

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⁷ The duration estimate adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the political and electoral process that installed Helmut Kohl as chancellor (September 1982-March 1983) and the installation of the Flick Parliamentary Inquiry Commission and the organization Nuclear Action Week against the deployment of nuclear weapons (May-November 1983).

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1990.
Reunification
(Political change)

<i>Duration:</i>	8 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	November 1989: East Germany's capacity to enforce its territorial separation with West Germany dissolves in the midst of an economic crisis, massive westward emigration, and massive demonstrations against the political apparatus of the Communist Party.
<i>Peak End:</i>	July 1990: Soviet chairman Mikhail Gorbachev confirms Soviet acceptance of reunified Germany's access to NATO.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	German Reunification.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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2000.

CDU Financing Scandal
(Scandal)

<i>Duration:</i>	6 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	November 1999: Walther Leisler Kiep, a former treasurer of the Christian Democratic party (CDU), is detained in connection to investigations on illegal financing practices within the CDU.
<i>Peak End:</i>	April 2000: Running on a renovation platform, Angela Merkel is elected chairwoman of the CDU.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	CDU Illegal Funding Scandal.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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Italy

Thirteen eventful years were identified for Italy. They begin with the strike waves, social protests, unexpected results, and generalized acts of violence that shook Italy between 1918 and 1919, a period commonly known as the *Biennio Rosso*. They continue with the Legalitarian Strike, the March on Rome, and Mussolini's arrival to power in 1922; the 1948 General Election Campaign, the murder attempt against communist chairman Palmiro Togliatti and the labor strikes that followed suit; the events of the "Maggio Strisciante" period, which include the wave of student protests of 1968 and 1969, the *Autunno Caldo* strike wave and the Piazza Fontana Terrorist attack in 1969, and the string of violent demonstrations that took place in the first semester of 1970; the corruption scandals and political violence events of the "Anni di Piombo", which include the Lockheed Scandal of 1976 and 1977, the wave of social violence and contestation of 1977, and the kidnap and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978; the major terrorist attacks and the capital-labor confrontations that took place in 1980, in the beginning of what is called the *Riflusso* period; and the period between 1992 and 1994, when the Italian postwar political order in Italy dissolved hand in hand with the *Mani Pulite* corruption scandals, major terrorist attacks and political murders, major economic crises, and the arrival to power of media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi.

1918-1920.

End of First World War and events from the *Biennio Rosso* Period
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	33 months. ⁸
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	March 1919: A demonstration organized by the Italian Socialist Party to protest against the death of a militant in Milan turns into a street fighting when protesters clash against far-right demonstrators.
<i>Peak End:</i>	December 1920: Irredentist Italian expeditioners occupying the Yugoslav city of Rijeka evacuate the city after the Italian army threatens their forceful removal.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	End of the First World War; <i>Biennio Rosso</i> strikes and factory occupations; fascists squad violence and Palazzo Accursio Massacre; Fiume/Rijeka occupation crises; Ancona munity; Electoral Results of the 1919 General Election.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Orlando I; Nitti I; Nitti II.

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⁸ The operationalization of the variable in the analysis also includes the twelve months 1918 months, which were the final years of the First World war and sit contiguous to post-war 1919 events.

1922.

Legalitarian Strike and March on Rome
(Political Crisis)

<i>Duration:</i>	4 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	July 1922: The Labor Alliances organizes the Antifascist Legalitarian Strike.
<i>Peak End:</i>	October 1922: After the conduction of the March on Rome, Benito Mussolini is appointed Prime Minister by king Vittorio Emanuele.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Legalitarian antifascist Strike, Fascist March on Rome, and Appointment of Mussolini as prime minister
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Bonomi I; Facta I; Facta II.

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1948.

First Postwar General Election; Togliatti Murder Attempt and Fall Strikes.
(Elections)

<i>Duration:</i>	6 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	February 1948: The Italian Communist Party (PCI) and its republican and socialist allies obtain 79% of the vote share in the Pescara administrative elections.
<i>Peak End:</i>	July 1948: A murder attempt against Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI chairman, triggers large strike waves in the aftermath of the first postwar general election in Italy, which had been won by the Demochristian period after a campaign marked by fears or hopes of a communist victory.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	1948 General Election Campaign and Results; Murder Attempt against Palmiro Togliatti and Summer Strikes.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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1968-1970.

Events from the *Maggio Strisciante* period
(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	34 months. ⁹
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	November 1967: University sit-ins multiply across Italy and stage take major higher education institutions like the Catholic University of Milan and the University of Turin.
<i>Peak End:</i>	August 1970: Mariano Rumor unexpectedly resigns as Prime minister soon after violent protests and strikes take place in Reggio Calabria in protest against the election of Catanzaro as the regional capital of Calabria,
Mariano Rumor	
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	<i>Sessantotto</i> Student Mobilizations; 1968 Workers' Strikes; Catholic Dissidence Mobilizations; 1969 Social Contestation; <i>Autunno Caldo</i> ; Piazza Fontana Terrorist Attacks; Fatti di Reggio and Gioia Tauro Violence Episodes.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Moro III; Leone; Rumor I; Rumor II; Rumor III.

Selected Bibliography

⁹ This number adds two non-contiguous periods of contingency: the 68/69 episodes of student protest, workers mobilizations, and social violence (November 1967-December 1969), and the violence acts of Reggio and Gioia Tauro.

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1976-1978.

Events from the *Anni di Piombo* period
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	22 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	March 1976: Revelations on kickbacks received by Italian politicians from Lockheed corporation to secure military contracts start to become published by the media.
<i>Peak End:</i>	May 1978: former Prime Minister Aldo Moro is murdered by terrorists after a three month-long kidnap period.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Lockheed Scandal and Parliamentary Inquiry Commission; 1976 General Election; <i>Movimento del '77</i> and Social Contestation; <i>Brigate Rosse</i> Terrorist Acts; Kidnap and Murder of Aldo Moro.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Moro IV; Moro V.

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1980.

Events from the *Riflusso* period.

(Multiple Events)

Duration:

6 months.

Peak Beginning:

May 1980: Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga is accused of helping the son of a Christian Democracy politician escape detention for his participation in a left-wing terrorist organization.

<i>Peak End:</i>	October 1980: A month and a half long strike at FIAT abruptly comes to an end after a surprisingly large demonstration of white collar workers demand an end to it.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Political Terrorism Surge and Donat Cattin Scandal; Ustica Incident and Strage di Bologna; FIAT strike and <i>marcia dei quarantamila</i> ; Francesco Cossiga downfall.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Cossiga II.

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1992-1994.

Events from the First Republic dissolution period
(Multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	27 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	April 1992. Despite a widely favorable political environment, the 4-party center-right coalition that had governed Italy throughout the eighties fails to gather a majority of votes in the 1994 Italian general elections.
<i>Peak End:</i>	December 1994. Less than a year before forming government, media Tycoon Silvio Berlusconi pre-steps down as prime minister after

	three no-confidence motions are simultaneously introduced in Parliament.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	1992 General election, anticipated presidential election, and government formation crisis ('92); Mani Pulite-Tangentopoli, Enimont process, and Guardia di Finanza inquiry ('92-'94); Falcone and Borsellino murders, and mafia terrorist attacks ('92-'93); Economic emergency measures and anti-austerity protests ('92); Postwar party system collapse, <i>Discesa in campo</i> , and 1994 general elections ('92-'94); Berlusconi downfall events (Biondi decree, Fininvest Inquiry standoff; Pension reform protests ('94).
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Andreotti VII; Cossiga Presidency; Amato I; Ciampi I; Berlusconi I.

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La Repubblica online archive, available at <https://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/>. Entries on Mani Pulite inquiry (February 1993 - December 1994), terrorist attacks and political murders (May 1992 - June 1993), economic reforms government reactions to the economic crises (June 1992 - December 1994), elections and referenda (February 1992 - March 1994), and the Berlusconi-Mani Pulite standoff in 1994 (March 1994- December 1994).

Netherlands

Nine major contingencies located in five different years were identified for the Netherlands. They begin with the mutiny of Indonesian and Dutch sailors in the *Die Zeven Provinciën* ship of 1933 and the 1934 riot in the Jordaan neighborhood of Amsterdam; the political crises provoked by the Indonesian independence war between 1946 and 1948; the 1976 Lockheed Corruption Scandal, the Government Formation crises of 1977, and in the same year, the Glimmen terrorist attack; the protests and political strains related to the question over the Netherlands' participation in NATO's Euromissile program in 1981, and in 1983, the arrival to power of Ruud Lubbers, the implantation of neoliberal policies, and the making of the Second Peace March against the installment of nuclear weapons in the country.

1933-1934.

De Zeven Provinciën Mutiny, Jordaan Riot
(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	4 months. ¹⁰
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	February 1933: Mutiny of Dutch and Indonesian Sailors in the <i>De Zeven Provinciën</i> battleship
<i>Peak End:</i>	July 1934: Riot in the Jordaan working-class neighborhood of Amsterdam erupt after the government of Hendrik Colijn decides to reduce unemployment benefits.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Mutiny of the <i>De Zeven Provinciën</i> battleship; Jordaan Riots.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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¹⁰ This duration figure adds two non-contiguous events: The mutiny of the *Die Zeven Provinciën* ship (February-April 1933); and the Jordaan Riots of July 1934.

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1946-1948.
Indonesian Crises.
(Political Crises)

<i>Duration:</i>	18 months. ¹¹
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	May 1946: In an effort to increase manpower to fight Indonesian independentists, Parliament votes a constitutional amendment to make military conscription compulsory
<i>Peak End:</i>	December 1948: The Dutch government launches a second military "Police Action" in Indonesia to force independentists to agree to Dutch conditions for granting independence. After widespread international condemnation, the Netherlands declares a unilateral ceasefire on December 31.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Resistance Acts Against Conscription; Signature of Linggadjati Agreements; First Java Police Action; Second Java Police Action and Indonesian Retreat.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Beel I.

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¹¹ The duration of this contingency period adds three non-contiguous periods of contingency: the Signature of the Linggadjati Agreements and the staging of Conscription Protests (May-Dec 1946), the launching of the First Java Police Action (March-July 1947), and the organization of the Second Java Police Action (July-December 1948).

1976-1977.

Lockheed Affair; Drenthe Hostage Crises; Government Formation crisis.
(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	16 months. ¹²
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	February 1976: Revelations on potential kickbacks received by Prince Bernhard, Queen Beatrix, consort, become published by the media.
<i>Peak End:</i>	December 1977: Demochristian Dries Van Agt is sworn in as prime minister after more than six months of absence of government due to gridlock regarding government formation.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	Lockheed Corruption Scandal; Drenthe Hostage Crises; Government Formation Political Crisis.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Den Uyl I.

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¹² The duration of this contingency period adds three non-contiguous periods of contingency: the Wijster train hostage crisis (December 1976); the Lockheed corruption scandal (February-August 1976); and the 1976 Glimmen train hostage crisis and the government formation gridlock (May-December 1977).

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1981.

Anti-Nuclear Missile Movement protests.

(Protests)

<i>Duration:</i>	7 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	May 1981: The results of the general election lead to a Grand Coalition that obstructs adopting a final resolution on the Dutch participation in NATO's nuclear Euromissiles program.
<i>Peak End:</i>	November 1981: 350,000 people protest in Amsterdam against the deployment of nuclear missiles in the Netherlands. The demonstration's success makes the newly constituted government suspend its final decision on the matter.
<i>Narrative Sequence:</i>	Anti-Nuclear Missiles movement protests.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	None.

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1983.

Keerpunt turnaround; Antinuclear Missile Movement—1983 wave.

(Period with multiple events)

<i>Duration:</i>	19 months.
<i>Peak Beginning:</i>	October 1982: Citing personal issues, Dries Van Agt unexpectedly resigns as prime minister. Ruud Lubbers, the Demochristian parliamentary speaker, substitutes him in the position.
<i>Peak End:</i>	June 1984: A Second “Peace March” is organized to protest the deployment of nuclear weapons in the Netherlands. Nearly 3% of the country’s population take part in it.
<i>Narrative Sequences:</i>	<i>Keerpunt</i> economic policy turnaround; Second Peace March and Third Euromissile Delay.
<i>Government Falls:</i>	Van Agt III.

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APPENDIX C

CONSTRUCTION OF COHORT SIZE AND COHORT EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT VARIABLES

GENERAL SOURCES AND IMPUTATION STRATEGIES

Including cohort-level controls in the regressions under analysis demanded counting with two 106-cohort long data series (1881-1987) on indicators of cohort affluence and cohort size for each country under investigation.¹ No single historical statistical repository currently offers such data series. To construct them, I use as main sources the United Nations' *World Population Prospects* (UNWPP 2011), the *European Historical Statistics* (EHS) series (Mitchell 1975); and the *Cross National Time Series Data* (CNTS) series (Banks and Wilson 2021). These repositories of cross-country historical statistics are well known and widely used in quantitative comparative historical research (Cole 2015; Paglayan 2020; Zeev and Russett 2018; Albertus and Gay 2017; Schofer and Meyer 2005; Kurzman and Leahey 2004; Rasler and Thompson 1985).

The sources above provided adequate bases for the generation of data series on cohort's size and educational attainment in a way that diminished measurement inconsistency and maximized comparability of data and indicators across countries. For the generation of yearly cohort data series, these sources sometimes exhibited several data gaps. I assessed them using linear imputation strategies.

¹ The first cohort included in the analysis for West Germany was born in 1886.

Boundary modifications across time were an initial challenge to the consistency of this country-level information. These territorial changes, however, are marginal for all countries except West Germany—or the Federal German Republic.² The UNWPP, EHS and CNTS only provide figures for West Germany—the Federal German Republic (FGR)—between 1946 and 1989. Earlier and later data provides statistical information for a united German state that was much larger in size and population than the FGR. To tackle the comparability issues posed by these shifts, I used Census and Statistical Yearbook information from the German Reich and the unified Federal Republic of Germany (Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amt 1908-1919; Statistisches Reichsamt 1920-1942; Statistisches Bundesamt 1985; 1991-2010; 2011) to calculate population and educational attainment estimates for FGR *Länder* before 1946 and after 1990.

COHORT SIZE


Consulted sources provide population figures predominantly through 5-year age brackets. The first category associated with young adulthood among them is typically the one going from 20 to 25 years old. Since 22 years is the median age of this bracket, the *cohort size* value for respondent i in country k equaled the *size of the population aged 20-24 when i was 22 years old*. Figure 1 in this appendix shows changes of these values across cohorts.

Data from 1951 onwards comes from UNWPP age-pyramid data. This information was published on a yearly basis. The UNWPP does not does not provide age population

² Changes in Germany's boundaries with Belgium (1925, 1945) and the Netherlands (1949, 1963) yielded negligible population shifts between these countries. France's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine (1914) and Italy's size fluctuations due to the changing status of South Tyrol (annexed in 1920), Istria (annexed in 1920, lost in 1947) and Trieste (annexed in 1920, lost in 1947, regained in 1954) are comparatively larger. Nevertheless, neither of these changes led to population shifts of more than 5% relative to the total population of these countries.

figures before 1950. Data from previous years was obtained from national census figures

TABLE I
COHORT SIZE VALUES ACROSS COHORTS (1881-1986)



compiled by the EHS.³ Values for inter-censal years and for 1950 were assigned using linear imputation methods.⁴

To construct a *cohort size* data series for West Germany, I used censal age-pyramid data from the German Reich (1880-1942), data of the FGR population pyramid in 1946 published in it the EHS, censal data from the FGR (1950-1990) and all German Statistical Yearbooks (1990 onwards). Data coming from the German Reich was weighted by the German Statistical Bureau's estimations on the share of the German population inhabiting FGR *Länder* during censal years. (Statistisches Bundesamt 1985).⁵ For inter-censal years, FGR *Länder*'s population shares were assigned using linear imputation.

COHORT EDUCATION

A chart on the evolution of cohort *educational attainment* values across birth years is shown in Figure 2. These values were computed using the following formula:

(1)

$$\text{cohort education}_{ik} = \frac{\text{\textit{k}'s number of tertiary ed. students when \textit{i}'s cohort was aged 20}}{\text{\textit{k}'s population aged 20-24 when \textit{i}'s cohort was aged 20}}$$


³ Early census data from the countries under analysis (especially Belgium and Italy) include groups of people without age data. However, the volume of these age “non-responses” was marginal and did not significantly alter estimated figures.

⁴ Censal Dutch data before 1899 contain information only on the number of people aged 20-30. For this case, I calculated an estimate of the number of people aged 20-24 by weighting the share of this bracket's population relative to that of people aged 20-30 in the last year for which direct data on this bracket was available.


⁵ I used linear imputations to compute share estimates for the years where such estimates were absent.

TABLE II
COHORT EDUCATION VALUES ACROSS COHORTS (1881-1986)


A.—Belgium




B.—France




C.—West Germany



D.—Italy



E.—Netherlands



Twenty years old was chosen as reference as it is the median age in the typical higher education age range (18-22). Since no data repository provides direct figures on the number of people within this age bracket, I chose the 20-24 year old population as the bracket in the denominator figure because it was the closest available to 18-22.

Data for populations aged 20-24 were obtained using the same sources and imputation procedures as those used for the construction of *cohort size*. Data on the number of tertiary students came from the CNPS. Values for years with missing data were estimated using linear imputations. West German values previous to 1946 and posterior to 1989 were estimated by weighting CNPS all-German data on tertiary education by the share of FGR *Länder* university students relative to the German total. Figures were obtained from German Statistical Yearbooks after 1989. Previous to 1950, they were computed using individual-university data published in Censual Statistical Yearbooks (Statistisches Reichsamt 1920-1942; Statistisches Bundesamt 1990-2010).

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APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
BELGIUM

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
1.— Cuts									
Cut 1	72	.	1.2721	(.5303)	.0005	(.0069)			
Cut 2	72	.	3.9529	(.5303)	.0000	(.0021)			
2.— Age		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>					81.364		.2481	.1786	.0695
Linear term	72	.	.0376	(.0029)	.0002	(.0002)			
Quad.term	72	.	-.0002	(.0000)	.0050	(.0025)			
3.— Period Controls									
Electoral year	72	(+)	.0469	(.0006)	.0431	(.0026)	-.0114	.0077	.0037
Gdp growth	72	(+)	.0076	(.0004)	.0213	(.0070)	-.0346	.0229	.0117
4.— Coh. education (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(-)	-1.5665	(.0208)	.0001	(.0012)	.2011	-.1490	-.0521
5.— Coh. education (quad.) ³ (+/-)									
<i>Quadratic shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>					0.220		.1761	.1287	.0474
Linear term	24	.	3.1973	(.0451)	.0377	(.0007)			
Quad.term	24	.	-7.2561	(.0566)	.0016	(.0000)			
6.— Cohort size (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(+)	.0003	(.0002)	.7042	(.7072)	-.0201	.0140	.0062
7.— Cohort size (quad.) ³ (+/-)									
<i>Quadratic shape: positive. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>					684.394		.4025	.4888	.8913
Linear term	24	.	-.0170	(.0044)	.0670	(.0675)			
Quad. term	24	.	.0000	(.0000)	.0607	(.0611)	.0000	.0000	.0000
8.— Cohort dummies ³									
1906-1910	36	(+)	.1028	(.0098)	.5598	(.0363)	-.0252	.0173	.0079
1911-1915	36	(+)	.3345	(.0141)	.0865	(.0081)	-.0836	.0633	.0203
1916-1920	36	(+)	.3706	(.0147)	.0765	(.0074)	-.0926	.0702	.0225
1921-1925	36	(+)	.3294	(.0178)	.1954	(.0171)	-.0823	.0624	.0200
1926-1930	36	(+)	.3110	(.0227)	.2951	(.0251)	-.0777	.0589	.0188
1931-1935	36	(+)	.1031	(.0250)	.7484	(.0535)	-.0258	.0195	.0062
1936-1940	36	(+)	.2134	(.0272)	.5206	(.0428)	-.0533	.0404	.0129
1941-1945	36	(+)	.3629	(.0292)	.2892	(.0266)	-.0907	.0687	.0220
1946-1950	36	(+)	.4779	(.0315)	.1729	(.0179)	-.1194	.0905	.0290
1951-1955	36	(+)	.4959	(.0334)	.1605	(.0155)	-.1239	.0939	.0301
1956-1960	36	(+)	.4153	(.0355)	.2538	(.0249)	-.1038	.0786	.0252
1961-1965	36	(+)	.1281	(.0321)	.7297	(.0579)	-.0320	.0243	.0077
1966-1970	36	(+)	.1647	(.0368)	.6575	(.0567)	-.0411	.0312	.0100
1971-1975	36	(+)	.0557	(.0373)	.8818	(.0717)	-.0139	.0106	.0033
1976-1980	36	(-)	-.0569	(.0413)	.8640	(.0548)	.0142	-.0107	-.0035
1981-1985	36	(-)	-.7656	(.0385)	.0568	(.0210)	.1914	-.1449	-.0465
1986-1987	36	(-)	-.2657	(.0388)	.7797	(.0199)	.0664	-.0503	-.0162

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
BELGIUM (CONT.)

