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Seminars in Economics Giorgio Brunello (University of Padova)

"The Long Term Payoffs of Having Privileged Peers. Evidence from Siblings in School" abstract By comparing siblings attending the same school at different points of time, we estimate the effects of schoolmates’ average parental education on lifetime earnings and other medium and long-term outcomes and investigate whether these effects vary with individual parental education. We…

Occasional Seminars Allievi Defense Session

JUNIOR ALLIEVI 10.00 Pietro BuriTitle: "Prospect Theory and Game Theory"10.30 Emanuele FerroTitle: "The effects of Italian pension reforms: from a defined benefit (DB) to a defined contribution (NDC) system"

Hosted events Presentation of the World Bank Report

Toward a New Social Contract: Taking on Distributional Tensions in Europe and Central Asia LEAD AUTHORS MAURIZIO BUSSOLO, (WORLD BANK) MARIA E. DAVALOS, (WORLD BANK) VITOROCCO PERAGINE, (UNIVERSITÀ DI BARI) RAMYA SUNDARAM, (WORLD BANK) INTRODUCTION: FRANCESCO FIGARI, (UNIVERSITÀ DELL'INSUBRIA, CERP - COLLEGIO CARLO ALBERTO) Please confirm your participation at: https://worldbankreport5october.eventbrite.it

Seminars in Economics of Innovation and Knowledge Maksim Belitski (University of Reading)

"Innovation in Schumpeterian Firms: Internal or External Knowledge Spillover?" abstract An important characteristic of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs is their ability of knowledge creation and commercialization as part of a market disruption strategy. Building on the knowledge spillover of entrepreneurship theory, the corporate entrepreneurship strategy and economic geography literatures, this study distinguishes between an internal and external…

Monday Lunch Seminars Toomas Hinnosaar (Collegio Carlo Alberto)

"Price Setting on a Network" abstract Most products are produced and sold by supply chain networks, where an interconnected network of producers and intermediaries set prices to maximize their profits. I show that under a few technical assumptions, there is a unique equilibrium in a price-setting game on a network. The key distortion in the…