"Building (and Milking) Trust: Reputation as a Moral Hazard Phenomenon"

"The Price of Development"

"Are Workers Better Matched in Large Labor Markets?"

"Time Inconsistency and Alcohol Sales Restrictions" Download the paper here

"Optimal Hiring and Retention Policies for Heterogeneous Workers who Learn"

"Reference Dependence, Risky Projects and Credible Information Transmission" abstract We consider the interaction between an informed agent (A) who can make announcements concerning the information she has and an uninformed agent (B) who has to decide whether to start a project or not. We study the role that reference dependence and loss aversion may play…

"Racial Fragmentation, Income Inequality and Social Capital Formation: New Evidence from the US" abstract Existing studies of social capital formation in US metropolitan areas have found that social capital is lower when there is more income inequality and greater racial fragmentation. I add to this literature by examining the role of income inequality between racial…

"Calendar Mechanisms" abstract I study a repeated mechanism design problem where a revenue-maximizing monopolist sells a fixed number of service slots to randomly arriving buyers with private values and increasing exit rates. In addition to characterizing the fully optimal mechanism, I study the optimal mechanisms in two restricted classes. First, the pure calendar mechanism, where…

"Mechanism Design With Budget Constraints and a Continuum of Agents" abstract This paper studies mechanisms for assigning a divisible good to a population of budget-constrained agents where agents' private valuations and budgetsare independently distributed. In this setting, I nd the welfare- and revenue-maximizing mechanisms for assigning the good. Both of these optimal mecha-nisms feature a…

"Dynamic Contracting under Adverse Selection and Renegotiation"