Interest Rate Misperception in the Credit Card Market

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Beliefs are crucial for understanding borrower incentives

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Price of a financial product, debt interest rate, is often obscure

Example: A Credit Card by Chase Bank



Source: Chase Freedom Credit Card

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- Information treatment: exogenous variations in perceived interest rates
- Debt is from credit registry: no confounding with intra-bank balance transfers

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Reasons for misperception: more than product designs and calculation errors

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- · Long-run effect depreciates quickly after 3 months
- · Potential reason: selective information avoidance

Related Literature

How consumer behavioral biases affect their borrowing decisions

 Bertrand and Morse (2011); Kuchler and Pagel (2021); Laibson, Lee, Maxted, Repetto, and Tobacman (2020); Meier and Sprenger (2010); Stango and Zinman (2009)

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Role of beliefs in explaining consumer spending-saving decisions

Allcott et al. (2021); Ameriks et al. (2020); Bailey et al. (2019); Bucks and Pence (2008); Giglio et al. (2021); Kuchler et al. (2022); Manski (2004)

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Biased memory

• Huffman et al. (2022); Olafsson and Pagel (2022); Sial et al. (2023)

Outline

Data and Descriptive Evidence

Information Treatment on Interest Rate

Long-Run Effect

Suggestive Evidence: Selective Information Avoidance

Conclusion

Data and Descriptive Evidence

A top-10 commercial bank in China

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- Credit card users nationwide
- · Sample gives good coverage of the whole demographic distribution

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- Include households with at least 15 outflow transactions
- Monthly income is paid as a direct deposit to this bank

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Consumers pay interest if the balance is not repaid in full within a month

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Consumers pay interest if the balance is not repaid in full within a month

• Exclude the consumers who use credit cards with 0 APR offers

For randomly selected customers who satisfied the criteria in Nov 2020

Q1 Suppose you spend ¥5,000 this month and repaid ¥0. What would be your interest payment next month? Choose the closest answer.

• A. 45 B. 55 C. 65 D. 75 E. 85 F. 95 G. 105

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Q2 ...and repaid ¥1000...

Q3 ...and repaid ¥3000...

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$$Perceived_r = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{x_1}{2000} + \frac{x_2}{4000} + \frac{x_3}{5000} \right)$$

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Discussion

The order of choices was randomized to minimize the anchoring effect

Data Summary Statistics

3,762 credit card users. Monthly data from Sep 2020 to Feb 2021


	mean	sd	p25	p50	p75	count
Debt	5784.8	14127.0	0	0	2149.0	3762
Spending	8962.5	11534.7	2678.4	5158.5	11099.4	3762
Credit limit	10544.0	7539.2	5333.3	7948.7	14897.4	3762
Credit score	54.96	6.665	50.51	54.33	58.70	3762
Income	17345.0	8938.9	12047.1	15683.7	20630.2	3762
Savings	173902.9	121630.9	94688.8	145657.2	221310.9	3762
Age	37.09	10.36	28	35.83	45.50	3762
Female	0.591	0.492	0	1	1	3762
Education	1.847	0.813	1	1.667	2.333	3762
Perceived interest rate	0.187	0.034	0.154	0.190	0.221	3762
Interest rate	0.186	0.0100	0.178	0.186	0.197	3762

Debt Interest Rate Misperception


Misperception: $Bias_i = Perceived_r_i - r_i$

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
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Debt Interest Rate Misperception: Heterogeneity



Misperception of Debt Interest Rate: Relation to Debt



Information Treatment on Interest

Rate

Causal Effect of Perceived Interest Rate on Debt

Naive OLS estimates are unlikely causal because *Perceived_r* are endogenous

- · Omitted variable bias: e.g., unobserved confounders
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RCT to perturb perceived interest rates exogenously: $Perceived_r \rightarrow Debt$

• Treatment status is an instrumental variable (IV) for perceived interest rates

Information Treatment Design

In the survey, random 40% of the participants who paid interest in 2020 saw

- The annualized interest rate is X₁% on your credit card
- If you carry over \$8,000 of debt from your credit card this month, you will need to pay $\$X_2$ next month

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- The annualized interest rate is X₁% on your credit card
- If you carry over $\pm 8,000$ of debt from your credit card this month, you will need to pay $\pm X_2$ next month

Then, 2nd-round elicitation for all participants who have paid interest in 2020

• Suppose you spend ¥6,000 on credit cards this month and repaid ¥3,000. What would be your interest payment next month?

Information Treatment – First Stage

	Con	Control		nent
	Before	After	Before	After
Bias	-4.63		-4.19	
	(0.31)		(0.34)	
Bias	7.24		6.81	
	(0.17)		(0.23)	

Information Treatment – First Stage

	Con	Control		nent
	Before	After	Before	After
Bias	-4.63	-5.02	-4.19	
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Bias	7.24	8.11	6.81	
	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.23)	

Information Treatment – First Stage

-	Con	Control		nent
	Before	After	Before	After
Bias	-4.63	-5.02	-4.19	0.31
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.30)
Bias	7.24	8.11	6.81	4.63
	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)