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
9.— Education									
Complete h.s.	72	(+)	.5306	(.0009)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1323	.1027	.0296
Inc. College	72	(+)	1.0410	(.0016)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2594	.2015	.0579
College	72	(+)	1.4710	(.0016)	.0000	(.0000)	-.3659	.2866	.0793
Ongoing	72	(+)	1.2738	(.0065)	.0000	(.0000)	-.3099	.2091	.1008
10.—Income									
2 nd lowest	72	(+)	.1369	(.0023)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0333	.0225	.0108
Median	72	(+)	.3926	(.0018)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0969	.0686	.0283
2 nd Highest	72	(+)	.5902	(.0002)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1463	.1054	.0410
Highest	72	(+)	.2933	(.0044)	.0010	(.0002)	-.0729	.0533	.0197
11.—Sociodemographic controls									
Female	72	(-)	-.6531	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	.1589	-.1072	-.0517
Married	72	(+)	.0294	(.0024)	.2326	(.0373)	-.0071	.0048	.0023
Rural	72	(-)	-.1061	(.0004)	.0000	(.0000)	.0258	-.0174	-.0084
12.—Region Controls									
Flanders	72	(-)	-.1395	(.0013)	.0002	(.0000)	.0340	-.0230	-.0110
Wallonia	72	(+)	.0082	(.0006)	.8175	(.0124)	-.0020	.0013	.0007
13.—Events ²									
'18	72	(-)	-.9778	(.1501)	.0000	(.0000)	.2349	-.1528	-.0821
'36	72	(-)	-.4998	(.1057)	.0015	(.0019)	.1198	-.0778	-.0420
'39-'45	72	(+)	.1697	(.0522)	.1934	(.1100)	-.0409	.0269	.0140
'50	72	(-)	-.3655	(.0325)	.0195	(.0120)	.0879	-.0574	-.0305
'55	72	(+)	.1325	(.0660)	.4342	(.2121)	-.0320	.0212	.0108
'60	72	(-)	-.1898	(.0904)	.0847	(.0759)	.0455	-.0294	-.0161
'68	72	(+)	.1572	(.1150)	.2885	(.2448)	-.0381	.0254	.0127
'78	72	(-)	-.3092	(.0127)	.0000	(.0000)	.0744	-.0485	-.0258
'80-'81	72	(+)	.5370	(.0062)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1292	.0843	.0448
'83	72	(-)	-.1920	(.0236)	.0103	(.0068)	.0462	-.0303	-.0159
'92	72	(+)	.2722	(.0255)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0654	.0426	.0228
'95-'96	72	(-)	-.1193	(.0096)	.0600	(.0111)	.0287	-.0188	-.0099

¹ For *gdp per capita* and linear specifications of cohort size and cohort education, predicted probability effects refer to differences in marginal effects of predicted probability between minimum and maximum values.

~~For age and quadratic specifications of cohort size and cohort education, predicted probabilities effects refer to differences in marginal predicted probability differences between the highest and lowest effects, taking into consideration the joint action, of linear and quadric estimated coefficients. Figures shown show variability range in absolute terms. For dummy variables, predicted probability effects refer to marginal effects.~~

² Refer to Figure 2 for indicative names of eventful periods.

³ For cohort dummies and cohort education and size in both their linear and quadratic specifications, cross-regression parameters were obtained from posterior probability weights of the subset of regressions that included them as regressors. .

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
FRANCE

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
1.—Cuts									
Cut 1	72	.	-.1128	(.1704)	.1341	(.0609)			
Cut 2	72	.	2.4761	(.1705)	.0000	(.0025)			
2.—Age		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point: 49.930</i>							.1001	.0487	.0514
Linear term	72	.	.0370	(.0002)	.0000	(.0000)			
Quad. term	72	.	-.0004	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)			
3.—Period Controls									
Electoral year	72	(+)	.0720	(.0002)	.0003	(.0000)	-.0149	.0055	.0094
Gdp growth	72	(+)	.0296	(.0003)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0436	.0157	.0278
4.—Cohort education (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(-)	-2.8735	(.0155)	.0000	(.0000)	.2968	-.1496	-.1472
5.—Coh. education (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point: .0496</i>							.2335	.1316	.1019
Linear term	24	.	.5452	(.1129)	.6710	(.0339)			
Quad. term	24	.	-5.4670	(.1586)	.0075	(.0007)			
6.—Cohort size (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(+)	.0000	(.0001)	.6202	(.6231)	.0015	.0015	.0008
7.—Cohort size (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: positive. Weighted avg. inflection point: 3357.79</i>							.3255	.3255	.5744
Linear term	24		-.0006	(.0003)	.4042	(.4070)			
Quad. term	24		.0000	(.0000)	.3659	(.3685)	.0000	.0000	.0000
8.—Cohort dummies ³									
1906-1910	36	(+)	.3595	(.0128)	.0343	(.0125)	-.0750	.0290	.0460
1911-1915	36	(+)	.4363	(.0358)	.0246	(.0147)	-.1038	.0629	.0408
1916-1920	36	(+)	.5536	(.0536)	.0094	(.0085)	-.1317	.0799	.0518
1921-1925	36	(+)	.4509	(.0576)	.0767	(.0452)	-.1074	.0653	.0421
1926-1930	36	(+)	.3514	(.0704)	.2348	(.1086)	-.0838	.0512	.0326
1931-1935	36	(+)	.2934	(.0777)	.3451	(.1442)	-.0700	.0429	.0271
1936-1940	36	(+)	.3209	(.0873)	.3194	(.1509)	-.0766	.0470	.0296
1941-1945	36	(+)	.3507	(.0930)	.2937	(.1456)	-.0837	.0513	.0324
1946-1950	36	(+)	.4574	(.0878)	.1774	(.0946)	-.1090	.0665	.0425
1951-1955	36	(+)	.5399	(.0579)	.1063	(.0457)	-.1284	.0779	.0505
1956-1960	36	(+)	.6022	(.0593)	.0773	(.0357)	-.1433	.0870	.0563
1961-1965	36	(+)	.5372	(.0726)	.1212	(.0596)	-.1279	.0778	.0501
1966-1970	36	(+)	.4134	(.1101)	.2485	(.1562)	-.0987	.0605	.0382
1971-1975	36	(+)	.4792	(.2224)	.2635	(.3045)	-.1149	.0712	.0437
1976-1980	36	(+)	.2345	(.2824)	.3344	(.0743)	-.0570	.0368	.0202
1981-1985	36	(-)	-.4759	(.3018)	.3391	(.1865)	.1115	-.0648	-.0467
1986-1987	36	(-)	-.9851	(.3114)	.1640	(.0841)	.2324	-.1377	-.0947

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
FRANCE (CONT.)

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
9.—Education									
Complete h.s.	72	(+)	.5575	(.0003)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1319	.0785	.0534
Inc. College	72	(+)	.9313	(.0004)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2228	.1371	.0857
College	72	(+)	1.3612	(.0006)	.0000	(.0000)	-.3253	.1994	.1259
Ongoing	72	(+)	1.4617	(.0043)	.0000	(.0000)	-.3023	.1119	.1904
10.—Income									
2 nd lowest	72	(+)	.2796	(.0005)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0579	.0216	.0363
Median	72	(+)	.5467	(.0006)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1196	.0555	.0641
2 nd Highest	72	(+)	.7768	(.0008)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1762	.0921	.0840
Highest	72	(+)	.7806	(.0011)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1781	.0950	.0832
11.—Sociodemographic controls									
Female	72	(-)	-.4708	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	.0974	-.0361	-.0613
Married	72	(-)	-.0940	(.0012)	.0000	(.0000)	.0195	-.0072	-.0122
Rural	72	(-)	-.1231	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	.0255	-.0094	-.0160
12.—Region Controls									
North	72	(-)	-.2973	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	.0604	-.0205	-.0399
Northwest	72	(-)	-.0792	(.0002)	.0069	(.0002)	.0157	-.0047	-.0110
East	72	(-)	-.1100	(.0001)	.0001	(.0000)	.0219	-.0066	-.0153
West	72	(-)	-.0950	(.0002)	.0346	(.0004)	.0188	-.0055	-.0133
Southwest	72	(-)	-.1302	(.0002)	.0001	(.0000)	.0258	-.0077	-.0181
Southeast	72	(-)	-.0071	(.0002)	.8199	(.0055)	.0014	-.0004	-.0010
13.—Events ²									
'18	72	(-)	-.4472	(.0818)	.0175	(.0442)	.0829	-.0147	-.0681
'34-'36	72	(-)	-.3592	(.0550)	.0081	(.0206)	.0666	-.0119	-.0547
'39-'45	72	(-)	-.0252	(.0359)	.8816	(.0807)	.0046	-.0007	-.0039
'47	72	(+)	.1795	(.0157)	.5264	(.0596)	-.0333	.0061	.0273
'54	72	(-)	-.6695	(.0361)	.0002	(.0011)	.1242	-.0225	-.1018
'58	72	(+)	.4062	(.0883)	.0717	(.0415)	-.0756	.0140	.0616
'61-'62	72	(-)	-.2889	(.0397)	.0472	(.0160)	.0537	-.0099	-.0438
'68	72	(+)	.1270	(.0419)	.1050	(.0467)	-.0237	.0045	.0192
'81	72	(+)	.2695	(.0157)	.0001	(.0000)	-.0501	.0092	.0409
'83	72	(-)	-.5292	(.0179)	.0000	(.0000)	.0983	-.0179	-.0804

¹ For *gdp per capita* and linear specifications of cohort size and cohort education, predicted probability effects refer to differences in marginal effects of predicted probability between minimum and maximum values. For *age* and quadratic specifications of *cohort size* and *cohort education*, predicted probabilities effects refer to differences in marginal predicted probability differences between the highest and lowest effects, taking into consideration the joint action, of linear and quadratic estimated coefficients. Figures shown show variability range in absolute terms. For dummy variables, predicted probability effects refer to marginal effects.

² Refer to Figure 2 for indicative names of eventful periods.

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
WEST GERMANY

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
1.—Cuts									
Cut 1	72	.	-2.0358	(.0298)	.0000	(.0000)			
Cut 2	72	.	1.4171	(.0298)	.0000	(.0000)			
2.—Age		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>							.2731	.2811	.5127
Linear term	72	.	-.0134	(.0001)	.1205	(.0022)			
Quad. term	72	.	-.0001	(.0000)	.1577	(.0028)			
3.—Period Controls									
Electoral year	72	(-)	-.0229	(.0001)	.2937	(.0016)	.0031	-.0003	-.0028
Gdp growth	72	(-)	-.0328	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	.0473	-.0075	-.0398
4.—Cohort education (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(-)	-2.5785	(.0218)	.0000	(.0000)	.1676	-.0584	-.1092
5.—Coh. education (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: positive. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>							.4021	.2436	.1585
Linear term	24	.	-3.3178	(.0795)	.0279	(.0023)			
Quad. term	24	.	1.3119	(.1956)	.6141	(.0418)			
6.—Cohort size (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(+)	.0000	(.0000)	.1173	(.1173)	-.0219	.0023	.0196
7.—Cohort size (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: positive. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>							.0436	.0035	.0459
Linear term	24		.0000	(.0000)	.7869	(.7924)			
Quad. term	24		.0000	(.0000)	.5079	(.5115)	.0000	.0000	.0000
8.—Cohort dummies ³									
1906-1910	36	(-)	-.0556	(.0016)	.8069	(.0055)	.0076	-.0010	-.0066
1911-1915	36	(-)	-.1573	(.0001)	.6127	(.0003)	.0115	.0193	-.0308
1916-1920	36	(-)	-.1314	(.0004)	.7094	(.0009)	.0096	.0161	-.0257
1921-1925	36	(-)	-.5373	(.0010)	.1591	(.0008)	.0393	.0659	-.1053
1926-1930	36	(-)	-.6142	(.0057)	.1186	(.0038)	.0450	.0754	-.1203
1931-1935	36	(-)	-.5585	(.0052)	.1764	(.0044)	.0409	.0685	-.1094
1936-1940	36	(-)	-.6066	(.0077)	.1544	(.0059)	.0444	.0744	-.1188
1941-1945	36	(-)	-.8346	(.0084)	.0536	(.0029)	.0611	.1024	-.1635
1946-1950	36	(-)	-1.0100	(.0095)	.0221	(.0016)	.0739	.1239	-.1979
1951-1955	36	(-)	-1.0123	(.0047)	.0256	(.0008)	.0741	.1242	-.1983
1956-1960	36	(-)	-1.1037	(.0049)	.0162	(.0005)	.0808	.1354	-.2162
1961-1965	36	(-)	-1.2202	(.0086)	.0089	(.0006)	.0893	.1497	-.2390
1966-1970	36	(-)	-1.1595	(.0122)	.0134	(.0013)	.0849	.1423	-.2272
1971-1975	36	(-)	-1.3529	(.0236)	.0041	(.0014)	.0990	.1660	-.2650
1976-1980	36	(-)	-1.4597	(.0374)	.0023	(.0021)	.1068	.1791	-.2860
1981-1985	36	(-)	-2.2044	(.0372)	.0000	(.0000)	.1614	.2705	-.4318
1986-1987	36	(-)	-2.4850	(.0376)	.0001	(.0001)	.1819	.3049	-.4868

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
WEST GERMANY (CONT.)

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
9.— Education									
Complete h.s.	72	(+)	.4332	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0689	.0254	.0435
Inc. College	72	(+)	.8274	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1377	.0594	.0783
College	72	(+)	1.1640	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1909	.0784	.1124
Ongoing	72	(+)	1.1685	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1578	.0157	.1421
10.—Income									
2 nd lowest	72	(+)	.0150	(.0000)	.6999	(.0001)	-.0021	.0003	.0018
Median	72	(+)	.1829	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0266	.0062	.0205
2 nd Highest	72	(+)	.2923	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0424	.0095	.0329
Highest	72	(+)	.3655	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0532	.0122	.0409
11.—Sociodemographic controls									
Female	72	(-)	-.8016	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	.1082	-.0108	-.0975
Married	72	(-)	.1505	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0203	.0020	.0183
Rural	72	(-)	-.0957	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	.0129	-.0013	-.0116
12.—Region Controls									
Northwest	72	(+)	.0669	(.0000)	.0053	(.0000)	-.0091	.0011	.0081
Southwest	72	(+)	.0003	(.0000)	.9887	(.0003)	.0000	.0000	.0000
13.—Events ²									
'18-'20	72	(+)	.3299	(.0053)	.3449	(.0071)	-.0618	.0357	.0261
'23	72	(-)	-.1895	(.0021)	.5995	(.0038)	.0355	-.0205	-.0150
'30	72	(+)	.0697	(.0161)	.7910	(.0076)	-.0131	.0075	.0055
'32-'33	72	(+)	.1665	(.0106)	.4548	(.0251)	-.0312	.0180	.0132
'39-'45	72	(+)	.2699	(.0040)	.0096	(.0009)	-.0506	.0292	.0214
'48	72	(+)	.1586	(.0062)	.1355	(.0095)	-.0297	.0172	.0126
'61-'62	72	(+)	.5193	(.0023)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0973	.0562	.0412
'67-'68	72	(-)	-.3925	(.0039)	.0013	(.0002)	.0736	-.0425	-.0311
'72	72	(+)	.3907	(.0064)	.0006	(.0001)	-.0732	.0423	.0310
'77	72	(-)	-.1878	(.0010)	.0033	(.0002)	.0352	-.0203	-.0149
'81	72	(+)	.7751	(.0018)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1453	.0839	.0614
'83	72	(-)	-.2780	(.0020)	.0006	(.0000)	.0521	-.0301	-.0220
'90	72	(+)	.2311	(.0006)	.0001	(.0000)	-.0433	.0250	.0183
'00	72	(-)	-.1710	(.0004)	.0201	(.0003)	.0321	-.0185	-.0136

¹ For *gdp per capita* and linear specifications of cohort size and cohort education, predicted probability effects refer to differences in marginal effects of predicted probability between minimum and maximum values. For *age* and quadratic specifications of *cohort size* and *cohort education*, predicted probabilities effects refer to differences in marginal predicted probability differences between the highest and lowest effects, taking into consideration the joint action, of linear and quadratic estimated coefficients. Figures shown show variability range in absolute terms. For dummy variables, predicted probability effects refer to marginal effects.

² Refer to Figure 2 for indicative names of eventful periods.

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
ITALY

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	direction	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
1.—Cuts									
Cut 1	72	.	1.9644	(.0127)	.0000	(.0027)			
Cut 2	72	.	4.4832	(.0127)	.0000	(.0007)			
2.—Age		(+/-)							
<i>Quad shape: negative.</i>			<i>Weighted avg. inflection point: 60.7793</i>				.2666	.1415	.1251
Linear term	72	.	.0676	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)			
Quad. term	72	.	-.0006	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)			
3.—Period Controls									
Electoral year	72	(+)	.0624	(.0000)	.0019	(.0000)	-.0127	.0040	.0087
Gdp growth	72	(-)	-.0168	(.0000)	.0057	(.0006)	.0315	-.0097	-.0218
4.—Cohort education (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(-)	.1882	(.0165)	.7811	(.0134)	-.0210	.0061	.0149
5.—Coh. education (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: negative.</i>			<i>Weighted avg. inflection point: .2338</i>				.1670	.0757	.0904
Linear term	24	.	3.1847	(.1099)	.0373	(.0028)			
Quad. term	24	.	-6.8201	(.4916)	.0277	(.0021)			
6.—Cohort size (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(+)	.0001	(.0001)	.5488	(.5512)	-.0187	.0065	.0122
7.—Cohort size (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quad shape: positive.</i>			<i>Weighted avg. inflection point: 3108.79</i>				.1765	.0585	.2275
Linear term	24		-.0002	(.0001)	.8734	(.8795)			
Quad. term	24		.0000	(.0000)	.8471	(.8530)	.0000	.0000	.0000
8.—Cohort dummies ³									
1906-1910	36	(+)	.2621	(.0002)	.2954	(.0004)	-.0536	.0171	.0365
1911-1915	36	(+)	.4755	(.0001)	.1676	(.0001)	-.1188	.0868	.0320
1916-1920	36	(+)	.6611	(.0005)	.0698	(.0002)	-.1652	.1207	.0445
1921-1925	36	(+)	.8231	(.0014)	.0252	(.0003)	-.2057	.1503	.0554
1926-1930	36	(+)	.8709	(.0018)	.0207	(.0004)	-.2177	.1591	.0586
1931-1935	36	(+)	.9725	(.0019)	.0128	(.0003)	-.2431	.1776	.0654
1936-1940	36	(+)	1.0316	(.0020)	.0096	(.0002)	-.2578	.1884	.0694
1941-1945	36	(+)	1.1347	(.0027)	.0050	(.0002)	-.2836	.2072	.0764
1946-1950	36	(+)	1.3117	(.0043)	.0013	(.0002)	-.3279	.2396	.0883
1951-1955	36	(+)	1.4127	(.0047)	.0005	(.0001)	-.3531	.2580	.0951
1956-1960	36	(+)	1.3774	(.0049)	.0008	(.0002)	-.3443	.2516	.0927
1961-1965	36	(+)	1.0611	(.0049)	.0103	(.0010)	-.2652	.1938	.0714
1966-1970	36	(+)	.6347	(.0050)	.1247	(.0052)	-.1586	.1159	.0427
1971-1975	36	(+)	.3320	(.0047)	.4259	(.0087)	-.0830	.0606	.0223
1976-1980	36	(+)	.1929	(.0044)	.6471	(.0093)	-.0482	.0352	.0130
1981-1985	36	(+)	.2445	(.0059)	.5709	(.0118)	-.0611	.0447	.0165
1986-1987	36	(+)	.5526	(.0096)	.3699	(.0099)	-.1381	.1009	.0372

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
ITALY (CONT.)

