Seminars in Economics

Seminars in Economics

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[Academic Events] Seminars in Economics Alp Atakan (Queen Mary University)

"Price Discovery in a Large Auction with Costly Information" Abstract: We study a common-value auction in which a large number of identical, indivisible object are sold to a large number of ex-ante identical bidders with unit demand. There is costly information acquisition or costly entry. We derive the limit price distribution. This allows us to…

[Academic Events] Seminars in Economics Peter Norman (UNC)

"Sequential Persuasion" Abstract This paper studies sequential move persuasion games with multiple senders. We use convex analysis to transform a problem with innite action spaces to a nite action model. This way we prove the existence of equilibria by the Zermelo-Kuhn backward induction algorithm, show that equilibrium outcomes are generically unique, and obtain a simple…