Information Treatment – 2SLS on Debt

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	ΔDebt	ΔDebt	$\Delta {\sf Debt}$	ΔDebt
ΔBias	-924.33**	-927.04**		
	(357.15)	(323.11)		
Δ Bias			1782.78*	1634.57*
			(945.22)	(984.55)
Constant	411.739	-1170.910	133.805	-1228.636
	(371.197)	(851.643)	(303.334)	(847.047)
Observations	1342	1342	1342	1342
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes
Fstat	225.812	209.142	65.279	81.058

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· Consumers take our info treatment as truth and reduce debts

Long-Run Effect

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	Control		Т	Treatment		
	Before	9 Months Later	Before 9 Months Later		9m DID	
Bias	-4.63	-4.82	-4.19			
DIUS	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.57)			
IDical	7.24	7.32	6.81			
Bias 	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)			


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
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Bias	(0.48)	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.44)	(0.87)	
IDiaal	7.24	7.32	6.81	4.67	-2.22***	
Bias	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.28)	(0.75)	

Debt Trajectories



Debt Trajectories



Reasons for misperception are more than shrouded prices and calculation errors

Information Avoidance

Suggestive Evidence: Selective

APR can vary over time


APR can vary over time (reduced APR offers, etc., depending on credit scores)

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• Information acquisition: logins to the mobile app

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Login Frequency and Interest Rates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Logins	Logins	Logins	Logins
r_i	-0.602***	-0.631***		
	(0.102)	(0.109)		
$r_i \times High Var$				
Observations	22572	22572	22572	22572
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.151	0.161	0.184	0.196

• Information avoidance: $r_i \setminus logins$

Login Frequency and Interest Rates

Interest rate variability: High $Var = 1 (\sigma(r_i) > median)$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Logins	Logins	Logins	Logins
r _i	-0.602***	-0.631***	-0.387***	-0.389***
	(0.102)	(0.109)	(0.077)	(0.072)
r _i × High Var			-0.532***	-0.576***
			(0.111)	(0.104)
Observations	22572	22572	22572	22572
Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes
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Individual FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes
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- Information avoidance: $r_i \setminus logins$
- · Avoidance is selective: only focus on "good news" when high variability

	Bias				Debt				
	High Attention		Low Attention		High Attention		Low Attention		
	3m DID (1)	9m DID (2)	3m DID (3)	9m DID (4)	3m DID (5)	9m DID (6)	3m DID (7)	9m DID (8)	
High Var	3.77*** (0.71)				-2804.32*** (534.87)				
Low Var	0.32 (0.53)				-256.87 (398.09)				

		Ві	as		Debt				
	High Attention		Attention Low Attention		High Attention		Low Attention		
	3m DID (1)	9m DID (2)	3m DID (3)	9m DID (4)	3m DID (5)	9m DID (6)	3m DID (7)	9m DID (8)	
High Var	3.77*** (0.71)		6.83*** (1.26)		-2804.32*** (534.87)		-5234.25*** (639.84)		
Low Var	0.32 (0.53)		4.52*** (0.72)		-256.87 (398.09)		-3687.19*** (587.42)		

		Ві	as		Debt			
	High Attention		High Attention Low Attention		High Attention		Low Attention	
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High Var	3.77*** (0.71)	3.36*** (0.64)	6.83*** (1.26)		-2804.32*** (534.87)	-2535.98*** (575.23)	-5234.25*** (639.84)	
Low Var	0.32 (0.53)	0.21 (0.67)	4.52*** (0.72)		-256.87 (398.09)	-132.34 (296.16)	-3687.19*** (587.42)	

		Ві	as		Debt				
	High Attention		High Attention Low Attention		High At	High Attention		tention	
	3m DID	9m DID	3m DID	9m DID	3m DID	9m DID	3m DID	9m DID	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
High Var	3.77***	3.36***	6.83***	1.54***	-2804.32***	-2535.98***	-5234.25***	-1032.21**	
	(0.71)	(0.64)	(1.26)	(0.33)	(534.87)	(575.23)	(639.84)	(410.77)	
Low Var	0.32	0.21	4.52***	2.17***	-256.87	-132.34	-3687.19***	-1609.77***	
	(0.53)	(0.67)	(0.72)	(0.58)	(398.09)	(296.16)	(587.42)	(534.68)	

- · Selective info avoidance could explain why misperception resumes/persists



Conclusion

Ubiquitous presence of debt interest rate misperception

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• Underestimation is correlated with larger debt

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Information treatment: perturb *Perceived_r* exogenously

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• Excess borrowing: 1 percentage point *Perceived_r* lower / ¥927 debt

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• Excess borrowing: 1 percentage point *Perceived_r* lower / ¥927 debt

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Ubiquitous presence of debt interest rate misperception

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Effect depreciates quickly in the long run

- · Bias and debt started to revert back after 3 months
- · Suggestive evidence: selective information avoidance

Appendix

- · Novelty: high-frequency nature of the question
- Present value P, periodic interest rate r, time horizon T. The future value F with periodic compounding is

$$F = P(1+r)^T$$

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- Prior literature (Bertrand & Morse, 2011; Stango & Zinman, 2009) focuses on the exponential bias $\hat{F} = (1 + r)^{(1-\theta)T}$, where θ denotes mistakes about compound rates over T
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- There is little effort on disentangling these three mistakes
- Our survey identifies the perceptions/mistakes about r by fixing T=1 and varies P with hypothetical values

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