Variables	Coefficient Estimates						Effects in Predicted Probabilities ¹		
			Est. Coeffs.		P-values				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	talk=1	talk=2	talk=3
9.—Education									
Complete h.s.	72	(+)	.7202	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1664	.0882	.0783
Inc. College	72	(+)	.8924	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2062	.1092	.0970
College	72	(+)	1.2631	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2915	.1536	.1378
Ongoing	72	(+)	1.2235	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2494	.0785	.1710
10.—Income									
2 nd lowest	72	(+)	.2453	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0503	.0162	.0340
Median	72	(+)	.3707	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0807	.0344	.0463
2 nd Highest	72	(+)	.5222	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1156	.0526	.0630
Highest	72	(+)	.5936	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1327	.0627	.0700
11.—Sociodemographic controls									
Female	72	(-)	-.9513	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	.1940	-.0610	-.1329
Married	72	(-)	-.1136	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	.0232	-.0073	-.0159
Rural	72	(-)	.1462	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0298	.0094	.0204
12.—Region Controls									
Northeast	72	(-)	-.0044	(.0000)	.8764	(.0002)	.0009	-.0003	-.0006
Center	72	(-)	.0743	(.0000)	.0069	(.0000)	-.0151	.0046	.0105
South	72	(-)	-.0648	(.0000)	.0546	(.0001)	.0131	-.0040	-.0091
Islands	72	(+)	-.0886	(.0000)	.0008	(.0000)	.0180	-.0055	-.0125
13.—Events ²									
'18-'20	72	(+)	.5437	(.0030)	.3968	(.0021)	-.1057	.0243	.0814
'22	72	(-)	-.1390	(.0014)	.8279	(.0018)	.0270	-.0062	-.0208
'39-'45	72	(+)	.3650	(.0015)	.1231	(.0021)	-.0709	.0163	.0547
'48	72	(-)	-.4534	(.0011)	.0513	(.0007)	.0881	-.0202	-.0679
'68-'70	72	(+)	.1269	(.0021)	.3914	(.0038)	-.0247	.0057	.0190
'76-'78	72	(-)	-.0807	(.0005)	.1766	(.0011)	.0157	-.0036	-.0121
'80	72	(-)	-.5647	(.0004)	.0000	(.0000)	.1097	-.0252	-.0845
'92-'94	72	(+)	.6730	(.0004)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1308	.0300	.1008

¹ For *gdp per capita* and linear specifications of cohort size and cohort education, predicted probability effects refer to differences in marginal effects of predicted probability between minimum and maximum values. For *age* and quadratic specifications of *cohort size* and *cohort education*, predicted probabilities effects refer to differences in marginal predicted probability differences between the highest and lowest effects, taking into consideration the joint action, of linear and quadratic estimated coefficients. Figures shown show variability range in absolute terms. For dummy variables, predicted probability effects refer to marginal effects.

² Refer to Figure 2 for indicative names of eventful periods.

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
NETHERLANDS

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
1.—Cuts									
Cut 1	72	.	.1107	(.0619)	.4609	(.0346)			
Cut 2	72	.	3.1367	(.0619)	.0000	(.0000)			
2.—Age		(+/-)							
<i>Quad shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>					45.8496		.0796	.0260	.0536
Linear term	72	.	.0431	(.0003)	.0000	(.0000)			
Quad. term	72	.	-.0005	(.0000)	.0000	(.0000)			
3.—Period Controls									
Electoral year	72	(+)	.1450	(.0019)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0216	.0003	.0213
Gdp growth	72	(-)	-.0163	(.0005)	.0009	(.0003)	.0223	.0002	-.0225
4.—Cohort education (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(-)	-2.4724	(.0227)	.0000	(.0000)	.2391	-.0967	-.1425
5.—Coh. education (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quadratic shape: negative. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>					.0474		.3547	.2081	.1464
Linear term	24	.	.7023	(.1502)	.2408	(.0918)			
Quad. term	24	.	-7.3401	(.4244)	.0000	(.0000)			
6.—Cohort size (linear) ³									
Linear term	24	(+)	.0001	(.0000)	.6968	(.7012)	-.0055	.0002	.0053
7.—Cohort size (quad.) ³		(+/-)							
<i>Quad shape: positive. Weighted avg. inflection point:</i>					1022.93		.7803	.5938	.1865
Linear term	24	.	.0035	(.0002)	.0047	(.0048)			
Quad. term	24	.	.0000	(.0000)	.0050	(.0050)	.0000	.0000	.0000
8.—Cohort dummies ³									
1906-1910	36	(+)	.1148	(.0062)	.3175	(.0263)	-.0184	.0028	.0156
1911-1915	36	(+)	.1302	(.0094)	.2786	(.0347)	-.0222	.0058	.0164
1916-1920	36	(+)	.2124	(.0094)	.1081	(.0156)	-.0362	.0093	.0269
1921-1925	36	(+)	.0881	(.0107)	.6600	(.0384)	-.0151	.0040	.0111
1926-1930	36	(+)	.1589	(.0339)	.4928	(.0896)	-.0275	.0077	.0198
1931-1935	36	(+)	.2099	(.0318)	.3762	(.0700)	-.0361	.0098	.0263
1936-1940	36	(+)	.2443	(.0385)	.3014	(.0722)	-.0420	.0115	.0305
1941-1945	36	(+)	.2184	(.0586)	.3738	(.1203)	-.0379	.0109	.0270
1946-1950	36	(+)	.1564	(.0800)	.5411	(.1952)	-.0277	.0088	.0188
1951-1955	36	(+)	.1146	(.1796)	.6381	(.3440)	-.0220	.0098	.0122
1956-1960	36	(-)	-.0376	(.2438)	.3586	(.0547)	.0029	.0050	-.0080
1961-1965	36	(+)	.0126	(.2671)	.3561	(.0960)	-.0059	.0078	-.0019
1966-1970	36	(+)	.1619	(.2960)	.4991	(.3332)	-.0317	.0150	.0167
1971-1975	36	(+)	.0166	(.3975)	.1893	(.0410)	-.0084	.0115	-.0031
1976-1980	36	(-)	-.3570	(.4469)	.2393	(.2952)	.0543	-.0031	-.0512
1981-1985	36	(-)	-.8135	(.5416)	.2897	(.3626)	.1305	-.0201	-.1104
1986-1987	36	(-)	-.9862	(.5950)	.3551	(.3459)	.1591	-.0261	-.1330

APPENDIX D
CROSS-REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COHORT CONTROLS
NETHERLANDS (CONT.)

Variables			Est. Coeffs.		P-values		Effects in pred. probs		
			$\bar{\beta}$		\bar{p}^v		\bar{p}^p		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
	reg. nbr	dir.	avg.	std.dev.	avg.	std.dev.	<i>disc</i> =1	<i>disc</i> =2	<i>disc</i> =3
9.— Education									
Complete h.s.	72	(+)	.5537	(.0008)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1070	.0483	.0587
Inc. College	72	(+)	.9623	(.0004)	.0000	(.0000)	-.1887	.0892	.0995
College	72	(+)	1.2147	(.0007)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2334	.1036	.1298
Ongoing	72	(+)	1.3920	(.0007)	.0000	(.0000)	-.2074	.0029	.2045
10.—Income									
2 nd lowest	72	(-)	-.6308	(.0122)	.0000	(.0000)	.0940	-.0014	-.0926
Median	72	(-)	-.2062	(.0162)	.0174	(.0076)	.0306	-.0002	-.0304
2 nd Highest	72	(+)	.2323	(.0161)	.1315	(.0276)	-.0344	.0001	.0343
Highest	72	(+)	.3479	(.0173)	.0586	(.0130)	-.0515	.0002	.0514
11.—Sociodemographic controls									
Female	72	(-)	-.1988	(.0001)	.0000	(.0000)	.0296	-.0004	-.0292
Married	72	(-)	.1000	(.0011)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0149	.0002	.0147
Rural	72	(-)	-.0514	(.0008)	.0067	(.0008)	.0077	-.0001	-.0075
12.—Region Controls									
West	72	(-)	-.0791	(.0002)	.0047	(.0001)	.0115	.0005	-.0119
East	72	(+)	.0513	(.0000)	.0255	(.0001)	-.0074	-.0003	.0077
South	72	(-)	-.1749	(.0002)	.0000	(.0000)	.0253	.0010	-.0264
13.—Events ²									
'33-'34	72	(-)	-.0977	(.0070)	.1868	(.0317)	.0157	-.0026	-.0132
'39-'45	72	(+)	.2928	(.0536)	.0237	(.0193)	-.0472	.0078	.0395
'46-'48	72	(-)	-.1084	(.0604)	.4027	(.2506)	.0176	-.0030	-.0145
'76-'77	72	(+)	.3045	(.0150)	.0000	(.0000)	-.0491	.0079	.0411
'81	72	(+)	.3022	(.0039)	.0001	(.0000)	-.0487	.0078	.0408
'83	72	(-)	-.4394	(.0045)	.0000	(.0000)	.0708	-.0114	-.0594

¹ For *gdp per capita* and linear specifications of cohort size and cohort education, predicted probability effects refer to differences in marginal effects of predicted probability between minimum and maximum values. For *age* and quadratic specifications of *cohort size* and *cohort education*, predicted probabilities effects refer to differences in marginal predicted probability differences between the highest and lowest effects, taking into consideration the joint action, of linear and quadratic estimated coefficients. Figures shown show variability range in absolute terms. For dummy variables, predicted probability effects refer to marginal effects.

² Refer to Figure 2 for indicative names of eventful periods.

APPENDIX D
POSTERIOR PROBABILITY STATISTICS

		Countries				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Countries	n	Belgium	France	West. Germany	Italy	Nether- lands
1.— Descriptive Statistics						
Mean Posterior Prob.	72	.0138	.0138	.0138	.0138	.0138
Standard Deviation	72	.0804	.0996	.1155	.1166	.0833
2.— Regression with largest Posterior Probabiliy						
<i>score:</i>		.5634	.8375	.9808	.9902	.6280
<i>bell width:</i>	—	(11 yrs)	(11 yrs)	(11 yrs)	(11 yrs)	(11 yrs)
<i>cohort education:</i>	—	linear	linear	linear	omitted	quadratic
<i>cohort size:</i>	—	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted	omitted
<i>cohort dummies:</i>	—	omitted	omitted	omitted	included	omitted
Cumulative Posterior Probabilities, by groups of regressions						
3.— Event variables' bell width						
<i>a</i> = .0010 (7 years)	18	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0016
<i>a</i> = .0008 (8 years)	18	.0000	.0002	.0000	.0000	.0309
<i>a</i> = .0006 (9 years)	18	.0000	.0274	.0000	.0000	.3352
<i>a</i> = .0004 (11 years)	18	1.0000	.9724	1.0000	1.0000	.6322
4.— Cohort Education						
Omitted	24	.0376	.0000	.0000	.9951	.0000
Linear	24	.5668	.8665	.9951	.0047	.0001
Quadratic	24	.3955	.1335	.0049	.0002	.9999
5.— Cohort Size						
Omitted	24	.9571	.9949	.9857	.9951	.9940
Linear	24	.0422	.0051	.0143	.0048	.0047
Quadratic	24	.0008	.0000	.0001	.0000	.0013
6.— Cohort Dummies						
Omitted	36	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	.0000	1.0000
Included	36	.0000	.0000	.0000	1.0000	.0000

APPENDIX E.

STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS: CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVES

FR '34-'36

Events from the *Front Populaire* period

Anti-Parliamentary Riots ('34);

Unitary Rally ('35);

Popular Front victory ('36);

Summer Strikes ('36).

Anti-Parliamentary Riots. On January 9, French financier and serial embezzler Alexandre Stavisky dies from a gunshot in Chamonix. Stavisky's death is officially reported as a suicide, but the circumstances surrounding his death and his rapports with prominent figures of the governing center-left Radical party generates a credibility crisis that leads to the resignation of Prime Minister Camille Chautemps on January 27 and a spike in far-right activism against the French parliament. In this context, Radical Édouard Daladier becomes France's new prime minister on January 30th.

Three days later, on February 2, Daladier announces the transfer of Jean Chiappe, the influential chief of the Paris police, to an administrative position in Morocco. Chiappe was a popular figure in right wing circles, especially among conservative veterans organizations. He had become implicated in the Stavisky affair, but his involvement had not been made public. Daladier offered the transfer to minimize the political costs of Chiappe's responsibility and to attract socialist support for his government (Blanchard 2015). While Chiappe refuses the prime minister's offer, Daladier ends up dismissing him. His decision sparks parliamentary and extra-parliamentary crises. Between February 5 and 7, three ministers resign in protest against Chiappe's removal (*Ibid*), all while the extreme-right press, popular among veterans organizations, warns against a "Jacobin coup d'État" in the making.

On February 6, 1934, a large mass of extreme-right supporters stage a demonstration in front of the National Assembly against perceived parliamentary corruption and in support of Chiappe. The rally soon degenerates into riots and clashes with police that kill 15 people. Daladier resigns as prime minister the next day, eight days after his inauguration. (Berstein 1976; Jenkins 2006) On February 9, disregarding parliament's left tilt, center-right President Albert Lebrun calls for the formation of a government of "national union" (*union nationale*) under the leadership of conservative Gaston Doumergue. Labor unions and the Communist and Socialist parties react to what they perceive as an antidemocratic right-wing power grab by organizing protests that peak on February 12. Clashes between police and left-wing demonstrators kill 15 people that day (Prost 1966).

Unitary Rally. In the Summer of 1935, in the wake of a political stand off that culminated in the inauguration of the right-wing government of Pierre Laval (Dubief 1989), a group of left-wing public figures summons unions, political parties, and community organizations concerned about the possibility of a democratic breakdown in France organize to stage a "republican" and antifascist left-wing "unitary" demonstration on Bastille Day (Racine-

Furlaud 1977). The July 14 demonstration, known as the Unitary Rally (*marche unitaire*), takes 500,000 people to the streets in Paris alone (Tartakowsky 1986). The demonstration's success paves the way for the build-up of a united Left ticket for the 1936 general election.

Popular Front Victory, Strikes and Matignon Agreements. On January 10, 1936, a common program for a left-wing Popular Front for the coming general elections is established between the Radical, Socialist and Communist Parties. Shortly after, the communist and socialist trade unions merge on March 2. Earlier, right-wing extremist organizations had staged a murder attempt against socialist leader Léon Blum, on February 13.

The Popular Front obtains an absolute majority in Parliament in the April 24 and May 3 general elections. The results of the election shift the center of gravity of the French Left away from Radicals and towards the Communist and Socialist parties, the latter of which becomes for the first time the parliamentary group with most seats (Dubief 1989). On June 6, Blum becomes France's first socialist prime minister. The victory of the Popular Front also marks the start of a massive wave of strikes (Prost 2002; Tilly and Shorter 1974). Responding to these events, on June 7, employers and workers' unions sign the Matignon Agreements under the auspices of Prime Minister Blum. The agreements introduce sweeping wage increases as well as improvements in working conditions, workers' representation, and collective bargaining. These agreements were the prelude to major legislations enacted by the new left majority that Summer, which would also include the forty-hour work week, the introduction of collective bargaining, paid leave, and the *de jure* guarantees for workers negotiated earlier between employers and workers' unions.

BE '36

Rexist Party breakthrough; Summer strikes.

On May 24, anticipated elections called by Catholic Party Prime Minister Paul Van Zeeland decimate the vote share of the traditional Catholic, Socialist and Liberal parties in favor of the Communist party and Flemish and Walloon right-wing extremist formations. The francophone Rexist party becomes the strongest of the latter two. It receives 11.49% of the votes cast (Gérard-Libois 1989). The election also makes the Socialist Party the plurality winner for the first time, triggering a government formation crisis solved only after Van Zeeland manages to build a Socialist-Christian Democratic grand coalition on June 13. At that moment, Belgium witnesses the peak of a massive strike wave that had begun to form a few days after the general elections (Bondas and Rens 1936). Against this backdrop, Van Zeeland organizes the National Labor Conference (CNL), a table of negotiation between employers and workers that leads to improvements in working conditions similar to those given by the Matignon Agreements in France (*cf.* FR '34-'36). On June 24, the last ongoing strike in the country ends.

Meanwhile, the concessions given to trade unions start to make far-right challenges to the status-quo more vocal. On October 25, Rexists call for the organization of a "March on Brussels". The demonstration, modeled after Mussolini's March on Rome in Italy, is made illegal by the government. By the end of the year, momentum for the Rexist party grows again after it builds a parliamentary alliance with the conservative wing of the Flemish Catholic party. Taking advantage of this environment, Rexist leader Léon Degrelle enters a special election to become PM of a Brussels on April 11 Seeking to defy the growing

political strength of Rexists, Prime Minister Van Zeeland himself enters the election as the common candidate for the Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal parties. After a series of missteps by Degrelle, Van Zeeland routs him by obtaining 276,000 votes, roughly four times more than Degrelle's (Gérard-Libois 1989).

IT '48

First Postwar General Election;
Togliatti Murder Attempt and Fall Strikes.

On February 15, concerns regarding a possible communist victory in the coming March general elections grow after local elections in the city of Pescara see left-wing parties, led by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) obtain 79% of the votes cast (Novelli 2008, 48). These concerns add up to a tense and uncertain political environment characterized by violent repressions against social protests, the ousting of the Communist Party from Italy's post-occupation governing body in 1947, volatile electoral results, and a recent rapprochement between socialists and communists. Reacting to a realistic prospect of a communist victory, the Christian Democrats and the Church, with the active assistance of the US, launch a massive anti-communist propaganda offensive (del Pero 2001; Martinez and Suchman 1950; Mistry 2006). In the April 18 general elections, the Christian Democrats obtain a resounding 48.5% of the vote. They attain an absolute majority in the lower and upper chambers (Ventresca 2004).

On July 14, Palmiro Togliatti, the chairman of the Italian Communist Party (PCI), becomes the target of a murder attempt. The incident prompts a massive strike wave that leaves large parts of the country with no access to railroad or telephone services. It also triggers multiple episodes of street violence that leave 14 people dead. The protests and clashes cease on July 16, after Togliatti's explicit request, and after Communist representatives withdraw their calls for the resignation of Christian Democratic Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi (DC) (Behan 1996).

BE '50

Léopold II restoration crisis;
Murder of Julien Lahaut.

On July 20, using its recently acquired absolute majority, and despite the opposition of all other major parties, the Christian Social Party (PSC-CVP) repeals the regency law that had King Léopold III barred from returning to Belgium. During the Second World War, Léopold had declined to denounce the German occupation of the country and had gone into exile in Switzerland in 1944. The decision to allow the King's return followed the result of a referendum on the matter on March 12. Its results had seen Flanders massively support the king's return and Walloon voters strongly reject it. Léopold returns to the country on July 22 (CRISP 1974; Gérard-Libois and Gotovitch 1983)

The king's return quickly sparks strikes and protests of particular intensity and violence in Wallonia. On July 27, strikes hit two thirds of the coal mines in the region. The following day, first-line Walloon politicians announce the formation of a Walloon "General Estates"

assembly amid the emergence of public discussions regarding the convenience of secession (Dolhet 2001). On July 30, three former WWII Resistance fighters are killed by police forces while they were protesting against the return of the king in the outskirts of Liège. Nearly 40,000 people, some carrying Walloon flags, attend their funerals. Against this backdrop, Léopold III reluctantly abdicates in favor of his son Baudouin on August 1, pressed by formal calls to step down by Prime Minister Jean Duvieusart and all but two Cabinet members. On August 11, Baudouin is sworn-in as King. His first act is to accept the resignation of the Duvieusart government that same day. Léopold's abdication generates important strains within the PSC-CVP. They become apparent in the government reshuffle after the installation of Joseph Pholien as Prime Minister (Gérard Libois 1987; Dejardin 2005).

On August 18, seven days after Baudouin's rise to the throne, an unknown person shoots Julien Lahaut, chairman of the Belgian Communist Party and an outspoken republican. His death triggers a wave of strikes and a public funeral attended by at least one hundred thousand people (Gerard 2016).

FR '54

Indochina Withdrawal Crisis; European Defense Community Dissensus.

Dien Bien Phu defeat;

European Defense Community Question;

Genève Agreements' Government crisis.

On May 7, in the wake of negotiation talks between France and Vietnamese independentists in Geneva, the French Army surrenders the valley of Dien Bien Phu to the Viet Minh. The valley had been taken by the French military and its Vietnamese allies in November 1953 through a large-scale military campaign that included the largest airborne operation conducted since WWII. The military operation had been executed against the backdrop of a spike in the saliency of defense issues in France. Public opinion was war-weary (Randle 1969, 6; Ruscio 1991, 40), and intense political disagreements existed regarding the ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC), a proposal for the establishment of a supra-national West European force that would entail, among other things, the rearmament of Germany and reduce the autonomy of the French military (Randle 1969, 15). Dissent over the EDC had become a threatening issue for the stability of French politics after former Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle had called in early April for a demonstration against the EDC on May 9 (Turpin 2001, 917). De Gaulle had been out of the political spotlight since 1946 despite being the most influential political figure of postwar France. De Gaulle was highly critical of the French political system's capability to navigate the crises the country was facing, and had called for the march as a vehicle to press for his arrival to power (*Ibid*).

While France had intended to occupy Dien Bien Phu to increase its bargaining power in the peace talks with the Viet Minh, the May 9 surrender of the valley leaves it in a much weaker negotiating position. The Dien Bien Phu campaign resulted in nearly 9,000 French casualties and the taking of around 7,000 war prisoners by the Viet Minh (Fall 2002). The defeat is a blow to right-wing Prime Minister Joseph Laniel, whose tenure was widely expected to end soon after the fall of Dien Bien Phu in (Randle 1969, 172). Laniel's survival as PM is also

menaced by the looming May 9 Gaullist protest against the EDC, which takes place two days after the French capitulation in Dien Bien Phu. The gathering, however, results in a fiasco. Due to its poor attendance, De Gaulle leaves the demonstration's site fifteen minutes after showing up (Turpin 2001, 918).

Despite de Gaulle's failure to produce major protests, Dien Bien Phu and the EDC question become important destabilizers of the coalition government of right-wing Prime Minister Joseph Laniel, one of the characteristically weak governments produced by the Fourth Republic. He had been appointed to the position on June 27, 1953 by President René Coty, after the first two appointees failed to form a government. Over the course of the Geneva Talks, Prime Minister Laniel gradually loses parliamentary support. He survives three votes of no-confidence on May 6 and 14 and June 9, but a fourth brings him down, on June 12. The next day, center-left Radical President René Coty nominates Pierre Mendès-France, also from the Radical Party, as prime minister. In his inauguration, he sets for himself a thirty-day deadline to put an end to France's involvement in Indochina. The final agreement between the Viet Minh and France is signed on the eve of July 21, a few hours past Mendès-France promised deadline. It plans the gradual retreat of French troops from the region, recognizes the independence of Laos and Cambodia, upholds the *de facto* partition of Vietnam between North and South, , and calls for the organization of national elections in Vietnam by 1956. On August 29, Mendès-France introduces—without endorsing it— a motion to ratify the EDC in the National Assembly. The motion will be finally rejected with a procedural vote on August 30, 1955, after two years of legislative limbo.

FR '61-'62

Algerian Withdrawal Crises

Referendum on Algerian Independence, OAS Terrorism (First Wave) ('61);
Second Algiers Putsch ('61);
Repression of Algerian- and Left-Wing Protests ('61);
Évian Agreements, OAS Terrorism (Second Wave), Murder Attempt against Charles de Gaulle ('62); Bab-el-Oued and Oran Massacres ('62).

On November 4, President Charles de Gaulle announces the organization of a referendum on Algerian self-determination. The date of the referendum is set for January 8, 1961. De Gaulle's announcement reverses his commitment to keep Algeria a part of France, which had been pivotal for his return to public life and the establishment of the Fifth Republic. His reversal responds to rising political violence within French society and the long duration of France's anti-guerrilla operations in Algeria, which had begun to strain the relationship between civil and military authorities. The referendum had 74.99% of the population supporting the right to self-determination for Algeria (Royer 1961). In reaction to the result of the referendum, the recently formed OAS (*Organisation de l'Armée Secrète*, Secret Army Organization) stages its first major terrorist attack by assassinating Pierre Popie, the leader of the Christian Democrat People's Republican Movement (*Mouvement républicain populaire*, MRP; Ruscio 2015; Rémi 2002).

The January referendum on self-determination and de Gaulle's abandonment of the "French Algeria" leads to the staging of a coup d'état in Algiers on April 21 (Abramovici

2011). That day, four generals garrisoned in Algeria's capital take control of the city and call for the deposition of President de Gaulle. A number of detentions of high-profile military officers in Paris swiftly neutralizes the rebellion's ability to gather support in metropolitan France. On April 23, de Gaulle gives a speech on national television that calls for soldiers and civilians in both France and Algeria to reject the coup. In the same speech, he decrees a state of emergency. Using his constitutional faculties, he grants himself exceptional executive powers until September 29, a date which will be later extended to July 15, 1962. At the government's request, Gaullist sympathizers stage massive demonstrations in support of the government in Paris on Sunday, April 23. The next day unions announce the organization of a one-hour general strike against the coup. On April 26, remaining rebel troops surrender to authorities.

Despite the coup's failure, the OAS keeps launching terrorist attacks throughout the Summer. On June 18, an attack against a train track in metropolitan France kills 24 people and leaves 123 people wounded.

On October 5, the Paris Police Department imposes a curfew on "French Muslims of Algeria". The announcement derives from de Gaulle's powers of exception and responds to violent confrontations between Algerian political organizations clashing in France (Haroun 2005; André 2014). The National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria's leading independentist organization, calls for a demonstration against the curfew on October 17. It is attended by 30,000 people and violently repressed. Police raids yield 11,000 detentions and at least 40 deaths—a number that did not go public until 1998 (Brunet 1999; Einaudi 1991; House and MacMaster 2006).

On January 1962, the OAS launches a new series of terrorist attacks. They include the machine-gunning of the Communist Party headquarters in Paris and the delivery of mail packages charged with explosives to the homes of public figures that had supported Algeria's self-determination right (Ruscio 2015; Rémi 2002). In this context, the Communist Party and the socialist and christian union federations call for a demonstration against OAS terrorism on February 7. Despite not being approved by the authorities, the demonstration nonetheless takes place and is violently repressed, leaving 8 dead. On February 13th, at least one hundred thousand people participate in demonstrations related to the funerals of the victims (Dewerpe 2006; Brunet 2003).

On March 18, following four weeks of secret negotiations, French authorities and the FLN sign the Évian agreements. They stipulate an immediate cease-fire between France and the FLN, an amnesty process, and a referendum on Algeria's right to self-determination (Aeron 1992). The OAS reacts to the agreements by launching another set of terrorist attacks and by declaring France an "occupation force" in Algeria. On March 21, OAS sympathizers occupy the quarter of Bab-el-Oued in Algiers (Thénault 2008). They also call European Algerians to stage a demonstration on March 26 to demand the end of the French Army's siege of the neighborhood. The protest ends up in a shootout that kills between 46 and 80 people (Haberbusch 2012). Meanwhile, the cease-fire negotiated in the Evian agreement provokes a security void for Algerian supporters of France that soon morphs into a surge of violence across the Country. Between March and November it is estimated that between ten and twenty-five thousand Muslim auxiliaries of the French Army were murdered.

On April 8, a referendum ratifies the Évian agreements in France (Goguel 1963). On the first of July, the final referendum on self-determination in Algeria takes place. 99.72% of voters support Algeria's secession from France. De Gaulle recognizes Algeria's independence two days later. Independence is officially proclaimed on July 5. The same day, Algeria's independence celebrations in Oran degenerate into attacks on remaining European Algerians, leaving between 95 and 453 people dead. The "Oran massacre" accelerates the evacuation of French Algerians from the country (Israël 1972; Pervillé 2014).

On August 22, an OAS commando stages a failed murder attempt against Charles de Gaulle in Clamart, near Paris. The perpetrator, Jean Bastien-Thiry, an Army lieutenant, is detained on September 15. He will be executed by a firing squad on March 11, 1963 (Jeanneney 2018).

GE '61-'62

Partition of Berlin ('61);

Spiegel Affair ('62).

Berlin Partition. On August 13 Walter Ulbricht, head of the German Democratic Republic, signs an order to seal the border between West and East Berlin. The announcement takes both West and East German observers by surprise, and comes one day after the start of the 1961 general election campaign in West Germany. The Berlin border was then the only remaining open border between West and East Germany. On August 15, a wall begins to be constructed in front of the Brandenburg Gate, one of Berlin's historical landmarks. Despite massive demonstrations against Berlin's partition and nominal acts of protest by Allied forces, the erection of the wall goes largely undisturbed. Christian Democratic Konrad Adenauer (CDU/CSU), West Germany's chancellor, makes his first visit to Berlin only 9 days after the start of the crisis (Kastner 2002).

The 1961 West German general elections take place on September 11. They see a strong decline of votes for Adenauer's christian-democratic coalition (CDU/CSU). Christian democrats fail to gain an absolute majority in parliament, forcing the formation of a coalition government with the Liberal Party (FDP). Commentators attribute Adenauer's losses to his apparent indifference to the Berlin crisis.

On October 22, 1961, the US military sends 4 tanks to the borderline between East and West Berlin in response to East German authorities' denying free access to East Berlin to officers dressed as civilian without showing identification (Garthoff 1991, 143). By October 25, similar incidents at the border, pushed by US authorities, multiply, and more US tanks are sent. That day, the British army also deploys tanks to the Tiergarten park. Two days later, Soviet tanks are also sent to the same area where America tanks are stationed in the West-East Berlin Border. The situation creates a stand-off between American and Soviet armored units that lasts for 16 hours. The situation de-escalates thanks to a backchannel between Kennedy and Krushchev that leads to the Allies' *de facto* recognition of the division of the city of Berlin (*Ibid*).

Der Spiegel Affair. On October 8, 1962, journalist Conrad Ahlers publishes in the *Der Spiegel* newsweekly a report on the state of the German Army. The article reveals documentation

signaling the unpreparedness of the German military for a potential armed conflict with the Eastern block, contradicting public declarations on the matter by Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss, a member of the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) (Der Spiegel 1982). In reaction to the story, arrest warrants for treason are issued against *Der Spiegel* journalists on October 23. Three days later, on October 26, police raids the magazine's headquarters in Hamburg and suspends the release of its upcoming issue (Bunn 1966, 54). In the afternoon, Ahlers is illegally apprehended while vacationing in Spain. On October 27, the chief editor of *Der Spiegel*, Rudolf Augstein, hands himself to the police. He will remain in prison for 103 days.

The reaction of the authorities to *Der Spiegel's* exposé soon becomes a hotly debated issue in the national media. It also sparks a profusion of acts in support of the magazine. Demonstrations are staged in Hannover, Berlin, and Hamburg. In the beginning of November, Paul Nevermann, the minister-president and mayor of Hamburg, demands Chancellor Adenauer a formal explanation for the police raid into *Der Spiegel's* offices. He also threatens to revise the permission given to federal officers to operate in Hamburg (Gimbel 1965, 284). By that time, official accounts of who ordered the police raid and the judicial actions taken against the *Der Spiegel* journalists start contradicting one another (*Ibid*).

On November 7, Adenauer gives a public statement about the affair in Parliament. In his speech, he accuses Augstein and *Der Spiegel* of treason (*Landesverrat*), a heavily loaded term in Germany given its frequent use by Nazis to punish disclosure of information about the regime. On November 8, after denying for a month any involvement in Ahlers' detention in Spain, the Defense Ministry admits its participation in the decision to storm *Der Spiegel's* offices. One day later, Franz Joseph Strauss admits his own personal involvement in the arrests that had followed suit. At this time the *Spiegel* affair degenerates into a government crisis when it becomes known that the Justice Ministry, which was led by Liberal Wolfgang Stammberger, had been overlooked in the government's decision to storm *Der Spiegel* headquarters. On November 19, all liberal ministers resign in protest, stripping Adenauer from parliamentary support. He continues as a caretaker Chancellor until December 14, when he forms a new government without Strauss in the cabinet. The new government secures the support of the Liberal Party in exchange for Adenauer's promise to resign as chancellor in 1963. On November 25, after a month of occupation, police leaves the headquarters of *Der Spiegel* in Hamburg.

GE '67-'68

Extra Parliamentary Opposition (APO) Protests

Summer 1967 student protest wave ('67);

Spring 1968 student protest wave and murder attempt against Rudi Dutschke ('68);

On June 2, 1967, Benno Ohnesorg, a student protester dies after police and demonstrators clash in Berlin during a protest against Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi's visit to West Germany (Provenzano 2020, 16). His death spreads student protests to the rest of the country, where

silent marches are staged across university towns soon after June 2. It is calculated that more than 100,000 people take place in these demonstrations (Thomas 2003, 114).

On February 1, 1968, the Technical University of Berlin hosts the International Vietnam Congress, a meeting organized against the Vietnam war. The Congress plans a rally that fails to be authorized by the government but takes place regardless on February 17. Between 15 and 20 thousand people take part in it. On February 21, a counter-demonstration meant to assert Berlin's "standing for peace and freedom", is organized by the Christian Democratic and the Socialist parties (CDU and SPD) as well as by the German Trade Union Confederation (DGB). One hundred and fifty thousand people participate in the demonstration (*Ibid*, 159-161).

On April 2, Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader, two radical left supporters, set two department stores on fire in Frankfurt in protest against the Vietnam War. One week later, on April 11, Rudi Dutschke is shot in the head by a Nazi sympathizer while buying medicines for his daughter. Dutschke was the most prominent figure of the "extra-parliamentary opposition" (APO) leadership since student protests began expanding in 1967 and made national headlines. The incident generates numerous demonstrations and violent incidents across the country. Barricades are erected and offices stormed in Essen, Esslingen, Frankfurt, Cologne and Munich (*Ibid*, 171-173). On April 13, in a televised speech, Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (CDU) denounces these acts of violence as riots staged by "militant left-wing extremist powers" seeking to destroy the "parliamentary democratic order". Against the backdrop of Rudi Dutschke's murder attempt, on April 15, nearly 300,000 people take part in the Easter March, a major pacifist demonstration in West Germany. Other mass demonstrations take place in May Day (40,000 in West Berlin) and in the antinuclear *Sternmarsch* in Bonn (110,000; Scott Brown 2013).

On May 11, between 60 and 80 thousand people protest against the so-called "Emergency Laws", four days after the beginning of their discussion in Parliament (Thomas 2003, 194). The laws would introduce a figure of "state of emergency" that would allow the use of force to suppress acts of insurrection or internal unrest. On May 15, the second reading of the law in Parliament produces a new round of demonstrations in 31 cities. During the last round of discussion of the law, 2,000 students block the city center of Munich. The law finally passes on May 30.

GE '72

Ostpolitik Government Crises;
RAF Terrorist Campaign.

Ostpolitik Crises. On February 9, West Germany's upper house (*Bundesrat*) votes against the ratification of the 1970 Moscow and Warsaw treaties. These agreements were the backbone of socialist chancellor Willy Brandt's "*Ostpolitik*" strategy, which sought to normalize relationships between West Germany and the Eastern Bloc. The *Bundesrat*'s rejection of the treaties demands an absolute majority support in the Lower Chamber (*Bundestag*) for their passing (Morgan 1972). Given Brandt's thin 4-member legislative majority in this chamber,

the result of the Bundesrat voting begins to put into question the political viability of the treaties.

Brandt's razor-thin legislative majority in the lower chamber (Bundestag) becomes chipped away between February and April (*Ibid*). Several MPs from the governing socialist-liberal coalition defect to the CDU-CSU opposition block. Rumors attribute those defections to promises made by CDU chairman, Rainer Barzel, to defectors, to participate in his future Cabinet, should Brandt be forced to resign. On April 23, Brandt eventually loses his remaining one-seat majority after the defection of MP Wilhelm Helms from the FDP to the CDU (Grau 2019, 1). After this switch and an unexpectedly strong victory of the CDU in the regional elections of Baden-Württemberg, Barzel introduces a vote of no confidence against the Brandt government, on April 27 (Laux 1973, 509). It surprisingly fails to pass by 2 votes. This time, strong suspicions of vote buying by the SPD and even by East German envoys begin to arise. In another showing of how closely divided politics have become in West Germany one day after the failed vote of no confidence, the German budget fails to pass due to a tied vote (247-247; Morgan 1972, 351).

Attempts to oust Brandt spark large demonstrations supporting him and his *Ostpolitik* throughout May. That month, in order to assuage the fears of the opposition and to guarantee the passage of the main ratification law of both the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, Brandt accepts a vote on a consensual "additional resolution" meant to accommodate CDU's demands. On May 17, the treaties are officially ratified by the Bundestag with the abstention of the CDU/CSU on the main resolution. The Bundesrat follows with ratification two days later. The treaties come into effect on June 3 (Laux 1973, 510).

On July 7, Karl Schiller, the powerful and popular head of the Ministry of Economy and Finance, resigns in opposition to the Brandt government's exchange rate policy. His departure adds to the wobbliness of Brandt's government and to growing speculation over looming snap elections. These are finally called on September 22. That day, Brandt strategically proposes a vote of confidence, which he expectedly loses. The defeat leads to the dissolution of Parliament, the first time in the post-war era (Binder 1972).

Brandt's *Ostpolitik* pursuit nonetheless continues. On September 25, he holds a press conference announcing the start of conversations for the signature of a "Basic Treaty" that would normalize the relations between East and West Germany. The agreement is presented by both governments on November 8.

The snap elections of November 19 act in large part as a referendum on the Basic Treaty and Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. In the election, the SPD receives 45.8% of the votes cast, an increase of 3.1 points relative to the last general election. (Laux 1973). These numbers represent a watershed in SPD electoral history. It is the party's historical maximum and makes it the plurality winner of a general election for the first time since the Weimar Republic. After the election, Brandt is able to resume his governing alliance with the FDP.

RAF crisis. Between May 11 and 24, 1972, the *Rote Armée Fraktion* (RAF), a leftist terrorist organization, conducts a series of bombing attacks against justice administration buildings, the headquarters of printed media and US army facilities in Frankfurt, Augsburg, Karlsruhe,

Hamburg and Heidelberg. The bombings cause 4 deaths, 70 injured people and massive evacuations. This “May Offensive” follows a series of bank robberies, bomb explosions and the violent liberation from prison of RAF leader Andreas Baader (Aust 2008). RAF bombings soon prompt a bomb scare wave throughout Germany (Rosenfeld 2014).

The RAF leadership, which had dispersed across Germany, is arrested soon after the “May Offensive”. The most salient of these detentions is Andreas Baader and Jan-Carl Raspe’s, who are arrested in a major police operation that is broadcast live on German TV. Against this backdrop, headlines from the right-wing Springer press outlets start disseminating news of an impending left-wing uprising in the country.

In response to the “May Offensive”—the first major wave of terrorism experienced in West Germany—the German parliament passes, on June 26, several constitutional laws that strengthen the capacity of the state to deal with suspects of criminal cases. Around the same time, Interior Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announces an increase of more than 10% in the number of police forces in West Germany, from 140 to 155 thousand.

NE ‘76

Lockheed Scandal (’76);

Drenthe Hostage Crises (’77);

Government Formation Crisis (’77).

Lockheed Scandal. On February 6, 1976, Lockheed corporation Chairman Carl Kotchian admits, during a senate hearing in the United States, having given bribes to Dutch government officials to secure the purchase of military aircrafts. During his intervention, Kotchian does not deny the rumored involvement of Prince Bernhard, Queen Juliana’s husband, in the kickback scheme (van Merriënboer, and van Griensven 2007, 166). As a reaction to Kotchian’s declaration, on February 10, socialist Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl announces an investigation into Bernhard’s involvement in the Lockheed affair. He nevertheless avoids announcing a criminal investigation into the case. Stories about Bernhard’s alleged participation in other illegal and criminal cases circulate in the Dutch press throughout the first semester of 1976 (*Ibid*, 169).

On August 12, PM Den Uyl receives the final report into Bernhard’s participation in the Lockheed affair. While the document falls short of accusing Bernhard of bribe-taking, it offers supportive evidence of Bernhard’s ties to an irregular one-million dollar transfer directed at him in connection to the purchase of Orion aircrafts for the Dutch Air Force. It also identifies two other irregular commissions handed to Bernhard in 1960 and 1968 (Kroeze 2017, 283). Between August 16 and 23, numerous cabinet meetings and secret talks between Den Uyl and Queen Juliana take place to delineate the government’s reaction to the report. During one of them, on August 17, Den Uyl informs the queen that his government is considering pressing criminal charges against Bernhard. At the same meeting, Juliana demands that the report be withheld from public release. Juliana’s reaction and her continuous defense of Bernhard generate intense speculations about an abdication, with growing concerns of a constitutional crisis.

On August 22, Justice Minister Dries Van Agt (CDA – Christian Democrats) sends a letter to Parliament that informs of the government's decision to open a criminal case against Bernhard. This decision is later defended by Prime Minister Den Uyl himself, in Parliament, on August 26. Four days later, the decision is supported in parliament vote by all parties except the small left-wing Pacifist Socialist Party (*Pacifistisch Socialistische Partij*, PSP). In early September, Bernhard will be symbolically punished by being discharged from military duties and banned from wearing the military uniform (*Ibid*, 284-286).

Drenthe Hostage Incident and Government Formation Crises. In the morning of May 23, 1977, South Moluccan terrorists hijack a train in the province of Drenthe and take 54 people hostage. Nearby, in the town of Bovesmilde, another terrorist command storms a primary school and holds 105 children and 5 adults as additional hostages. The incidents escalate the terrorist activities that several Moluccan independentist organizations had conducted in the Netherlands since 1970 to press the Dutch government to support the independence of the South Moluccan Islands from Indonesia. Although the formation of an Independent South Moluccan Republic had been promised by the Dutch during the Indonesian independence process, it had failed to be materialized (Bootsma 2015).

In the afternoon of May 23, the kidnappers demand the severance of diplomatic ties between the Netherlands and Indonesia, and the liberation of 21 jailed South Moluccan independentists and their safe evacuation from the Netherlands. The hijackers threaten to execute hostages if these demands are not met by May 25, the date when general elections were scheduled. The elections were taking place after the fall of Joop Den Uyl's grand coalition, due to disagreements between left-wing governing parties and Christian Democrats over land tenure reform and the compensation of expropriations by municipalities. Mutual trust between these parties had been slowly eroding. The irruption of the hostage crises into the campaign generates concerns about an electoral breakthrough of the far-right Dutch People's Union (NVU), which had been unexpectedly close to attaining representation in the City Council of the Hague after the 1975 municipal elections (Andere Tijden 2002).

On May 25, the government rejects the hijackers' demands. Nonetheless, the kidnappers choose not to execute their threats. That day, the general elections proceed normally. The turnout rate is historic (88%). Results favor large parties over small ones. The far-right NVU fails to attain parliamentary representation. The winner of the election is the ruling Labor Party (PvDA), which wins 53 parliament seats and increase their parliamentary representation by a fifth. The newly formed Christian Democratic Appeal receives only one extra seat relative to the aggregate number of parliamentarians of the three formerly independent Christian democratic parties.

Meanwhile, the Moluccan terrorists hesitate on how to respond to the government's refusal to negotiate. On May 27, they release the children from Bovesmilde school. They keep control of the school premises and the train until June 11, when the government decides to storm the latter. Six terrorists and two hostages are killed in the action. At the school, the hijackers surrender to the authorities on the same day.

In the aftermath of the hijacks, political attention turns to government formation. The significant progress of the incumbent Labor Party gives socialist PM Joop den Uyl a strong

mandate to form a government. On June 1, for the first time since 1959, he is directly tasked by the queen to form a government without the intermediation of an *informateur* acting as a formal negotiating figure.

The PvdA's intention is to repeat a coalition with the CDA and D66, a small left wing party. Bolstered by the election results, this time it demands a majority of cabinet positions. It also claims the post of Justice Minister, which had been previously held by CDA leader Dries Van Agt. The CDA rejects this offer. Instead, it demands a coalition without the D66, and parity between the PvdA and CDA in cabinet positions. Negotiations stall between July and September. On October 20, the negotiating teams of PvdA and CDA finally agree on a cabinet composed of 7 PvdA, 7 CDA and one D66 ministers. The agreement also lets CDA keep the Justice ministry. However, on November 5, the agreement is eventually rejected by the PvdA's executive committee, whose left-wing opposed the deal (Van Merriënboer, Johan, Peter Bootsma and Peter van Griensven. 2007).

On November 8, CDA member Willem Van der Grinten is appointed *informateur*. He sets up communications between Christian Democrats and Liberals (VVD) to generate a viable alternative coalition. The first meeting towards this goal occurs on Nov 15. On December 19, against all predictions, Dries Van Agt (CDA) becomes prime minister in a CDA-VVD coalition. The seven-month time lapse between the elections and Van Agt's appointment sets up a government formation record in postwar Europe.

GE '77

RAF Terrorist Attacks – Red Autumn Period.

On April 7, West Germany's Attorney General Siegfried Buback and two more people are murdered in Karlsruhe. Buback had been responsible in the early seventies for dismantling the RAF terrorist group (*cf.* GE'72) and the imprisonment of their leaders (Der Spiegel 1977b). The murder occurs on the eve of the verdicts of the "Stammheim trial", the highly publicized trial against RAF leaders Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof, Andreas Baader, and Jan-Carl Raspe. On April 28, they are given life sentences.

Throughout the Summer, Ensslin, Meinhof, Baader, and Raspe engage in widely mediatized hunger strikes protesting their prison conditions (Der Spiegel 1977a). Meanwhile, the "second generation" of the RAF conducts terrorists acts in retaliation for the conviction of the terrorist organization's former leaders. These acts include the murder of Dresdner Bank spokesman Jürgen Ponto, an attack against the Federal Prosecutor's office in Karlsruhe, and on September 5, the kidnapping of Hanns Martin Schleyer, the President of the German Confederation of Employers (Der Spiegel 1977c). On October 13, the RAF terrorist campaign reaches a peak when Palestinian RFA allies hijack a Lufthansa flight and demand the release of the imprisoned RFA members (Der Spiegel 1977d) .

On October 18, a special operation of German counter-terrorism ends the plane hijack. On the same day, after being informed of the hijack's failure, jailed RAF leaders commit suicide in prison on the same day (Der Spiegel 1977e). Hours later, RAF members shoot Hanns Martin Schleyer dead (Der Spiegel 1977f).

BE '78

Egmont Pact Breakdown crisis.

On September 26, two CVP (Flemish Christian Democrat) representatives break party discipline and vote against Law 461 in a parliamentary committee vote. The law codified into legislation the Egmont Pact, an agreement on Belgium's federalization reforms that was negotiated in 1977 between Prime Minister Leo Tindemans (CVP) and the socialist, christian democratic and regionalist parties. This coalition was meant to secure the qualified majority required to pass the reforms. The two CVP defectors on September 26 jeopardize the passing of the law shortly before being voted on the floor.

On October 10, CVP chairman Wilfried Martens declares in Parliament that his party was not ready to fully support Law 461, and proposes delaying the vote on the articles that may require constitutional reform. In a speech in parliament, Tindemans responds to this request by surprisingly resigning as prime minister. (Brassine and Mabilie 1978). Negotiations over the Egmont Pact also produce strong tensions within the Socialist Party, then the only remaining unitary (i.e., national) party formation in the country. The split between its Walloon and Flemish members takes shape soon after Tindeman's resignation. On October 18, the party suspends the preparation of its national congress and the meetings of its Belgium-wide executive committee (CRISP 1978).

On October 20, Paul Vanden Boeynants, the chairman of the PSC (Walloon Christian Democrats), forms a caretaker government and submits a constitutional revision proposal regarding federalization. Under Belgian law, this automatically triggers the dissolution of Parliament. General elections take place on December 17. They are the first in which Belgian socialists present separate French and Flemish candidate lists. In Flanders, the election marks the access to Parliament of the *Vlaams Blok*, a coalition of right-wing groups that had split from the Volksunie, Flanders' traditional nationalist party, due to its support for the Egmont pact (Mabilie and Brassine 1979).

In the first three months of 1979, both Martens and Vanden Boeynants unsuccessfully attempt to form governments in January and March. The impasse is finally broken on April 3, when the Christian Democratic parties (CVP and PSC), the newly formed Walloon and Flemish socialist parties (PS and SP), and the FDF (*Front démocratique des Francophones*, regionalist and centrist) finally agree to elect Wilfried Martens as prime minister.

BE '80-'81

Events from the *Redressement* period

Federalization crises ('80);

Economic Readjustment Crises ('80-'81);

First Peace March ('81).

On December 16, 1979, the Flemish Christian Democratic Party (CVP) decides not to support a plan that would give the Brussels region the same legal status and autonomy as the

newly created regional entities of Flanders and Wallonia (Brassine 1980). The decision erodes the governing coalition of Wilfried Martens, which was composed of Christian Democrats (CVP, PSC), Socialists (PS, BSP), and the FDF (*Front Démocratique des Francophones*), a regionalist francophone party that had won a majority of votes in Brussels in the 1978 general elections. One of the main political objectives of the FDR was to make the Belgian capital a fully autonomous region with the same powers as Wallonia and Flanders (Mabille 1981a).

On January 9, the Martens government suggests voting only the parts of the regionalization reform proposal that did not require constitutional modifications (Brassine 1980, 30). The project secures the support of the socialist parties. The FDF, on the other hand, decides to support the proposal only after issuing a joint declaration defending Brussels' political autonomy along with the rest of French-speaking parties on January 11. The declaration is strongly rejected by Flemish MPs, prompting Martens to craft yet another proposal in the morning of January 16. The new proposal contains explicit provisions against the demands of the francophone front. As a response, around noon, the FDF decides to oppose the state reform plan while also refusing to leave the governing coalition. Around 4 pm, its ministers are removed without notice by Martens (*Ibid*, 39).

Martens forms a new Christian-Socialist governing coalition on January 23, after the socialist parties receive guarantees on the state reform plan that was about to be established. The exclusion of the FDF from the coalition marks the first break up of the united parliamentary front that francophone parties had formed since Belgium started its federalization process in 1970.

Despite the formation of a new government, on April 2, two bill proposals containing the bulk of the partition plan fail to gather the qualified majority required for their approval. Six CVP senators vote against it. Martens resigns as prime minister on April 3, but he is tasked by the king to form another government on April 17. One month later, on May 18, Martens manages to form a stronger christian-socialist-liberal coalition that finally passes key reforms between the end of July and the beginning of August. These include the establishment of linguistic community-level governments (Flemish, German, and French-speaking) and two regional governments in Wallonia and Flanders. The constitution of Brussels as a region is left out for further discussion.

In the second semester of 1980, an economic crisis suddenly revives political tensions. A national conference to discuss budget, employment and welfare policies to tackle the crisis was scheduled for June. However, due to disagreements between governing coalition parties, it is rescheduled to mid-July and then once again to September. On September 24, the liberal parties make public their opposition to tax increases, demanding instead the containment of public spending. These positions collide with the economic positions of the socialist parties. As a consequence, Martens resigns yet another time on October 4. On October 22, he forms a new government without the participation of the liberal parties.

Despite shared qualms over austerity measures, trade unions, industrial organizations and the Martens government all announce an "interprofessional agreement" restraining wage increases on February 13, 1981.

On March 28, Martens ends up proposing the end of wage-price indexation. The socialist parties reject the proposal, creating another governing crisis leading, on March 31, to Martens' third resignation as Prime Minister in a year. After Martens' stepping down, King Baudouin tasks Gaston Eyskens, another Flemish Christian Democrat, to form a government. He steps in as Prime Minister of another Christian Democratic-Socialist coalition on April 5. His government withdraws all wage-price de-indexation proposals, leading to speculative attacks against the Belgian franc.

Another standoff within the governing coalition emerges in August because of Cockerill-Sambre, a recently merged steelworks conglomerate employing nearly 40,000 people in Wallonia (De Vos 1981a). The combination of sustained losses and a large debt had led banks and investors to refuse the financing needed for its survival (Capron 1989). In September, the francophone socialists (PS) refuse to take part in cabinet meetings until the government agreed to support Cockerill-Sambre. In this context of communitarist tensions, Eyskens resigns as Prime Minister on September 21. His exit prompts anticipated elections on November 8.

During the campaign, on October 15, a massive protest against the deployment of nuclear missiles takes place in Brussels. The demonstration reacts to NATO's plan to install 48 nuclear missiles in Belgium as part of its "double-track" deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union. Established in 1979, this policy contemplated opening denuclearization negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union and the deployment of nuclear missiles in West Germany and other European NATO-members in case negotiations failed. Due to the growth in public attention towards the issue throughout the year (Gérard 1984; De Vos 1981b), the organizers had been expecting an attendance of 100,000 people. The demonstration draws instead 200,000 people to the street (Gérard 1984).

The snap election takes place three weeks after the demonstration, on November 8. Christian parties (CVP and PSC) suffer their biggest post-war defeat and lose a fourth of their seats (-21); socialist parties (PS and SP) maintain their vote share but gain a few seats (+4). Liberals (PVV and PRL), on the other hand, make substantial gains (+15) in this cycle (Mabille 1981a, 1981b). Taken together, these results make socialist and Christian Democratic parties even up their scores and representation in Parliament for the first time since WWII (Mabille 1981a, 1981b).

King Baudouin refrains from inviting a socialist politician to form a government after the election. He first tasks Flemish liberal Willy de Clercq and then Walloon Christian Democrat Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb to form a coalition (de Vos 1981c). They both fail to do so. By then, the economic environment in the country had continued to deteriorate. Belgium was the most indebted country in Western Europe, and the one with the highest unemployment rate (Le Monde 1982; de Vos 1981c). At that time, the Belgian franc had also begun to suffer speculative attacks (Renard 1981).

On December 7, King Baudouin asks Wilfried Martens once more to become Prime Minister. On December 17, Martens forms a new government supported by a Christian-Liberal coalition and the Flemish Socialist Party (SP). The francophone Socialist Party (PS) enters the opposition. In his government platform, Martens suggests delaying his final decision to install Euromissiles in Belgium (Gérard 1984). Economically, his program favors

strong austerity measures, including the repeal of wage-price indexing (de Vos 1981d). It also contains a request to be granted special powers to govern by decree on economic matters for a span of two years.

On February 2, in an unprecedented decision since the 1930s, Martens' slim parliamentary majority grants him special powers. The decision prompts a general strike wave that paralyzes Wallonia on February 8 (De Vos 1982a). Five days later, on February 13, a march of steelworkers takes place in Brussels in protest against the European Community's reluctance to authorize public funds to maintain Cockerill-Sambre afloat. The protest leaves 27 injured people. At the end of February, Wallonian steelworkers go on strike (Lemaitre 1982).

On February 22, the Belgian franc is devalued. The decision is accompanied by additional austerity measures, including a 3-month freeze in salary increases (De Vos 1982b). These measures are followed on March 9 by cuts in government spending and welfare provisions in March (De Vos 1982c). Seven days later, on March 16 another steelworkers' demonstration leads to 279 people injured. Later on, protests from Cockerill-Sambre workers recede after an agreement with management is reached (De Vos 1982c). On March 23, the government decides to function as a guarantor of bank loans granted to Cockerill-Sambre. Public demonstrations against the economic measures start fading after that day.

IT '80

Events from the *Riflusso* period

Political Terrorism Surge and Donat Cattin Scandal;
Ustica Incident and Strage di Bologna;
FIAT strike and *marcia dei quarantamila*;
Francesco Cossiga downfall.

On May 28, recently reappointed Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga (DC) is implicated in an obstruction of justice scandal. Newspapers report that the judge overseeing investigations into the *Prima Linea* left-wing terrorist organizations had issued a request to Parliament to investigate Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga. Some days before, Roberto Sandalo, a recently detained member of *Prima Linea*, had accused Cossiga of sharing classified information to Carlo Donat Cattin, a member of the DC governing body, to allow his left-wing terrorist son to escape Italy before his apprehension (*La Stampa* 1980). The political relevance of Sandalo's declaration amplifies against the backdrop of a spike in political assassinations throughout the year. They include, on January 6, the murder of Sicilian governor (*presidente della regione*) Piersanti Mattarella; on February 6, the death of Vittorio Bachelet, a former vice-president of the Italian judiciary council, in Rome; and on May 28—the day Sandalo's accusation makes the news—of *Corriere della Sera* journalist Walter Tobagi in Milan.

On May 31, the parliamentary committee in charge of authorizing judicial inquiries for ministerial position holders (*commissione inquirente*) rejects investigating Cossiga in a close 11-9 vote. The tightness of the result allows the PCI to introduce a motion to revisit the committee's decision. On July 27, Cossiga is spared from being investigated after another unexpectedly tight result in a plenary vote.

Political executions continue in Italy over the rest of the Summer. On June 23, the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR), a right-wing terrorist organization, murders deputy attorney general Mario Amato in Rome. On August 6, a mafia commando executes Palermo Chief Prosecutor Gaetano Costa. Italy's public safety crisis also manifests in particularly massive forms at the end of June. Four days after Amato's murder, on June 27, a mysterious plane flying from Bologna to Palermo crashes near the island of Ustica, killing 81 people. Up to this date, the causes of the crash remain contested (Ortigosa 2015).

Later on, on August 2—six days after the vote of parliament on Cossiga's role in the Donat Cattin affair—a bomb explosion inside Bologna's central train station kills 85 people and injures another 200. In contrast to the investigation into the Ustica crash, inquiries into the authors of the “strage di Bologna” are conducted with unusual expediency. On August 28, the Bologna prosecution office (*Procura*) issues 28 arrest warrants against members of extreme right-wing terrorist organization in connection to the terrorist attack. The detentions mark the beginning of a long and tortuous judicial case that will extend up until 1995 and fail to produce insights into the motivations of the terrorist attack's masterminds (Oliva 2019).

By the end of the Summer, political attention begins to shift from security matters to economic issues. In the midst of an economic crisis, on July 2 and 4, Cossiga submits to Parliament a series of economic austerity packages (Palmieri 1980). After multiple failed attempts to pass the economic provisions, Cossiga withdraws them on August 28. On September 2, he reintroduces them through a single law project commonly referred to as the *decretone* (Bapisarda 1980).

Another front of contention opens on September 7, four days after the *decretone*'s submission to parliament. On that day, collective contract negotiations between unions and employers start at FIAT, Italy's flagship carmaker and one of the engines of its industrial sector. The negotiations start in a tense atmosphere. Throughout the summer, the FIAT administration had made public its intention to slim down its workforce after August (Devecchi 1980a). Two days before the start of the negotiations, company managers had announced their desire to put 24,000 employees on work suspension (*cassa integrazione*, De Luna 2020, 9).

In the first week of the negotiation, FIAT executives announce the beginning of procedures to directly lay off 14,000 workers (*Ibid*). The announcement leads to the break up of negotiations and the beginning of a strike at the FIAT factories premises in Turin. Due to FIAT's economic importance and its unionization tradition, the strikes acquire a national character as an emblematic site of struggle between Italian unions and industrialists, the latter of which were voicing increasingly strong demands to cut labor benefits and diminish the political clout that Italian labor had acquired throughout the 70s (Garner and Garner 1981). The strikes' profile grows further when a national strike from steelworkers is organized in support for FIAT's workers on September 25.

Labor mobilizations that day are massively attended across Italy and particularly in Turin, where a 60,000-person demonstration takes place (Novara 1980). Despite the success of labor demonstrations, its aftermath exposes rifts within it. Union leaders call to suspend the strikes and resume negotiations, but grassroots factory councils (*consigli di fabbrica*, CdF) at

FIAT decide to stage factory occupations. The sit-ins score a major political victory—and further expose divisions within the left—when PCI chairman Enrico Berlinguer visits an occupied factory one day after the beginning of the strike and commits the support of the Communist Party for whatever courses of action FIAT workers decided.

The government's austerity package is voted in Parliament two days after the steelworkers strike, on June 27. To protect the package from obstructionism, Cossiga had introduced a confidence motion to vote it verbatim, which he predictably wins. However, the *decretone* is later defeated in a secret ballot voting procedure by a one-vote difference. Cossiga resigns as Prime Minister around 14:30. Two hours later, FIAT announces the suspension of its layoff plans (Devecchi 1980b). Three days later, it backtracks from the suspension and announces procedures to put 22,884 workers into *cassa integrazione* for 3 months.

FIAT's position is strengthened on October 5, when Labor minister Franco Foschi validates the first month of the *cassa integrazione* program laid out by its administrators (Devecchi 1980c). On October 8, FIAT doubles down on its attack against the unions and publishes a manifesto in national newspapers attacking them. The day after, white-collar workers unsuccessfully attempt to break the workers' blockade of the FIAT-Mirafiori factory (Devecchi 1980d).

On October 14, the *coordinamento dei quadri intermedi Fiat* (CQI), a recently established association of FIAT managers, stages a demonstration against strikes and factory sit-ins. The demonstration soon morphs into the so-called "March of the forty-thousand" (*marcia dei quarantamila*), in which a surprisingly large contingent of 30,000 white collar workers walk through Turin to demand the end of factory occupations (Benedetto 1980). In support of the CQI's demands, in the afternoon of that day the Turin prosecution office announces measures to guarantee "freedom to work" the next day. The day after, steelworkers' union leaders agree to a collective contract giving FIAT freehand in suspension and laying off policies. Despite strong opposition from the CdFs, the contract is later approved by a majority of workers.

Three days after the signature of the agreement, DC leader Arnaldo Forlani is asked to form a government by President Sandro Pertini. He forms a governing coalition with the DC, the Socialist Parties (PSI and PSDI) and the Republican party (PRI) on October 18.

FR '81 Socialist Party Electoral Victories.

The first round of the 1981 French Presidential election takes place on April 8. The polls open without a clear frontrunner. Four candidates have chances to qualify for the run-off election: the incumbent president, liberal Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (UDF); the mayor of Paris, Gaullist Jacques Chirac (RPR); communist chairman Georges Marchais (PCF); and socialist leader François Mitterrand (PS). The closeness of the election reflected the recent fragmentation of the French political system. The right had split after Chirac resigned as Giscard's prime minister in 1976. On the left, socialists and communists had ended an agreement to present single candidates in 1977. The 1981 pre-campaign was also marked by the short-lived presidential bid of Coluche, a well-known comedian. Owing to protest votes,

he had polled third in the race as late as January. Facing waning support and intense pressures to suspend his campaign, he had decided to withdraw from the election on March 16 (Lhomeau 1981).

The election results qualify Giscard and Mitterrand for the run-off election. Giscard receives 28.3% and Mitterrand 25.8% of the votes cast. In third place comes Jacques Chirac (18.0%) and then George Marchais (15.3%) who loses a quarter of votes compared to the last time the communist party had a candidate running . (21.2%).

The run-off election takes place on May 5. Communist chairman Marchais openly calls PCF sympathizers to vote for Mitterrand. Jacques Chirac, on the other hand, refuses to endorse Giscard (Goldey and Knapp 1982). Mitterrand ends up winning the presidential election by a 3.5-point margin. His victory is the French left's first since the beginning of the 5th Republic.

Financial markets respond negatively to Mitterrand's victory. Between May 11 and 15 the Paris Stock Exchange falls by 17% –its largest postwar dip (Marti 1981). That day, trade is suspended to prevent further losses. During these days the French franc falls victim to a speculative attack. The Bank of France spends 15% of the country's reserves to stabilize its value (Renard 1981).

Mitterrand is sworn in as President on May 21. Eight days later, in order to count on a supportive legislature (the previous elections were held in 1978 and gave a majority to the right), he dissolves the National Assembly and calls for new parliamentary elections. The first and second rounds of the anticipated legislative election take place on June 14 and 21. Mitterrand obtains a resounding victory. The results give 36% of the vote to the Socialists, while the Communists receive another 16%. Thanks to Mitterrand's coattails and vote transfers between left-wing parties, the Left obtains an absolute majority in the second round -the first time the Left controls the Assembly since the beginning of the 5th Republic. The new rapport of forces leads to the formation of a new government that includes three Communist ministers, a first since the momentary late and post-WWII years of unity (1945-1946). The June Parliamentary elections clear the way for the implementation of signature left-wing policies: the 39-hour work week, a 5th week of paid holiday for all employees, the right to a pension at age 60, renewed workplace participation, the nationalization of some industrial groups, banks and financial holdings, the abolition of the death penalty, a 10% increase in the minimum wage, and the immediate creation of 55,000 jobs in the public sector (Friend 1998).

GE '81

Peace Movement protests;

Flick and Neue Heimat corruption scandals.

In the Summer of 1981, the debate over NATO's deployment of nuclear missiles as a deterrence strategy against the USSR, which was commonly known across Europe as the "Euromissile" program, reaches an inflection point in West Germany. SPD chancellor Helmut Schmidt's support for the "Euromissile" program had triggered few reactions when the plan was launched. Nevertheless, after the victory of pro-armament Ronald Reagan in

the 1980 US presidential elections it suddenly took off as a first-line political matter in West Germany and other European countries (Der Spiegel 1981a).

On June 20, between 60 and 100,000 people take the streets of Hamburg to protest against Euromissiles on the closing day of the German Protestant Church Congress—an important event in the yearly calendar of West Germany’s peace activism. (Tompkins 2016, 212). The march is organized by peace collectives, environmental activists and left wing political organizations, including the active participation of youth organizations from the governing SPD. The involvement of the latter reflected growing and increasingly public controversies within the SPD between its establishment, which supported Schmidt’s endorsement of West Germany’s participation in the Euromissiles program, and an increasingly vocal left-wing base that rejected it.

On September 13, 70,000 people demonstrate against US State Secretary Alexander Haig’s visit to Berlin (Tréan 1981). Two days later, the US European Army commander Frederick Kroesen becomes the target of a failed murder attempt by left wing terrorists (Vinocur 1981).

On October 10, as part of a concerted action across several Western European capitals, 300,000 people take part in a peace march in Bonn against the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe (Tompkins 2016, 212). At that time, the march becomes the largest demonstration in Germany’s history (Wetz 1981). The success of the mobilization demonstrates the saliency of the Euromissile question for domestic policies and the SPD’s fracture over the matter, which starts putting strains on the solidity of the governing coalition that the SPD had formed with the pro-Euromissile FDP (Tréan 1981).

West German politics is hit with another unexpected political development at the end of the year. On December 6, *Der Spiegel* publishes information about secret meetings between MPs across the political spectrum to introduce constitutional-level reforms on political party financing policies. The reforms intend to neutralize a judicial investigation into contributions to political parties disguised as donations to charitable organizations that was about to be made public (Der Spiegel 1981c). By mid-December, the saliency of the inquiry spikes when information starts to leak about the systematic participation of Flick, one of Germany’s largest industrial conglomerates, in these practices (Käsler 1991, 255). In its December 13 edition, *Der Spiegel* reports that Flick had made a previously undisclosed donation to socialist Finance minister Hans Matthöfer for 50,000 DMs (about 308,000 dollars; Der Spiegel 1981d). By the end of December, new revelations on the case start to implicate major political figures. Such figures include Alfred Nau, SPD’s the party’s treasurer, and Walther Leisler Kiep, his CDU equivalent. They also concern cabinet members Otto Lambsdorff (Economy, FDP), and Hans Matthöfer (Finance, SDP), for whom evidence is found of having received illegal donations from Flick.

Lambsdorff and Matthöfer’s involvement in the scandal morphs it from being the “party spending affair” to the “Flick Affair”. Lambsdorff and Matthöfer had been involved in authorizing a 120-million DM tax break (about 739 millions 2022 USD) to the Flick corporation (Winkler 2007, 667; Der Spiegel 1981b). In February 1982, the Federal Prosecutor office opens formal investigations into Matthöfer, Lambsdorff and other FDP and CDU politicians. The office also starts investigating Friedrich Karl Flick, President of

Flick Corporation, and its CEO, Eberhard von Brauchitsch. (Von Brauchitsch will be forced to withdraw his widely supported candidacy as the chairman of the powerful Federation of German industries (BDI), in March 1982 [Winkler 2007, 668]).

Parallel to the Flick affair, February also witnesses the burst of another major finance scandal. The scandal concerns Neue Heimat, a trade union-owned corporation that was Europe's largest construction company and the flagship corporation of Germany's "not for profit" economic sector. Against the backdrop of an economic downturn in Germany and pressures for salary contention policies, the scandal begins when *Der Spiegel* publishes in its February 8 edition an article about the multiple and imaginative forms in which NH Chairman Albert Vietor had used this position for private gain for more than fifteen years. Vietor is fired by the NH governing council on February 11 (*Der Spiegel* 1982a).

NE '81

Anti-Nuclear Missile Movement protests.

The campaign for the May 26 General Election takes place in the context of the Netherlands' unresolved participation in NATO's Euromissiles program (see GE'81). A few days after the program was originally announced on December 6, 1979, an unusual coalition of left-wing MPs and ten dissident members of the governing confessional parties—the so called "loyalists" (Van der Beek 2016, 43)—had decided to contest Prime Minister Dries Van Agt's support for the Euromissiles program. They had published a preemptive declaration against the Netherlands' participation. The declaration delayed the country's decision to participate in the program until December 1981, once new General Elections had brought about a new legislature (Van Dijk 2012).

Despite the saliency of the Euromissiles question for the Dutch public opinion, and due to important intra-party divisions (Kaarbo 2012, 96), parties campaign without establishing a clear stance on it. Trying to balance its identity as both a social movement and a governing party, the Labor Party (PvDA) campaigns on an abstract anti-nuclear stance that nonetheless accepts the Netherlands's hosting of Euromissiles (Kriesi 1989, 301). In the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) the issue had become particularly polarizing due to the existence of a solid pro-NATO establishment cohabiting with a strong tradition of pacifist confessional activism. One of the flag bearers of this tradition is the influential IKV (*Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad*), a leading confessional pacifist organization that had gradually drifted away from the CDA's leadership's positions on nuclear weapons to the point of sometimes making veiled attempts to canvass against the party (Binnendijk 2010, 35).

General Elections take place on May 26. The election results weaken the Netherlands' largest political parties and fail to produce a clear electoral mandate on the Netherlands' participation in the Euromissile program. The governing Christian-liberal coalition loses 4 seats and fails to gather a parliamentary majority. The PvDA's 10-seat loss also forestalls a left-wing governing coalition.

The process of government formation is slowed down by economic policy disagreements between the PvDA and the CDA, and by personal frictions between their respective chairmen, Joop Van Der Uyl and Dries Van Agt. The latter is finally sworn in as the head of

a grand coalition on September 11. In the coalition agreement document, the PvDA reserves the right to leave the government should it go against the party's positions on Euromissiles (Kaarbo 2012, 98).

As a means of pressuring the Dutch government to reject NATO, the IKV and left-wing organizations organize a rally against the deployment of nuclear missiles on November 21. The announcement occurs five days after Van Agt introduces his government program and a month before December 21, the deadline that Van Agt's preceding government had set to clarify the Netherlands' stance regarding Euromissiles. The anti-missile demonstration is attended by at least 350,000 people in Amsterdam (Ter Steege 1981). It is the most massively attended of the series of protests against the deployment of nuclear weapons that took place in Europe throughout the Fall, and the largest in the Netherlands' history.

A few days later, the Netherlands postpones *sine die* its final decision to agree to the installation of nuclear missiles on its territory (Everts 1985, 137). At that moment, in November, 47% of the population opposes Euromissiles (compared to 38% in July). That number reaches 52% by December (Roche 1988, 262).

BE '83

Second Peace March.

In early September, the CNAPD (*Coordination Nationale d'Action pour la Paix et la Démocratie*) and VAKA (*Vlaams Aktiekomitee tegen Atoomwapens*) begin preparations for a major march in October against Belgium's participation in NATO's Euromissiles program. Both organizations were the main forces of anti-nuclear weapons activism in Wallonia and Flanders, and had jointly announced the protest at the end of 1982. Throughout September, the protest receives wide media coverage. The march rapidly gathers endorsements from the francophone and Dutch-speaking socialist parties, as well as from trade unions (Gérard 1984, 26). Christian democratic parties neither support nor reject the march. In fact, 40 CVP MPs take part in the demonstration on October 30 (*Ibid*, 30). Overall, the demonstration gathers 300,000 people. It becomes the largest demonstration held in Belgium up to that date. In reaction to the rally, the Belgian government announces once more another delay in its final decision to allow the installation of nuclear missiles in the country.

The wide success of the demonstration begins putting pressure on the necessity to discuss Belgium's participation in the Euromissiles program in Parliament. The CNAP formally requests such discussion on November 2. On November 8, unions support the request through 15-minute work stoppages (*Ibid*).

Between November 8 and 12, discussions in Parliament on the Euromissiles question end up taking place. The outcome was uncertain given the slim 6-MP majority of the governing coalition and the attendance of 40 CVP MPs to the peace march. The discussions, however, end up giving Martens freedom to design Belgium's policy towards NATO's Euromissile program.

On December 30, the government informs the CNAP that Belgium has not yet reached a conclusion on the Euromissiles question, but would make preparations to be able to host 48

NATO nuclear missiles by 1985. The decision is met with much weaker protests than the massive protest held two months before. On March 13, 1985, Martens will finally formally authorize the deployment of Euromissiles in Belgium.

FR '83

Tournant de la Rigueur turnaround

On March 6 and 13, 1983, the run-offs of France's 1983 municipal election take place in the midst of a worrying economic context. Since 1981, demand-side economic policies by socialist President François Mitterrand had been ineffective in relaunching economic growth (Lacombe 2018, 384). The election results are widely interpreted as a "warning" to Mitterrand's economic policies. While they confirm the expected defeat of the governing left block, the latter minimize their losses relative to initial expectations (Rollat 1983). This provides Mitterrand an additional margin of action to decide economic alternatives to re-address the poor economic performance of his administration.

Renewed internal struggles arise between the more left and moderate members of the government over France's stay in the recently established European Monetary System (EMS). Some start questioning whether Pierre Mauroy should stay as PM. (Eloire 2020). The left wing of the party, led by Social Affairs Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, and Research and Industry Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, support France's exit from the EMS and call for establishing tariffs as a way to increase France's independence over its economic policy-making. The moderate wing, represented mainly by Budget Minister Jacques Delors and by Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, remain committed to France's stay in the EMS and push for economic austerity measures.

Left and center-leaning socialists had tended to cohabit under a "big tent" under Mitterrand's leadership. However, the coexistence among these wings had started to become tense after June 1982. At that moment, wage hikes, the enlargement of the public sector and nationalization policies had been paused, and the French franc had undergone a 10% devaluation relative to the dollar (Renard 1982). Disagreement over the course of action spreads to unions in February 1983, when CFDT union leader Edmond Maire suggests another set of economic adjustments to address the country's lasting economic crisis (Le Monde 1983a).

On March 14, Mitterrand meets Pierre Mauroy and offers him to form a new government in charge of carrying out France's withdrawal from the EMS. Mauroy declines such a task (Elgie 1993). After consultations with the Treasury, Mitterrand makes a U-turn on March 16. He decides to keep France in the EMS and Mauroy as prime minister.

On March 21, after several negotiation rounds with EMS members, a general overhaul of the parity ranges of the system is announced. The new dispositions devalue the French franc 2.5% relative to the German mark in net terms. That day, Pierre Mauroy declares the devaluation of the franc as the first of a broader package of economic readjustment (Rollat 1983).

Mauroy is formally reinstated as Prime Minister on March 23. A day later, Mitterrand announces in a TV address a broader package of austerity measures. It is formally introduced by Mauroy on March 26 (Colombani 1983). The introduction of the package marks the beginning of the gradual introduction of neoclassical considerations in Mitterrand's economic policies (Elgie 1993, 124).

GE '83

Events from the *Wende* Period

Helmut Schmidt Downfall and 1983 General Election;
Flick Parliamentary Inquiry Commission;
Nuclear Action Week.

On September 9, 1982 socialist Chancellor Helmut Schmidt holds an address to parliament in the midst of an economic crisis and growing tensions between him and the FDP, the junior partner of his government coalition. During his speech, Schmidt asks CDU minority leader Helmut Kohl to introduce a no-confidence motion against his government. His unusual request seeks to trigger snap elections in order to call out the FDP on its attacks against the Schmidt government. Although the liberal party made part of the government, its relationship with the SPD and Schmidt had gradually eroded with disagreements over economic policy and the socialists' unwillingness to stifle corruption scandals involving FDP politicians. Fearing political costs of being ousted by Schmidt, the 4 liberal FDP ministers finally present their resignation on September 17, putting an end to 13 years of socialist-liberal governments in West Germany.

Elections in the state of Hesse take place 9 days later, on September 26. The election results produce unexpected outcomes, adding to the political fluidity that German politics was then undergoing. against pundits' prediction and despite an economically recessive context and, the SDP decreases its vote only marginally. The recently established Green Party scores a good performance (8%) and obtains parliamentary representation in the regional assembly. Center and right-wing parties undergo poor electoral performances. The vote share of the CDU stagnates, and the FDP fails to obtain the 5% minimum vote share required for parliamentary representation. This outcome thwarts the formation of a christian-liberal governing coalition.

The electoral results in Hesse show the damaging effects that the FDP's exit from the governing coalition had had on its electoral prospects, and trigger speculations about the feasibility of a red-green coalition in the coming general elections. In this context, on October 1, Schmidt is replaced by Kohl thanks after a no-confidence motion supported by the CDU and a heavily divided FDP. Its executive board had approved supporting Kohl only by a 3-vote margin (18 to 15; Winkler 2007, 700).

In his inaugural address, Kohl calls for anticipated elections for the Spring 1993. Against this backdrop, on October 26, Schmidt declines to be the SPD's candidate in the upcoming elections. Moderate Hans-Jochan Vogel is chosen as the socialist candidate on November 1. His campaign is heavily focused on opposing Germany's participation in NATO's "double

track” decision (*cf.* BE’81). Four days later, on November 5, pro-Kohl Hans-Dietrich Genscher is narrowly re-elected as FDP chairman. The party splits after his election. Several important liberal figures leave the party to join the SPD. Others found the Liberal Democrats (*Liberale Demokraten*, LD), a left-leaning liberal party, on November 28.

On December 17, Parliament introduces a technical vote of no confidence against Kohl to organize snap elections. Two days later, the new governing coalition experiences another setback in the Hamburg state election. Results give the SPD an unexpected absolute majority and deny the FDP parliamentary representation after receiving only 2.6% of the votes cast. In this politically unstable environment, German President Karl Carstens dissolves Parliament on January 7 and sets March 6 as the General Election Day.

Near election date, surveys signal Kohl as the clear election frontrunner, giving him a 5% point lead over Vogel (Chandler 1989, 308). The results of the election end up doubling that estimate. The CDU/CSU obtains 48.7% of the votes cast. In its worst electoral performance in 25 years, the SPD gathers 38.2%. The FDP eventually saves its parliamentary representation and obtains 6.9% of the vote share. The Green Party obtains 5.6% and enters Parliament for the first time. Helmut Kohl is sworn in as chancellor on March 23.

Kohl’s victory over Vogel puts Germany closer to agreeing to participating in NATO’s Euromissiles program. Activism against this possibility gains impetus after the election. On the weekend of April 1-3, 780,000 West Germans protest across the country against the deployment of nuclear missiles (Tompkins 2016, 212). On April 16, peace activists set a coordinating committee for the organization of large-scale mobilization wave over the fall (Breyman 2001, 154).

Spring and Summer of 1983 also see the Flick affair (*cf.* GE’83) and other scandals regarding irregular party financing practices resurface in the German political arena. Shortly after Kohl’s re-appointment as Chancellor, legislators from the Green party—the only party spared from finance scandals—introduces a motion for the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate irregular party finances. Instead, on May 19 the Bundestag votes in favor of an alternative proposition from the SPD, which instead proposed an investigative commission limited to irregularities connected to the Flick affair. Kohl’s government soon launches dilatory tactics to obstruct the commission’s work. On June 14, citing concerns about tax secrecy, Finance Minister Gerhard Soltenberg refuses to share fiscal documents with the commission. After a long standoff, on September 9 Green and Socialist MPs file a constitutional controversy procedure to secure access to the file. (The procedure will be adjudicated in their favor on July 17, 1984).

In the Fall of 1983, peace demonstrations and the Flick affair keep attracting political attention.

A new wave of massive anti-missile demonstrations begins in September. The peak of this wave takes place during the Nuclear Action Week, a seven-day demonstration campaign staged between October 15 and October 22. Official estimates suggest that 500,000 people, and a million according to organizers’ estimates, take part in the demonstrations (Tompkins 2016, 212). As part of the Nuclear Action Week, a human chain of 108 kilometers is formed

on October 22 between Stuttgart and Ulm, both of which are home to American military bases.

On November 4, Franzbruno Eulencamp, the public prosecutor in charge of investigating the Flick affair, requests authorization to press charges against Flick managers Eberhard von Brauchitsch and Manfred Nemitz and several FDP politicians, including former and current ministers of economy Hans Friderichs and Otto Lambsdorff. Both politicians refuse to resign from their cabinet positions after the request. On December 2, the Bundestag votes in favor of lifting Lambsdorff's parliamentary immunity. Six days later, he becomes the first sitting minister formally indicted in the country's history. (Webb 2014, 49).

Late November also brings new developments regarding the Euromissiles question. At the SPD's annual congress, which takes place between November 17 and 19, the party's executive committee votes 283 to 14, with Helmut Schmidt's among the latter, to reject the installation of nuclear missiles in Germany. The vote completes the U-turn that the SPD had operated with respect to international security since 1981. It marks the end of the security consensus that Germany had enjoyed since the 1960s. On November 22, however, Parliament authorizes the deployment of nuclear missiles in Germany, with 286 votes in favor coming from the governing coalition, and 226 against coming from SDP and Green MPs. The next day, the first missiles start being sent to Germany (Markham 1983, 14). They are installed in Mutlangen, in Baden-Württemberg between November 25 and November 30 (Burns and van der Will 1999, 306).

NE '83

Keerpunt turnaround;

Antinuclear Missile Movement—1983 wave.

Citing personal exhaustion, Christian Democratic Dries Van Agt steps down as the Netherlands' Prime Minister on October 13, 1982. Van Agt's resignation comes as unexpected given his political trajectory. He had managed to survive a very narrow and fragile parliamentary majority and govern continuously between 1977 and 1981. At the moment of his departure, he had begun a new government formation process following snap elections.

Soon after, CDA Parliament Speaker Ruud Lubbers replaces Van Agt as the nominee to form a government. The program of his government, supported by the CDA and the VVD (*Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie*, conservative liberal) is presented on October 29. The document's main goal is to reverse the steep economic crisis that the Netherlands was undergoing since 1979. The country was facing its largest public deficits in the twentieth century and had lost 690,000 jobs between 1980 and 1982 (Arnoldus 2007, 202; Ten Hooven 2011, 64). Lubbers' government announces an aggressive program of budget cuts and salary containment policies to address this crisis. He announces his intention to give the Dutch economy a "breathing room" (*adempanze*) from labor cost increases and to repeal wage-price indexation by government decree. Lubbers' decision had few precedents in the Netherlands. It overlooked traditionally non-governmental wage-setting institutions, which had proven increasingly ineffective in producing agreement between labor and capital (Nijhof and Van den Berg 2015; van den Braak 2002, 49).

Fearing loss of autonomy in setting up labor policies, Lubbers' declaration produces a reset in wage negotiations between Dutch labor unions and employers' federations. On November 18, Chris van Veen and Wim Kok, the leaders of the largest employers and union organizations in the Netherlands (VNO ad FNV), start informal talks. These meetings were secretly conducted and lead on November 24 to the signature of an accord, later known as the Wassenaar agreement, that introduces salary containment strategies coupled with more flexible working hours policies.

In the public sector, Lubbers' budget proposal for 1983 includes spending cuts of 13 billion florins (nearly 13.9 billion 2022 USD). The proposed cuts mainly affect social spending and salary provisions. In January, the government announces a 2% decrease in public workers' salaries and large layoffs, including 1% of the Dutch teacher's labor force. In early 1983, this austerity package begins provoking nation-wide strikes of teachers, railroad, and transportation workers (Ter Steege 1983a).

The beginning of 1983 also resumes the thorny debate of Euromissiles (cf. NE '81). On February 5 the National Consultative Body for Peace Organizations (LOVO), an umbrella organization gathering most of the Netherlands' peace activism collectives, announces the launch of a demonstration against Euromissiles on October 29 (Benni 2015, 34). Near that time, it was widely expected that the Dutch government would eventually allow the installation of nuclear missiles. (Ter Steege 1983b). On May 11 Lubbers announces another delay in the Netherlands' decision to host nuclear missiles (Le Monde 1983). The organizers of the march, however, maintain their October schedule.

On April 12, Lubbers' government implements another spending cut of 2 billion florins (Ter Steege 1983c). On July 16, a third cut of 11 billion florins is announced for the next fiscal year. (Ortega 1983). The measures include a 3.5% salary cut for public workers and an 8% reduction in pensions for people retiring for occupational injury (Ter Steege 1983d). By October, growing discontent spurs wildcat strikes among transportation employees (van der Velden 2012). The strikes soon expand to other industries with a high share of public employees.

On October 29, in the midst of this growing discontent, the anti-nuclear missile demonstration takes place. After nine months of preparation and three full years of continuing mobilization, the peace movement is put to a test. Supported by all left wing political parties, the socialist trade union (FNV), and confessional pro-peace organizations—including the influential Inter-Church Peace Council (*Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad*, IKV; teer Veer 1988), the march is a resounding success. 550,000 people—approximately 3% of the Dutch population—take the streets of Amsterdam to reject the country's participation in the Euromissiles program. This march remains, until now, the largest demonstration ever held in the Netherlands.

Three days after the anti-missile march, Lubbers announces a reduction in salary cut for public workers (from 3.5% to 3%). A day later unions reject the offer and begin a seven-week long strike that paralyzes key public services in the country. Trash collection halts in Amsterdam and the postal service is suspended throughout the Netherlands. By November 11, a series of legal disputes start to put pressure on ending the strikes, which are eventually

prohibited by court order at the end of the month. The last demonstrations take place on December 5 (Ter Steege 1983e).

On March 3, 1984, pressure against Lubbers' impending decision on the Euromissiles question grows. The influential IKV for the first time explicitly opposes government support for the installation of nuclear missiles in the country. A few days earlier, Lubbers' conservative liberal coalition partners, the VVD, had threatened to leave the government if the governed decided to decline hosting nuclear missiles (Ter Steege 1984a). A final yet technically vague decision finally emerges on June 6. That day, Lubbers announces that the Netherlands' decision to host missiles would be contingent on the outcome of the nuclear negotiations that were taking place in Geneva between the US and the Soviet Union. In practice, Lubber's announcement approves the Netherlands' participation in the Euromissiles program, as it states that the country would host missiles if the USSR failed to withdraw all its nuclear arsenal (Tagliabue 1984). Lubber's decision is not met with major acts of protest.

GE '90 Reunification

On the afternoon of November 9, in the German Democratic Republic, the recently established government of Communist Party chairman Egon Krenz announces the easing of travel restrictions towards West Germany. Krenz had been recently appointed GDR chairman in substitution of Erich Honecker, whose 30-year tenure as the leader of East Germany had briskly come to an end due to mounting social protests and a migratory crisis (Hirschman 1993).

The new regulations were to take effect the day after the announcement. However, the spokesperson in charge of communicating the policy shift mistakenly declares that the regulations had immediate effect in a press conference. His declaration prompts a massive gathering of people along the Berlin Wall demanding access to West Berlin, which is soon granted by border guards. Between November 10 and 11, more than 200,000 East Germans cross the Berlin Wall (James and Stone 1992). The fall of the Berlin Wall signs the end of communist control of East German Politics. Prime Minister Willi Stoph resigns four days after the opening of the Berlin Wall. Krenz will step down as East Germany's Head of state on December 6.

The Fall of the Berlin Wall takes the political establishment of the Federal German Republic (FGR) by surprise. Cutting short a visit to Poland, West German chancellor Helmut Kohl heads to Berlin on November 10 and joins other first-rank politicians in a demonstration in front of West Berlin's City Hall. Keeping a narrative recognizing the separateness of West and East Germany, the speeches of the West German leaders declare the fall of the wall as a watershed in the relationship of the two countries (Winkler 2007, 901; Ehrl 2018, 160). This position coincides with that held by East German political activists. For them, the collapse of the communist regime represented an opportunity not for doing away with but reforming the GDR.

As the locus of political mobilization in East Germany shifts from activist networks to mass audiences, demands for reform subside in favor of German reunification (Winkler 2007, 905-909). By the end of November polls report that 60% of the population in East Germany favors reunification. In West Germany, the equivalent figure is 70%. (*Ibid*, 909).

Against this backdrop, on November 28, Kohl presents to Parliament a bold ten-point plan to integrate East Germany into the FRG. The plan, which had been prepared in secret, receives key domestic and international support. At home, it is backed by all groups in Parliament except the Greens. Abroad, the support of US President George Bush offsets the reticence of other Western powers. Kohl's program, however, stops short of mustering enough support to make the plan a reality. The Soviet Union maintains its veto. It rejects Kohl's ten points and dismisses the possibility of a NATO membership for a unified Germany, which had been set as a precondition for Reunification by Western powers.

Domestically, the SPD is divided over its support for Kohl's plan. Oskar Lafontaine, the party's candidate apparent for the upcoming general elections, is vocally against it. There are also debates on whether to organize reunification by fast-track "annexation", under the legal framework of West Germany's Basic Law, or through a more democratic negotiation that would require a longer constitutional making process. The debate is important because the SPD, which supported the latter option, was widely expected to win the March 18 general elections in East Germany—the first to occur since the Second World War. The elections end up being won surprisingly by the Alliance for Germany, a right-wing electoral coalition committed to fast-track Reunification.

Forces in favor of a slowdown of reunification also emerge in West Germany. On May 13, the SPD scores electoral wins in Lower Saxony and North Rhine Westphalia. These victories make the socialists attain a majority in the upper chamber, giving them veto power over key Reunification legislation. Throughout the Spring, Oskar Lafontaine tries to leverage his political clout to block these reforms. In this period, he threatens to resign as Chancellor candidate if the SPD votes in favor of Kohl's reunification proposals (*Ibid*, 992).

On May 5, the "2 plus 4" negotiation between East and West Germany and Allied powers on a fully sovereign and united Germany begin. Among key issues in the negotiations are the formalization of postwar German borders and Germany's future military alliances. By that time, Germany's bargaining position had strengthened due to the ongoing economic collapse of the USSR. On May 13, the German government acts as a guarantor of a 6-billion-mark loan from German Banks to the Soviet government. Two weeks later, during a joint conference with George Bush, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev declares that Germany should have the freedom to choose its military partners after unification.

The fast-track reunification option finally gathers enough parliamentary support to materialize in mid June. In that time Lafontaine announces not being opposed to SPD parliamentarians' vote in favor of the treaty of Monetary, Economic and Social Union—a core legislative instrument for fast-paced reunification. The treaty is passed by both German parliaments on June 21. That day, a resolution recognizing postwar borders between Poland and Germany as permanent is also passed. The treaty formalizing this decision is signed with Poland on November 14.

Formal negotiations towards reunification begin on July 6. Major obstructions towards reunification evaporate in mid-July, when Kohl and Gorbachev meet in the Soviet Union. At the summit, the Soviet Union guarantees recognizing a unified Germany with the condition that any NATO operations be prohibited in East Germany until the full withdrawal of Soviet troops.

On August 31, the Reunification Treaty between East and West Germany is formally signed. On October 3, East and West Germany become officially unified. On December 2, the first general elections common to all Germans since 1933 take place. Galvanized by his action for reunification, Helmut Kohl becomes the first chancellor of a reunited Germany. He gathers 43.8% of the vote to 33.5% for SPD's Oskar Lafontaine.

BE '92

"Black Sunday" and Wilfried Martens' downfall.

On September 29 the right-wing *Volksunie* (VU) abandons the government coalition headed by Wilfried Martens, which had governed Belgium uninterruptedly for nearly 10 years. The VU's decision responded to its opposition to the agreement that Martens had offered to Francophone coalition partners regarding the devolution of competencies and financial resources to Belgian regions. The VU's abandonment of the government coalition denies Martens the qualified majority necessary to push forward the third wave of federalization state reforms in Belgium. As a result, Martens resigns as prime minister on October 4 (Arcq, Blaise and Lentzen 1991, 73). On October 17, Parliament is dissolved. Anticipated elections are called for on November 24

The November 24 snap elections, which will soon be referred to as "Black Sunday," shift the relative political power of Belgian parties. The Socialist and Christian Democratic parties, which were the main members of Martens' governing coalition, obtain historical minimums both in Flanders and Wallonia. They lose an aggregate of 400,000 votes. By contrast, recently established regional parties see their support soar. In Wallonia, the leftist *Ecolo* party doubles its vote share to 13.4%. In Flanders, the extreme-right party *Vlaams Blok* (VB) becomes the plurality winner in Antwerp, and receives 10% of all the votes cast across Belgium—a number almost four times higher than in 1987. The far-right formation also multiplies its parliamentary representation by six (Mabille, Lentzen and Blaise 1991).

After 11 years as the central figure of Belgian politics, Wilfried Martens resigns as Prime Minister the day after the election. The election results also impede the formation of a stable coalition with traditional allies. In December 1991, King Baudouin charges liberal Guy Verhofstadt to form government, paving the way for the first Belgian government not led by a Christian Democratic politician since 1957. Verhofstadt's search for a stable governing coalition, however, fails (Mabille and Brassinne 1992). Four months later, on March 7, 1992, the instability spurred by the election finally comes to an end when Flemish Christian Democrat Jean Luc Dehaene finally manages to form a viable grand coalition between Christian Democrats and Socialists.

IT '92-'94

Events from the First Republic dissolution period

General election, anticipated presidential election and government formation crisis ('92);
Mani Pulite - Tangentopoli, Enimont process, and Guardia di Finanza inquiry ('92-'94);
Falcone and Borsellino murders; mafia terrorist attacks ('92-'93);
Economic emergency measures and anti-austerity protests ('92);
Postwar party system collapse, *Discesa in Campo* ('92-'94), and 1994 general election;
Berlusconi downfall events (Biondi decree; Fininvest Inquiry standoff; pension reform protests) ('94).

In the April 5 and 6 Italian General Elections, the balance of power that had long organized Italian politics breaks after the governing “*quadripartito*” not only fails to capitalize on the electoral collapse of the Communist party (then renamed Democratic Left Party - PDS) but actually loses its majority. The “*quadripartito*” was a four-party cartel headed by the Christian Democracy (DC), Italy’s perennial plurality winner, and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). It had governed Italy almost uninterruptedly since 1982. After 1989, the driving force of the coalition had lied in the so called “CAF” informal political alliance between the three most dominant figures of Italian politics during the 80s: former Prime Minister and PSI Chairman Bettino Craxi, former Prime Minister and DC Chairman Arnaldo Forlani, and six-time and then incumbent Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, also from the DC (Ginsborg 2007, 304-317).

Despite retaining a slim parliamentary majority, the quadripartito parties first react to the April elections by announcing the end of the coalition and withdrawing their long held plan to install Craxi as Prime Minister and either Forlani or Andreotti as President (Messina 1992a; Geremicca 1992a). The coalition partners are put further on the defensive on May 2, when newspaper headlines make public that former Milan mayors and PSI deputies Carlo Tognoli and Paolo Pillitteri had received notices of indictment (*avvisi di garanzia*) in connection to “Mani Pulite,” an emerging judicial investigation into kickbacks and illegal party financing in Milan. In contrast to many other corruption scandals that had quickly faded in public opinion, Mani Pulite was expanding due to high quality investigations conducted by judge Antonio di Pietro and the Milan’s Prosecutor’s office. By May 13, the inquiry had already issued indictment notices to 12 MPs. Most were members of Craxi’s PSI, and all were quadripartito politicians.

In the midst of this unfavorable environment, and going against its first reaction to the April elections, the quadripartito majority hastily reassembles mid-May to finally proceed with the long-planned candidacy of CAF member Arnaldo Forlani to the Italian Presidential election (Geremicca 1992b; Messina 1992b). The position had remained vacant after former President Francesco Cossiga made good his resignation threats and prematurely stepped down from office at the end of April, two months before the end of his tenure. The quadripartito appeared to be certain of Forlani’s success in the election, which was a secret-ballot vote. (Bonsanti 1992a). However, in a major upset, he fails to gather enough support to clutch the election in two consecutive voting rounds held by MPs on May 16.

Forlani withdraws his presidential bid at the end of the day, creating a political deadlock that relaunches the candidacy of another CAF member, Giulio Andreotti, to the Italian

presidency (Fuccillo 1992). Andreotti's aspirations finally become buried by a dramatic explosion in Sicily, one of his political strongholds. In the afternoon of May 23, 400 kilograms of explosives blow up near the Palermo airport and kill Giovanni Falcone, a nationally admired prosecutor known for his efforts in fighting the mafia (La Licata 2002). The day after, the stalemate in Parliament ends. After 16 voting rounds, Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, a DC member with little ties to CAF (Adornato 1992), is elected President.

Scalfaro's election shifts the political attention back to government formation. Popular opinion begins favoring the nomination of Mario Segni (Valentini 1992). Segni was a young DC politician who had become widely popular after sponsoring an electoral reform referendum that had weakened political parties by eliminating multiple preference voting. However, in another remarkable show of strength from the Italian political establishment, the nomination of Bettino Craxi, the only politically surviving CAF member, is considered as imminent (Bonsanti 1992b). Not unlike Andreotti, however, unforeseen political developments in Craxi's political home turf doom his premiership ambitions. On June 3, a TV news show reports that Mario Chiesa, a Milanese PSI official who had been the first Mani Pulite detainee, had directly implicated Craxi in acts of corruption. Scalfaro chooses another PSI politician, Giuliano Amato, to form a government on June 26. His government starts with the support of the quadripartito on July 4.

Throughout summer, the intense discredit of Italy's political class reaches a new peak with the accumulation of a new batch of moral, economic, and security crises.

Amato's government is immediately forced to turn its attention to the dire state of Italian public finances it had inherited from the Andreotti Administration (Schettino 1992a). On July 11, after apologizing for the state of Italy's finances on national TV, Amato announces a fiscal adjustment package—or "*manovra*"—of 30 trillion liras, approximately 26 billion 2022 USD. Among other measures, the package includes the forced requisition of 0.6% of Italians' savings. Three days after the announcement of the *manovra*, Amato loses its first minister to Mani Pulite when Gianni de Michelis resigns as Foreign Affairs minister after receiving an *avviso* from Di Pietro's investigation. (By the end of summer, 14 MPs will be implicated in the inquiry). Three days later, another milestone of the ever-expanding judicial inquiry is reached when Salvatore Ligresti, Italy's fifth-wealthiest man, enters jail in Milano for his participation in kickback practices. Two days later, on July 19, another explosion in Sicily shakes Italian politics again when a large detonation in Palermo kills Paolo Borsellino, another emblematic anti-mafia figure. On July 26, Amato authorizes the deployment of 7,000 troops to Sicily (Cowell 1992). To this day, this deployment continues to be the largest domestic military operation ever launched in postwar Italy.

By late July, more than 550 amendments had been proposed to Amato's *manovra* (Clericetti 1992). To save the package's integrity, on July 29 Amato submits a request to vote it verbatim and tied to a confidence motion. The *manovra* is finally approved on July 29 (Schettino 1992b). Amato's announcement relieves speculative pressure on the lira throughout August. The following month, however, speculative attacks against Italy's currency resume with higher intensity. On September 11, Amato announces in a national broadcast a 7% devaluation of the lira and is forced to leave the European Monetary System (EMS) on September 17. Two days later, Amato is forced to submit a new *manovra* package three times bigger than July's. Targeting pension benefits and health system expenses, the

introduction of the new austerity package triggers the largest social protest wave experienced in Italy since the 1970s (Sivo 1992).

In the third week of September, Italian union federations organize a campaign set of strikes and demonstrations that peak on September 26, when a pensioners rally against the September *manovra* gathers 200,000 people in Rome (Repubblica 1992). A day later, the broad malaise against the political establishment finds an expression in the local elections held in Mantua, where the quadripartito majority attains only 23% of the votes cast—10 points less than the plurality winner, the North Italian nationalist and anti-system Lega Nord (Rodota 1992).

Amato's second *manovra* is scheduled to be voted in Parliament in the midst of this generalized discontent. By the beginning of October, this economic emergency project had accumulated more than 1,100 amendment proposals, which blocked the passing of the package (Schettino 1992b). To force the adoption of the legislation in its original form, Amato calls for another confidence motion tied to his economic proposal. On October 22, the opposition refuses to take part in the voting process, allowing the motion to pass with a minority support of 314 votes. The strategy adopted by political parties during the votes on the *manovra* show their commitment to avoiding the organization of anticipated elections in an unfavorable political context. January 16, 1993, however, marks the impending end of the legislature. That day the Italian Supreme Court approves an electoral reform referendum to have Italy transition from a proportional to a mainly majoritarian system. The proposal, which had been supported and introduced by Mario Segni would drastically rearrange the structure of incentives within Italian party politics.

Meanwhile, Mani Pulite continues unabated. In a span of two weeks in February, three ministers resign after receiving *avvisi di garanzia*. By then, giving a “political solution” to the judicial processes had evolved into a pressing. By the end of February, newspapers start reporting the imminent introduction of a judicial reform decree by recently appointed Justice minister Giovanni Conso (Coppola 1993). Prepared in secrecy, the decree triggers an immediate backlash as it retroactively decriminalizes illegal party financing. On March 7, citing legislative technicalities, President Scalfaro refuses to sign the decree—the first time an Italian President does so in the history of the Italian Republic.

CAF members become directly implicated in Mani Pulite shortly after the “Conso decree” fiasco. Bettino Craxi had already received 11 indictment notices by March 23. Forlani and Andreotti receive a first one two weeks later, on April 5. On March 27 Andreotti also begins to be investigated by the Palermo prosecutor office over mafia criminal association. He will begin to be formally investigated in connection to the mafia-sponsored murder of journalist Mino Piccorelli on June 9.

By the end of March, judicial anti-corruption inquiries had issued 1,119 *avvisi di garanzia* and opened judicial cases against 852 officials, 154 MPs, and 1,487 businessmen (Damilano 2012, 170). By the spring of 1993, they had spread from Milan to all across Italy, with important epicenters in Venice, Naples and Rome. During this period the labeling of the corruption scandals shift from Mani Pulite, which kept being used as a reference to the investigations held by the Milan prosecutor's office, to *Tangentopoli*—“bribe city”.

The discredit of political parties becomes overt once again when the referendum on the reform of electoral law that Segni had impulsed (a shift from a proportional to a majoritarian system) takes place on April 18. Organizers were hoping to reach 60% of the votes to make the referendum politically meaningful (Scalfari 1993a). Eventually, a massive 82% of voters cast their ballots in favor of a majoritarian electoral system. The overwhelming support for a change in the electoral law is interpreted as a sign of needed anticipated elections. Amato resigns as Prime Minister four days after the referendum, on April 22. The issue of when to hold new elections will become an important topic in subsequent months (Geremicca 1993)

On April 26, Scalfaro appoints Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the governor of the Bank of Italy, as Prime Minister. Ciampi was the first “technocrat”—an independent government official with technical expertise—nominated for the position in Italy’s history. His cabinet is presented to Parliament on April 29, and includes also for the first time three former communists. Prior to the confidence vote of Ciampi’s government, the parliament schedule includes a secret ballot motion to approve a request from Milan’s prosecution office to criminally investigate Bettino Craxi. Against all expectations, the motion ends up being rejected. The results lead to the resignation of former communist cabinet members a few hours after swearing in. Ciampi’s nomination as Prime Minister, however, is confirmed on May 7.

In his first month in government, Ciampi faces the largest series of terrorist attacks seen in Italy since the seventies. On May 14, a car explodes in the outskirts of Rome; on May 27, 100 kilograms of explosives blow up near the emblematic Uffizi Art Museum in downtown Florence, killing 5 people.

Two weeks later after the first terrorist attacks in May, the first local elections using ballotage procedures take place on June 6. The elections see the formation of pre-established party coalitions and an unprecedented number of dissident lists. The election results confirm Lega Nord’s upward trend. It becomes the most voted party in Northern Italy and wins the mayorship in Milan. The elections also mark a strong comeback of the Italian left-wing block. Led by the former communist PDS, it scores important wins across the country. Former quadripartito parties are the election’s biggest losers. The DC and its dissidents combined see their vote share decrease by 6 points and win only one local election. The PSI is completely erased. In Milan, its traditional stronghold, it does not manage to elect even one person to the city council (Di Franco and Gritti 1993).

The late summer sees new dramatic developments connected with Tangentopoli/Mani Pulite. On July 20, Gabriele Cagliari, the former CEO of petroleum company ENI, commits suicide, suffocating himself with a plastic bag during his stay in prison in connection with a corruption case. Three days later, Raul Gardini, Italy’s second wealthiest man, commits suicide in his Palazzo in Milan. Gardini was a former CEO of the powerful Montedison industrial conglomerate. He was expected to enter prison in connection to the Enimont trial, which began one day after his death on July 24. The case is the largest kickback judicial inquiry in Italy and potentially in Europe (Wakin 1993). It investigated the payment of a nearly 280 million dollar bribe made by Montedison to secure the Italian state’s buyback of Montedison’s shares in Enimont, a joint venture between ENI and Montedison that had started three years before (Cowell 1993). Three days after Gardini’s suicide, on July 27, car bombs explode in downtown Milan and next to the historic San Giovanni in Laterano basilica in Rome. The attacks kill 10 people and leave 64 injured.

The Enimont trial begins in earnest on October 28, when the trial against Sergio Cusani begins. He had been responsible for channeling money from Montedison to the governing political parties. On April 24, 1994, Cusani will be sentenced to eight years in prison.

New revelations of alleged political corruption linger well into Autumn. On November 2, several former secret service agents who had been processed for acts of corruption declare that President Scalfaro had stolen money from the secret service budget during his tenure as Interior minister during the government of Giulio Andreotti (Scalfari 1993b; the accusations will be found to be a lie). A day later, Scalfaro appears in an unanticipated broadcast TV message where he warns that “dark forces” were attempting to wage “the slow destruction of the Italian state”. The address breaks records of audiences in the country (Longo 1993).

In this context, a new set of local elections takes place between November 21 and December 5. The election results confirm the comeback of the Italian left. It increases its total vote counts and benefits from the fragmentation of the right-wing. Impulsed by these trends, the left-wing electoral coalition wins all mayoral races in big cities: Rome, Naples, Palermo, Venice and Trieste. This victory is the first since 1945 for Venice and without precedents in Trieste. The MSI (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*), the heir to Mussolini’s fascist party, also scores notable electoral gains. Its candidates make it to the run-off election in Rome and Naples. Together with the approval of the majoritarian electoral law on December 18, these results add mounting pressure to the scheduling of anticipated elections. As a delay strategy, a group of MPs introduce a motion of no confidence against the Ciampi government, which is set for discussion on January 12 only to be rapidly withdrawn that day. The next morning, Ciampi submits his resignation as Prime Minister. President Scalfaro dissolves the Parliament on January 16, and sets March 27 as the date for new elections.

Political parties scramble to set electoral alliances for what seems like an uncertain election with a new majoritarian electoral rule and a short campaign period. The right-wing block enters the campaign highly fragmented. The Pact for Italy, is created on January 5 between the DC, now rebranded Italian Popular Party (*Partito Popolare Italiano*, PPI) and Patto Segni, a DC splinter group led by Mario Segni. The Pact’s capacity to bring together all right wing forces, however, is thwarted by the rejection of DC figures to forge an alliance with the fascist-rooted MSI and the anti-system federalist Lega Nord. Reacting to this fragmentation and to the impending announcement of a unified left wing alliance for the elections, popular media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi announces on January 19 that he would launch a campaign to become Prime Minister if the “moderate” [i.e., right-of-center] Italian political forces failed to unify by January 23.

On January 24, Mario Segni and the Lega announce a final agreement to form an electoral coalition. The accord, however, is disavowed by Lega leader Umberto Bossi one day later. On January 26, Berlusconi announces in a broadcast message his “descent to the field” (*discesa in campo*), declaring the launching of a campaign promoting him as candidate to the Prime Minister office. By February 5, Berlusconi secures the support of Lega and a small DC splinter party to establish an electoral coalition in the North of the country. On February 10, he constructs a parallel Alliance in the South with the MSI, which had been recently renamed Alleanza Nazionale. Acting as a hinge between the coalitions is Forza Italia, a new political party built by Berlusconi and formally founded on February 5. The last minute formation of

a right wing coalition under the leadership of Berlusconi makes the March 26 competitive once again.

In the two months leading into the election, developments of “Tangentopoli” inch closer into the electoral campaign. On February 11, the Mani Pulite prosecutorial team issues a domiciliary arrest against Paolo Berlusconi, Silvio’s brother, in relation to tax evasion and kickback schemes in the Milanese construction industry (Sasso 1994). Two days later Bettino Craxi, a long-time personal friend of Berlusconi, sends to the Mani Pulite team a dossier allegedly implicating PDS chairman and prime minister candidate Achille Occhetto in alleged illegal finance practices. By March, Mani Pulite extends its inquiry into Berlusconi’s media empire after the Milan prosecutor’s office issues an arrest warrant against Marcelo dell’Ultri, the CEO of Berlusconi’s media conglomerate Fininvest. Six days before the election, a news scoop also reports that dell’Ultri was being investigated in connection with mafia activities.

In yet another electoral turnaround, Silvio Berlusconi becomes elected Prime Minister in the March 26 General elections after receiving 42.8% of the votes, 8.2 points more than Occhetto’s left wing alliance. Berlusconi is sworn in as Prime Minister of the Italian “Second Republic” on May 1. His government is supported by a slim majority composed of Forza Italia, the far-right Alleanza Nazionale and the anti-system Lega Nord. Both parties had been vocal supporters of *tangentopoli* during 1992 and 1993.

By July, an inquiry into systemic bribing schemes from Italian corporations to the Financial Police (*Guardia di Finanza*) to safely evade taxes starts to inch closer to Berlusconi’s Fininvest. (La Repubblica 1994a). Against this backdrop, on July 13, Berlusconi’s Justice minister Alfredo Biondi issues an aggressive clean-slate decree. It orders, among other things, the release of more than 2,000 people that remained in preventive detention in connection to bribing cases (Mazzocchi 1994). Similar to the 1993 Conso decree, the Biondi decree triggers a widespread public outcry that includes for the first time an explicit rebuttal from Di Pietro and the rest of the Mani Pulite prosecutorial team.

The Biondi decree evolves into a government crisis three days after being introduced. In a TV interview on July 16, Lega Interior Minister Roberto Maroni accuses Berlusconi and Biondi of having tricked him by handing him a fake version of the Biondi decree to assure its passing in the Council of Ministers. He also announces Lega’s exit from the governing coalition if Berlusconi insisted on pushing through the Biondi decree (Palombelli 1994). The decree is finally rejected in a parliamentary commission on constitutional grounds on July 19. On July 25, Salvatore Sciascia, in another major developing case, the director of fiscal services at Fininvest, confesses to the Milan *pool* having paid bribes in the name of Berlusconi’s company. The same day an arrest warrant is issued against Paolo Berlusconi.

On October 5, the head of the Milan Prosecutor’s office Francesco Borrelli states in an interview that inquiries into Fininvest bribes to the *Guardia di Finanza* were advancing and closely reaching “top finance and political levels” (Buccini and Di Feo 1994), in an apparent allusion to Silvio Berlusconi. Berlusconi reacts the next day by sending a letter to the Italian Judiciary Council (*Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura*, CSM). The letter issues a formal complaint against Borelli, requests his transfer away from Milan, and suggests opening charges against him for tampering with government tasks (Messina 1994).

Between October 18 and 20, the CSM dismisses Berlusconi's complaints against Borrelli. On those very days, however, the government's attack against the Mani Pulite team doubles down after Justice minister Biondi announces a formal inquiry into potential judicial wrongdoings in the Milanese corruption inquiry.

Berlusconi's political standing takes another hit on a different frontline on October 14, the day of a massive protest wave unseen in Italy since the end of the sixties. That day, 90 Italian cities host demonstrations in the context of a general strike that sees between 3 and 5 million people protest against the 1995 Budgetary law (Sivo 1994a). The law had been introduced in Parliament at the end of September and included a 48-trillion lire spending cut package that reduced pension benefits (Repubblica 1994b). Another massive general strike against the pension reform takes place on November 12, when one million people assemble in Rome against Berlusconi's budget package (Battistini 1994). The protest is, to this day, the largest demonstration ever recorded in Italian history. On November 14, Berlusconi's government successfully passes the 1995 budget, which he had tied to a confidence vote. However, the bulk of the pension reform is withdrawn after a 26-hour negotiation between Berlusconi and unions, on December 2 (Sivo 1994b).

By then, Mani Pulite has become completely politicized. On November 20, *Corriere della Sera* leaks a declaration from MP Tiziana Parenti, a former Mani Pulite member and Berlusconi supporter, where she accuses members of the team of blocking cases implicating left wing-figures. The leak takes place two days before another one revealing that Berlusconi had received an indictment notice in connection to Fininvest's bribes to the financial police on November 21.

A few weeks later, on December 6, Antonio di Pietro announces his resignation from Mani Pulite. The most visible public figure of the investigation, the highly popular prosecutor (La Repubblica 1994c) cites the politicization of the inquiry as the trigger for his decision. Demonstrations in his support are staged the same day all across Italy (de Gregorio 1994). By then, Mani Pulite in Milano and the related "Tangentopoli" inquiries pursued by 70 prosecution offices across Italy had released more than 12,000 indictment notices and made more than 5,000 arrests (Barbacetto, Gomez and Tavaglio 2014, 232).

Di Pietro's resignation further depletes what was left of Berlusconi's political capital (Fuccillo 1994). His governing coalition slowly crumbles throughout mid-December. By December 19, three different motions of no confidence against his government are presented in Parliament: one from the PDS, another from the Lega—which had formally left the governing coalition on December 13—and another from Rifondazione Comunista. Berlusconi resigns as Prime Minister on December 22, before any of these votes take place. The second "technocratic" government of Italy will be installed on January 17. That day, President Scalfaro appoints another director of the Bank of Italy, Lamberto Dini, as Prime Minister.

BE '95-'96

Agusta-Dassault Scandal ('95);

Dutroux Affair, White March, and Di Rupo judicial inquiry ('96).

Agusta-Dassault Scandal

On February 17, Christian Democratic Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene calls anticipated elections a few months before the end of the legislature term. His decision is grounded in a desire to avoid a political campaign during the upcoming budget negotiations and to capitalize politically on favorable economic conditions. The same day, Étienne Mangé, the treasurer of the Flemish Socialist Party (SP), is arrested in connection with an ongoing judicial inquiry on kickback schemes inside the Belgian Air Force (Barrez 1998). Mangé was the treasurer of the Flemish Socialist Party (SP), which was a member of the governing coalition. In his deposition on February 20, Mangé accuses SP chairman Louis Tobback, foreign affairs minister Frank Vandenbroucke, and incoming NATO chairman Willy Claes of illegally receiving money from Italian company Agusta to secure military contracts with the Belgian Air Force.

Mangé's accusations amplify the political importance of ongoing judicial investigations into kickback schemes inside the Belgian Air Force, which had, until then, been restricted to members of the Walloon Socialist Party (PS) (Stroobants and Dewez 1995). Attention to the case increases once more on March 7, when police searches the Brussels office of French aircraft maker Dassault in connection to the Air Force kickback scandal. The next day, Lieutenant General Jacques Lefèbvre commits suicide. Lefèbvre had been the Air Force Chief of Staff in 1989, when Dassault received a commission to produce military helicopters for the Belgian Air Force. On March 22, newspapers report that foreign minister Vandenbroucke had ordered burning the money the PS had received illegally. He resigns from his portfolio later that day (Haquin 1995).

The May 21 general elections take place under wide speculations about the political impact the Agusta-Dassault scandal would have on Belgium's socialist parties, and by implication, on Dehaene's governing coalition. Both the SP and the PS, however, finish unscathed. In Wallonia, the PS shrinks by a meager 1.6%, and in Flanders, the SP sees its vote share increase by 5%. On June 23, Jean-Luc Dehaene (CVP) is reappointed Prime Minister of an other grand coalition. The largest political impact of the Agusta-Dassault affair will take place on October 19, when Willy Claes is forced to step down from the NATO chairmanship, after the Belgian Parliament lifted his immunity to allow investigating his role in the Agusta-Dassault affair.

Dutroux Affair

On August 15, 1996, in the outskirts of Charleroi, police searches the house of Marc Dutroux, an unemployed electrician who was a convicted child molestor and held an extensive criminal record. Dutroux had been detained three days earlier in connection with an investigation about missing children led by Jean Marc Connerotte, an investigative judge from the Neufchâteau prosecution office (*parquet*). The search leads to the rescue of 12- and 14-year old Sabine Dardenne and Letitia Delhez. On August 17, further searches in another of Dutroux's properties lead to the discovery of the corpses of 8- and 17-year old Julie Lejeune and Mélissa Russo, whose disappearance one year before had been widely covered by the media (Laporte 1996).

By August 19, the news had already started to cover the bizarrely negligent rapport that Belgium's police and judiciary had had over the years with Marc Dutroux (Haquin 1996a, 1996b). In a context of increasing outrage over the "Dutroux" affair, the funerals of Julie Lejeune and Mélissa Russo's take place on August 22. They are broadcasted on national TV and bring tens of thousands of people to the streets (de la Guerivière 1996a).

On August 22, Justice Minister Stefaan de Clerck launches a formal investigation into possible malpractices in the Dutroux affair. The investigation develops parallel to the detentions of officials on the grounds of collusion with Dutroux (Guillaume 1996). The detentions strengthen the credibility of the thesis that the Dutroux scandal was only one component of a large, politically protected child-trafficking ring (de la Guerivière 1996b).

On September 6, the legitimacy crisis of Belgian political and judicial institutions grows further after aides of former Walloon minister Alain Van der Biest are arrested in connection with the 1991 murder of francophone Socialist Party (PS) chairman, André Cools. By then, politicians and political commentators in Flanders start demanding the eviction of the PS from Dehaene's governing coalition (Dubuisson 1996).

On Friday, September 19, the judicial inquiry into malpractices regarding the Dutroux investigation confirms that police forces had withheld information that would have led to Dutroux's arrest since 1995 (Haquin 1996c). During the weekend, the leader of the police union rejects in a hasty press conference the results of the investigation and threatens to make sensitive corruption investigations regarding Belgian personalities public (Ephimenco 1996). Another developing story regarding the Dutroux affair occurs at the end of the month. On September 27, Marc Dutroux's lawyer submits a formal request to remove investigative judge Jean-Marc Connerotte from the case for having attended a charity dinner for victims of sexual exploitation.

On October 4, parents of Dutroux's victims and criminal victims' organizations announce the organization of a march on October 20 to demand more transparency and accountability in the Belgian justice system (Lamensch 1996). On October 9, 2.7 million signatures demanding judicial reform are delivered to parliament (Lamensch and Wouters 1996). After months of reluctance, that day a parliamentary committee of inquiry into the Dutroux affair is announced (Alsteens and Haquin 1996). The next day, adding to growing rumors about the true magnitude of the scandal, the *Morgen* newspaper reports on Connerotte's alleged discovery of a child prostitution ring that had been operating in Belgium for 25 years (Le Soir 1996).

On October 14, the Court of Cassation (the highest-order judicial court in Belgium) decides to authorize the removal of Connerotte from the Dutroux investigation under intense scrutiny from public opinion. In the following three days, it is calculated that 500,000 people took part in demonstrations, some of them violent, against the court's decision (Walgrave and Rihoux 1997). The peak of this mobilization wave, however, will take place during the "White March" of October 20, a demonstration in Brussels that had been announced at the beginning of the month.

The demonstration's organizers expected the demonstration to assemble around 80,000 people. Instead, more than 300,000—3% of Belgium's population—take part in it (Walgrave

and Manssens 2000). The White March remains the largest demonstration in Belgium's history up to this day.

On November 16, in the midst of growing and highly mediatized rumors about the existence of pedophilic rings in Belgian politics, *De Standaard* newspaper reveals that vice-president Elio di Rupo, a first-rank figure of the francophone socialist party (PS), and Jean-Pierre Grafe (the Education minister of Wallonia) were being investigated for pedophilic behavior (Rosenzweig 1997). The accusation puts further into question the viability of the Christian Democratic-Socialist coalition that supported Dehaene (Buerkle 1996).

At the request of Di Rupo himself, parliament decides to open investigations into the vicepresident on November 17. Three days later, parliament sends a formal request to the Court of Cassation to investigate Di Rupo. The *Cour de Cassation* dismisses the investigation on December 9, after discovering that the declarations of the main witness into the case had been revised three times at the request of the police and had actually initially not mentioned Di Rupo (Vanesse 1996).

GE '00

CDU Illegal Funding Scandal.

On November 5, an arrest warrant against Walter Leisler Kiep, an important CDU politician, is issued by the Prosecutor's office in Augsburg. The warrant is issued in connection to investigations into bribes given by the Thyssen corporation to government officials to secure authorization to sell 36 Fuchs tanks to Saudi Arabia. Kiep had been the Minister of Economy of Lower Saxony and the treasurer of the CDU from 1972 to 1992. He had failed to report receiving 1 million DMs from Karlheinz Schreiber, an arms dealer who was the central character of the bribe investigation. In his deposition, Kiep declares that he had received the money at a Swiss highway service station along with Horst Weyrauch, an auditor close to former chancellor Helmut Kohl. He also ascertains that the money had been deposited into a secret bank account of the CDU (Detmer, Krach, Mascolo and Pieper 1999).

Kiep's declarations soon morph the "Fuchs" inquiry from a contained corruption case into a widespread illegal party funding affair centered on the CDU. The affair strongly tarnishes the reputation of former chancellor Helmut Kohl, who had been the architect of German Reunification and was still the dominant of the CDU. Weyrauch had been close to Kohl, and Kiep had been CDU treasurer during most of Kohl's tenure as CDU chairman and chancellor. The implication of these leaders in the party funding scandal jeopardizes the string of electoral gains that the CDU had made in the preceding year. These victories had strengthened the CDU's right-wing faction, which had recently unexpectedly won the Hesse state elections.

While Kohl denies any knowledge of Kiep's actions or of any similar matter (Mascolo 1999), on November 26, former CDU secretary general Heiner Geissler confirms the existence of secret CDU bank accounts. On November 30, Kohl finally recognizes his knowledge of the accounts and takes political responsibility in the schemes. Two days later, the Bundestag

appoints a parliamentary inquiry committee to investigate CDU party donations and its connection with international military trade (Der Spiegel 1999).

While failing to cooperate with the committee, on December 16, Kohl decided to give an interview to the ZDF network. In the interview, Kohl confesses having received up to 2 million marks that had not been properly disclosed between 1993 and 1998. However, he refuses to name the sources of the donations, claiming he was bound to “his word of honor” to keep them confidential (Hildebrandt et al. 1999). Kohl’s declarations take the CDU’s establishment by surprise and begin increasing the cost of the scandal onto its future performance. Most of the party’s leadership, such as chairman Wolfgang Schäuble, were close to Kohl or had been high-ranking party and state officials during his chancellorship. In addition, Kohl’s half-made confession also begins to make the party liable for actions that had been committed in earlier times.

The first crack in the CDU’s reluctance to criticize Kohl occurs soon after Kohl’s TV interview. On December 22, 1999, CDU secretary general Angela Merkel writes an op-ed in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* about the state of her party. A former protégée of Kohl and a figure with limited power within the CDU establishment, Merkel calls for the political retirement of Kohl and a reform of the CDU. By January 3, 2000, Kohl accumulates four indictment notices (Hildebrandt, Hipp and Mascolo 2000). On January 18, he is forced to resign from the CDU’s honorary chairmanship for refusing to disclose the names of irregular donors.

By January, the case had also expanded to other high-ranking CDU officials. New cases of financial malpractice in the central and state offices of the CDU keep accumulating throughout January. On January 10, CDU chairman Schäuble admits having received a donation of 100,000 DMs from Karlheinz Schreiber in 1994. Four days later, CDU leaders in Hesse admit the existence of covert bank accounts then worth 30DM. They had existed since 1983 (Hildebrandt et al 2000). On January 20, Wolfgang Hüllen, the main financial officer of CDU’s parliamentary group, hangs himself (*Der Spiegel* 2000). Pressure mounts within the CDU as the case grows bigger. On January 24, Merkel shares that the source of 11 DMs received since 1989 by the CDU could not be identified. On January 25, former Interior minister and Hesse-CDU chairman Manfred Kanther, a prominent member of the right-wing faction of the CDU, resigns from his Bundestag seat.

On February 15, the Bundestag fines the CDU with 41 million marks for irregularities in its 1998 financial report. One day later, Wolfgang Schäuble resigns as CDU chairman. After Kanther’s departure, four personalities stand as potential successors. Three of them are backed by the establishment: former Defense minister and candidate to the Presidency of Schleswig Holstein, Volker Rühe; Jürgen Rüttgers, deputy chairman of the CDU’s parliamentary group, and Bernhard Vogel, the sitting minister-president of Thuringia. The fourth candidate is Angela Merkel, who is associated with the left-wing of the party. A relatively obscure figure prior to the CDU’s financial scandal, Merkel benefits from a soaring popularity and strongly support from the party’s grassroots (Fischer et al 2000; Hildebrandt and Kloth 2000). As establishment candidates fail to gain momentum, Merkel ends up registering as the sole formal candidate for the CDU’s chairmanship on March 20. She is elected as the party’s leader with 96% of the votes on April 20.

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